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Based on a social constructivist, pragmatic cognitive understanding of naming, the study 
investigates the discriminatory hegemonic presuppositions and perceptions that are  
interpellated with personal names in Germany and Sweden. The critical lens of Black 
Feminist, Postcolonial, Postmigrant, Critical Trans and Disability Studies is applied in order 
to deconstruct current and past hegemonic naming norms. By regarding the un/intelligibility 
o f n a m e s a s c o n s t i t u t e d b y i n t e r s e c t i n g p o w e r r e l a t i o n s , 
racism_genderism_ableism_migratism_ classism, the dispositive model helps to identify 
what personal names and naming practices are made un/thinkable.
Accustoming is introduced as an analytic tool to understand how hegemonic knowledge on 
naming is acquired and internalized in a structuralist and essentializing way. The analysis of 
administrative and legislative discourses demonstrates how hegemonic naming norms have 
been historically and institutionally accustomed. That a personal name is not only determined 
by institutional but also by individual decision-making is illustrated on the example of the 
child’s well-being, a commonly used argument for name decisions at registry offices. The feel 
for language as another norm to justify de_perceived name discrimination is analyzed against 
the background of how sprachgefühl as an emotive concept interpellates nationalist images of 
the self and the Other. The final chapter addresses the consequences of discriminatory 
naming practices: the definition and denial of personhood. The study concludes with a 
collection of empowering interventions in discriminatory naming practices and 
recommendations for a contra_ discriminatory anti-structuralist perception of personal 
names.
By employing a transdisciplinary approach, the study illustrates how disciplinary boundaries 
are transgressed and how different discourse areas and material that traditionally are 
investigated in law, history, linguistics and literature is integrated in Gender Studies research.
Ausgehend von einem sozialkonstruktivistischen, pragmatisch-kognitiven Verständnis von  
Namen untersucht die Studie die diskriminierenden Wahrnehmungen, die über Personen-
namen in Deutschland und Schweden aufgerufen werden. Durch Anwendung der kritischen  
Theorien und Zugänge der Black Feminist, Postcolonial, Postmigrant, Trans und Disability  
Studies auf Namensdiskurse werden gegenwärtige sowie historische hegemoniale Normen  
dekonstruiert. Mit Hilfe des durch intersektionale Machtverhältnisse konstituierten  
Dispositivmodells wird die Intelligibilität von Personennamen zur Diskussion gestellt.
Vergewohnheitung (accustoming) als neues analytisches Konzept macht nachvollziehbar,  
wie hegemoniales Wissen zu Namensgebung auf strukturalistische und essentialisierende  
Weise erworben und internalisiert wird. Die Analyse administrativer und legislativer  
Diskurse zeigt, wie hegemoniale Namensnormen historisch und institutionell  
vergewohnheitet wurden. Dass ein Personenname institutionell auch durch individuelle  
Wahrnehmung bestimmt wird, illustriert die Analyse des ‚Kindeswohl‘, einem zentralen  
Argument für Namens-entscheidungen auf Standesämtern. Ein weiteres Beispiel für die  
Rechtfertigung ent_wahrgenommener diskriminierender Namenspraktiken ist das  
Sprachgefühlkonzept, dessen Verwendung daraufhin untersucht wird, inwiefern es  
nationalistische Vorstellungen des Eigenen und des Anderen aufruft. Schließlich wird die  
An- und Aberkennung von Menschsein als Konsequenz diskriminierender  
Namenshandlungen adressiert. Eine Sammlung empowernder Interventionen in  
diskriminierende Namenspraktiken sowie Empfehlungen für eine kontra_diskriminierende,  
antistrukturalistische Wahrnehmung von Personennamen runden die Studie ab.
Mit ihrem transdisziplinären Ansatz veranschaulicht die Arbeit, wie disziplinäre Grenzen  
überschritten und Diskursfelder und -materialien, die traditionellerweise in den Rechts-,  
Geschichts-, Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaften analysiert werden, in die  
Genderforschung integriert werden können.
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Introduction: Defining the Scope of Research
1. Introduction: Defining the Scope of Research
 
“Choosing, giving, and using a name are political acts […].” (Layne 2006:32)
 
Personal names are an indispensable part of everyday life. In Western societies, 
“choosing, giving and using a name”, as Linda Layne’s quotation suggests, have been 
crucial to distinguish people from one another and, thus, to organize social life. While 
writing my dissertation, I became more and more aware of the fact that organizing social 
life with the help of personal names and classifying and hierarchizing people by the 
means and on the grounds of social categorization are interdependent. Hence, naming 
activities can be indeed understood as “political acts”.
When asked during these past several years about the nature of my research, my answer 
often depended on who was asking and was often based on my assumptions of this 
person. What would they be most interested in knowing? Would they regard my topic as 
exciting, boring, or shocking? Would the person consider my work important and 
relevant to their everyday life? Hence, I assumed that the person would have specific  
expectations based on my answer. Simultaneously, these inquiries and assumptions 
helped me to identify the complexity as well as transdisciplinarity of my research 
question, which is when, how and why everyday perceptions and negotiations of 
personal names are discriminatory.
To fellow PhD students as well as Gender Studies colleagues, I usually replied that I 
would conceptualize a feminist approach to analyze structural discrimination in 
hegemonic discourses on personal names. I explained that I would question the 
discriminatory expectations which are interpellated when someone learns about another 
person’s name. One example I would often highlight is that white1 people are often not 
shocked2 when they learn that the person with the supposedly German name is white 
1 ‘White’ is a designation for the position that is privileged by racism. Following Eggers et al., in order 
to distinguish its political meaning from ‘Black’ as the empowered self-designation, written with an 
initial capital letter, white is written in italics (Eggers et al. 2005a:13).
2 Cf. for the conceptualization of ‘shock’ Mulinari, Neergaard 2012 and chapter 1.2.1.
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but were often surprised when the person was of Color3. Furthermore, I also wanted to 
find out why people check whether a person is female or male just because they are 
unfamiliar with the gender conventions and interventions of the person’s name. This 
inspired me to question in what contexts the way of negotiating names is discriminatory 
and in what contexts names are perceived without further questioning or ‘shocks’ (cf. 
chapter 2).
To traditional linguists, I explained that I am interested in learning what linguistic 
structures the categorizations of names as female, male and unisex as well as German, 
Swedish, foreign and loan are based upon and how they are negotiated in mainstream 
discourse. To what extent are personal names perceived in the way linguistics and 
specifically onomastics describes and categorizes them? Furthermore, I elaborated on 
the question of what a feel for the German language (‘deutsches Sprachgefühl’) means 
and what consequences a hegemonic understanding implies for people whose names are 
hegemonically not ‘felt as German’. This made me think that maybe people’s ability to 
memorize names is affected and constituted by the feel for language concept which 
privileged people are only reminded of when a name’s pronunciation or morphology 
does not comply with what they internalized as ‘German’ (cf. chapter 5).
To scholars with a focus on the deconstruction of national history and law, I explained 
that I investigated the historical background of naming laws and hegemonic societal 
naming practices in both Germany and Sweden by dealing with these questions: To 
whom do these laws apply? What are the historical implications and circumstances 
under which hegemonic naming practices have been institutionalized? How are these 
legal directions as well as their implementation by the authorities linked to 
conceptualizations of nationalism and citizenship? Are there any differences and 
commonalities between Sweden and Germany? And finally, to what extent are naming 
laws and their implementation discriminatory? To what extent do they affect a person’s 
personhood status (cf. chapter 3, chapter 6).
To the German registrars I interviewed, I replied that I was interested in the process of  
how people are named and registered. Specifically, I wanted to research the following: 
3 I am grateful to Natasha A. Kelly for this example (Kelly 2012b).
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Which names are authorized for registration and which are not? Are there any forbidden 
names? Have there been any cases where the registrar did not acknowledge a certain 
name? Have there been any cases where the registrar made a decision different to that 
of one of their co-workers? On which principles is the decision made of whether or not a 
name is in a newborn child’s interest? To what extent is it possible for people to change  
their name (cf. chapter 4).
To my co-workers in the administration of a higher education institution, I answered 
that I wanted to know how people are discriminated via their names, for example, when 
they apply for a job. People with names that are considered Turkish or those with Arab 
names are less likely to be invited to an interview. I also explained that I compared the  
German and Swedish contexts in order to determine the extent to which both national 
legislation and discourses constitute similar forms of exclusion and discrimination. 
Several studies have shown that the situation in Sweden is similar: People that are 
perceived, negotiated and migratized as non-Swedish are likewise discriminated in the 
job and housing market. However, in order to improve their opportunities on both 
markets, some have changed their names into more ‘Swedish-sounding’ ones. What is 
the background for this legal option (cf. chapter 2.3.5, chapter 3.2.3.2.3)?
To my parents, I responded that I was curious to find out whether there was a certain 
story behind the choice of their first names as well as those of their brothers and sisters 
who were mostly born shortly before or after World War II. Why, for example, is it that  
my aunts’ and uncles’ names are all listed in the ranking of the most popular names of 
“German, Germanic and foreign origin” as printed in the NS-Family Register issued by 
the Nazi authorities? Why is it that some of the first names chosen honor a deceased 
family member? How can the initials of a person’s name be HH and a child be called 
Horst after World War II? What were my grandparents’ motivation and thoughts in 
naming their children (cf. chapter 6)?
These ongoing discussions and conversations with the many generous people that were 
willing to listen and share their time and thoughts with me have one commonality: They 
were primarily based on my assumptions and not necessarily on the actual expectations 
of my conversational partners. While talking, I realized that naming affects basically 
everyone, at least everyone I spoke with. In this way, Layne’s initial citation appears to 
10
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be confirmed once more: naming is indeed a political, a crucial act in a person’s life 
because it has powerful societal consequences. For example, a name is conventionally 
regarded as an indicator for a person’s gender. In order to stress the relevance of the 
conventionalized genderization of names, the pronoun that I use to refer to a person in 
this study will be determined by the conventionalized gender perception of a person’s 
first name in the societal and/or linguistics contexts in which the person is socialized, 
lives and/or publishes. This is why I introduce a person whose knowledge production I 
discuss with their full name. In Layne’s case, ‘Linda’ is conventionally perceived as a 
female first name in the societal context she publishes, the USA. Reference books such 
as Ames, Doody (1974) confirm this conventionalized genderization of Layne’s first 
name.4 Consequently, the pronoun I use is ‘she’. Personal names that are not conform to 
the conventionalized gender perception will be followed by the gender-neutral pronoun 
‘they’ or by the person’s name. However, this practice does not tell necessarily how the 
actual person is positioned with regard to gender. They can be positioned as trans, cis or  
gender non-conform.
Thus, it appeared to me that naming is a topic that everyone – to varying degrees – is 
actively involved in: the parent or family member that was engaged in the process of 
finding a name for a child, the historian that could tell me about the historical  
circumstances of name enforcement in Germany, and particularly all those that 
provided me with an opportunity to learn by sharing their knowledge about 
discrimination so generously with me; knowledge that is based on their experiences with 
the hegemonic, stereotypical, normative and discriminatory perceptions of their 
personal names. 
By naming them here, I would like to thank all who were an invaluable support on my 
PhD journey: Many thanks for helping me grow!
Lann Hornscheidt: Without your wisdom, wit and wondering, this dissertation would 
not have been possible. Your way of perceiving the world did not only inspire me to 
conduct this study, it also fortified me to go further and challenge accustomed 
4 In his reference book, Otto Nüssler negotiates names in a gender-binary way, as either female or 
male. According to the findings in his Danish, German, English, Spanish, French, Gaelic, Italian, 
Latin, Hungarian, Dutch and Swedish sources, the name ‘Linda’ is conventionally perceived as a fe-
male name only (Nüssler 2002:265).
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structuralism forever – and owing to your network, even in Sweden. Incredibly, this 
dissertation has eventually come to an end, also thanks to your restless encouragement, 
endless patience and amicable support. Thank you!
Mats Landqvist: In our talks and exchange of thoughts, I got to know you as a scientist  
with a passionate wit for deconstructing linguistic deadlocks. In order to avoid my PhD 
process becoming one of them, I finally decided to keep my promise (that I already 
broke several years ago) and put an end to all the waiting. Many thanks for your support 
and patience.
Michelle Wright: Thank you so much for the time and patience you put in commenting 
an early version of my dissertation. Necessarily, I felt sort of devastated afterwards. 
Hence, without your encouraging feedback I would not have dared to adopt a more 
distinct voice and play a stronger part in my own work.
I am more than grateful to my dear colleagues and friends for the clever, motivating and 
inspiring exchange of thoughts, specifically: Izabela A. Dahl – for your friendship and 
for your confidence in me and my scientific work; Kerstin Piepenstock – as my first  
colleague you have been an invaluable inspiration who generously reminded the naive 
apprentice in Gender Studies (that I surely still am) to position themselves; Alyosxa 
Tudor, Gülay Çağlar, Emily Ngubia Kessé, Natasha A. Kelly, Robin Hilbrig and Lio 
Oppenländer – our working relationship and friendship turned academic work into a 
joyful and passionate way of sharing thoughts, time and life with each other. Natasha 
and Alyosxa – I owe you one more debt of gratitude for being there with me at our joint 
60% seminar and helping me understand my own research.
I was privileged to be a part of two colloquia, one organized by Lann Hornscheidt at the 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin’s Center for Transdisciplinary Gender Studies and 
another one organized by Nina Lykke and Cecilia Åsberg within the framework of the 
InterGender Research School, coordinated at Linköping University. I particularly want 
to thank Lann Hornscheidt for patiently bringing us together, guiding us through and 
experiencing with us some of the opportunities, challenges and pitfalls of feminist 
communication and knowledge production. I am grateful to Izabela A. Dahl, Kerstin 
Piepenstock, Alyosxa Tudor, Tamás Jules Fütty, Jay Keim, Julia Roßhart, Claudia 
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Brunner, Alanna Lockward, Delina Binaj, Wibke Straube, Ulrike Hamann and Katarina 
Löbel  as  members  of the  Berlin coloquium for  your clever remarks  on  and  generous 
patience  with  my  process  of learning  how to re_produce  my  own,  hopefuly, feminist 
knowledge  productions.  A special thanks to  Tamás  Julz,  Julia  and  Roswitha  Kersten-
Pejanić  –  knowing that  a long-time  PhD student like  me  was  not  alone  on the  PhD 
journey made me feel confident that this journey could come to an end. I am more than 
grateful to Nina Lykke for her constant support in supervising our D09 group; I am also 
grateful to  Alyosxa  Tudor,  Jay  Keim,  Wibke  Straube,  Magda  Górska,  Tove  Solander, 
Ingvil  Helstrand,  Goldina  Smithwaite,  Anna  Siverskog,  Klara  Dolk  and  Lina 
Radžiūnienė as members of the Linköping coloquium for the inspiring and chalenging 
exchange in  producing feminist  knowledge.  This  gratitude  also includes  you,  Daniel 
Wojahn, Iwo Nord, AnouchK Ibacka Valiente, Katharina Krämer and Lian Hüntelmann, 
whom I met between these worlds.
I met the most inspiring people with whom I was privileged to work in diferent contexts 
and projects over the years at the Center for Transdisciplinary Gender Studies and at the 
Department  of  Northern  European  Studies,  as  wel  as through the InterGender 
Network:  Many thanks to  Karin  Aleksander,  Ute  Arnold,  Delina  Binaj,  Gülay  Çağlar, 
Izabela  A.  Dahl,  Anna  Damm,  Marzena  Dębska-Buddenhagen,  Urmila  Goel,  Robin 
Hilbrig,  Lann  Hornscheidt,  Jay  Keim,  Natasha  A.  Kely,  Emily  Ngubia  Kessé,  Grada 
Kilomba,  Adetoun  Küppers-Adebisi,  Lio  Oppenländer,  Aistė  Paškauskaitė,  Claude 
Preetz,  Kerstin  Rosenbusch,  Ja’n  Sammla,  Era  Trammer,  Alyosxa  Tudor,  Stef  Urgast, 
Sonja  Weeber,  Anne  Wiegmann, Ida  Zelic  and  al the coleagues  at the InterGender 
Board. I am  also very  grateful to Damaris Nübling for  her encouraging interest in and 
support of my research.
My students at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin: Many thanks for chalenging me to 
become a teacher who does not teach their students but instead learns from them and a 
lecturer who does not instruct but encourages their students to find their inspiration in 
feminist knowledge productions. I would especialy like to thank Katy, Rahel, Stef and 
Regi for their feedback on one of the early chapters of my dissertation.
Many thanks go to Monika Elrich at the registry ofice in Erlenbach/Main and to two 
other  anonymous registrars for  agreeing to  be interviewed  at  an  early stage  of  my 
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research. The insights into your daily work routine were an important starting point and 
source of inspiration.
A multi-page manuscript and a researcher lost in words, grammar, content and 
structure is in urgent need of patient and faithful people who are willing to work their  
way through endless pages to correct, amend and suggest what should be changed. 
Dayna Sadow, Joachim Funke, Izabela A. Dahl, Shanta Priya Morely, J. Kennedy, and 
Christine Oluwole-Aina, without your support this study would contain even more flaws 
than those that remain – and that are, of course, all mine. I cannot thank you enough!
A special thanks to Henni Freudenberg: Without you, I might not have written this 
dissertation at all (you know what I mean.)
Many thanks go also to my colleagues at the Hertie School of Governance who endured 
my constant talk about being in the final stage of my PhD and who supported me with 
kind encouragement at the Hanns Eisler cafeteria, the Hertie cafeteria or the staff 
kitchen, particularly Anja Fleischer, Dayna Sadow, Fleur Diggines, Aram 
Khaghaghordyan, Maren Menzel, Maris Moks, Jen Shivel, Duygu Hinze and Kai von 
Lengerke.
A PhD can be a troublesome business, especially when paired with one of my worst 
habits: I am not exactly what I would call a role model when it comes to cultivating close  
contact, even to the nicest of people. However, Ulrike Amann, Ute Arnold, Jörn 
Brinkhus, Daniela Christian, Sarah Christian, Mirko Freitag, Malte Gasche, Andreas 
Gosolke, Julia Hasse, Stephan Gabriel Haufe, Kathrin Hennig, Christian Hoffmann, J. 
Kennedy, Öztürk Kiran, Maria Klieber, Corina Shika Kwami, Maren Lehmann, Arne 
Mielken, Shanta Priya Morely, Christine Oluwole-Aina, Juan Pineda, Simone Prühl, 
Matthias Rühl, Kathrin Rothermich, Moritz Dannhauer, Ulrike A. Storch, and Jan-Peter 
Wettlaufer have been so generous to remain friends with me. They illuminated those 
rare moments when I allowed myself to leave both PhD and a conscience of guilt behind 
me and enter the world of recreation. Thank you for your patience, friendship and 
support in these often troublesome times. To my friends in the distance: I am sorry for 
the many events that changed your lives and which I missed. I hope we can get back in  
touch some time now that my PhD journey has finally come to an end.
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Last but not least, many thanks to my family: My parents Gertraud and Horst-Dieter, 
my sister Barbara, my nephews Moritz, Paul and Tom, my cousins Kathrin, Hannah and 
Fridolin, as well as Moni, Klaus, Axel, Joachim, Friederike, and my late grandmother 
Berta. Your love and support gave me the strength to believe in myself. Thank you so 
much!
This study is dedicated to all people and spirits
who were and still are joined in the fight against oppression.
Their inspiring questions and suggestions helped me to identify the complexity as well  
as transdisciplinarity of my field of research and of the everyday discrimination through 
accustomed perceptions of personal names. Consequently, my central questions are:
• What are the hegemonic presuppositions, assumptions and perceptions that are 
interpellated with personal names and that can be analyzed as everyday 
discrimination?
• What personal names do these assumptions, implications and presuppositions 
apply to and which names are excluded, silenced and made unintelligible?
• How and to what extent is this hegemonic knowledge of names acquired, 
disseminated, sedimented and normalized?
With the help of this set of overarching questions, I aim to explore the consequences of  
this process of normalization of hegemonic knowledge of names that I introduce here as 
accustoming, which is the way people normalize and get used to discriminatory ways of 
perceiving personal names. Thus, I aim at questioning myself critically as a researcher 
who is privileged by most of the discriminatory naming practices identified in this study:
• What are my own presupposed assumptions and perceptions towards names?
• To what extent are those assumptions and perceptions constituted by disciplinary 
epistemologies and methodologies?
• To what extent do I assume that names can and need to ‘tell a person’s gender 
and national, religious, racialized and/or migratized origin’?
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• How and where do I identify hegemonic assumptions and perceptions towards 
names?
These questions have been constituted by my theoretical understanding of the 
relationship between language use and discrimination. In the following, I present how 
both the underlying theoretical approach and research questions have motivated this 
study’s methodology, methods and corpus generation.
1.1 Theory: A Power-Sensitive Deconstructivist Approach for a  
Trans- and Postdisciplinary Analysis of Names
This study is based on a social constructivist understanding of the social world that is 
defined by a pragmatic constructivist perspective of language as language use. With 
their deconstructivist and power-sensitive focus on structural discrimination and 
privilege, postcolonial, feminist theories clearly show the link between discriminatory 
language use on an institutionalized level and a discriminatory cognitive perception of 
the social world on a more individualized level. Theories on intersectionality and 
interdependency of power relations describe how they are interwoven on a discursive 
level. The dispositive model can help to explain the discursive level’s constitution. 
Scholarly approaches on social and self-positioning describe the importance in 
recognizing how an individual is constituted by the impact of power relations and how 
this constitution defines the meaning of individual actions. This complex theoretical  
approach is related to Lann Hornscheidt & Mats Landqvist’s introduction of the 
relationship between language and discrimination (Hornscheidt, Landqvist 2014).
1.1.1 Social constructivism
From a social constructivist perspective, the way the social world is described and 
perceived is regarded as socially constructed. For example, everyday conventions such 
as assigning a child one gender out of two possible options and giving a newborn child a 
gender-distinct name are not given truths but normative practices that have been 
conventionalized throughout time and space. Thus, reconstructing, reproducing and 
commonly sharing these conventions to gender a person and assign them a ‘female’ or 
‘male’ name appears more and more normal and natural. However, from a social  
16
Introduction: Defining the Scope of Research
constructivist perspective, neither people nor names are ‘female’ or ‘male’. Rather, they 
are negotiated and naturalized as such on the grounds of medical and juridical 
discourses that Dean Spade 2011 identified – following Michel Foucault – as powerful 
institutions defining social norms (Spade 2011; Foucault 2005; cf. also chapter 6.1.1).
In a Foucauldian framework, the analysis of hegemonic discourses is an approach to 
explain how the social world is constituted by powerful norms (Foucault 2005). 
However, as I will show later, the concepts of power and in particular power relations in 
this study are defined according to Black feminist scholarship (cf. chapter 1.1.3). The 
way people are perceived and negotiated, how personal names are perceived and 
negotiated, and how academic research on discrimination via personal names is 
perceived and negotiated is defined, reproduced and confirmed in legal, media, and 
academic discourses. This normative knowledge can be expressed in multiple linguistic 
ways, for example by thought, sign language, speech, facial expression, and silence.5
Furthermore, since this study focuses in particular on the hegemonic social norms of 
Western societies, the concept of ‘Western’ and ‘the West’ is negotiated as a powerfully 
constructed framework against which the social world is made understandable. 
Historically grown artifacts such as values, knowledge productions, histories, theories, 
“science and technology […] are often seen as ‘Western’” (Shohat, Stam 1994:14) and in 
this way taken as the point of departure in organizing the hegemonic global norms. 
Postcolonial scholarship challenges the assumed universality, neutrality and objectivity 
of these hegemonic norms and depicts the colonialist heritage and continuities in the 
context of the rise of Western ‘development’ and Enlightenment (cf. Farr 2005), which I 
explore in depth in chapter 1.2. Thus, dominant discourses in Western societies are 
negotiated as re_producing Eurocentric perspectives in this study.
Eurocentric social norms have historically constituted social identities in Western 
societies. In these contexts, identities are regarded as discursive and thus processual 
categorizations that organize social order. By help of a morphological specification, 
‘categorization’ describes the process of perceiving and classifying a person or name as 
‘female’ or ‘male’ whereas ‘category’ essentializes a person’s identity (cf. Hornscheidt 
5 Cf. Hornscheidt 2012, particularly chapter ii “was ist sprache?” [what is language?].
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2006; Hornscheidt 2008a). Since the process of social categorization has been 
historically normalized by help of medical and juridical institutions, social categories 
appear to be the natural and essential way of structuring but also hierarchizing the 
social world and are thus undeniable. Consequently, people appear to be female or male, 
Black, white, Jewish, Christian, secularized, disabled, abled, Swedish, German, foreign 
and are not understood as made or constructed as such. As a result, German citizens 
have more rights in Germany than non-German citizens. I describe this firm 
categorization as structuralist (cf. chapter 5) and the hierarchization as a structuralist 
effect of power relations (cf. below).
Structuralism is the most conventionalized approach in academic scholarship on 
personal names. The academic disciplines of linguistics and in particular onomastics, as 
well as anthropological, ethnological, legal and social sciences, are often associated with 
the studies of names. The traditional approach to these sciences is usually based on a  
categorical understanding of names and interested in questions related to a name’s 
social meaning. The meaning of a name depends on the discourses of a specific society 
in which a personal name ‘makes sense’. Consequently, personal names are often 
regarded as being a part of an often nationalized language. In this respect, languages 
and names are described and differentiated from each other on the grounds of language 
specific indicators, such as grammatical ir/regularities or convention (cf. chapter 5). 
These indicators are assigned meaning in terms of providing information about the 
name’s ‘gender’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘race’, ‘class’ and ‘dis/ability’ which can also be found in 
mainstream discourse’s belief that a name ‘tells’ something about its bearer. Hence, 
from a structuralist perspective, one might identify names as loan names that are, for 
example, negotiated as German but are of ‘non-German origin’ (cf. Seibicke 2008:109). 
Specific phonetic sequences are identified as typical morphemes of Swedish names, 
whereas others are not (cf. Noréen, Grape 1921; Sahlgren 1940; Brylla 2002; Brylla 
2009). Another example is to investigate the extent to which structural assimilation 
processes make a name appear less gender-specific when subordinated vowels at the 
end of a name were previously recognized as markers for a ‘female’ first name but now 
also cover ‘male’ names (cf. Nübling 2009). In all these contexts, the social 
categorization of personal names as German, Swedish, female and male is negotiated as 
18
Introduction: Defining the Scope of Research
given and not as ascribed to name. Thus, structuralist studies would investigate 
questions such as: What is in a name? Where does the name come from? What is the 
gender of a name? The answers to those questions are based on diachronic etymological 
research on and a conventionalized knowledge about the social categorization of names 
(cf. Seibicke 2008:209).
However, in the context of discrimination, conventionalization (and their discriminatory 
effects) is not questioned but regarded as fundamental for the classification of names in 
linguistic research. The differentiation of people through social categorization is 
constituted by hierarchization and valuation between different groups (cf. also 
Hornscheidt, Landqvist 2014:25). For example, Ella Shohat & Robert Stam state that 
“[s]ocial identities are [...] historically shaped and have consequences for who gets jobs, 
who owns homes, who gets racially profiled, and so forth” (Shohat, Stam 1994:100; cf.  
also Akman et al. 2005; Ahmed, Hammarstedt 2008; Bursell 2007; Kaas, Manger 2010; 
Krause et al. 2012; Senatsverwaltung für Integration 2010; Towfigh et al. 2014). As 
described by Shohat, Stam (1994), social identities have been historically ascribed to 
people in hierarchical and powerful ways. In this way, a structuralist perspective on 
language would not help to answer my research question on the discriminatory 
presuppositions of hegemonic naming practices. It does not question presupposed and 
powerfully constructed knowledge productions but rather aims at analyzing and 
describing presupposed underlying structures that are reproduced as given. For 
example, research questions such as ‘How can the gender of a name be predicted by help 
of a computer program?’6 do not question the category ‘gender’ but rather reaffirm it as 
antecedent. Consequently, a research focus on the relationship between personal names 
and structural discrimination requires a perspective that analyzes the negotiation of 
meaning in their social context.
6 These research questions are met by a software that “classifies names accurately by gender, country 
of origin, or ethnicity”. Cf. website NamSor. Cf. also blog article NamSor 2014. Here, not only is  
gender and ‘ethnicity’ understood as unchangeable as well as predictable but the social positioning 
of the name bearer is also ignored.
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1.1.2 Pragmatic constructivist understanding of language as language 
use and the constitutive role of language in the making of 
people: Personal appellation of personal names
The integration of the social context into the analysis is a crucial theoretical aspect of 
this study. In understanding language use as a performative activity, the meaning of a 
speech act is powerfully negotiated in a specific societal environment and context. John 
L. Austin considers the speaker’s intention as decisive for the truth or felicity conditions 
of a speech act (Austin 1992). To revert to one of the most popular examples of speech 
act theory, a priest that baptizes a child transforms the child into a person with a name.  
Or in a less Christian inspired context: The registrar registers a newborn with a name. 
The speech act is felicitous when the child is subsequently called that name. The same 
applies to the categorization of newborn children as ‘female’ or ‘male’ after medical 
examination: The felicity conditions will only apply to cis-children (cf. Butler 2008; 
Butler 1997).7 With regard to a power-sensitive approach, Austin’s approach neglects the 
conventionalized norms that hierarchize and valuate the meaning and impact of speech 
acts. Consequently, in her response to Austin, Judith Butler questions the extent to 
which the intention of a speaker is relevant for the powerful effects of a speech act, given 
that “[t]he subject who utters […] socially injurious words is mobilized by [a] long string 
of injurious interpellations” (Butler 1997:49). Thus, I may not intend to insult or 
discriminate a person by giving them a specific name; however, the speech might 
nevertheless have an injurious effect depending on the context in which the historically 
sedimented meaning of a linguistic expression is interpellated.
The negotiation aspect of speech acts is often silenced in traditional linguistic discourse. 
In order to be able to communicate with each other, people need to agree on a shared set  
of conceptualizations that invoke similar associations. Therefore, meaning is not 
neutral, objective or static but instead constantly negotiated against the background of 
convention. In order to describe this processual relationship between 
conventionalization and negotiation of meaning, Hornscheidt (Hornscheidt 2006; 
Hornscheidt 2008a; Hornscheidt 2011b) introduced the concept of ‘re_production’: It 
invokes the idea that an expression’s meaning is constituted by hegemonically shared 
knowledge; every time people communicate they draw upon that commonly shared 
7 Cf. chapter 1.1.3 for the conceptualization of cis-.
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knowledge and negotiate its meaning in a new context. In this way, they provide an 
expression with a new, context specific meaning. The underscore in ‘re_production’  
shall symbolize the fraction and shifting of conventionalized meaning according to the 
new context (Hornscheidt 2011b). In this study, the meaning of the underscore is also 
applied to conceptualizations such as re_construct, de_mentioning (cf. below), 
de_perception (Kelly 2016), dis_identification (cf. chapter 2.2.1) and is used in order to 
c o m b i n e s i n g u l a r i z e d p o w e r r e l a t i o n s i n a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n t w a y : 
_racism_genderism_ableism_migratism_classism_ (cf. chapter 1.1.4).
Perceiving a linguistic activity as a form of social negotiation opens up possibilities for 
discriminated groups and their communities to be their own authority in terms of 
meaning making. In hegemonic discourse, grammatical descriptions of language in 
dictionaries or categorical classifications of personal names in reference books are 
understood as the linguistic authorities on the ‘original’ or ‘true’ meaning of a linguistic 
expression. In this context, personal names are classified and negotiated in a 
structuralist way as German, Germanic, loan and foreign names (cf. for example 
Seibicke 2008) and consequently, so are their bearers. However, this study acts on the 
assumption that a person is not their name or whatever category is associated with them 
but rather becomes them. According to Butler, recognition is essential for people to 
become subjects by ways of interpellation: “The act of recognition becomes an act of 
constitution: the address animates the subject into existence” (Butler 1997:25; cf. 
chapter 6.1.1). Thus, people are not born as ‘women’ (Beauvoir 2000; Wittig 1980), 
‘Black’ (Wright 2004) or ‘migrants’ (Tudor 2010) but conceptualized, socialized and 
thus made as such. As the recognition of a person is expressed through, for example, 
naming, and naming through, for example, the ascription of gender and origin, the 
subject has become a gendered and nationalized person.
In their comprehensive study, Hornscheidt analyzes, from a pragmatic constructivist 
perspective, the extent to which Swedish personal appellation forms such as nouns and 
pronouns interpellate the prototypical idea of people being androgendered (Hornscheidt 
2006; Hornscheidt 2008a). According to Hornscheidt, every linguistic expression 
interpellates ideas and concepts that a person has acquired and connected to this 
expression. The conceptualization of ‘expression’ also includes utterances such as sign 
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and oral language, as well as silenced knowledge (cf. also methodological approach 
‘silencing’ in chapter 1.3). Silenced knowledge can comprise the conversational 
implicatures that people need to integrate in a conversation in order to make sense of 
what the speaker suggests as true, informative, relevant and perspicuous (Grice 1975). It 
can also comprise linguistic presuppositions that people need to agree with in order to 
make sense of a statement (cf. Christie 2000). For example, I need to agree with the 
proposition that gender exists in order to make sense of the assumption that personal 
names are gender-distinct. Furthermore, silenced knowledge can comprise counter-
activist knowledge productions that aim at deconstructing and intervening in 
discriminatory discourse, which might be the reason why they are ignored and thus 
de_mentioned by hegemonic discourse (Lockward 2010). And finally, it can comprise 
hegemonic norms that are denied and thus denamed as discriminatory (Hornscheidt, 
Nduka-Agwu 2010). Therefore, as shown, an expression may invoke different 
implications depending on what a person has learned about the expression in a given 
context. By following Hornscheidt this study focuses on those expressions, personal 
names in particular, that invoke or interpellate conceptualizations of people 
(Hornscheidt 2006; Hornscheidt 2008a). Hornscheidt negotiates this process as 
‘personal appellation’ (Hornscheidt 2006).
Studies on personal appellation forms focus mostly on the perception of collectivizing 
appellation forms. For example, they focus on personal nouns or pronouns and analyze 
to what extent people are recognized as male or female (cf. Hornscheidt 2006; 
Hornscheidt 2008a; Kusterle 2011; Binaj n.d.; Kersten-Pejanić 2016). They do not yet 
focus on the extent to which people are identified as transgender or gender non-
conform. Although that does not mean that personal names are ignored in these studies, 
they have not yet been recognized the same way as collectivizing nouns. Based on 
predetermined phrases with gender-unspecific pronouns Hornscheidt asked their test 
persons to write a fictional story about a person and assign this person a name 
(Hornscheidt 2008a:201–203). The aim of this exercise is to examine the impact 
previously mentioned gender-unspecific pronouns have on the conventionalization and 
perception of people. Although not explicated in the study, it seems that the name serves 
as an indicator for the fictive person’s genderization. Given that personal names 
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conventionally are perceived as gendered and assuming that the test persons most 
probably re_produce this hegemonic perception, this presupposition is surely beneficial 
for the purpose of the study. However, the extent to which the individual test person 
that assigned the personal name to their character actually understands the character as 
cis- or transgendered cannot be assessed.
This study contests the assumption that personal names are or shall be genderable in 
hegemonic discourse (cf. chapter 4). Thus, the concept of personal appellation is also 
and foremost applied to personal names. I argue that personal names interpellate 
certain perceptions of people on a binary-fold level: First, a personal name interpellates 
the idea that it belongs to one specific, individual person. And second, it simultaneously 
interpellates – through conventionalization – a person’s hegemonic categorization as 
non-migratized or migratized and gendered. By asking how people are perceived and 
categorized via their personal names, the structuralist focus of analysis of personal 
names is extended to the integration of specific contexts as well as the people involved. 
As I will elaborate in chapter 5, this context is constituted by conventionalized processes 
of categorizing people as gendered and non-/migratized. Constant re_production of 
social categorization leads to a sedimentation and, as I will demonstrate with this study, 
accustoming of hegemonic knowledge (cf. Marmaridou 2000; chapter 2.2). This 
knowledge fossilizes metaphorically (cf. Lakoff, Johnson 2011; cf. chapter 5.5) and 
results in a structuralist perception of names according to which names ‘tell’ something 
about their bearers instead of understanding this ‘something’ as a powerful ascription 
and order. This process of constant re_production, sedimentation and fossilization I will  
develop further in chapter 2.2 as accustoming, a process of getting accustomed to a 
hegemonic and structuralist way of perceiving the world and in particular people.
Summing up, a structuralist way to comprehend people’s names is understood as a 
prerequisite for structural discrimination, as it leads to an essentializing of people. Since 
I intend to identify the effects of accustomed ways to categorize the social world, I aim to 
analyze the hegemonic context and framework in which discriminatory norms and 
categorizations are created, negotiated, confirmed and re_produced. From a 
constructivist perspective, categories are conceptualized as effects of normative 
discourse and not as given truths. Thus, constructivist pragmatic research on names 
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would analyze how personal names are negotiated in society and what societal effects 
these negotiations have for the perception of people. For example, what are the 
consequences when personal names that are ascribed a certain linguistic regularity are 
normalized as German names?
1.1.3 Structural discrimination and privilege
The understanding of discrimination in this study is inevitably linked with the 
conceptualization of privilege. Discrimination and privilege are negotiated as structural 
phenomenon that constitutes society. ‘Structural’ refers to the framework of social 
norms that have been so naturalized that they have become essential for the perception 
of the social world. It also refers to societal institutions such as registry offices, as well as 
such institutionalized discourses as medical and juridical that re_produce and foster 
discriminatory social norms.8 As previously mentioned, people’s social categorization is 
one of these social norms that became sedimented in Western societies. Thus, at this 
point in time, it is unthinkable to have a society that does not distinguish people along 
presumed, constructed categories such as gender, race, migration, disability or class. As 
stated using Shohat & Stam, this form of social categorization has “consequences for 
who gets jobs, who owns homes, who gets racially profiled, and so forth.” (Shohat, Stam 
1994:100). Thus, differentiating people along these categories is never a neutral activity 
or an innocent description of a person but has always discriminatory or privileging 
effects. Since it is historically grown, it is also fundamental for social orders that are 
enacted through institutionalized normative practices. By referring to Lorde 2007, 
Collins 2000, Kilomba 2010b, El-Tayeb 2011 and Spade 2011, Hornscheidt & Landqvist 
state that “the idea of discrimination being a structural phenomenon has a long 
tradition, specifically in Critical Race and Gender Studies”9. Their knowledge 
productions also constitute the theoretical background of this study. When referring to 
the structural framework of social norms, they speak of “old blueprints of expectation 
and response, old structures of oppression” (Lorde 2007:123), “concept of hegemony 
[…] matrix of domination” (Collins 2000:109), “plantation memories” (Kilomba 
2010b:13), “system of knowledge”, “power relations” (El-Tayeb 2011:xv; El-Tayeb 
8 Cf. for an explanation on the example of structural racism: Ramsey 2015.
9 Original: “föreställningen om diskriminering som ett strukturelt fenomen har en lång tradition, 
framförallt i kritiska ras- och genusstudier” (Hornscheidt, Landqvist 2014:61, translated by EH).
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2011:xxii) and “systems of meaning and control” (Spade 2011:25), or in other words of 
racism, sexism/genderism, ableism, migratism and classism.
Racism in this study is negotiated as the power relation that acts on the assumption of  
white supremacy. White supremacy is a racist conceptualization that is re_produced in 
everyday practices such as racial profiling, job interviews and pointing out that a person 
is anything but white for no further reason than maintaining the historically grown and 
socially constructed differentiation. Globally and throughout centuries, white people 
have re_produced this ideology to justify social exclusion, subjugation, enslavement, 
exploitation and the genocide of people that white hegemonic discourse declared as 
non-white. Because whiteness provides privilege, the definition of who is white and who 
is not constantly shifts depending on what group of people the white hegemonic 
discourse regards as socially ‘desirable’. People are differentiated on the grounds of 
socially constructed racialized markers such as skin tone and hair color, religion and 
ways of living, and language use and personal names. Thus, racism in, for example, 
Germany and
Sweden is re_produced through colonial racism against Black people and People of 
Color, anti-Romaism10, anti-Semitism and anti-Muslimism. The critical approach 
against white privilege that this study builds on is grounded in Black and transnational 
feminist postcolonial scholarship (cf. specifically Lorde 2007; Collins 2000; Smith 1983; 
Mohanty 2003). Critical Whiteness Studies name, analyze and deconstruct whiteness as 
the powerfully silenced hegemonic norm in society. Evolving in the US, the anti-racist  
interventions have been applied to the German and Swedish contexts by revealing that 
racialized people are not only excluded from hegemonic images of the German and 
Swedish nation states (cf. Oguntoye et al. 2006; Ayim 1996; Ayim 2002; El-Tayeb 2001; 
Eggers et al. 2005b; Hà et al. 2007; Hà 2012; Kilomba 2010b; Otoo 2012; Habel 2011; 
Mulinari, Neergaard 2012) but also from Europe (cf. El-Tayeb 2011; Wright 2004). For 
example, people with personal names that are hegemonically negotiated as German or 
Swedish are expected to be white.
10 Based on the decision at the first World Roma Congress in 1971, in this study, the self-denomina -
tion ‘Roma’ is used as an umbrella term for groups that have been racialized on grounds of anti-Ro-
maism and that comprise the heterogeneity of Roma communities, including Sinti. Cf. Randjelovic 
2007, Randjelovic 2011.
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In this study, sexism is understood “as a basic, complex and pervasive form of 
discrimination and structural power relation” (Hornscheidt 2015:32) that constitutes 
and generates gender (rather than sex) as a social category (Butler 2008). By following 
AG Einleitung’s and Hornscheidt’s suggestion, the main focus of this study lies more on 
‘genderism’ than ‘sexism’ (AG Einleitung 2011; Hornscheidt 2012). With the change of 
focus, the discriminatory effects of ascribing gender to people are taken into account 
rather than circling around women and men as two fixed categories. Following AG 
Einleitung (2011), Hornscheidt (2012) and Hornscheidt (2015), this change of 
perspective includes differentiating between various realizations of genderism: 
androgendering, binary gendering, heterogendering, reprogendering, and cisgendering. 
According to them, androgendering universalizes men as prototypical for being human 
whereas women are regarded as people that are gendered. Binary gendering acts on the 
assumption that there are ‘naturally’ only two genders, women and men. This becomes 
apparent when gender-distinct personal names are normalized and gender non-conform 
and gender-neutral names are made unintelligible. With regard to self-empowering 
naming practices, trans*people’s names might meet the conventionalized gender-
distinctivity expectation towards personal names whereas gender non-conform people’s 
names might not. Heterogendering re_produces the idea of women being 
heterogendered. Hornscheidt states that “[c]is-gendered men can obviously also be 
heterogendered but heteronormativity has totally different effects on persons 
discriminated or privileged by sexism” (Hornscheidt 2015:34) which is why 
heterogendering is applied to cisgendered women in this study. According to 
Hornscheidt, couple gendering is “an important heterogendering strategy” that 
normalizes “a couple as the standard and desired form of living in Western societies” 
(Hornscheidt 2015:34–35). Heterogendered couple gendering is, for example, expressed 
by women assuming their husbands’ last names while simultaneously being 
discriminated against on the grounds of androgendering. Reprogendering re_produces 
the idea that all women are mothers and daughters and that every person is a member of 
a biologicalized family. To assign daughters their fathers’ last names is a reprogendering 
strategy that, again, simultaneously discriminates against daughters in an 
androgendering way. Cisgendering regards binary gendering as unchangeable and 
implies that a person can be identified as female or male throughout this person’s entire 
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life. The privileged position is marked by the prefix ‘cis-’ that indicates the non-changing 
and retaining of the assigned gender categorization. The impossibility to officially 
change one’s supposedly gender-distinct name into a gender-contrarian one without 
medical pathologization is an example for cisgendering in German legislation. Finally, 
the realizations of genderism in Western contexts often simultaneously re_produce 
white and ableized privilege on the grounds of default-setting. Default-setting is a 
conceptualization for the normalization and prototypization of people in certain 
contexts (cf. chapter 1.1.4). That genderism already privileges the cis-male position does 
not mean that the cis-womanisized position is discriminated only. Cis-womanisized 
people are simultaneously privileged when they are white and ableized.
Ableism is based on the idea that people are physically, psychologically and 
intellectually in the position to live a life without any obstacles. The normalization of 
moving and living without any obstacles, meeting up with people in crowded places, and 
expressing oneself with a clear voice and in an elaborated and complex style ableizes and 
privileges people who do not need to think about possible obstacles that will prevent 
them from performing as hegemonically expected. This study assumes that ableism as a 
structural power relation constitutes formal naming practices as a relevant condition for 
capacitated personhood (cf. chapter 6). In Germany, ableized adults can expect to be 
addressed in a polite form in public and official contexts, specifically when, for example, 
they hold a representative position. People who do not know each other usually address 
each other formally. Addressing someone informally on a first name basis and then 
talking to the person’s companions about that person infantilizes them. Today, ableized 
adults can also expect that their last names do not invoke any expectations about their 
‘physical, psychological and intellectual condition’. Simi Linton suggests naming the 
ableized position ‘non-disabled’ in order to focus on the disableized position and to 
move it from the margin to the center (Linton 2006:163).
Migratism has been conceptualized by Alyosxa Tudor as a power relation and strategy 
that constitutes and positions persons as ‘migrants’ and as ‘people with migration 
background’ in Western European societies (Tudor 2010; Tudor 2014). In this way, 
‘migration’ is ascribed to people. Consequently, Tudor states, “one is not born a 
migrant” (Tudor 2010:396) but becomes one and thus is migratized. The concept of 
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migratization specifies the different strategies to position people as migrants and non-
migrants. Tudor aims at distinguishing between racism and migratism, since the latter 
can also affect white people. In the European context, white migratized people are 
conceptualized as Others from within Europe, whereas colonial racism constitutes Black 
people and People of Color as Others from without Europe, as Michelle M. Wright 
suggests (Wright 2004). Placing people outside Europe and thereby constructing them 
as nonEuropean is both a racist and migratist strategy. Or, in other words, 
discrimination through racism always implies discrimination through migratism, 
whereas migratism can imply privilegization through racism (Tudor 2010; Tudor 2014). 
For the German and Swedish contexts, migratization applies only to those groups of 
people that are denied as belonging to Western Europe and that, via their names, are 
ascribed an ‘origin’ outside of Western Europe (Tudor 2010:410). This does not include 
white Christian_secularized citizens from countries like the US or Canada, who define 
their national identity through narratives of migration from Europe. Those narratives 
are also re_produced and pertained through reprogendering naming practices, such as 
keeping the family name. Consequently, migratism does neither affect white Europeans 
that pass off as German in Germany or as Swedish in Sweden. Tudor and Hornscheidt 
described this privileged position of the white, non-migratized, Christian_secularized 
and cis-binary-reprogendered person as statisized (Tudor 2010; Hornscheidt 2010). 
This inclusive conceptualization of the non-migratized Western-European becomes 
evident in hegemonic naming practices. Onomastic scholarship, for example,  
differentiates between nationalized names such as German and Swedish names, ‘loan’ 
names and ‘foreign’ names. Other than loan and foreign names, scholars of onomastics 
negotiate nationalized names as the ‘original’ names of a specific society. However, the 
distinction between nationalized and loan names is only etymological, since many ‘loan’ 
names pass as nationalized names in hegemonic discourse whereas ‘foreign’ names 
migratize and mark their bearers as non-German and non-Swedish (cf. chapter 5).
Classism constitutes the idea of an educated prosperous middle-class background as the 
privileged norm. Middle-class is a classification ascribed to people that are privileged 
through access to different forms of resources, for example, money, knowledge, jobs and 
houses, and through racism, genderism, ableism and migratism. However, studies on 
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classist discrimination in Germany, for example, often disregard and de_mention power 
relations as having classist effects as hooks (1995) and Roßhart (2016) critique. Studies 
conducted in Sweden and Germany show that people with personal names that 
hegemonically are negotiated as non-German are less likely to be invited to job 
interviews (cf. Bursell 2007; Kaas, Manger 2010; Krause et al. 2012). In this way, they 
are simultaneously discriminated in a migratist, possibly racist and classist way. As a 
white, non-migratized, ableized and cis-womanisized person with a working-class 
background, I might re_produce a hegemonic bias when analyzing social inequalities 
from an anti-classist perspective. In order to challenge this bias and my privileged 
position towards racism, genderism, ableism and migratism, I primarily focus on the 
classist effects of these power relations. Yet, classist naming practices have  
discriminatory consequences for their name bearers. However, these naming practices 
reinforce the discriminatory effects for people that are positioned as discriminated for 
other reasons.
The commonalities of these structural power relations are characterized as being
• collectivizing. An individual’s self-identification is constituted by forms of 
collective categorization. A personal name might invoke expectations towards a 
specific ‘group membership’. For example, if a first name is hegemonically 
negotiated as female in Swedish or German societies, the bearer would be 
expected to be identifiable (by themselves as well as by third persons) as female 
and implicitly also as ableized as well as white and non-migratized, as long as the 
last name complies with hegemonic expectations and perceptions of  
(stereo)typical ‘German’ or ‘Swedish’ last names (cf. chapter 5).
• one-directional and unchangeable in terms of hierarchy. People are irreversibly 
positioned as discriminatory and privileged in a binary and hierarchical way, for 
example women as discriminated against men, Black/People of Color as 
discriminated against white people, disabled against abled, migratized against 
non-migratized people. The positions cannot be changed; thus, men cannot be 
discriminated by women in the context of sexism understood as a structural, 
historically grown form of oppression. A similar strategy might apply to people 
that are discriminated by classism. For example, a person from a working-class 
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background might acquire a professional position that hegemonically is identified 
as a position of the middle-class. However, as Julia Roßhart states, the memory 
of having been a member of the working class seems to be constitutive for this 
person’s self-identification, which makes the person live with the constant 
uncertainty of being in the ‘right’ place and of being ‘uncovered’ one day (Roßhart 
2016). The one-directionality and unchangeablity is also a reason why the 
conceptualization of ageism is not taken into account here. Age is regarded as 
reaffirming the discriminatory effects of racism, genderism, ableism, migratism 
and classism.
• historically grown and therefore the reason for social inequalities. In this study, 
social inequalities are understood as the consequences of a persistent and 
structural form of cognitive and institutionalized categorization that groups 
people powerfully together under overarching classifications. The social roles and 
images that have been ascribed to male, white, non-migratized or ableized people 
distinguish them from their discriminated ‘counter-parts’ in terms of privileged 
access to jobs, homes, comfort, health and wealth. Since these roles and images 
have been based on collective categorizations, structural discrimination affects 
people not only on an individual but also collectivizing level. However, a 
conventionalized understanding of discrimination in, for example, German 
jurisdiction silences the historical continuities of collective oppression and only 
focuses on individual activities performed by a person with a discriminatory 
intention. In this way, this study challenges this legal understanding of 
discrimination according to which a person is discriminated on an individual 
level but not as a member of an imagined collective that is structurally 
discriminated (Crenshaw 1989; Crenshaw 1991; Spade 2011; Hornscheidt, 
Landqvist 2014:70).
• re_produced in similar ways. For example, a typical discriminatory activity and 
attitude of privileged people is that they are not aware of their privilege and 
ignorant towards the knowledge productions of discriminated people on 
structural discrimination. Hornscheidt & Adibeli Nduka-Agwu introduced the 
concept of ‘denaming’ in order to describe the active silencing of a privileged 
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person’s or group’s own privileges and position of privilege (Hornscheidt, Nduka-
Agwu 2010), whereas Alanna Lockward introduced the concept of 
‘de_mentioning’ to describe the active silencing of counter-activist knowledge 
and expertise (Lockward 2010). The underscore in Lockward’s conceptualization 
signalizes that de_mentioning is simultaneously a form of mentioning the 
oppressed position as silenced. Consequently, being privileged means that one 
has the choice to reflect about the discriminatory consequences of the perception 
of personal names as nonGerman or female, as the privileged position is the 
denamed social norm. Discriminated people do not have that choice, as 
illustrated by journalist and migration and diversity expert Mekonnen Mesghena 
at a panel discussion that addressed racist practices in the performing arts in 
Germany: “As long as privileges have skin colors, first names, last names and 
places of residence […] we need to talk about skin color, being Black and 
racism.”11
• being intersecting. Racism, sexism/genderism, ableism, migratism and classism 
do not stand independently and alone for themselves but are intersecting. For 
example, having a female name does not necessarily mean that a woman is 
exposed to sexism only. As long as the name corresponds with the juridical 
gender assigned by birth, with hegemonic conventions that negotiate the name as 
German and with the hegemonic expectation that a person with a German name 
is white and non-migratized, it simultaneously provides privilege (cf. following 
chapter).
The list of power relations mentioned in this study might not be exhaustive. I listed 
exclusively those that I became aware of through studying current knowledge 
productions on structural discrimination. Thus, the Swedish and German societies 
might be constituted through additional power relations that are so naturalized that 
even those discriminated by them might not be aware of their discriminatory effects. In 
order to be able to identify oneself as a social subject, people tend to rely on categorical 
images and stereotypes that represent social groups. However, hegemonic discourse 
11 Original: “Solange Privilegien Hautfarbe, Vorname, Nachname und Wohnort haben […] müssen 
wir über Hautfarbe, Schwarzsein und Rassismus reden.” (Mesghena 2012 translated by EH).
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primarily provides positive images of privileged groups for positive self-identification. In 
comparison, discriminated groups are either presented as the unwanted Other or not 
represented at all. For example, gender non-conform people that do not identify as 
binary gendered are forced to identify with the normalized gender options: one out of 
two unchangeable positions. Or in other words, with no alternative options for 
identification, a gender non-conform person is forced to dis-identify with themselves. 
The same might apply to Afro-German and intellectually disableized people (cf. chapter 
2.2.1). Thus, in hegemonic discourse, their position is neither recognized nor made 
intelligible. Here, Butler’s quotation applies once more: “The act of recognition becomes 
an act of constitution: the address animates the subject into existence” (Butler 1997:25).
The ambiguous and hierarchical images and stereotypes of people for self-identification 
as well as the un/intelligibility of social positions are historically grown and have 
become naturalized in hegemonic discourse. Consequently, they will not immediately 
change. This is why these forms of social categorization are negotiated as structural 
discrimination and privilegization in this study – structural because they are 
naturalized, historically conveyed, unchangeable within hegemonic discourse and often 
not even recognized as discrimination and privilegization. Thus, structural  
discrimination and privilege are often unconsciously re_produced, as they 
simultaneously appear to build a framework that constitutes social life.
1.1.4 Dispositive of structural power relations: abjectification, default-
setting & intersectionality
A crucial starting point for my research was the question why discrimination has been so 
persistent in German society – despite the innumerable knowledge productions of 
feminist activists and scholars fighting against discrimination. This question inspired 
the collective AG Einleitung (2011) to search for an explanation to better understand the 
ways that lead to discrimination. Their dispositive model on structural power relations, 
which is further developed by Hornscheidt (2012), is a temporary approach that aims at 
describing the extent to which a society is constituted by discriminatory norms, what 
forms of discrimination a society recognizes and what forms it makes intelligible as 
discriminatory. It is grounded in power-reflective feminist knowledge productions such 
as Butler’s performance theory (Butler 2008), the conceptualization of a prototypical, 
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mythical default-setting norm (Lorde 2007:116; Linton 2006) and Crenshaw’s 
intersectionality theory (Crenshaw 1989). In this way, it defers from other dispositive 
approaches (for example of Foucault 1978; Keller 2005; Bührmann 1997; Bührmann, 
Schneider 2007; Bührmann, Schneider 2008 and Bührmann, Schneider 2010) by 
negotiating the dispositive as conditional for what can be imagined, recognized and said 
in everyday discourses and by regarding what can be imagined, recognized and said in 
everyday discourses as constitutive for the dispositive.
I illustrate the reciprocity of this process by help of the following example. A person that 
is born into the world is confronted with already existing hegemonic normative 
conceptualizations and practices that define the social order of a society. These 
normative discursivations position the newborn person within this order. Following a 
medical examination, the newborn baby is categorized as a girl or boy in German and 
Swedish hospitals. Since these medical norms imply that people can only be assigned 
one of two possible genders, a third gender or a gender-free person does not ‘exist’ in 
German and Swedish registration legislation. A child is forcefully gendered regardless of 
whether the child identifies with the ascribed gender. A child that is born with an 
intersex condition may not be gendered at first (Deutscher Bundestag 1/01/2009: article 
22, paragraph 3; PStG-VwV-ÄndVwV, Bundesministerium des Inneren 2014: section I, 
article 2, paragraph g)). However, binary gendering remains compulsory, since in 
hegemonic discourse the idea of not being gendered at all is made unthinkable and, 
thus, forces intersex-conditioned people to consider taking on one of the two gender 
options later in life. Medical examination also defines the extent to which a newborn 
child is classified as disableized when born with a condition that, according to medical  
standards, is regarded as deviant from the norm. Additionally, the ius sanguinis 
principle in the context of citizenship assignment requires racialized ancestry research 
that classifies the newborn child as German on the grounds of a blood relationship to a 
German citizen. Here, the idea of Germanness implies that a German person is white, 
which makes the idea of a Black German or a German of Color unthinkable. Thus, the 
newborn child is already classified before they knows what categorization means and 
how they can identify with the categories ascribed to them. Nevertheless, they will grow 
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up learning about the relevance of these categorizations, be forced to re_produce them 
and thus reaffirm the framework of structural power relations (cf. chapter 2.2.1).
The dispositive approach provides an explanation for how categorization constitutes a 
person’s life as privileged or discriminated in a society and the extent to which a 
person’s social position is thinkable, identified and recognized at all. Since every 
situation is inevitably constituted by racism, genderism, ableism, migratism and 
classism, these power relations always affect people. Thus, whether and how people are 
perceived and categorized through their personal names is determined by the 
intelligibility of people’s categorization. For example, in current German hegemonic 
discourse, the idea of a person being gender-unspecific or gender-free is made 
unthinkable (AG Einleitung 2011; Hornscheidt 2012) and aggressively prevented (cf. 
Baum 2014). Consequently, in hegemonic discourse, the idea of personal names being 
gender-unspecific or gender-free is likewise made unthinkable. Butler states in her 
performance theory: “[P]ersons are only intelligible through becoming gendered in 
conformity with recognizable standards of gender intelligibility” (Butler 2008:22). Thus, 
the idea of people not performing according to these standards is made unthinkable and 
remains unspeakable in hegemonic discourse. Butler’s concept of the unintelligible, the 
abject, can be transferred to further areas where specific groups of people are made 
unthinkable in a society (AG Einleitung 2011; Hornscheidt 2012). In hegemonic German 
discourse, Afro-Germans are still negotiated as nonGermans despite the fact that they 
have lived in Germany (and the prior territories that were identified as ‘German’) for 
centuries (cf. Oguntoye et al. 2006; El-Tayeb 2001; El-Tayeb 201; cf. chapter 2.3 for a 
more in-depth discussion). The same applies to the Swedish context, as Ylva Habel has 
shown (Habel 2011). Consequently, Afro-Swedes and Afro-Germans with or without 
names that are hegemonically negotiated as ‘Swedish’ or ‘German’ have been abjectified 
in hegemonic discourse.
Against this background, the dispositive simultaneously constitutes the image of a 
prototypical person, a citizen of a state. Thus, I assume that the prototypical image of a 
state’s citizen and of human beings in general is interpellated in hegemonic naming 
practices that are analyzed in the context of this study. Consequently, this study aims at  
identifying the prototypical images that are made intelligible through specific naming 
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practices. Audre Lorde describes this prototype as the ‘mythical norm’ for those that are 
cognitively excluded by the prototypization in the USAmerican context: “In America, 
this norm is usually defined as white, thin, male, young, heterosexual, Christian, and 
financially secure” (Lorde 2007:116). The norm Lorde describes is the most privileged 
social position, which is also to be found in Sweden and Germany. Therefore, the 
conceptualization of a prototypical, mythical norm can be transferred to the Swedish 
and German contexts, which has also been confirmed by studies on the cognitive 
perception of people as androgendered in linguistics and psychology.12 Linton identifies 
this form of silent and implicit norm setting of the privileged as default-setting:
“The assumed position in scholarship has always been the male, white, non-
disabled scholar; it is the default category. As recent scholarship has shown, these 
positions are not only presumptively hegemonic because they are the assumed 
universal stance, as well as the presumed neutral or objective stance, but also 
undertheorized. The non-disabled stance, like the white stance, is veiled.” (Linton 
2006:163)
According to my reading of Linton, her critical approach on default-setting endorses the 
conceptualization of the dispositive as a constituting structure-providing framework. 
Disableized persons might be recognized in specific areas of societal discourse, as in 
medical or juridical discourses when being pathologized. However, in others they are 
made unintelligible, for example as producers of academic scholarship. Consequently, a 
personal name on an academic paper might hegemonically be perceived and negotiated 
as belonging to an ableized person. Linton links this academic norm-setting to 
academia’s triple fundamental principles of universality, neutrality and objectivity, 
12 Cf. Hornscheidt 2006, Hornscheidt 2008a and the results of Marie Skłodowska Curie Initial Train-
ing Network - Language, Cognition, and Gender (ITN LCG) (Université de Fribourg 2009-2013),  
Gygax et al. 2008, Kusterle 2011. Incidentally, the EU program named after physicist and chemist 
Marie Skłodowska-Curie silenced her full name for the entirety of its Seventh Framework Pro-
gramme for Research (2007-2013) in a migratist way. Skłodowska, a migratizable Polish surname, 
was her first surname. Marie acquired the second last name after marrying Pierre Curie, a French 
physicist. With the silencing of Marie’s Polish surname, the EU made Marie readable as French and 
prioritized the perception of Marie being French over Marie being Polish. With the new Research  
Programme Horizon 2020, the EU partly recognizes the full name without, however, providing any 
clarification as to why the program chose not to call it such earlier (European Commission, Re-
search and Innovation 2014).
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which are constantly defended and maintained through hegemonic theory construction, 
epistemology and methodology. I will come back to this discussion in chapter 1.2.
In addition to the identification of the most privileged position in society and its sub-
discourse, academia, Lorde’s and Linton’s observations also share the complexity and 
multifacetedness of this default position. As mentioned in the previous chapter, for this 
study I identified only those power relations as structural that I – from my multifaceted 
privileged perspective as white, non-migratized, cis-binary-womanisized and ableized – 
am currently aware of and which corresponds with the theories my study is based upon. 
Although my social position is partly constituted by discrimination, I nevertheless share 
to a great extent privilege with the default position. Kimberlé Crenshaw describes the 
complexity and concurrency of power relations as intersectionality. Crenshaw’s 
conceptualization focuses on the question of how legislation in the US deals with 
discrimination on the grounds of racism and sexism. It challenges the way women of 
Color experience “the operative conceptions of race and sex” (Crenshaw 1989:140) and 
how these experiences are silenced by law and white feminism that look at race and 
gender separately (Crenshaw 1989; Crenshaw 1991). In this way, women of Color have 
been made unthinkable and abjectified by US legislation and white feminism.
In 1978, the conceptualization of intersecting power relations had already been 
examined by the Combahee River Collective, an initiative of Black Feminists, as 
“systems of oppression [that are] interlocking” (Combahee River Collective 1995). With 
their Statement, the Collective intervened in a universalizing understanding of feminism 
that silences racism, heterosexism and classism performed within the white women’s 
and white feminists’ movement. Thus, when doing feminist research like this study aims 
at doing, it is crucial to recognize these interlocking differences as results of hegemonic 
discursivations that are in danger of being neglected as abjectifications.
Consequently, a dispositive oriented, intersectional approach can help to pose questions 
I otherwise would have not. For example, it prompted me to integrate questions on the 
relationship between personal names and ableist discrimination, which I had not 
previously identified as related to my research topic (cf. chapter 6.2.3). Additionally, the 
approach looks at ideologies such as nationalism in an intersecting way by questioning 
the extent to which nationalism is constituted by default images of race, migration, and 
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gender. In order to keep the intersecting complexity, simultaneousness and concurrency 
of the power relations in mind, AG Einleitung suggested combining power relation with 
an underscore: racism_genderism_ableism_migratism_classism. The analysis 
conducted in chapter 2.3 aims at illustrating the power relations’ intersectionality in the 
context of naming.
1.2 Moving from Theory to Methodology: Conceptualizing  
Power as ‘Hegemonic Discourse’
Hegemonic discourse is a central conceptualization in this study. By using ‘hegemonic 
discourse’ as a frame of reference, I follow the approaches previously mentioned that 
relate the critical deconstruction of the privileged position to the life narratives and 
knowledge productions of people that are forced to deal with structural discrimination 
(Lorde 2007; Combahee River Collective 1995; Crenshaw 1989; Collins 2000; Butler 
2008; Linton 2006; Kilomba 2010b; El-Tayeb 2011; Spade 2011; AG Einleitung 2011; 
Hornscheidt 2012). My study is an attempt to use the critical lens of these approaches in 
order to deconstruct the intersecting complexity of hegemonic norms identified in 
hegemonic discourse. On a discursive level, I regard hegemonic discourse as 
fundamentally constituted by historically accustomed, structurally sedimented and 
i n t e r s e c t i n g l y i n t e r r e l a t e d s o c i e t a l p o w e r r e l a t i o n s : 
_racism_genderism_ableism_migratism_classism_. It is important to note that specific 
discourses such as the media or academic discourse are not necessarily hegemonic per 
se, although they are published by institutions that have historically supported and 
re_produced hegemonic discourse. Hegemonic discourse is understood as the 
re_production of a dominant discursive pattern that is constituted by the discriminatory 
impact of power relations. In the following, I list some specific aspects of this study’s 
understanding of hegemonic discourse that support my analysis with an example taken 
from media discourse in Germany.
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“How objective are the final grades in law? Three researchers evaluated the results 
of hundreds of state examinations in a comprehensive study. The result is alarming 
– only men with German names may rejoice.”13
Hegemonic discourse, here re_produced in media discourse, silences the impact of 
power relations on people’s social positioning as either discriminated or privileged. In 
this way, it actively ignores and dementions counter activist discourse, discourses that 
aim at intervening in discriminatory actions and changing social conditions in a 
sustainable way. While the quotation focuses on the results of a recent study, it 
simultaneously suggests that the presence of discrimination in legal exams appears to 
surprise the researchers. The conclusion that only individuals described as male with a 
name conceptualized as German were not affected by discrimination is almost presented 
as a novelty. Thus, the quotation suggests that no research had been done before on the 
subject and that discrimination is regarded as something that is unexpectable.
What the journalist missed to respect and take into account are knowledge productions 
that approach everyday discrimination from a power-sensitive perspective. As shown, 
various feminist, postcolonial and postmigrant scholars have negotiated the issue of 
inequality and oppression by taking the effects of sexist/genderist, racist and migratist 
power structures into account (for example for the German context Oguntoye et al. 
2006; Hügel-Marshall 2001; Polymorph 2002; Steyerl, Gutiérrez Rodriguez 2003; 
Eggers et al. 2005b; Hà et al. 2007; Kilomba 2010b; Nduka-Agwu, Hornscheidt 2010; 
AK Feministische Sprachpraxis 2011; Arndt, Ofuatey-Alazard 2011; Hà 2012; 
Hornscheidt 2012). Since these power structures constitute everyday life, academic 
fields such as legal studies that might even deal with the identification and negotiation 
of inequality are likewise considered as spaces that are not free of structural 
discrimination and violence. By omitting any references to productions of counter-
knowledge, the journalist’s quotation responds to hegemonic discourse’s strategies in 
silencing and normalizing academic privilege. However, privilege is here enacted by the 
authorization of research that is conducted in a structuralist and positivist way. From a 
feminist, postcolonial and postmigrant perspective, none of the results come as a 
13 Original: “Wie objektiv sind Jura-Abschlussnoten? Drei Forscher haben in einer umfangreichen 
Studie die Ergebnisse Hunderter Staatsexamen ausgewertet. Das Ergebnis erschreckt - nur Männer 
mit deutschem Namen dürften sich freuen.” (Lüpke-Narberhaus 2014, translated by EH).
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surprise or shock. Quite the opposite: Studies that aim to prove discrimination based on 
so-called ‘objective’, data-driven research even seem to be redundant. Given that 
discrimination is structural and thus constitutes every corner of people’s social life, why 
should, for example, the grading of law exams be an exception in terms of 
discrimination? Thus, the quotation above conflicts with the following observations that 
Grada Kilomba identified in her research on everyday racism in German academia 
(Kilomba 2010b:25–38), and that Habel 2011 could confirm for Swedish academia 
(Habel 2011): the myth that academic and mainstream knowledge productions are 
universally valid, objective and neutral.
1.2.1 Deconstructing the universality myth of hegemonic knowledge 
production
Within mainstream media discourse, ‘it is a truth universally acknowledged’ that in 
democracies, legal studies and legislation have been institutionalized in order to 
regulate the lives of citizens by securing equal access to civic rights and preventing 
discrimination (Deutscher Bundestag 31/12/2014: article 3; Deutscher Bundestag 
14/08/2006). Given that the non-discrimination clause for legal studies is regarded as 
universally true, the results of the study are indeed shocking. With regard to the terrorist 
acts of a white non-migratized cis-male Norwegian, Diana Mulinari & Anders Neergaard 
explicate that being shocked about acts of racist violence performed by the hegemonic 
‘norm’ person, the white self, is a form of denial of racism: “To be shocked is to embody 
the privilege of white ‘innocence’. The terror in Utøya shifted violence from the margins 
(migrants, refugees, homosexuals) to the centre” (Mulinari, Neergaard 2012:14; cf. also 
chapter 6.2.1). Thus, to be in shock means to ignore, silence and dename the possibility 
that the white self is and acts violently racist. This becomes even more evident by the 
use of the pronoun ‘we’ (cf. Hornscheidt, Göttel 2004:247) when used to speak on behalf 
of the citizens of a state, as is usually done by politicians and in hegemonic media 
productions (cf. Mulinari, Neergaard 2012:13). In a context such as the one described by 
Mulinari & Neergaard, the use of a universal ‘we’ silences the voices of those who are 
aware that racist violence is a structural reality that is experienced everyday.
Kilomba summarizes this denaming of white privilege caused by the de_mentioning of 
anti-racist knowledge production as follows: “It is not a question ‘am I racist or not?’. 
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That is not the question that the white person is supposed to pose; instead, the question 
how I do deconstruct my own racisms should be asked” (Kilomba 2010a:00:02:43). For 
feminist, postcolonial and postmigrant scholars, positivist empirical studies that ‘prove’ 
that discrimination indeed exists do not really say anything new. As Kilomba states, the 
production of knowledge is not a neutral activity (Kilomba 2010b:27). By silencing 
counter-activist knowledge, hegemonic knowledge production creates a space where 
hegemonic discourse defines “who can speak” (Kilomba 2010b:28) which, consequently, 
is the privileged default position. Thus, the evidence of discrimination in legal exams 
could be identified as universal knowledge of counter-activist scholarship, whereas it is 
dementioned in universalized hegemonic academic discourse.
1.2.2 Deconstructing the objectivity myth of hegemonic knowledge 
production
In this study, the objectivity claim is negotiated as a hegemonic norm that is based on 
the belief that research and grading can, indeed, remain unaffected by the researcher’s 
individual choices and attitudes towards the research topic, the own social positioning 
and the social positioning of others. However, in her research on everyday racism, 
Kilomba identified objectivity as a myth of hegemonic white scholarship whose validity 
and truths “are controlled by white scholars, both male and female” (Kilomba 
2010b:29). The assumption that objectivity is possible is a form of the colonization of 
knowledge by the ‘objective’ researcher, as Kilomba stresses:
“For a long time [Black writers and scholars] have been speaking and producing 
independent knowledge but when groups are unequal in power, they are likewise 
unequal in their access to the resources necessary to implement their own voices 
(Collins 2000). Because [Black writers and scholars] lack control over such 
structures, the articulation of [their] own perspective outside the group becomes 
extremely difficult, if not unrealizable. As a result, the work of Black writers and 
scholars often remains outside the academic body and its agendas […]. These are 
not accidentally there; they are placed at the margins by dominant regimes that 
regulate what ‘true’ scholarship is.” (Kilomba 2010b:28)
This hegemonic dogma of performing objectivity and preventing subjectivity can also be 
found in the study on discrimination in legal exams. Emanuel Towfigh, Christian Traxler 
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& Andreas Glöckner (2014) identified unequal grading of written and oral exams that 
were taken by people who differed in ascribed gender and origin: People registered as 
females and people with assumed ‘non-German’ names performed worse even though 
they had better grades when entering university. In order to be able to make a statement 
about the (anonymized) candidates’ origin, the researchers integrated an onomastic 
analysis into their study that generated information on ‘migration background’ on the 
grounds of the candidates’ personal names. The ‘likelihood’ that a name has a ‘migration 
background’ was described as “(subjective)”14.
Although the scholars are hesitant to identify unequal treatment as discrimination (cf. 
Towfigh et al. 2014:24–27), they miss to indicate how they define discrimination and 
how they relate the concept to gender and ‘migration background’ in their research. 
They also omit to describe how ‘migration background’ is both defined and identified in 
the onomastic analysis they refer to. In this way, they negotiate concepts such as 
‘migration background’ and ‘discrimination’ as self explanatory and exclude and 
de_mention counter-activist theories and methodologies that approach questions of 
discrimination from a perspective which is sensitive to historically sedimented power 
structures (cf. chapter 2).
1.2.3 Deconstructing the neutrality myth of hegemonic knowledge 
production
With universality and objectivity comes neutrality as another myth of hegemonic 
knowledge production. By claiming that there are German and non-German names, the 
authors of both the quotation and the study not only insist that names can be classified 
as such; they also assert that this classification is relevant for their research and for 
societal discourse on name discrimination. From a constructivist perspective, they are 
not even wrong in assuming so. However, to state names are German or not, male or 
not, migratized or not is not a neutral and innocent classification. By describing 
hegemonic academia as a powerful and violent space, Kilomba maintains that social 
categorization is particularly not neutral when it is re_produced in academic 
scholarship. Thus, hegemonic knowledge production creates a white space
14 Original:“(subjektive) Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass bei einem Namen Migrationshintergrund vorliegt” 
(Towfigh et al. 2014:10, translated by EH, my emphasis).
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“where Black people have been denied the privilege to speak […] where [Black 
people] have been voiceless and where white scholars have developed theoretical 
discourses that formally constructed [Black people] as the inferior ‘Other’, placing 
Africans in absolute subordination to the white subject. Here [Black people] have 
been described, classified, dehumanized, primitivized, brutalized, killed.” (Kilomba 
2010b:27)
Thus, academic knowledge production and their hegemonically negotiated, historically 
conventionalized and structurally pre-defined theories, epistemologies and 
methodologies cannot, by definition, be regarded as neutral. As Kilomba proved with 
her study on everyday racism, there is fundamental evidence of discrimination in 
hegemonic academia that conventionalized and incorporated hegemonic power and 
silenced whiteness, androgendering, statization, ability and middle-class as the 
privileged norms. Against the background of the mythical ‘neutrality claim’, counter-
activist knowledge productions have been neglected by hegemonic academic scholarship 
in their aim to emphasize the voices of the oppressed and to regard the individual’s 
experience of structural discrimination as collective knowledge that is shared by people 
imagined as the Other by hegemonic discourse. In this way, counter-activist knowledge 
can be regarded as a threat to hegemonic academic discourse.
1.2.4 About the role of structure-oriented research
Since structure-oriented research aims at describing the grammatical structures of a 
name, it focuses on approaching the set of rules that is assumed as being inherited and 
specific to the linguistic system of a language. In this context, language is understood as 
a system that evolves in and is expressed by (often nationalized) linguistic communities. 
Although grammatical deviations are recognized as local dialects and sociolects by 
hegemonic linguistic discourse, they are simultaneously negotiated as varieties of a 
standardized language. By focusing on the standardized linguistic variety, structural 
discrimination is not really taken into account in structure-oriented research. In this 
study, the standardized language is regarded as the language that dominates hegemonic 
discourse.
However, some forms of structure-oriented research that use predefined categories such 
as statistic research can be helpful in order to assess the state of hegemonic discourse.  
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Typical statistical categories for the assessment of demographic developments are 
gender, migration background and experience and citizenship (cf. Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2014; Statistiska centralbyrån n.d.). For example, studies that identify 
discrimination on the housing and job markets do so by using binary categories such as 
‘migrant’/’non-migrant’ as well as ‘female’/’male’ (cf. Akman et al. 2005; Bursell 2007; 
Kaas, Manger 2010; Krause et al. 2012; Senatsverwaltung für Integration 2010; cf. 
Towfigh et al. 2014 for an onomastic determination of social categories). Thus, statistical 
data can show and enumerate the effects of discrimination by help of hegemonic 
terminology and hegemonic ways of categorization. Although they show some evidence 
that people are treated differently, some of them hesitate to identify unequal treatment 
as discrimination and leave the question of how discrimination is defined unanswered 
(cf. Towfigh et al. 2014:24–27). As discussed above (cf. chapter 1.1.3), in hegemonic 
discourse, discrimination is often associated with its legal definition (cf. Deutscher 
Bundestag 14/08/2006) and negotiated as an activity that is consciously done (cf. 
Hornscheidt, Landqvist 2014:70). In this way, discrimination is not taken into account 
in its structural dimension and historical continuity as “old blueprints of expectation 
and response, old structures of oppression” (Lorde 2007:123). Lorde describes the 
hegemonic silencing of the continuity of oppression as “historical amnesia” that forces 
counter-activism “to repeat and relearn the same old lessons over and over” (Lorde 
2007:117).15
With some exceptions (cf. Akman et al. 2005), these studies often focus on only one 
form of social categorization; on gender or on citizenship but not on their intersections. 
In a small random test in 2005, Saro Akman, Meltem Gülpinar, Monika Huesmann & 
Gertraude Krell investigated the chances of ‘Turkish women’, ‘Turkish men’, ‘German 
women’ and ‘German men’ being invited to submit a complete job application in 
response to a brief online job posting. They identified that ‘German men’ received the 
most invitations, followed by ‘German women’. ‘Turkish men’ were a bit more successful 
than ‘Turkish women’ but far less successful than ‘German women’. The results indicate 
that people with Turkish citizenship are more discriminated than people with German 
citizenship, of which ‘German men’ are the most privileged and ‘Turkish women’ the 
15 Having said this in 1980 with not much change in terms of acknowledging difference as a conse-
quence of historically accustomed forms of oppression, Lorde’s statement is still valid today.
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most discriminated group among their peers. Towfigh et al. (2014) also discuss the 
“effects of gender”16 and “the origin of a name”17 as potential indicators for 
discrimination but, unlike (Akman et al. 2005), not the simultaneous effects of 
genderization and migratization for migratized women. As shown, this specification is 
often a simplification of the situation a person faces who is discriminated by more than 
just one power relation.
What is more, the indication of citizenship cannot assess racist or migratist 
discrimination of, for example, Afro-Germans and Germans of Color that have a 
German passport. The passport does not stop hegemonic discourse from de_perceiving 
Afro-Germans and Germans of Color as Germans. Similarly, the indication of gender 
de_mentions trans and gender non-conform people. In this way, the living situation of a 
gender non-conform person of Color is statistically not assessed but de_mentioned and, 
according to Natasha A. Kelly, de_perceived on a cognitive level (Kelly 2016). In this 
way, hegemonic de_perception can lead to the abjectification of AfroGermans, Germans 
of Color and trans and gender non-conform people (cf. chapter 1.1.4). Simultaneously, 
statistical research often focuses on the discriminated and privileged groups and less on 
the processes and societal structures that position people as such. Conceptualizing 
‘gender’ and ‘origin’ as given silences the hegemonic re_construction and re_production 
of gender and origin as sources of discrimination.
According to Lorde, there is also the risk that disadvantaged persons who experience 
discrimination as a normal part of their daily lives might not recognize it as such (Lorde 
2007:122). Consequently, the scientific assessment of statistical data acquired through 
surveys which ask an individual person to explain the extent to which they feel 
disadvantaged and discriminated needs to be regarded as a method that does not take 
into account the impact of the power relation in which people grow up. Against that 
background, questions of the representativity of surveys regarding the number of 
participants seem to be redundant: What social groups constitute the target group? 
Based on what criteria do I develop my definition of ‘disadvantaged’ people? And 
regarding my own role as a researcher: How can I relate to (the myth of) objectivity if  
16 Original: “Geschlechtseffekte“ (Towfigh et al. 2014:24, translated by EH).
17 Original: “Namensherkunft“ (Towfigh et al. 2014:26, translated by EH).
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my research design on discrimination is based on individual decisions I (or the 
disciplines) have made from a privileged perspective? How do I relate to inequality in 
comparison to someone whose social position is constituted by experiences of 
discrimination on a daily basis?
Finally, as quantitative research equips neutrality, universality and objectivity with the 
idea of representativeness, it would not recognize an individual’s report on self-
experienced structural discrimination as ‘empirically resilient’. Standpoint feminist 
knowledge productions investigating inequalities and discrimination challenge 
conventional methodologies and methods derived and discussed in structure-oriented 
academic disciplines and their methodological presuppositions and normalizations (cf. 
chapter 1.2). Given the number of reports of counter-activist knowledge productions on 
discrimination already quoted, the question for research inspired by feminist, 
postcolonial and postmigrant scholarship is rather how and not if a person is 
discriminated during a legal exam, for example. Consequently, I decided not to conduct 
questionnaires or other quantitative studies in order to collect statistic data because of 
the bias in statistical categorization and the insufficiency of ‘assessing’ discriminatory 
agency.
However, in order to recognize the impact of social categorization, the use of social  
categories in statistical surveys can be regarded as sedimented accustomed structures 
that people re_produce to explain the social world. In this way, quantitatively assessed 
data can depict social stratification on inequalities on the housing and job markets and 
identify social categories as indicators for discrimination. Some quantitative studies are 
referred to in this research (cf. above).
1.3 Methodology: Applying Counter-Activism
The discrimination of people in the context of naming has, to my knowledge, not been 
investigated against the background of a model that regards structural power relations 
as constitutive for the intelligibility of people. There have been numerous studies on the 
everyday discrimination of people via discriminatory perceptions of their personal 
names. However, the hegemonic act of naming as a normalized, sedimented and 
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accustomed form of institutional and structural discrimination and privilege has not 
been conducted from a social constructivist, pragmatic perspective that aims at being 
sensitive towards the dispositive of power relations.
In order to be able to respond to the central research question on the intelligibility of 
personal names and the hegemonic presuppositions that are interpellated with personal 
names, I apply a discourse critical perspective to my analytical methods. This 
perspective is based on the theories of Black Feminist Studies, Postcolonial Studies, 
Critical Whiteness Studies, Postmigrant Studies, Critical Trans Studies, Disability 
Studies and Minority Studies described in the previous chapters and challenges the 
boundaries of traditional disciplines because it objects to the powerful exclusions and 
limitations of disciplinary epistemologies and methodologies.
1.3.1 A trans- and postdisciplinary multi-voiced analysis of personal 
names
Although I have a disciplinary background in linguistics, this study aims at transgressing 
traditional linguistic epistemologies. Instead of focusing on the description of a name’s 
grammatical features and differences in comparison to other languages, I challenge 
linguistic name classification and examine the powerful hegemonic expectations and 
consequences of a structure-oriented categorization of personal names. The field of 
Feminist and Gender Studies, in which this study is situated, is, according to Nina 
Lykke, not a traditional discipline but rather a “postdisciplinary discipline” that 
“pass[es] as a discipline and claim[s] the academic authority of one, but which also 
keeps up a transversal openness and a dialogical approach to all academic disciplines” 
(Lykke 2011:8). Following Lykke’s definition, a postdisciplinary discipline is  
characterized by a critical perspective towards the “epistemological foundations of 
knowledge production” (Lykke 2011:17), as pointed out by Sandra Harding, for example 
(Harding 1983). Thus, postdisciplinarity can be understood as “a mode of organizing 
knowledge production in ways that are different from the discipline-based structure of 
the modern university” (Lykke 2011:28). Consequently, postdisciplinary feminist 
research takes the researcher’s social position in the context of structural power 
relations into account and reflects upon the powerful exclusions that are produced in 
structuralist and essentialist research (cf. below). In contrast, Lykke describes the “mode 
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of working with research questions” (Lykke 2011:28) as transdisciplinarity. According to 
her, transdisciplinary feminist research poses questions that cannot be answered by 
traditional disciplinary scholarship and, consequently, is called on to develop new 
theories and methodologies (Lykke 2011:27). In this study, I take up Lykke’s 
observations by reflecting on whether a trans- and postdisciplinary ‘dialogical approach’ 
can facilitate my research question on a methodological level.
By applying a critical discourse perspective, I regard language use as central for 
determining the meaning of the social world (Fairclough 2003). In this study, naming 
practices such as the initial naming of newborn children, the self-determined naming of  
empowered persons, and the legislative limitations to choose a personal name are 
understood as areas of language use that constitute the meaning, relevance and role of 
personal names in society. Consequently, language use also comprises linguistic 
activities such as thinking, signing, verbalizing, gesticulating, mimicking, denaming and 
de_mentioning in the context of naming practices. According to scholars who 
conceptualized the ‘linguistic turn’ for the social and cultural sciences18, only language 
use makes it possible to grasp everyday life and to identify, distinguish and classify 
people, social norms and academic knowledge productions (cf. Jaworski, Coupland 
2001). Thus, the ‘linguistic turn’ encourages researchers to focus on the creative and 
powerful potential of language use and to reflect on the processes and implications of  
knowledge productions, including one’s own in academic discourse. In this way, 
‘discourse analysis’ is a critical approach that examines how language use constitutes 
specific discourses in society and transgresses disciplinary boundaries.
Ruth Wodak, Peter Nowak, Johanna Pelikan, Helmut Gruber, Rudolf de Cillia & Richard 
Mitten’s discourse-historical analysis of how anti-Semitism is re_produced in public 
discourse in Austria (Wodak et al. 1990) has been inspirational to this study because of  
its comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach. Scholars from disciplines such as 
history, social sciences, linguistics and psychology contributed to the joint research 
question while integrating their disciplinary background knowledge into the research 
design. In this way, the research team was able to address multidisciplinary aspects that 
were linked to the research topic. Although I am aware that I cannot cover and speak for 
18 Cf. Jaworski, Coupland 2001 for an overview.
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multiple disciplines (or even for one), Wodak, Nowak, Pelikan, Gruber, de Cillia & 
Mitten’s interdisciplinary approach inspired me to look at different areas of research 
that could support addressing the complexity and relevance of naming practices in 
society and in different academic fields. Consequently, under the umbrella of Feminist 
and Gender Studies, this study integrates research areas and material that traditionally 
have been investigated by academic fields and disciplines such as onomastics, history, 
legal studies, social sciences such as sociology and social anthropology, pragmatics, 
Scandinavian studies, socio-psychology, and literary and educational studies that have 
been operating in the context of the social categorization of personal names. The 
scholarship around Wodak has also been inspirational for its deconstructivist approach 
towards the hegemonic homogenizing conceptualizations of the ‘nation’ (Wodak et al.  
1990; Wodak et al. 1999). The powerful in- and excluding social consequences of 
nationalism are central to the analysis of naming practices in this study (cf. chapter 3). 
However, Wodak, Nowak, Pelikan, Gruber, de Cillia & Mitten’s studies lack an 
intersecting perspective on _racism_genderism_ableism_migratism_classism_ that 
has been described by counter-activist feminist scholars.
By applying a dispositive-oriented perspective, I aim at responding to Black feminist 
critique that exposed how social positioning affected by the intersection of structural 
power relations are and have been made unintelligible in hegemonic discourse (cf. 
Combahee River Collective 1995, cf. below). As Hornscheidt & Landqvist point out, a 
dispositive analytical approach differs from a discourse analytical one on the question of 
intelligibility: “that what is not even possible to say or to think in a situation and that 
therefore is unnameable”19. People affected by being made unintelligible may not be able 
to recognize this form of discrimination since “one often does not recognize privilege, 
[…] discriminatory structures become individualizing and […] humans internalize 
them”20. According to Hornscheidt & Landqvist, in order to be able to approach what is 
unthinkable, practices and situations of structural discrimination need to be regarded 
from a historical and comparative perspective (Hornscheidt, Landqvist 2014:100).
19 Original: “det som inte ens är möjligt att säga eller ens tänka sig i en situation, och som därför är  
onämnbart” (Hornscheidt, Landqvist 2014:99, translated by EH).
20 Original: “man ofta inte lägger märke till privilegier, […] diskriminerande strukturer blir individu-
aliserade [sic!] och [...] människor internaliserar dem” (Hornscheidt, Landqvist 2014:99, translated 
by EH).
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This is why this study looks at the historical continuities of everyday discrimination 
through hegemonic naming practices in Germany and Sweden. For example, in April 
2010, the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet claimed in an article that “Swedes are 
world champions in changing names”21. The statement seems to be confirmed by Eva 
Brylla, a well-known linguist, recognized expert and official advisor on naming in 
Sweden. Brylla is quoted by saying that her research colleagues abroad were always 
surprised when learning that there are so many Swedes that want to change their names 
(Lagerblad 2010c). I do not intend to verify the claim but rather negotiate it as a 
statement that might tell something about hegemonic Swedish self-perception based on 
the example of naming. The seemingly unusual opportunity to change one’s name in 
Sweden (as compared to the German situation) gives reason for comparing the naming 
traditions and intelligibilities in German and Swedish hegemonic discourse. Another 
reason is that I assume both societies, also according to recent research on linguistic 
discrimination (cf. Hornscheidt 2006; Hornscheidt 2008a; Hornscheidt, Landqvist 
2014), to be comparable in terms of their geopolitical setting in the Global North and 
Western Europe, similar in their forms of governance (democracies, rule of law, division 
of powers), and in the implementation of societal norm settings (registration of people 
based on nationalist conceptualizations of citizenship and genderization, 
‘Christianization’ of registration and naming processes). Counter-activist movements 
against these norm settings also seem to share similarities (anti-genderist linguistic 
activism and interventions in hegemonic cis-binary-gendering, cf. Wojahn 2015). In this 
way, the study examines the extent to which the effects of hegemonic discourse on 
naming in Germany are comparable to the ones in Sweden. Maybe there are some 
lessons from which both discourses can learn.
As previously described, silencing is regarded as a linguistic activity that can have 
discriminatory effects. This is why the analysis of different naming practices that silence 
the positions of the discriminated and privileged has been integrated into this study.
Denaming means the active silencing of a privileged person’s or group’s own privileges 
and position of privilege (Hornscheidt, Nduka-Agwu 2010). For example, when a 
juridical decision on naming declares that a name is not genderable because it does not 
21 Original: “svenskar är världsmästare på att byta namn” (Lagerblad 2010c, translated by EH).
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follow a German feel for language, the genderability of a name is problematized but not 
the problematic concept of genderization. In this case, gendering is denamed as the 
normalizing practice that secures privilege in hegemonic discourse (cf. chapter 5).
Contrarily, de_mentioning denotes the active silencing of anti-discriminatory counter-
activist knowledge and expertise as well as the counter-activist position (Lockward 
2010). This occurs when cis-binary-gendering is negotiated as one of the most central  
ways to categorize people, and when the idea that names need to be gender-distinct as 
either female or male is regarded as obligatory for the registration of a child. In both 
cases, people that are positioned as trans*, transgender, gender-fluid, trans_x_ing22, 
gender non-conform or trans*_genderqueer23 are de_mentioned.
In this study, denaming and de_mentioning are analyzed as the two prominent 
strategies for linguistic presupposition. Presuppositions are denamed hegemonic 
knowledge productions that need to be silently accepted in order for a linguistic activity 
to make sense. In this way, hegemonic knowledge productions are silently constituted 
and normalized (Christie 2000). For example, in order to choose a child’s name that is 
gender-distinct, I first need to have accepted that names are and not made gender-
distinct. Furthermore, I need to have silently accepted that gender is a relevant 
distinction and that this distinction can be made on the grounds of hegemonically 
defined grammatical features or convention (cf. chapter 5). Hence, the silent acceptance 
of a structuralist perception of names responds to a requirement asking for gender-
distinctivity. Linton describes the implicit norm setting of the privileged perspective as 
default-setting (Linton 2006; cf. chapter 1.1.4). For example, the Turkish-German 
community negotiates names like ‘Helga’ and ‘Hans’ as prototypical names for the 
privileged non-migratized – default – Germans (Akyün 2007:8; 136-151).
22 For the conceptualization of dyke_trans*people and people who dyke_trans as critical positioning 
and self-naming practice cf. AG Einleitung 2011 for dyke_trans as well as the catalogue to the exhi-
bition of dyke trans | dis_visualizing re_locating de_silencing curated by Ja`n Sammla and Lann 
Hornscheidt (Sammla, Hornscheidt 2012), the video_poem spuren legen_verwehen by Layla Zami 
and Lann Hornscheidt (Zami, Hornscheidt 2012) for the conceptualization of ‘to dyke_trans’ and 
Hornscheidt 2012 for ‘trans_x_ing’.
23 This self-designation form is used by AK ProNa 2015 in order to open up the many cis-binary-non-
conform conceptualizations people identify with.
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Making social positioning unintelligible is a form of silencing that is, according to AG 
Einleitung 2011, Hornscheidt 2012 and Hornscheidt, Landqvist 2014, different from 
denaming and de_mentioning, which are performed on a discursive level. Denaming the 
privileged position and de_mentioning counter-activist knowledge productions are 
understood as active but not necessarily conscious discursive forms of hegemonic 
silencing where the effects of social positioning are made intelligible (Hornscheidt, 
Landqvist 2014:99–100). As hegemonic discourse constitutes the norms of how to 
perceive the world, it privileges people whose norms conform to the hegemonic norm 
and does not distinguish between silences on the grounds of dispositive abjectification 
and silences on the grounds of discursive ignorance. Thus, power-sensitive knowledge 
productions on the unintelligibility of social positioning cannot be expected to evolve in 
hegemonic discourse. Integrating counter-activist knowledge productions into 
discourse-critical methodologies is required in order to understand the scope and effects 
of structural discriminations and to avoid hegemonic silencing. In this way, it can be 
understood as a concrete response to Bakthin’s perception of discourse as multi-voiced 
(Bakhtin 1981). Consequently, hegemonic naming practices can only be identified as 
such by contrasting counter-activist interventions. This is why individual and artistic 
knowledge productions such as literary, personal reports and autobiographies are 
essential parts of my analysis. Ulrike Hamann introduced the polylux approach as a 
mode for a comparative analysis to identify counter-activist knowledge productions and 
interventions. She suggests comparing different counter-hegemonic and hegemonic 
narratives on, for example, a specific event in colonial history. Counter-hegemonic 
knowledge productions represent the empowered perspective on colonialism, whereas 
hegemonic narratives re_produce knowledge that is made intelligible in hegemonic 
discourse. By comparing both the counter-hegemonic and hegemonic descriptions of the 
colonialist event, the extent of racist thought and perspective becomes evident in the 
way oppressed and oppressive groups are named and conceptualized in the different 
narratives. Is their self-designation used and are they described from the oppressor’s or 
from the oppressed group’s perspective? Are survivors of colonial atrocities mentioned 
at all? To what extent are the responsibilities of the oppressive group taken into account 
(Hamann 2010:482–483)? However, counter-activist knowledge productions and 
int ervent ions can a lso be ident i f ied in hegemonic d iscourse , s ince 
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_racism_genderism_ableism_migratism_classism_ have not only destroyed, erased 
and devaluated counter-activist knowledge productions but also appropriated them 
(Kilomba 2010b, Otoo in Kabisch 2014). Qualitative differences in narrations 
re_produced from a privileged position can then be understood as traces of counter-
narrations which disrupted colonial discourse by making the re_production of racist 
terminology less acceptable (Hamann 2010:482). Inspired by the polylux approach, this 
study investigates how the institutional conceptualization of personal names as cis-
binary-gendered has been changed in Swedish legal discourse. It also helps to analyze 
the historical continuities of the naming laws’ discriminatory impact in both Germany 
and Sweden. In order to do so, it is necessary to identify the differences between 
knowledge productions that are created from an empowered counter-activist position 
and knowledge productions that are re_produced from a privileged, potentially self-
critical position and that rely on the previous ones.
1.3.2 Analyzing hegemonic naming practices through social 
positioning and critical self-positioning
Positioning in this study is, from a constructivist pragmatic perspective, understood as a 
social act that constitutes a person’s discursive role (Hornscheidt, Landqvist 2014:135). 
Social positioning describes the act performed by social categorization that 
hegemonically is often perceived and negotiated as the fixed and unchangeable identity 
of a person. Shohat & Stam negotiate identities as “chronotypical positionings” (Shohat, 
Stam 1994:100) within a social space and a historical timespan and as markers for 
historical and social power relations that constitute how the world is perceived (Shohat 
1998). Thus, as also demonstrated in chapter 1.1.3 power and hierarchies are central for 
social positioning. Consequently, identities, social categories and social positions need 
to be investigated within their respective social and historical contexts that are 
determined by power relations.
Based on their experiences with fighting against interlocking systems of oppression, the 
scholars of the Combahee River Collective emphasize the necessity for Black 
womanisized feminists “to develop a politics that [is] anti-racist, unlike those of white 
women, and anti-sexist, unlike those of Black and white men” (Combahee River 
Collective 1995). As a white womanisized person, I read this emphasis as a reminder for 
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the relevance of considering the different effects that are created when people fight 
against discrimination from different social positionings. Lorde, member of the 
Combahee River Collective, calls on feminists to be aware that “[i]t is not our differences 
which separate women, but our reluctance to recognize those differences and to deal 
effectively with the distortions which have resulted from the ignoring and misnaming of 
those differences” (Lorde 2007:122). In the context of this study, I read Lorde’s 
intervention as another important reminder to reflect upon the extent to which I, as the 
multifaceted privileged researcher, identify racism, genderism, ableism, migratism and 
classism as interlocking systems that create differences among feminists which can 
position feminist researchers as simultaneously discriminated and privileged, and which 
have an impact on my knowledge productions.
Consequently, social positioning constitutes the meaning of people’s linguistic activities. 
For example, talking about feminist research in Germany and Sweden interpellates 
certain expectations towards the researchers’ social position, institutional and 
professional role, and their names: What names do feminist students, researchers and 
professors at German and Swedish universities have? What names do non-feminist 
students, researchers and professors have? Are there different expectations towards the 
names of feminist and non-feminist researchers, and if so, why? To what extent do I as a 
researcher that experiences white, non-migratized, cis-binary-gendered, ableized 
privilege in the context of naming recognize personal names as only hegemonically 
negotiated as ableized, binary-gendered, and German or non-German? To what extent 
do I imagine the possibility of perceiving and negotiating names as gender-free? To what 
extent do I imagine a person with a supposedly non-German name to be German? To 
what extent do I imagine that a researcher’s name belongs to a disableized person? 
Obviously, the answers will have an impact on my research.
Following feminist scholarship articulated as situated knowledge (cf. Haraway 1988), 
standpoint theory (cf. Harding 1983, cf. Collins 2000), and politics of location (cf. Rich 
2003; Mohanty 2003), Tudor argues that the analysis of discrimination requires 
awareness and critical reflection of one’s own social positioning (Tudor 2011; Tudor 
2014). Critical self-positioning entails not only becoming aware of the discrimination 
and privilege one has as a consequence of the power relations’ constitutive impact on the 
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social order. For the discriminated position, it provides a space for self-definition where 
they can voice and name oneself (Collins 2000). However, the privileged position is 
called upon to do something once the awareness of privilege has been acknowledged. 
For example, focusing in this study on how privilege is re_produced in naming practices 
and how I have been re_producing these privileging naming practices, as well as how 
they can be deconstructed are attempts to do something.
When analyzing naming practices, critical positioning is also essential. After having 
tried in vain to become a successful author, Claus Heck, a cis-male-identified non-
migratized German, created the pseudonym Aléa Torik (Bendixen 2013; Schaschek 
2013). With the new name, he succeeded in being recognized as a migratized, 
womanisized person and became a published author. Since he intended to be recognized 
as someone less privileged than himself, Heck occupied the position of the  
discriminated for his own benefit and, thus, appropriated a position from which he 
cannot speak speak because of a lack of a migratized cis-woman’s experience and 
knowledge of discrimination (cf. Tudor 2011). Thus, the extent to which a name change 
is an intervention in discriminatory naming practices or not depends on the privileged 
people’s critical positioning. For example, in 1960’s post-war Germany, gentile Ingrid 
Hella Irmelinde Kirsch assumed ‘Sarah’ as her first name as a form of protest against the 
Holocaust and her father’s anti-Semitic attitude (Munzinger-Archiv 2013). Twenty years 
earlier, National Socialist legislation forced Jewish womanisized persons to take on that 
name. The extent to which this name change needs to be regarded as an occupation and 
appropriation of the discriminated social position depends on the extent to which Kirsch 
silenced her white, non-Jewish privilege that was interpellated by her previous first 
names for her own social benefit. A privileged person assuming a name that is perceived 
and negotiated in a discriminatory way by hegemonic discourse might have intervening 
potential as long as the person acknowledges the privileged position. In that case, the 
name might become perceived as less and less discriminatory.
Thus, from a privileged position, critical self-positioning and the analysis of 
discriminatory naming practices can only be attempts to identify privilege, to raise 
awareness, and to intervene in such practices in an accountable and responsible way. 
This is why Tudor distinguishes between anti- and contra_self-positionings (Tudor 
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2010; Tudor 2014). Anti-self-positionings are interventions performed from a 
discriminated position that Collins describes as empowerment (Collins 2000, cf. 
chapters 6.2.2.2 and 6.2.2.5). Contra_self-positionings are interventions performed 
from a privileged position. Tudor suggests marking the privileged person’s attempt for 
intervention by the underscore to interpellate the fractions those attempts can have. 
Privileged people’s social positions are marked by ‘contra’ to remind that for privileged 
people, the fight against discrimination is a choice and not a risk (Tudor 2014:216–219). 
Privileged people might be against discrimination but this does not necessarily mean 
that they act against discrimination. Because of a lack of knowledge, they might also fail 
to identify and understand anti-discriminatory fights: Privileged people experience 
power as privilege and not as oppression. By negotiating privilege as the norm, a 
society’s hegemonic setting provides privileged people the choice but not the necessity to 
actively engage against discrimination. Thus, there is no risk of losing privilege.
Taking into account the previously described characterization of structural 
discrimination and privilege, a privileged position cannot be changed or replaced with 
the discriminated position. Consequently, as a person privileged by racism and 
migratism, I cannot claim to have made the experience of being considered non-German 
or non-European when asked “where do you come from?” when people learn my name. I 
cannot claim that I know from my life experience what this question means to people 
that are questioned to be German or European. However, I can choose to challenge my 
own accustomed hegemonic perceptions of names. I can question the discriminatory 
interpellations that imply that only people with non-migratized names are a part of an 
imagined24 German society.
1.3.3 Analyzing hegemonic naming practices through life stories
As previously stated, in this study life narrations from people experiencing structural 
discrimination are regarded as central resources of counter-activist knowledge 
productions in order to understand how structural discrimination is expressed in 
everyday naming practices. Various feminist researchers have employed life stories as a 
24 For the conceptualization of how nations and nationalism have been developed through imagined 
communities cf. Anderson 1983.
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method in order to bring “reflective positioning [...] into practice” (Ghorashi 
2005:374).25 By assessing and analyzing incidents of unequal treatment on the German 
and Swedish job markets (cf. below), structural discrimination becomes accessible as a 
practice that is experienced by individuals and shared collectively when people are 
denied Germanness and Swedishness and are cis-binary-gendered on the grounds of 
hegemonic perceptions of their names. Life stories that I as a researcher privileged by 
racism, cis-binary-genderism and, through my education and profession, also classism 
do not experience provide spaces to learn and understand the extent of structural 
discrimination and privilege. In the field of oral history, Izabela A. Dahl and Malin Thor 
stress the relevance of life stories in the making of history by expanding the variety of  
stories to include historisized events (Dahl 2013; Dahl, Thor 2009). By integrating 
individual and accidental stories in the analysis of the different naming practices 
examined in this study, I aim to reflect my position as a privileged researcher in 
particular and approach the privileging effects of discriminatory naming practices in 
general. In this respect, analyzing the various hegemonic ways in which people are 
excluded from, for example, an imagined nationalized community (Anderson 1983) is 
crucial. By ascribing a group of people a non-normative identity, this group is 
consequently constituted as a collective that does not belong. Consequently, being 
collectively labelled as ‘different from the norm’, as ‘the Other’, is an experience that is  
shared among people assigned to a gender non-conform group and people negotiated as 
non-European. Since a personal name hegemonically interpellates both the idea of a 
person’s gender and nationalized origin, in this study, everyday naming practices are 
regarded as incidents where individual people share similar experiences on a collective 
level. In this way, life narrations can be regarded as individual accounts of people that 
share the experience of their identity co-constituted by hegemonic as well as counter-
activist discourse.
By referring to Abu-Lughod (1993), Halleh Ghorashi states that “[s]tressing the 
particularity of experiences against simple generalizations leaves space for ‘writing 
against culture’, which subverts the process of Othering within anthropology” (Ghorashi 
2005:366). Subversive examples are the life reports of Afro-Germans on their self-
25 Lykke calls them “life history narratives” (Lykke 2011:74–75).
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naming practices, by which they took on a name that re_establishes the violently 
interrupted connection to their African descent as a form of anti-racist empowerment 
(cf. chapter 6.2.2.2). By assuming the ‘new’ names, the ‘old’ names which had been 
eradicated and silenced by colonial discourse become revitalized. In this way, these 
names symbolize Afro-German historiography ‘writing against (hegemonic German) 
culture’ (Kelly, Oguntoye 2015; Kelly 2016), which in its continuity has made Afro-
German identification unintelligible. Thus, according to Ghorashi
“the life story becomes one of the few methods that can grasp this process-like 
character [of the concept of identity, EH]. An identity is not a complete whole but is 
in fact unsettled, ambiguous, mostly elusive and subject to change in a new context. 
Still, all this does not mean identity is constantly shifting: despite the fact that 
identity is a process of ‘becoming’, there is a certain degree of continuity to it. Past 
experiences tend to determine (un)conscious preferences of people in the choices 
they make. These choices are reconsidered when someone comes into contact with 
new, often unknown possibilities.” (Ghorashi 2007:119)
Thus, past experiences such as the identification of a person as German on the grounds 
of their supposedly German name has tended to (un)consciously prefer people with 
‘German’ names on the housing and job markets. These experiences might have 
influenced migratized parents in naming their children, when they preferably chose to 
give them a supposedly German name (Gerhards, Hans 2009). Furthermore, the 
experience of unintelligibility has made it impossible for Afro-Germans to find a name 
that interpellates Afro-German genealogy, and for trans and gender non-conform people 
to find a name that interpellates gender-non-conformity against the background of 
hegemonic discourse.
The choices Ghorashi speaks of in the quotation above are related to people who 
experience discrimination. However, the extent needs to be questioned to which the 
choices’ determination caused by “[p]ast experiences” (Ghorashi 2007:119) can also be 
observed in people who experience privilege. I argue that name choice is also constituted 
by the experience of privilege. White, non-migratized, gender conform people might be 
more likely to choose a name for their child that they have learned to know as being a  
(proto)typical name for a German cis-citizen. Thus, in this study I also attempt to 
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transfer and apply the approach of the life narration to a critical self-evaluation of my 
own life stories where I experience privilege. In this way, the privileged position is not 
only regarded as an effect of structural discrimination but also as the source for 
inequality, different life questions and unequal experiences. Privileged people do not 
need to actively understand the mechanism of structural discrimination in order to 
survive, since their privilege and survival is secured by hegemonic norms. This is why 
this study’s focus is specifically directed at the silenced discriminatory everyday actions 
of the privileged and reflects on the questions which are not asked and the knowledge 
that is not known in order to deconstruct privilege and fight against discrimination.
1.3.4 Integrating a structure-oriented analysis of names
As mentioned in chapters 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 a structure-oriented approach is the most 
traditional and widely applied method to analyze personal names with regard to their 
linguistic and social effects. A structure-oriented linguistic approach acts on the 
assumption that a name can be described and differentiated from other names on the 
grounds of internal grammatical rules. Consequently, a structuralist linguistic analysis 
of names focuses more on grammatical entities, such as a name’s phonology, 
morphology and semantics and less on the discriminatory effects of naming as an 
activity. Based on structuralist analysis results, naming would be classified as a practice 
that can ascribe a person to be German, Swedish, Turkish, Arabic, Jewish, Hindu, 
female and male. It would, however, not necessarily be identified as a practice that is 
discriminatory because it re_produces these classifications by negotiating them as 
given.
Yet, the discriminatory effect of social categorization is taken up in anthropological and 
sociological research on names which investigates the extent to which people with non-
German names are discriminated at school, at university and on the job and housing 
markets. Although this study is conducted from a pragmatic constructivist perspective 
that challenges these forms of social categorization, the structuralist approach provides 
an important contribution to understand how personal names are negotiated in both 
hegemonic academic and hegemonic mainstream discourse. It is important to note that 
the structuralist approach objectives are different from those of the pragmatic 
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constructivist approach. Thus, they can only be compared to each other by analyzing 
what they can and cannot achieve.
It is vital for this study to recognize the powerful and sustainable impact that a 
structuralist perception of the world has in terms of categorizing people. Thus, 
identifying the impact of structuralism on peoples’ way of conceptualizing the world is a 
helpful tool to implement empowering interventions by conceptualizing and 
recommending alternative, subversive ways to structure the world. For example, 
personal names that hegemonic discourse negotiates as nonEuropean can be promoted 
as German. The normative understanding that names need to specify a person’s 
genderization can be contested against the background of an understanding that names 
first assign personhood to people (cf. chapter 6).
A conference organized by the interdisciplinary project “Un/doing Differences. 
Praktiken der Humandifferenzierung” in Mainz, Germany, in September 201526 shows 
how traditional academic disciplines such as linguistics and sociology open up to 
interdisciplinary research questions that incorporate the social impact naming practices 
have on people’s lives. The conference aimed at discourse on current research that 
identifies personal names as social markers. By questioning the extent to which personal 
names represent social categorization, it had a clear focus on the pragmatic effects of 
names. For example, current research examines the extent to which particularly initial 
naming practices constitute the social birth of a child and influence a person’s 
perception and negotiation in society27 (cf. also chapters 6.1.1 and 4). However, social 
categorization itself was not questioned.
Other structure-oriented studies deal with the relationship between names and identity 
by questioning how names are perceived as markers that people use for social 
categorization (cf. Hagström 2006). For example, numerous studies have examined 
such questions as “who gets jobs, who owns homes, who gets racially profiled?” (cf.  
above, quoted from Shohat, Stam 1994:100). These structure-oriented anthropological 
26 The project is directed by Damaris Nübling and Stefan Hirschauer from the Johannes Gutenberg 
University Mainz (cf. DFG-Forschergruppe 1939 2013-2019).
27 Cf. topic areas “Pränatale Namengebung und soziale Geburt” and “Soziale Faktoren der Rufnamen-
vergabe und ihre Wahrnehmung” (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur 2015).
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and sociological studies often aim at defining verifiable, “empirically resilient” ways 
(Towfigh et al. 2014:10) in order to measure that people are treated differently, for 
example on the labor or housing markets (cf. Kaas, Manger 2010; Krause et al. 2012; 
Senatsverwaltung für Integration 2010) or in educational institutions such as schools 
and universities (cf. Carl von Ossietzky-Universität Oldenburg 16/09/2009; 
Stefanowitsch 2010; Towfigh et al. 2014). Since hegemonic discourse often requires 
measurable statistical data in order to recognize scientific research as ‘valid’, the 
indication for and verification of equal treatment can then be measured against the 
success of people with migratizable names receiving the same number of job and flat 
offers. Identifying the social categorization of the applicants and comparing the number 
of successful applications would then ‘prove’ that people with migratizable names are 
treated differently.
1.3.5 Pejorization as a constructivist pragmatic-oriented analysis of 
hegemonic naming practices as forms of l inguistic 
discrimination
Since a structure-oriented analysis of names does not integrate the impact of structural 
power relations on naming practices in an intersecting way, it cannot answer questions 
related to structural discrimination that is the subject of this study. By applying a power-
sensitive deconstructivist approach as described in chapter 1.1 a constructivist 
pragmatic-oriented analysis focuses on the processes and actions that are evoked by 
naming practices. Thus, it focuses on the impact naming practices have for individuals 
on a discursive level. Consequently, a constructivist pragmatic analysis of naming 
practices investigates how personal names are conceptualized and negotiated in 
hegemonic discourses, and more specifically, what names are prioritized, which persons 
are associated with what personal names, and what societal effects the hegemonic 
perception of personal names have for the name bearers. The analysis of the specific 
societal and historical context of naming practices is indispensable to understand the 
structural dimension of naming practices as a form of linguistic discrimination that 
people have become accustomed to in their everyday life experiences. Moving from a 
structuralist understanding of names as entities that ‘show’ or ‘tell’ something about a 
person to a constructivist pragmatic-oriented point of view can help to regard personal 
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names as a processual naming practice in which names are ascribed a conventionalized 
and normalized meaning.
The constructivist pragmatic-oriented approach of this study is based on Hornscheidt’s 
pejorization model (Hornscheidt 2011b). Although it does not explicitly deal with the 
analysis of personal names, Hornscheidt’s model provides a critical perspective to the 
analysis of linguistic discrimination. Hornscheidt negotiates pejorization as a linguistic 
activity that interpellates discriminatory images of people on a collective level. 
Pejorizations do not only occur when individual people are addressed explicitly, for 
example by calling them names and addressing them with pejorative ‘foreign’ and 
enforced appellation forms28. They also occur in contexts where people use ableist 
metaphors to describe a situation or an activity, such as ‘this is so lame’ and ‘blind trust’. 
In these contexts, the interpellated disability is negotiated as the undesired one. 
Although no concrete person is addressed, the discriminatory linguistic activity is 
performed by the indirect negative evaluation of people’s disabilities (Hornscheidt 
2013:30–31). By distinguishing between a norm (ableized) and a deviant (disableized) 
position, pejorizations naturalize linguistic forms of Othering and thus the idea of 
people belonging to a collective group (Hornscheidt 2013).
In the context of indirectly performed linguistic discrimination, Hornscheidt also takes 
up Butler’s intervention in Austin’s speech act theory (Butler 1997). As Butler, 
Hornscheidt criticizes the focus on the speaker’s intention while analyzing a linguistic 
activity and adds the dispositive approach to their model of analysis (Hornscheidt 2013). 
Thus, in the analysis of naming practices, discrimination is not defined by a speaker’s 
intention but by structural power relations that constitute the situation in which naming 
practices are performed. With regard to studies on linguistic discrimination (cf. for 
example Arndt, Hornscheidt 2004; Nduka-Agwu, Hornscheidt 2010; Arndt, Ofuatey-
Alazard 2011), naming practices such as the initial naming of newborn children have, to 
my knowledge, less often been regarded as discriminatory than situations where people 
experienced linguistic violence by use of collective personal appellations forms. A 
possible reason why naming practices have not yet explicitly been taken into account as 
28 Cf. for example Nduka-Agwu, Hornscheidt 2010 and Arndt/Ofuatey-Alazard 2011 for a critical 
analysis of racist personal appellation forms in the German language communities.
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forms of linguistic discrimination might be that conventionally, personal names are 
negotiated as usually interpellating an individual person. Since this study is based on the 
assumption that naming practices also interpellate discriminatory images of people on a 
collective level, the linguistic activities and personal appellation forms mentioned in 
Hornscheidt's approach are extended by naming practices and personal names.
By incorporating AG Einleitung’s dispositive approach (AG Einleitung 2011) discussed 
in chapter 1.1.4, the pejorization model exceeds conventional structuralist approaches 
which regard linguistic utterances as offense, insult or violence (cf. for example 
Herrmann et al. 2007). Hornscheidt brings together the following dimensions of 
linguistic name-calling practices to identify the extent to which a linguistic activity is 
discriminatory (Hornscheidt 2011b). For the purpose of this study, they are applied to 
naming practices:
• the concrete linguistic activity that can be an utterance or non-utterance. The 
absence or silencing of personal names is also regarded as utterance.
• the conventionalized, constantly negotiated meaning of personal names,
• the situation of a linguistic activity including all persons that are involved in a 
naming practice,
• the person and/or normative perception that is interpellated by the naming 
practice.
The analysis of naming practices as a form of pejorization aims at identifying the 
discursive strategies as well as normative perceptions that constitute a discriminatory 
situation. It is not important for the pejorative effect of the naming practice whether or 
not the pejorization was intended by the speaker and whether or not the discriminated 
person identifies the naming situation as discriminatory.
For example, German registry offices usually object to a newborn child being assigned a 
personal name that contradicts the gender information provided in the ‘International 
Handbook of Forenames’ (Nüssler 2002) and claim to act in the child’s interest. In a 
press release by the German Association of Registrars, the name Amos Raban She Kilua 
is mentioned as an example that is regarded as a threat to the child’s well-being 
62
Introduction: Defining the Scope of Research
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Standesbeamten 14/11/2008). According to hegemonic 
reading conventions, Amos Raban She Kilua is negotiated as migratized. Consequently, 
the child bearing this name is confronted with migratism. However, the extent to which 
the child has to deal with structural migratist discrimination depends on the child’s 
social position as migratized or non-migratized, a fact that is fundamental for the child’s 
life.
According to Hornscheidt’s model, a person (with or without a migratizable name) is 
discriminated when they is assigned to the group that is interpellated by the pejorative 
categorization ‘migrants’ (Hornscheidt 2011b). Thus, a person that does not belong to 
the group of migratized people but has a migratizable name is not discriminated on a 
structural level. If they, however, feels insulted by the categorization, the person acts 
discriminatory because they re_produces the idea that statization is the only way to 
perceive people as German.
In the press release, a situation which takes place in Amos Raban She Kilua’s 
kindergarten is also described in which the pejorative use of the name is trivialized as 
‘teasing’. In this way, the structural aspect of the discrimination is disregarded and 
de_mentioned, resulting in the perception of structural discrimination as an individual 
case linked to the specific migratizable name. Simultaneously, names that are not 
migratized are silently identified as the only possible names that are regarded as 
‘normal’ and that comply with normative grammatical perceptions of names (cf. chapter 
5).
Thus, in this study, the pejorization model will help to analyze the impact of structural 
power relations in the context of naming in a systematic way. The focus of analysis is on 
the comprehensive set of dimensions that need to be taken into account to identify 
naming practices as discriminatory: the concrete linguistic expression, the historically 
conventionalized and normalized hegemonic meaning of this expression, and the social 
positioning of the people involved.
63
Introduction: Defining the Scope of Research
1.4 Method & Material: Identifying Hegemonic and Counter-
Activist Discourses
The dispositive approach has methodological consequences for my research and the 
material I have chosen for analysis. Since it acts on the assumption that power relations 
constitute everyday practices, it provides a certain ‘liberty’ and ‘illimitability’ to the 
corpus: Any material from everyday discourse will do, which is why I have come up with 
a research strategy that can only be explained retrospectively.
I started my research by investigating how naming practices are constituted and affected 
by the dispositive of structural power relations. Based on studies and personal reports 
on everyday naming discrimination, I aimed at identifying the mechanisms of why 
people who participate in hegemonic discourse are accustomed to perceiving and 
negotiating personal names in a discriminatory way. By counter-activist educational 
academic discourse, pragma-cognitive academic discourse and with counter-activist 
personal life stories, I conceptualized accustoming as an analytic tool to understand the 
re_production of hegemonic knowledge as a process of acquiring and getting used to 
hegemonic norms.
I then furthered my analysis by employing the dispositive approach in an intersectional 
way. Focusing on how naming is affected by racist and migratist ways of perceiving and 
negotiating people, I aimed at identifying situations where naming is and can be 
discriminatory by employing counter-activist discourses on everyday discrimination. By 
using the discriminatory effects of one or two power relations as a starting point of my 
analysis, I was able to question how ableism affects naming practices, a context that I  
had de_perceived as a potentially discriminatory one for naming. As a consequence of 
this chapter, I was prompted to look at the historical continuities of people’s 
discrimination via their names, specifically in legislation and jurisdiction.
By help of historical studies, personal life stories and legal texts, I could emphasize how 
legislation had contributed to the persistence of structural discrimination by ways of 
institutionalizing accustomed discriminatory naming norms that simultaneously served 
to maintain the concept of the nation state and to justify the concept of ius sanguinis as 
the fundamental principle of German and Swedish citizenship. In this context, I was 
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made aware of another principle of hegemonic naming practices that is specifically 
applied in Germany, the child’s well-being.
The child’s well-being appeared to be a commonly accepted principle in German and 
Swedish legislation and in the decisions made by registrars, which is why I questioned 
what it actually meant for two plaintiffs that took court action, one from a privileged and 
one from a de_privileged position. As a result, a so-called German feel for language 
could be identified as another argument to justify discriminatory naming decisions, 
which is why I addressed this naming presupposition in another chapter. With the aid of 
different discourses that presupposed, discussed, defined and challenged the idea of an 
assumed ‘natural’ and ‘authentic’ feel for language, I aimed to illustrate the 
discriminatory impact of using sprachgefühl as a conceptual norm for decision-making 
in naming contexts.
The final chapter is built on the previous chapters’ results and addresses the final 
consequence of discriminatory naming practices: the question of defining and denying 
personhood through naming practices. The chapter draws greatly on counter-activist 
artistic discourses and personal life stories that have been produced in situations of 
hegemonic silencing of traumatic names, enforced and empowering name change, and 
hegemonic silencing of discriminated people’s original names that enabled the 
objectification and assassination of fellow humans.
Thus, both the questions and the material analyzed in each chapter have been generated 
and specified during my research and are organized in a way to make them recognizable 
as the intermediate results of the preceding chapter(s). In order to identify possible 
similarities and differences in naming processes, I compared in particular the historical 
institutionalization of discriminatory naming practices in Sweden and Germany, as well 
as the ‘grammaticalization’29 of names as German or Swedish.
29 Not to be confused with the linguistic theoretical approaches which describe ‘grammaticalization’ in 
the context of language change when a linguistic entity that conventionally was identified as a  
noun’, loses’ this conventional semantic meaning and is instead more frequently used as an entity  
that marks a morpheme (cf. Szczepaniak 2011). Grammaticalization here denominates the process 
of regarding, describing and defining language in a structuralist way and therefore ascribes names a 
grammatical function.
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As mentioned earlier, based on my theoretical approach and assumption that power 
relations constitute everyday life, hegemonic discourse can be found everywhere. 
However, I chose to limit the material, or rather discourses, to public spaces where I 
expected to find naming practices that have a sustainable normative impact on people’s 
lives in society, as well as to activist spaces where I had the opportunity to learn from 
empowering naming interventions. In this way, the material and naming examples in 
my study were found
• through systematic keyword research, for example by using the search options 
offered in library catalogues which provided results for further readings, official 
websites (Patent- och Registreringsverket ( P R V ) , Skatteverket, Federal 
Association of German Registrars, legal institutions in both Sweden and 
Germany) or popular scientific media reports on names (Språktidningen, Spiegel 
Online), searching for keywords such as ‘Kindeswohl’ (child’s well-being), 
‘Sprachgefühl’ or ‘språkkänslan’ (feel for language), ‘Namensänderung’ or 
‘namn bytte’ (name change) or ‘personnummer’ (personal identity number),
• through references I found in academic literature that, on the grounds of their 
impact, I had identified as key literature, such as publications by onomastic 
scholars who are recognized and negotiated as experts in German and Swedish 
academic, media, governmental and juridical discourse (cf. Nübling et al. 2012; 
Seibicke 2008; Nüssler 2002; Brylla 2002; Nyström et al. 2013).
• through specific questions I addressed during interviews with three registrars (cf. 
Hayn 23/07/2012; Hayn 24/07/2012b; Hayn 24/07/2012a),
• as well as by chance such as in artistic counter-knowledge productions but also 
through personal talks and exchanges with friends, colleagues, family members 
and other people that showed interest in my work.
Thus, I predominantly analyzed (mostly written) knowledge productions from the 
following discourse areas that serve as both primary and secondary resources:
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• academic discourse that is identified as expert discourse on naming by e.g. 
juridical and media/public discourse but also traditional academic as well as 
academic feminist knowledge productions on linguistic everyday discrimination,
• juridical discourse expressed through legislation, legal commentaries, and court 
decisions that negotiate naming as a right and obligation and that define and 
decide on the ‘appropriateness’ of names and naming on a legal level,
• legislative discourse expressed through legal bills and committee reports that 
suggest the adoption of a new and the amendment of an existing law,
• governmental/executive discourse expressed through explanatory information on 
laws and regulations provided by governmental authorities, such as registry 
offices,
• media discourse expressed through journalistic print and online articles of new 
papers and journals that negotiate e.g. the ‘experts’ opinions on names as well as 
legal decisions and/or regulations and instructions,
• popular scientific educational discourse expressed through specific websites that 
inform, for example the history of a specific social group from the group’s own 
perspective for a mainstream audience;
• artistic discourse expressed through counter-knowledge productions and 
interventions such as literature;
• everyday discourse where people primarily are discriminated through hegemonic 
accustomed perceptions of their names, such as in job/housing application 
processes, as expressed through autobiographies, life stories, interviews, personal 
reports and comments.
Academic discourses on naming serve both as resources and as sources for my research 
which aims to apply a transdisciplinary perspective. I discuss what norms on naming 
have been institutionalized in selected studies on naming in both Sweden and Germany 
and the effects on the research. Since the media authorizes certain scholars by 
presenting them as experts, and since some legal decisions are also discussed in public,  
newspaper and online articles on naming contributed to my corpus for analysis:
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• What are the topics to be discussed?
• What kind of presupposed silenced knowledge is (through historical 
accustoming) implied and negotiated in these contexts? Here, I focused on 
specific key-concepts I identified as silenced presuppositions.
• Who is authorized to speak as an expert?
• Are there any differences between the German and Swedish media’s agenda-
settings on naming?
• And how are these discourses inspired or confronted and challenged through 
everyday discourses where people deal with naming discrimination, for example 
in artistic knowledge productions? How do people regard and confront 
institutionalized discriminatory naming practices they are juridically forced to 
apply?
In my analysis I identified different levels of hegemonic discourse, as well as of 
discrimination against people whose personal names are perceived and negotiated as 
different from hegemonic discourse. These levels are constituted by the various 
discourses as follows:
• the structural level that constitutes as well as is constituted by societal norms e.g.  
reproduced in hegemonic everyday discourses,
• the institutionalized level that is constituted by institutional regulations of e.g. 
juridical discourses,
• the individualized level that is constituted by pseudo-individual naming practices 
e.g. the search for ‘unique names’ for ‘unique persons’.
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1.5 How is This Study Structured?
Given that I aim to discuss how discriminatory perceptions of personal names can be 
challenged and changed, it seems necessary to focus first on the identification of the 
hegemonic presuppositions, assumptions and perceptions that are interpellated with 
personal names and that constitute everyday discrimination. In order to develop 
answers to this question, it needs to be explained how discriminatory perceptions are 
conceptualized in this study, how they are expressed in the context of naming and why I 
think it is important to have them challenged and changed.
Being trained in deconstructivist as well as feminist, postcolonial scholarship,  
discriminatory perceptions of names is something that I understand as ‘structural’, to 
wit, as something so normal in hegemonic discourse that these structures are often 
denied. When reflecting about discrimination, I do not think of any thoughts and/or 
actions that are performed intentionally. Discriminatory perceptions of names are 
something people grow up with, experience, get used to, internalize – accustom and 
re_produce. Thus, when it comes to personal names, it is the hegemonic knowledge on 
how to read them that is shared in a society. As the concept of a society is not clearly 
defined or given, it is necessary to sketch the Swedish and German societal frameworks 
in which I conceptualize and develop my answers: How are they defined by 
conceptualizations of the nation state in legislation and mainstream discourse? 
Conceptualizations of personal names as well as institutionalized naming practices need 
to be investigated in their historical continuities; thus, it is crucial to briefly sketch the 
historical context that provides the background for today’s legislation on names and its 
links to the personal status of people as citizens or non-citizens30 of a state. That the 
state takes on a pivotal role in naming processes becomes evident with regard to the 
numerous court cases that deal with the institutional limitations and alleged principles 
(such as that of the child’s well-being) of choosing or changing a name independently. It 
quickly becomes clear that there are several underlying presuppositions that are linked 
to naming. For example, what role does a structuralist perception of names play when 
30 Cf. the concept of non-citizenship that was introduced by illegalized people (‘refugees’) and free-
dom fighters (OPlatz – Berlin Refugee Movement) in Berlin in order to pinpoint the institutional 
preconditions for the discrimination they face every day, the denial of the rights a citizen of a state 
– here Germany – would have in order to survive. Cf. Refugee Tent Action 2013 and The Action 
Circle of Independent Non-Citizens' Struggle 2013.
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courts decide that a name does not comply with the German sprachgefühl? Another 
crucial aspect is that a personal name is a prerequisite in Western societies for people to 
be recognized as humans. But how is ‘human’ conceptualized and who is privileged to be 
considered as the default human? How are the concepts of ‘individuality’ and 
‘uniqueness’ linked to a person’s name, to the hegemonic perception of names and 
people, to privilege? In the following chapters particular attention is given to questions 
of the intelligibility of names as well as of persons and the challenges and chances that  
are linked to contexts of name change in the hegemonic societies of Germany and 
Sweden.
First, in chapter 2.2 on the acquisition of personal names I introduce the concept of  
accustoming as an analytic tool to understand ways of getting used to the re_production 
of hegemonic knowledge. Accustoming is a linguistic activity that constitutes hegemonic 
discourse by its normalizing and conventionalizing hegemonic practices. An example for 
this is the unquestioned norm in German registry offices that personal names need to be 
gendered (cf. chapter 4). With accustoming, I aim to provide an approach that explains 
how hegemonic knowledge on naming is acquired and how it is internalized in a 
structuralist way. I assume that this way does not only provide the acquisition and 
dissemination of knowledge with a structure, for example by classifying hegemonic 
knowledge productions as crucial, neutral, universal, and objective. Structuralism also 
essentializes hegemonic knowledge productions as given truths, instead of negotiating 
them as one possible, powerfully established way to perceive and structure the world. 
Hence, a structuralist perception of names that is constituted by hegemonic knowledge 
on names limits the way names can be negotiated: Why and when is there a need to read 
a name as gendered? Why cannot names like Ali be understood as German?
In chapter 2.3 titled “Framing Naming – Structuring Life in Germany and Sweden: Why 
hegemonic naming practices are discriminatory”, I intend to show how the process of 
accustoming hegemonic knowledge on names is linked to power relations. Applying AG 
Einleitung’s dispositive approach, I conceptualize power relations as a framework that 
constitutes a structural society. This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive 
methodological statement of how and why hegemonic naming practices are negotiated 
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as discriminatory in this study, and how this is fundamental for my analysis of naming 
practices.
In chapter 3 titled “Historical Continuities in Everyday Discrimination Through Names: 
Sedimentation of Accustomed Norms in Germany and Sweden”, I take naming 
processes from the structural to the institutional level. On the example of administrative 
and legislative discourses, I demonstrate how hegemonic knowledge productions on 
naming are accustomed in and through discursive practices that decide how people are 
categorized and named institutionally. These discourses are powerful, since they define 
which personal names and which social positionings are intelligible in a society which 
re_produces and confirms them by hegemonic academic, medical, medial as well as 
everyday discourses. I distinguish these discourses for analytical purposes only as they 
are influencing and constituting each other. Academic discourses can be legislative and 
medical but whether they re_produce hegemonic or counter-discursive knowledge 
depends on their political agenda: Feminist, postcolonial and postmigrant counter-
discourses have often challenged and rejected hegemonic knowledge productions. The 
rejection of the essentialization of gender, race, and origin but also of ability that are 
often negotiated as given categories in juridical as well as biological discourses is just 
one example.
The individual process of decision-making in the context of naming is further discussed 
in chapter 4 “What Is Best for the Child? Children’s Welfare as a Strategy for 
Accustomed Individualized Structural and Institutional Discrimination”. Here, the 
individualized level is added to the methodological framework. By questioning if the 
child’s well-being is threatened by naming decisions, I will discuss how discriminatory 
structuralist accustomed knowledge on names is individualized by institutional 
discourses, such as registering a child. I argue that the name of a child is not an 
individual choice but is constituted by power relations on a structural as well as 
institutional level.
In chapter 5 “Feeling Grammar: ‘Sprachgefühl’, Metaphors and Emotive Names”, the 
concept of a feel for language (sprachgefühl) is investigated against the background of 
grammatical structures. By using the emotive concept ‘gefühl’ (feeling/affect), language 
can be understood as being ‘natural’ and thus ‘neutral’ experiences for their speakers.  
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Therefore, it is possible to metaphorize and personify language as being in a relationship 
with its users. Against this background, I will argue that the normalization of a 
hegemonic understanding of a feel for a nationalized language enables the  
establishment and stimulation of an emotional relation to the ‘nation’. It also authorizes 
people who identify a language as their first language to decide whether a certain way to 
use and negotiate language is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ or appropriate.
Chapter 6 “Naming Me, Naming You? Becoming a Person: The Personal, the Collective 
and Their Name(s)” is devoted to the question of what role naming plays in the context 
of assigning people personhood in Germany’s and Sweden’s hegemonic legal discourses.  
When it comes to personal names, discrimination tackles people not only on a structural 
but also on a very individual level since names also re_produce and reinforce the idea of  
personhood. The personal name stands for personalization, making a person 
recognizable as a civic individual and as a citizen. I contend that without a name, a 
person is less likely considered as a person, such as when a name is silenced and/or 
replaced by a number.
The study concludes with a collection of some empowering interventions in 
d i s cr i mi n at o r y n ami n g p r act i ce s a nd s o me r e co mm en d at i on s f o r a 
contra_discriminatory anti-structuralist perception of personal names. The idea is to 
transform the accustoming of hegemonic knowledge into a power sensitive as well as 
critical attitude that focuses on raising awareness among privileged people and 
encourage them to engage and learn about discriminatory sedimentations and actions in 
society. I suggest a deconstructivist approach that might help overcome mythical and 
unfeasible demands on knowledge production to be universal, neutral and objective. 
This would put power relations and their discriminatory effects at the center of research 
and not groups of people or language specific personal names that only can be described 
as such due to powerful discursive perceptions, negotiations and assignments.
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2. Girl or Boy, Where Are You From? Getting Accustomed To and 
Accustoming Hegemonic Naming Practices
People are discriminated against everyday based on categorical perceptions of their 
personal names. People involved in naming activities, particularly when privileged, are 
often not aware of the discriminatory impact of the act. Since I, as a person privileged by 
cis-binary-genderism, racism, ableism and migratism, am no exception, I begin the 
analytical part of my study with an everyday example of my own. It deals with the 
discriminatory naming experiences a sales agent shared while visiting me in Berlin 
Neukölln in 2013. Since Neukölln is a Berlin district popular with migratized people, I 
would expect to meet people with migratizable names there. Analyzing the conversation 
I had with the sales agent helped me to approach some normalized presuppositions in 
the context of naming practices – knowledge about societal norms I need to accept in 
order to make sense of the way personal names are hegemonically perceived in German 
society. Presuppositions are defined by the silenced and often unconscious acceptance of 
that normative knowledge. They are silently interpellated such as when it is acceptable 
to distinguish names on a linguistic level as German, Turkish or Arabic, and when it is 
acceptable that I as a non-migratized Berliner do not need to know how to pronounce 
the names of fellow Berliners that are migratized.
This chapter is organized around the assumption that structural discrimination in 
hegemonic everyday practices are historically grown and accustomed by the people that 
live in a society and share these practices as experiences of discrimination or privilege. 
After examining an exemplary naming situation with the sales agent, I introduce the 
conceptualization of accustoming as an unconscious process of acquiring 
presuppositions as a form of hegemonic knowledge. Secondly, I employ the dispositive 
approach in order to question hegemonic normative naming practices, which are 
constituted by the discriminatory effects of intersecting power relations. The research 
questions are generated by the methodology described in chapter 1.3 which enabled me 
to question the impact of ableism on naming practices, which I would not have 
otherwise done due to my accustomed silenced privileged point of view. The analyzed 
corpus consists of material from various discourse fields (academic, literature, popular 
science, activism) which deal with the relationship between social categorization and 
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naming: popular scientific information websites and blogs, belletristic narratives, 
newspaper articles, governmental brochures and websites, and research papers written 
from different mono-, inter-, transdisciplinary perspectives (onomastics, history, 
ethnology, sociology, postcolonial and postmigrant studies, disability studies).
2 . 1 A Sales Agent Comes By: A Random Tale of Everyday  
Discrimination in the Context of Naming31
One day in spring 2013, someone knocked on the door to my flat. When I opened it, I  
realized it was someone I did not know. I immediately ‘identified’32 this person as male 
on the grounds of how I learned to read a body as unchangeably gendered throughout a 
person’s life, as cis-male. While he was talking and showing me a laminated ID bearing 
his name and his company’s name, I was able to draw some conclusions about his 
positioning in Germany – based on how I learned to distinguish the color of skin, hair 
and eyes as well as ‘German’, ‘non-German’, ‘European’ and ‘non-European’ names in 
racist and migratist ways (cf. chapter 5.1). My visitor asked whether I was aware of the 
announcement in the stairway that he was scheduled to come and talk to people living 
on the block about their energy consumption. I was not aware of this but since I was not 
happy with my gas provider, I agreed. The consultation ended with me signing a 
contract. As he was preparing it, he asked about my name and apologized for possibly 
pronouncing it wrong, a comment that astonished me. Why would he think he needed to 
apologize to me? And why did I not apologize for not having had the same thought when 
he told me his name – a name I assumed would most likely be pronounced differently 
according to hegemonic German conventions; conventions that are racist and migratist 
according to counter-activist anti-racist, anti-migratist scholarship (cf. Otoo 2012; Mai 
2012; Klüger 2008; Klüger 2013; Prusher 2014; Tudor 2010; Tudor 2014; cf. chapters 5 
and 6.2.2.4). And I did not even admit it, so it was actually I who should have apologized 
for my lack of knowledge. Yet, his comment and my silent acceptance of the apology are 
31 I am grateful to an anonymous sales agent that shared his knowledge about racist name discrimina-
tion with me (Anonymous sales agent 2013).
32 For a critique on identity politics and the necessity of a politics of localization and critical position-
ing cf. Tudor 2010, Tudor 2011 and their reading of Collins 2000 and Rich 2003. Cf. also chapter 
1.3.2.
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meaningful because of the presuppositions that are implied in the context of the 
utterance, and the two of us implicitly seem to know that:
• personal names and naming practices are negotiated as being a part of the 
German language;
• concepts of ‘nation’, ‘origin’ and ‘non-/belonging’ are invoked, interpellated and 
re_constructed by personal names;
• the pronunciation and structure of personal names can be negotiated as signifiers 
for an assumed nationalized group membership;
• the idea of distinguishing between a ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ pronunciation of the so-
called German language(s) or names is important and powerful in Germany;
• despite the variety of ways to pronounce German names or language phonetically, 
only those classified as either a German dialect or high-German (which can 
actually be regarded as just another dialect) are hegemonically accepted as ‘right’ 
(or German);
• the idea that names can be pronounced differently only applies hegemonically to 
oral language use as well as to the ability to speak orally; therefore, sign language 
is silenced and de_mentioned as a linguistic form to express names;
• ideologies such as ‘integration’ and ‘equality’ are negotiated as achievable as long 
as the German language is pronounced and re_produced according to hegemonic 
standardization as ‘right’ and ‘original’ (high-German and other dialects). A 
pronunciation that is classified as ‘accent’ just because a set of phones and 
phonemes are considered nonGerman (cf. chapter 5) is negotiated as deviant with 
different discriminatory implications: Some accents seem to be negotiated as 
more desired than others (Robinet 2015:12). However, this implies that instead of 
focusing on ways to communicate efficiently in different contexts or how 
communication can be made possible, an imagined and constructed correctness 
is re_produced. By defining what is right or wrong, language use results in 
exclusion and Othering – not because communication is impossible but because 
certain ways to pronounce linguistic entities do not comply with the hegemonic 
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phonetic norms and become exotified (Hayn, Hornscheidt 2010). They are placed 
outside the linguistic community of the very language that alternatively could be 
used as a means of communication.
• only white, non-migratized people are hegemonically perceived and negotiated as 
able to speak German without any ‘accent’, whereby the linguistic competence of 
e.g. migratized Germans including white Germans, Germans of Color and Black 
Germans is silenced (cf. Sow 2008; Ergün 2010) and the linguistic competence of 
people that are assigned an accent is de_mentioned;
• it is negotiated as acceptable to categorize and essentialize people by using 
terminology that interpellates the discriminatory position in society, such as the 
term ‘migrants’.
While talking about how people are perceived according to their names in racist and 
migratist ways, what assumptions are made, and what stereotypes and discriminatory 
images are re_produced in people’s mind, he shared some experiential knowledge with 
me. In particular he stressed how often people had asked him where he came from and 
– after receiving an answer – continued to ask more personal questions, such as what 
his religious confession was, an experience that I as a non-migratized person never 
made with my name. Quite the contrary: It is possible that non-migratized people are 
asked whether their name is English, for example. However, according to Tudor, people 
with names that are perceived as Western European and, I would add, Christian are not 
questioned to be German (Tudor 2010; Tudor 2014; cf. chapter 5.3). This hegemonic 
idea was also behind the anti-Semitic politics of the 19th and early 20th century that first 
forced German Jews to change and assimilate their names to hegemonic Christian 
norms and later to specify their religion (cf. chapter 3.2.2.2.3). Thus, non-migratized 
people with non-migratizable names have historically held privileges on the grounds of 
migratist and racist perceptions of their names and origin. This experience of privilege is 
re_affirmed when hegemonic phonetic norms are negotiated as exclusively relevant for 
communication. They enable privileged non-migratized Germans as myself to decide 
whether to make the effort to learn and memorize the pronunciation of a name that,  
according to hegemonic discourse, is identified as non-German. The option to choose is 
based on a hegemonic understanding that only the German language and only some 
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ways of speaking German are negotiated as ‘correct’ or acceptable. In this way, the 
optionality inherently implies inequality and unequal treatment and re_produces the 
correctness ideology (cf. chapter 5).
Although this episode may appear to be an individual and coincidental story, I insist 
that the experiences we both made are neither coincidental nor individual (cf. chapter 
4). In this chapter I would like to illustrate that these kinds of naming presuppositions 
and assumptions are re_produced everyday, and that they are powerfully linked to the 
social categorization of people. Of course, this everyday episode of racism and migratism 
is experienced by individuals and is performed by individuals. However, I attempt to 
show that this experience is not exceptional but systematically shared by many, either 
from a deprivileged or privileged perspective; this experience is grounded in a 
hegemonically shared knowledge on how to negotiate people and their names. In 
particular, I question how people learn and get used to hegemonic ways of perceiving 
and negotiating people via their names. To what extent and when are naming practices 
discriminatory? Why is it important to acknowledge that being socialized in the 
hegemonic societies of Germany and Sweden means to have acquired an essentialist, 
discriminatory way of perceiving and negotiating people? I focus on naming strategies 
using not only my own example above but also various studies and individual but 
collectively shared stories which demonstrate that people are discriminated on the 
grounds of a conventionalized perception of their names and often not invited to job or 
housing interviews (cf. chapters 1.1.3 and 2.3.5).
During our conversation my visitor told me that in another job, he once had to do that 
exactly: sort out job applications according to certain criteria. His boss asked him to 
invite only those that had a ‘German’ name (such as Peter, thereby normalizing ‘male’ as 
well as non-migratized names as prototypical German and silencing migratized, non-
male Germans) and whose application photo ‘looked’ German (without a full beard, 
implying that ‘Germans’ do not have beards, at least not at that point in time). While he 
was explaining the racist_migratist procedure, it also became evident how the procedure 
was simultaneously constituted by sexism and genderism and more implicitly ableism. 
He only mentioned names and ‘looks’ that met hegemonic images of males and 
masculinities. ‘Male’ employers are also considered the norm on the labor market (cf. 
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Krause et al. 2012). A person named Peter, with or without a beard, would only in 
counter-discourses be conceptualized and perceived as a trans*man. The same applies 
to a migratized person named Ali who my visitor introduced as the counter-prototype to 
‘Peter, the non-migratized German’. The fact that ‘Ali’ hegemonically is identified as 
‘male’ might also be a stereotypical, normalized genderist practice for names that are 
perceived as non-European and non-Christian. Apart from a stereotypical perception of 
names, there is usually a hegemonic lack of competence on conventionalizations of how 
to gender migratized as well as racialized personal names (cf. chapter 2.3.1). In the 
hegemonic German linguistic community, the genderization competence regarding first 
names is mostly based on conventionalized use (cf. Seibicke 2008; Nübling et al. 
2012:129). However, some phonological structures such as names ending with a suffix 
like -a, -ine and -e are indeed negotiated in a structuralist way as interpellating 
genderization (here: femaleness), though form-oriented genderization of names is not as 
widespread, according to Damaris Nübling, Fabian B. Fahlbusch & Rita Heuser 
(Nübling et al. 2012:129–130; cf. chapter 5). From a deconstructivist perspective, the 
structure-oriented identification of ‘a name’s gender’ is nevertheless perceived as 
conventionalization, since this hegemonic knowledge about the normative effects of the 
suffixes a, -ine and -e as gender-distinct is also based on convention. Thus, I assume 
that racialized and migratized names are negotiated as gender-distinct only if they 
provide a phonological or phonotactic structure that is similar to the German one or if 
they are conceptualized as prototypical names.
This example shows how I became accustomed to perceiving and negotiating names in a 
German context that I have labeled here as hegemonic. With ‘hegemonic’ I mean the 
powerful effects of naming practices that are discriminatory and that are not reflected 
and challenged in a critical, power sensitive way. The classification of names as female 
or male, as German or non-German, as Christian or non-Christian is just one example. 
The categorization of names in these ways itself is motivated by hegemonic 
discriminatory perceptions of people. Names do not ‘have’ a meaning. They are ascribed 
to be German, female, and Christian. This is not what the name tells me. It is a  
knowledge that I have learned in order to read and perceive a name in this particular 
way. This form of classification is neither neutral nor objective (cf. chapter 1.2). Some 
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personal names are excluded from being intelligible as ‘German’ in the German 
hegemonic context. Instead, they are othered as migratized names. The option to 
conceptualize names as non-gendered, gender-free and gender-neutral is also made 
impossible. As the term ‘personal names’ suggests, the hegemonic presuppositions and 
assumptions on names rely on the idea that all people have names. This assumption is 
grounded in conventionalization and legislative obligation and less in the idea that 
people have a right to a name. Rather, the right to a name is limited by hegemonic 
conventions and obligations, as I discuss in chapter 6.1.2. That a name like my own, 
Evelyn, can be read as German (despite its classification as a loan name, cf. chapter 5.3) 
and as female (in English and Gaelic speaking contexts also as male though rather 
historically)33 is an information I have learned to know. I became accustomed because 
the name and myself as linked to that name are negotiated as non-migratized and hence 
white as well as womanisized and not because the name i s female or a recognized 
English loan name in the linguistic framework of German language use.
Feminist scholars have negotiated this process of gendering – or more generally of 
categorizing people – as a powerful performative act (Butler 2008); as a linguistic 
appellation process (Hornscheidt 2006; Hornscheidt 2008a); as a way of becoming: 
becoming a woman (de Beauvoir 1949), a lesbian which is not a woman in de Beauvoir’s 
sense (Wittig 1980), Black (Wright 2004), a migrant (Tudor 2010). Based on these 
scholarly knowledge productions it can be stated that identity is not given but ascribed 
and powerfully negotiated, re_produced and prevalently disseminated in Western 
discourses. When conceptualizations such as ‘gender’, ‘race’, ‘migration’, ‘class’, 
‘religion’ and_or ‘nation’ are invoked by personal names, it is not only necessary to 
reflect upon where this knowledge comes from but to also ask:
• What do I presuppose as knowledge? What is the ‘background’ knowledge I need 
to know and accept in order to be able to classify names as German, female, 
Christian or not?
33 According to Nüssler, Evelyn is recognized as a ‘female’ (f) name in the Danish (DA), German (DE) 
and English (EN) sources, whereas in the English and Gaelic (GA) sources it is also recognized as a 
‘male’ (m) name (Nüssler 2002:147).
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• Why do I seem to share this knowledge as well as the non-questioning of it with 
so many people? How is this knowledge distributed, acquired and accustomed 
with what consequences?
• What effects does the re_production of this implicit, tacit knowledge have in 
what contexts?
• When is this knowledge challenged and questioned and why? How do I deal with 
this knowledge after having learned to reflect upon it as discriminatory?
I will come back to these questions throughout this study.
2.2 Acquiring Personal Names. Accustoming as an Analytic  
Tool to Understand Ways of Getting Used to the  
Re_production of Hegemonic Knowledge
While thinking about ‘accustoming’ as a conceptualization for the analysis of names, it 
was helpful to link education and socialization processes with the acquisition of naming 
practices. I assume that the knowledge about names is part of the socializing process in 
which children acquire and internalize not only how to categorize others according to 
hegemonic norms but also how to identify themselves within these normative discourses 
by help of personal names.
2.2.1 Acquiring social categorization: how to identify others and 
oneself
The ‘identification’ of people with regard to ‘migration’, ‘race’, ‘ability’, ‘class’ and 
‘gender’ is something that people learn to do. To classify people is one of the first things 
children acquire. Against the background of a binary gender system that is powerfully 
normalized and re_produced in such Western societies as the German, Swedish and 
British (the following example is taken from the latter), Maisha-Maureen Eggers states 
from an educational, gender and critical race theory perspective that there is a diversity 
of options for women and men, girls and boys to identify and represent themselves as 
female and male:
“Both women and men have various self-representations [...] at their disposal. [...] 
After only seven years, girls and boys develop different self- and world 
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representations. A longitudinal study of the Open University London substantiates 
this work of distinction in a test situation entitled ‘Rocket Pop and Princess Pop.’ 
The same number of girls and boys is asked to choose a sherbet. The ‘rocket 
sherbet’ is presented with social symbols of masculinity, the color blue, an 
exploding stripe, a rocket. The ‘princess sherbet’ is presented with social symbols of 
femininity, the color pink, a white princess with yellow hair, a yellow wand with 
little stars. All children, except for one child, choose the sherbet that was assigned 
to their gender. All children, except for one, do not realize that it is exactly the same 
sherbet.”34
These processes of ‘identification’ that constitute people’s self-perception in terms of 
‘migration’, ‘race’, ‘ability’, ‘class’ and ‘gender’ are not realized in separated spaces; 
rather they constitute each other as, for example, in Germany:
“The current dominant image of childhood in Germany centers a white, middle-
class, blonde child as an epitome of innocence. Despite increasing pluralization, 
there is still an antiquated prototype of a ‘German’ child […]. It is a picture that was 
constructed especially in the second post-war period. It is an outdated picture of a 
naive, innocent child, as pictured, for example, on the Kinderschokolade package, 
or on the Brandt Zwieback package, or on the bottle of the Rotbäckchen juice.”35
As Eggers illustrates, the hegemonic environment that children grow up in creates 
unequal opportunities for self-identification. (cf. Kilomba 2010a:00:58–1:48; Hügel-
34 Original: “Sowohl Frauen als auch Männern stehen vielfältige Selbstrepräsentanzen […] zur Verfü-
gung. [...] Bereits nach sieben Jahren entwickeln Mädchen und Jungen unterschiedene Selbst- und 
Weltrepräsentanzen. Eine Längsschnittstudie der Open University London konkretisiert diese Un-
terscheidungsarbeit in einer Testsituation mit dem Titel ‘Rocket Pop und Princess Pop.’ [sic!] Die  
gleiche Anzahl von Mädchen und Jungen wird vor die Wahl einer Brause gestellt. Die ‘Raketen-
Brause’ ist aufgemacht mit gesellschaftlichen Symbolen von Männlichkeit, die Farbe blau, ein ex-
plodierender Streifen, eine Rakete. Die ‘Prinzessin-Brause’ ist aufgemacht mit gesellschaftlichen 
Symbolen von Weiblichkeit, die Farbe pink, eine weiße Prinzessin mit gelben Haaren, ein gelber 
Zauberstab mit Sternchen. Die Kinder entscheiden sich – bis auf ein Kind – alle für die ihnen 
geschlechtlich zugeschriebene Brause. Alle Kinder, bis auf einen [sic!], merken nicht, dass es sich 
um haargenau dieselbe Brause handelt.” (Eggers 2012:15, translated by EH).
35 Original: “Das gegenwärtige dominante Bild von Kindheit in Deutschland zentriert ein weißes, 
bürgerliches, blondes Kind als Epitome von Unschuld. Es herrscht [...] – trotz zunehmender Plural-
isierung – noch immer ein veralteter Prototyp eines ‘deutschen’ Kindes. Es ist ein Bild, das vor 
allem in der zweiten Nachkriegszeit konstruiert wurde. Es ist ein überholtes Bild eines naiven, un-
schuldigen Kindes, wie es bspw. auf der Packung der Kinderschokolade, oder auf der Packung von 
Brandt Zwieback, oder auf der Flasche von Rotbäckchen Saft abgebildet wird.” (Eggers 2013a:11, 
translated by EH).
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Marshall 2001:17). In contrast, as the citation shows, white children are able to identify 
themselves with their assigned gender roles, whereas
• children of Color are forced to identify with the white subjects, thus 
dis_identifying36 their themselves.
• disableized children are also forced to identify with ableized subjects and 
dis_identify themselves;
• children that do not or do not yet know the extent to which they identify with 
gender are forced to echo the provided binary-gender norms and thus 
dis_identify themselves.
According to Eggers, the branding of gender differences is a manipulation of the fiction 
of gender differences (Eggers 2013b). These processes of manipulation and 
dis_identification lead to the irrecoverable de_perception of the idea that people can be 
equal, here symbolized through pop rocks. Thus, the concept of manipulation can be 
transferred to all forms of discriminatory differentiation that result in oppression. From 
the position of “a forty-nine-year-old Black lesbian feminist socialist mother of two, 
including one boy, and a member of an interracial couple” (Lorde 2007:114), Lorde 
describes this experience as follows:
“For in order to survive, those of us for whom oppression is as american as apple 
pie have always had to be watchers, to become familiar with the language and 
manners of the oppressor, even sometimes adopting them for some illusion of 
protection.” (Lorde 2007:114)
Hence, oppression resulting from differentiation is something that structurally 
oppressed people become not only familiar with, but which is internalized in order to 
survive in a discriminatory society. Holocaust survivor Ruth Klüger reports that even 
before her seventh birthday, she knew about her exclusion from Vienna’s anti-Semitic 
society. In order to reject the anti-Semitic threat, she insisted on being called by her 
other first name that would most certainly be regarded as Jewish by hegemonic 
discourse (Klüger 2013, cf. chapter 6.2.2.3).
36 Cf. conceptualization of the use of the underscore chapter 1.1.2.
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Eggers confirms that children by the age of seven have already adopted and internalized 
the re_production of difference and ‘do difference’ where there is not any (cf. pop rocks; 
Eggers 2013b:10–11). Thus, according to Eggers’ reference to academic work by critical 
race theorists that identified racism as constitutive for the legal but also educational 
system of the USA, these fictions of difference which people learn to adopt have harmful 
effects. They appear to be neutral and even banal, as the pop rocks example above 
suggests. However, fictions actually re_produce dominant hegemonic images of people 
and silence how these images and fictions are secured in such everyday discourses as 
advertisement, children and school books, the news, forms of entertainment and, 
consequently, in naming practices. Eggers concludes:
“The being of the social world is learned under the sign of inequality conditions. 
The self-view and the world view of children are therefore strongly influenced by 
this knowledge of inequality.”37
Children’s perception of themselves as part of the social world is constituted by the 
identification of the individual, unique self which is, as I will show later, manifested by 
the assignment of a personal name (cf. chapter 6) and the identification of the social  
group(s) the children are ascribed to on the grounds of social categorization. In this way, 
the identification and re_production of internalized fictions of difference, but also of 
individualized uniqueness from one’s personal name, is just one aspect of hegemonic 
everyday discourse. In the following, I particularly want to question what knowledge is 
interpellated by naming processes. By following Eggers’ and Lorde’s observations, I 
examine how people become accustomed to naming processes on a cognitive level with 
the effect that the gendering, non-/migratizing and racializing of a name is normalized 
and taken for given.
2.2.2 Socializing personal names: how hegemonic naming practices 
are acquired, sedimented and structuralized cognitively
Sophia Marmaridou’s approach on language use, meaning and cognition provides a 
crucial conceptualization to examine the relationship between the interpellation and 
37 “Das So-Sein der sozialen Welt wird unter Zeichen von Ungleichheitsverhältnissen gelernt. Die 
Selbst- und Weltsichten von Kindern entwickeln sich daher stark geprägt von diesem Ungleich-
heitswissen” (Eggers 2013b:11, translated by EH).
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internalization of knowledge productions: According to Marmaridou “language is 
grounded in human cognition and develops in society” (Marmaridou 2000:3). She 
claims that ‘cognitive structures’ evolve in people’s cognition in response to their 
interaction with society. Hence, interaction provides the foundation for the negotiation 
and acquisition of meaning. This approach delivers an explanatory model for questions 
such as how people become used or accustomed to hegemonic naming practices and 
why, and takes both the processes of accustoming as well as structuralizing into account.  
While growing up, people learn to interact with hegemonic norms in society. Therefore, 
they acquire and accustom how meaning is negotiated, how things, events, people, and 
the way of conceptualizing knowledge becomes meaningful and what knowledge 
productions one ‘should’ know and re_produce. Hence, they learn and internalize the 
normative ‘rules’ of how to perceive and re_produce personal names, for example in 
German society, in a hegemonic way: as German or non-German, as female or male, as 
Christian or non-Christian. The fact that this way of perceiving and negotiating names is 
‘normal’ or ‘right’ has been constantly confirmed in and through hegemonic discourse by 
traditional linguistics, media reports and court decisions (cf. chapter 2.3, chapter 5, 
chapter 4.3 and chapter 4.4). Simultaneously, as Marmaridou 2000 suggests, these 
‘rules’ have been internalized and sedimented as ‘cognitive structures’ – or as I prefer to 
call them: structuralizations. According to a constructivist pragmatic point of view, I 
assume that structures are not given but instead appear to be given because of constant 
re_production and internalization. This structure-oriented, structuralist perception of 
the world silences the conditions under which structures evolve and sediment, namely 
within the framework of unequal and hierarchical power relations. Thus, by implicitly or 
explicitly assuming that, for example, a personal name represents a person’s ‘gender’, 
‘race’, ‘non/migration’, ‘dis/ability’ and ‘class’, it is silenced that ‘gender’, ‘race’, 
‘non-/migration’, ‘dis/ability’ and ‘class’ are not neutral or given categories but powerful 
categorizations to structure and hierarchize the social world. There is a vital reason as to 
why personal names are distinguished on the grounds of this structuralist 
understanding, and carries with it an important consequence: It provides and 
guarantees privilege as long as the name complies with the hegemonic conceptualization 
of privilege.
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But how and when does one ‘comply’ with regard to names? For example, a name that is  
hegemonically negotiated as German also makes its bearer appear German, which in 
Germany is associated with the ‘default’ privileged position of a white, non-migratized, 
cis-binary-gendered, Christian_secularized, ableized person (cf. also AK ProNa 2015:11–
12). However, this privilege can be overruled by a racist, migratist, ableist, genderist 
and_or classist perception of a person’s body, language use (e.g. style and/or 
pronunciation), looks and behavior. In hegemonic discourse, a name like Anna Kiss on a 
job application for an academic position might invoke the image of a non-migratized, 
white, cis-female, ableized person with an academic middle-class background. In this 
case, the name interpellates the normalized ‘default’ knowledge about a person that is 
shared in the German hegemonic discourse (cf. chapters 1.1.4 and 2.3.4). Yet, the same 
name might interpellate a different image or expectation when it is the name of
• a contact person that works in the Hungarian Embassy,
• a participant of the Special Olympics floor-ball team,
• the trainer of an empowerment workshop that addresses racist and genderist 
discrimination,
• or the artist of a transvestite performance show.
Hence, the perception of a name is always linked to a specific situation of utterance that 
determines when and to what extent a person is migratized, disabled, trans and gender 
non-conform and of Color. It also depends on the perspective a person has on names, 
whether counter-activist or hegemonic, that defines the relevance of a person who meets 
the respective expectations as being migratized, disabled, trans and gender non-conform 
and of Color. Conventionalized perceptions of names are bound to hegemonic discourse 
and reported in mainstream media. In this way, they are contrary to counter-activist 
discourses, such as the Special Olympics as well as anti-genderist, anti-racist  
empowerment workshops, which are mostly top news items in counter-discourses only.
Examining the perception of my own first name, Evelyn, I conclude that it usually is 
negotiated as ‘German’ and ‘female’ and no one was ever surprised to learn that I am 
white, non-migratized, Christian-socialized and ableized. I was also never surprised, 
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since this is how I learned to identify myself, as the default German, beyond my name 
and with different levels of consciousness. For example, I might have been conscious 
about the part-discriminatory effects of being perceived as ‘female’ from an early age but 
just like in and contributing to hegemonic discourse, I simultaneously silenced the 
privileging effects of cis-binary-gendering as well as being structurally positioned as 
white, non-migratized, ableized, Christian-socialized. Thus, the identification of myself 
by myself matched the expectations that are hegemonically interpellated by my first 
name. These expectations are linked to internalized structuralizations that powerfully 
position people within a society and that provide social positioning with meaning and 
relevance. To be identified in hegemonic discourse as ‘German’ or ‘German-like’ is 
relevant for a person’s life performance in society. Names that in a structuralist way are 
identified as ‘German’ are ‘inclusive’ and interpellate belonging to German society. A 
‘non-German’, ‘non-Christian’ name that according to accustomed hegemonic 
knowledge on ‘German’ names is not genderable is regarded in an excluding and 
Othering way. Thus, hegemonic political demands on ‘integration’ or ‘inclusion’ that 
negotiate in particular migratized people as those who need to take action, actually fail 
in their addressing practices. Addressees for actions would instead be people that are 
restricted in their way of perceiving and negotiating migratized people as Germans 
because of their structuralist perception of the world. Instead, the migratization and 
genderization of people based on their names are negotiated as relevant, necessary and 
inevitable practices in hegemonic discourse in Germany. Counter-activist discourses 
that intervene in this normative, structuralist understanding of necessity demonstrate 
the discriminatory consequences of name privilege, such as the exclusion of people on 
the job and housing markets (cf. chapter 1.2). However, by attempting to be and become 
aware of the discriminatory effects of hegemonic naming practices, privileged people 
can try to transfer this counter-activist knowledge into a critical positioning towards 
structural power relations (cf. chapter 1.3.2).
One way to reflect and deconstruct one’s own accustomed ways of thinking, perceiving 
and talking about people is to question to what extent one is aware of structural 
discrimination. As mentioned above, I assume power relations to form a framework – a 
dispositive – that constitutes the intelligibility of people and the knowledge about 
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people (Butler 2008). As AG Einleitung (2011) and Hornscheidt (2012) illustrate, the 
non-gendering of people and their discriminatory effects – also in and through naming 
practices – is not even conceptualized and spoken about in hegemonic discourse. Only 
by nominating dyke_trans as the empowered position that is discriminated by 
genderism (AG Einleitung 2011) and introducing trans_x_ing as a visionary 
intervention (Hornscheidt 2012; xart splitta e.V. n.d.), the cognitively unthinkable 
became tangible and intelligible. As AG Einleitung (2011) states with reference to Butler 
(2008) it is the unthinkable and unintelligible, the abject, that defines the boundaries of  
the hegemonic discourse. As soon as the abject enters hegemonic knowledge production, 
it leaves its traces and loses its status as the unthinkable – regardless whether 
hegemonic discourse appropriates this counter-knowledge or rejects it.38
In naming, this concerns the idea that names are non-genderable. In current German 
hegemonic discourse, it is unintelligible not to gender a name. This is obviously linked 
to the normative idea that people need to be gendered as either female or male (cf. AG 
Einleitung 2011; Butler 2008). Although some counter-activist knowledge on 
trans*_genderqueer as a non-fix and flexible gender conceptualization might have 
entered the discourse the hegemonic normative perception is, however, grounded in the 
fiction of a binary-gender-system. Hence, gendering as one of the most fundamental 
cognitive categorizations makes gender-free and gender non-conform names more or 
less unthinkable in hegemonic discourse (cf. Hornscheidt 2012). This leads to the fact  
that people that re_produce accustomed hegemonic knowledge continue to question 
and investigate the gender of a person on the grounds of their name, while 
simultaneously asking where a name comes from (cf. chapter 5.1). Lann Hornscheidt 
expresses the intersecting simultaneity of migratization and genderization of personal 
names in a spoken word poem:
“NO – A NAME […] AH – NOT FROM HERE – THIS IS WHY I CANNOT 
ALLOCATE AND CLASSIFY THE NAME: WHERE IS IT FROM? WHAT DOES IT 
MEAN? IS IT A WOMEN’S NAME THERE? A MEN’S NAME; THERE?”39
38 Cf. chapter 6.2.2.2, footnote 227 on appropriation of names and for rejection cf. basically all chap-
ters.
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Only by constantly searching for counter-discursive knowledge productions on naming 
as well as learning, daring, training and trying can one become more aware of the 
powerful effects of naming privileges. The final chapter 7 is devoted to the question of  
how one can actively become involved in re_producing and de_silencing counter-
knowledge on naming practices in an accountable way. But first, I attempt to provide 
some insights into the sedimentation processes that constitute the hegemonic 
framework within which names are perceived and negotiated in a discriminatory way in 
institutionalized and everyday discourses.
2.3 Framing Naming – Structuring Life in Germany and  
Sweden: Why Hegemonic Naming Practices are Discriminatory
“Power comes to appear as something other than itself, indeed, it comes to 
appear as a name.”
(Butler 1997:35)
The extent to which a name appears to be powerful or why power can be expressed 
through the perception of a name is at the core of this subchapter. In order to describe 
the relationship between personal names and power, I apply the concept of accustoming 
to the hegemonic sedimented context, in which discriminatory norms and 
categorizations are created, negotiated, confirmed and re_produced. AG Einleitung’s 
dispositive approach provides a methodological framework that has been conceptualized 
for the German context (AG Einleitung 2011) but may also be adapted to the Swedish 
one (Hornscheidt, Landqvist 2014). According to AG Einleitung (2011) and Hornscheidt 
(2012), every situation in which people interact is inevitably constituted by power. This 
consequently affects naming practices that are by no means innocent or non-effecting 
decisions, or as quoted in the beginning to this study: “Choosing, giving, and using a 
name are political acts” (Layne 2006:32).
39 Original: “NEIN – EIN NAME […] AH – NICHT VON HIER – DESHALB KANN ICH DEN NA-
MEN NICHT ZU- UND EINORDNEN: VON WO DENN? WAS BEDEUTET ER DENN? IST ES EIN 
FRAUENNAME DORT? EIN MÄNNERNAME; DORT?” (Hornscheidt 2016, translated by EH).
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In this study, power is understood as a structural framework. It is re_produced and 
confirmed by accustomed normative actions, such as naming, that are enacted every day 
and which are continuously negotiating what naming practices are thinkable, speakable 
and addressable or intelligible in society. As I illustrated in my introductory example, 
the intelligibility of naming is constituted by what I have learned as hegemonic 
knowledge productions. The knowledge on categorization presupposes that it is 
acceptable and normal to migratize and gender names. These presuppositions are taken 
for given and deeply sedimented in people’s cognition as unquestionable 
structuralizations (Marmaridou 2000). This is why I do not think that my perception of 
names is individual or unique but a shared knowledge that is hegemonically accepted on 
a structural level; structural because the ‘world’ is continuously and systematically 
perceived and negotiated in a structuralist way. Consequently, it is the exclusionary or 
limited conceptualization of people in German and Swedish society that lead to 
discrimination and privilege. In order to make discrimination more graspable – as AG 
Einleitung suggests – it became necessary in anti-discriminatory activism to distinguish 
and specify the various forms of discrimination that affect people differently yet 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a n d i n t e r d e p e n d e n t l y ( A G E i n l e i t u n g 2 0 1 1 ) : 
_racism_migratism_genderism_ableism_classism_.
2.3.1 When migratist, racist and genderist perceptions of names 
constitute each other
As stated in chapter 1.1.3 Tudor introduced migratization as an analytic concept that 
identifies the process of people’s inclusion in and exclusion from society (Tudor 2010; 
Tudor 2014): The only groups affected by migratization are those who are denied being 
perceived as Western Europeans and whose ‘origin’ is thus placed outside of Western 
Europe (Tudor 2010:410; cf. also El-Tayeb 2011; Wright 2004). In this way, the 
perception of names as well as of their bearers as non-Germans and non-Western 
Europeans normalizes migratization on a cognitive level. Every time a person is 
forcefully migratized on the grounds of their name, it is because of the normalization to 
perceive certain names in a migratist way and not because of the name or person. 
Whether a name is perceived as gendered often depends on the linguistic knowledge on 
how a personal name is negotiated: If the name is hegemonically negotiated as 
‘German’, then people will generally know how to gender the name through accustomed 
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conventionalizations accordingly. This form of accustoming is recognized in hegemonic 
discourse on names; while presenting a systematization on the ‘characteristics’ of first 
names in the German language, Wilfried Seibicke states that German speakers’ ability to 
gender a name is related to conventionalization on how to perceive a name, either on the 
name’s form and/or if ‘irregular’ (Seibicke 2008:106), as is mostly the case (cf. also 
Nübling et al. 2012:129), on its use. In her study on the gender perception of first names, 
Nübling poses the question of to what extent the sonority of names has changed during 
the second half of the 20th. She suggests that the sonority influences people’s 
conventionalized perception of names, also in terms of their genderability century 
(Nübling 2009). Nübling performed a diachronic analysis of the phonetical system of 
first names by comparing the extent of changes in the structure of names, which are 
hegemonically assigned ‘female’ and ‘male’ names. Her research resulted in the 
observation that since the beginning of the 21st century, names such as Horst and 
Helga40 that were popular during the Nazi regime and shortly afterwards have been 
replaced by names that share a similar sonority, such as Leon and Leonie (Nübling 
2009). According to Nübling, this is expressed by the identification of an increased 
occurrence of vowels such as /a/ and /i/ in ‘male’ names that previously would have 
been negotiated as markers for ‘female’ names. At the same time, the length of names 
has also supposedly changed, with ‘female’ names becoming shorter (and more similar 
to ‘male’ names). Nübling describes this change as a processual ‘androgynization’ 
(Nübling 2009:83). However, the extent needs to be questioned to which this phonetic 
‘trend’ actually represents a change in the cognitive perception of gender. For the US 
context, there is evidence that as soon as formerly ‘male’ names are more frequently 
used for ‘girls’, parents might tend to use these names less often for their ‘male’ 
newborns. Barry & Harper found out that those names that are identified as unisex are 
derived from names that previously were considered ‘male’ names in hegemonic 
discourse (Barry, Harper 1982; Barry, Harper 1993). An increasing use of the names for 
femalized children will ultimately result in avoiding their use for ‘male’ children 
(Nübling et al. 2012:127). Thus, this development illustrates how the androgenderist 
perception of cis-male people as the norm is re_produced and manifested by the 
40 Cf. chapter 6.2.1 for the practice of naming children Horst and Helga in Germany before and after 
1945.
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hegemonic ideology that cis-male cannot be associated with anything that interpellates 
‘femaleness’, whereas the other way around is acceptable. This androgenderist 
identification of the self begins at a very early age, when small boys re_produce 
hegemonic discourse on cis-masculinity and start to deny and avoid anything that might 
interpellate girlishness, thus fostering girl hate right from the start of their socialization 
(cf. also Nübling et al. 2012:127–128 and Alford 1988:148). As for the question of the 
interdependency of genderist and migratist name perceptions, it is necessary to stress 
that the name statistics on which Nübling’s analysis is based upon only comprised 
names that passed as German names. Conventionalized accustomed genderization of 
names presupposes a tacit understanding of ‘Germanness’ as the silenced norm.
If the gender conventions of migratized names are unknown, usually an accustomed 
German sprachgefühl is applied to migratized names, such as when a German court 
argues that ‘Kiran’ does not sound ‘female enough’ according to a German feel for 
language (cf. chapter 5). Genderism and migratism may be perceived as the most 
prevalent power relations when it comes to names; the question of how to gender and 
‘originate’ a person is interpellated in hegemonic discourses on names when names are 
negotiated as indicators for discrimination on the housing or job market (cf. chapter 1.2) 
or subject to court decisions on whether a name is gender-distinct (enough) (cf. chapters 
4 and 6.1.2). Since migratism and genderism are constantly re_produced and 
confirmed, they are convenient for accustoming while interdependently linked to each 
other. This also becomes evident when Fatima El-Tayeb states that gender-identity 
actually is conceptualized as white in the hegemonic European context (El-Tayeb 
2001:12).
Sharon Dodua Otoo presents another example that shows how whiteness and non-
migratization is normalized in hegemonic naming processes in her novella „the things i  
am thinking while smiling politely”. The protagonist distances herself from her last 
name that is usually migratized in the hegemonic discourses of the countries where the 
novella takes place, in the UK and Germany:
“Names are important, but I no longer know mine.
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I have never cared much for my so-called maiden name. Some officially suited 
white lady once glared at me in barely-hidden disgust when, in response to her 
customer-service trained polite enquiry, I told her that it really didn’t matter how 
she pronounced it. ‘Yes it does!’ She clenched her teeth slightly but definitely as she 
spoke. ‘It is your surname!’
My eyes spotted something quite amazing on a wall somewhere to the right of her 
head. Perhaps she had identity issues of her own. In any case, I really didn’t care. I  
didn’t even quite know how to bend and squash my Ghanaian name to suit English 
tongues – and leaving it to freely expand across my lips in its full tonal glory would 
simply underline even more how much I really did not belong. I wish Auntie had 
thought of that and had given me appropriate Afro-centric guidance before 
abandoning me to the indoctrination generally referred to as the British education 
system. I may have better learned how to handle my identity in public.” (Otoo 
2012:9–10)
The white person here migratizes the protagonist by insisting that their surname would 
be pronounced other than suggested by the protagonist and therefore differently than a 
pronunciation which followed internalized rules of British-English phonetics (cf. also 
chapter 5). In this way, the white person re_produces the hegemonic structuralist myth 
that there is one correct pronunciation of a name that simultaneously allocates the name 
as well as the person to a ‘place of origin’. As she insists that the pronunciation of the 
name cannot be British-English, the ‘place of origin’ of both name and person is then 
outside of the UK. It is also placed outside of Europe on the grounds of accustomed 
racist strategies, such as to cluster names linguistically as belonging to ‘language 
families’ (cf. for example Wikipedia 2016b; Lewis 2016), as well as to distinguish people 
visually in Black, PoC and – though hegemonically mostly silenced – white (cf. Wright 
2004; Kelly 2012a; Tudor 2010; Tudor 2014) as well as chapter 1.1.3). Specific to 
hegemonic linguistic clustering in language families is the colonialist perspective from 
which languages were classified: Languages were not only assessed and categorized by 
Western comparative linguists; by claiming that languages are genetically related, they 
also applied the racializing as well as reprogendering concept of biological relationships 
within families to languages at a metaphorical level. In this way, the “officially suited 
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white” (Otoo 2012:9–10) person re_produced a colonial scenario in which the Black 
protagonist is conceptualized as genetically not belonging to Europe and thus not 
authorized to pronounce her last name as they chooses or to have a name that  
hegemonically is recognized as belonging to Europe, or, as in the following case, to 
Germany: When the protagonist actually changed her name after marriage to “a 
surname so unambiguously of the country he [=husband] was born, raised and lived in”, 
“other officially suited white ladies in cold offices” still questioned the Black person’s 
last name (Otoo 2012:10). In this way, whiteness is re_produced as the norm for 
surnames that are perceived as European, as well as for all practices that are linked to 
hegemonic norms of acquiring a last name in Europe, such as by birth and/or by 
marriage. This is also expressed through the insistence that the correct pronunciation of  
the Black protagonist’s surname is important, which does not allow the name to lose its 
repro- or androgendering impact. As a womanisized person the protagonist also has to 
deal with the complexity of genderism that negotiates the surname as a symbol for 
‘belonging’ to the family of the biological father or, when heteronormatively married, 
husband (cf. chapter 6.2.2.1). This connection is also addressed in Otoo’s novella:
“And yeah, the other reason that I mistreated my name was because I did not want 
to be associate with my father any second longer than strictly necessary.” (Otoo 
2012:10)
In this colonialist setting, name change – which in Germany is legally normalized only 
in the context of marriage (cf. chapter 3) – can be regarded as a counter-activist, anti-
racist and anti-reprogenderist practice (cf. chapter 6.2.2.1).
2.3.2 When a racist perception of names is linked to the invention of a 
Christian Europe
As stated above, a hegemonic perception of names as ‘German’ simultaneously 
interpellates not only non-migration and the ‘ability’ to gender people according to an 
assumed binary-gender system but also whiteness per default. Next to the default 
classification of ‘Germanness’ as white, another strategy can be identified as a racist 
classification of people on the grounds of their names; namely, when names are ascribed 
religious (other than pseudo-secularized Christian, cf. El-Tayeb 2011:xx; El-Tayeb 
2011:xxvii) and non-European belonging. This is the case when people are racialized on 
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the grounds of anti-Semitic or anti-Muslim images. With regard to the European 
hegemonic context, El-Tayeb defines the continental European perceptions of racism 
and race as conceptualizations that are denied existing:
“Race, at times, seems to exist anywhere but in Europe, where racialized minorities 
have traditionally been placed outside of the national and by extension continental 
community. Europe can thus be situated within the larger context of ideologies of 
Colorblindness that prohibit discourses around racialized oppression […] In its 
European version, this ideology is characterized by the convergence of race and 
religion as well as the externalization of racialized populations […] European racial 
and religious diversity is less a reality than a threat to the continent’s very essence.”  
(El-Tayeb 2011:xvii)41
It seems important to note that names and naming practices in hegemonic white 
American,Cana dian or Australian society are also conceptualized in this context as 
European since in Europe, names and family background are often negotiated with links 
to ‘immigration’ as a form of European colonialism. In these contexts, migratism as a 
discriminatory power relation does not apply to naming practices, since the idea of a 
migration history or background constitutes the image of hegemonic North American 
and Australian nationalism (Shohat 1998; Shohat, Stam 1994). However, this does not 
prohibit migratism_racism in the form of racial profiling of people who are classified 
and criminalized as ‘illegal immigrants’ in the US context and who are considered as 
non-white and therefore of a non-European background (Murray 2010). Another 
example of naming that is influenced by Christianity’s dominance in Europe is the anti-
Semitic prohibition of the first name Judas at German registry offices. As the web portal 
www.vorname.com reports, ‘Judas’ was forbidden as a first name because of its 
Christianity influenced interpellation of Judas Ischariot’s betrayal of Jesus Christ that 
could result in vilification (cf. Fröschle 2008). The name is also metaphorically widely-
used as a synonym for betrayal. This dominant Christian image overruled the relevance 
of the name in Judaism.
41 Cf. also Hornscheidt, Nduka-Agwu 2010 for a culturalist understanding of racism, cf. Wright 2004 
for a distinction between ‘Others from within’ and ‘from without’ Europe.
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Hence, a name that is considered of ‘German origin’ in hegemonic discourse is also 
interdependent with religiousized conceptualizations; conceptualizations that negotiate 
religion as a crucial categorization of people (cf. Brunner 2011 for the concept of 
religiousization). Similar to racialization and migratization, the hegemonic ‘religious’ 
norm in Germany – Christianity – is silenced. Here, the conceptualization of 
Christianity also includes its pseudo-secularized continuities in, for example,  
negotiating Christian names such as ‘Christian’ as German (cf. Nüssler 2002:94) and the 
elsewhere mostly ‘female’ name ‘Maria’42 as an intelligible second name for ‘boys’ 
(NamÄndVwV, Bundesministerium des Inneren 2014: section 67).43 The complexity of 
this privileged localization in hegemonic discourse is discussed and further analyzed by 
(Tudor 2010) and (Hornscheidt 2010) as ‘statization’. Statization is the normalized 
linguistic conceptualization that defines the members of a group as belonging to the 
German ‘nation state’, for example, via their personal names and language use. In this 
way, statisized people are localized as privileged as opposed to migratized people who 
may have names that are perceived as non-German or non-Western European.
2.3.3 When an explicit ableist perception of names is exceptional
At the beginning of my research, ableism appeared to me as a power relation that has a 
less immediate constitutive effect on naming practices due to the normative perception 
of people I had become accustomed to. As far as I am aware, in current hegemonic 
Swedish or German discourses personal names are not negotiated as signifiers for 
people who are conceptualized as ‘abled’ or ‘disabled’. Employing an intersectional 
approach, however, made me more conscious about the ableist perception of names. 
Some last names may interpellate ableist conceptualizations that today are no longer 
tied to the name bearer’s social localization as abled or disabled. In German hegemonic 
discourse, the surname ‘Lahm’ can in its use as an adjective interpellate ableist 
conceptualizations, such as ‘lame’ or ‘paralyzed’. This conventionalized meaning is 
mainly interpellated and linked to the name bearer to ‘mock’ them. For instance, 
influential onomastic linguist Jürgen Udolph explains that the last name of professional 
42 According to Nüssler’s sources, Maria is negotiated as f in BI, DA, DE, EN, ES, FR, GA, IT LA, NL, 
PL, PT, RM, SV and m in DE, NL, SV (Nüssler 2002:283).
43 Cf. also Lange 1993 for how Christianity has constituted hegemonic supposedly secularized Euro-
pean values.
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soccer player Lahm could be linked to the fact that one of his ancestors was probably 
slow, had a weakness of the limbs or palsy and comments: “Completely inappropriate 
for someone who has to earn his living with his feet.”44
By mentioning disability explicitly as a way to understand the assumed ‘original’ 
meaning of the name, the negotiation of ‘lahm’ as characteristic for its name bearer and 
as an impediment for playing soccer is discriminatory. Instead of advocating that people 
can also make a living from playing soccer in a wheelchair45, the normative 
conceptualization of how to play soccer in order to be athletically and economically 
successful is re_produced. Thus, marginalized forms of playing soccer are 
de_conceptualized/made unintelligible as a sport that people in wheelchairs could do 
for a living. As Hornscheidt has discussed for the evaluation of linguistic pejorization 
(Hornscheidt 2011b), in this case it is not the ableized soccer player Lahm who is 
discriminated but those who are marginalized through the re_production of the ableist 
conceptualization of the name ‘Lahm’ in this very context.
From a historical perspective however, last names could have been negotiated as 
signifiers for a person’s dis/ability. In what is called one of the German speech 
communities today, last naming became more and more common from the 13th century 
onwards. Nübling, Fahlbusch & Heuser negotiate the introduction or use of last names 
as a means to distinguish people with same first names from each other. While people 
were mostly named after their fathers (Nübling et al. 2012:149) or professions (Nübling 
et al. 2012:150), some names were used to describe a person’s ‘character’ using the body 
perception (Nübling et al. 2012:155), particularly by describing diseases and deviations 
from a hegemonically conceptualized body norm (Nübling, Dammel 2007:145). Names 
such as Klein, Vogelhaupt, Schily or Lahm could at the time interpellate an ableist 
perception of those named so and most likely not in praise of their body height, head 
shape, position of their eyes or ability to walk (cf. Kunze 1998:141–145). Notions that 
interpellate body parts can also be associated with accustomed racialized and gendered 
perceptions of people in the context of racial and gendered distinctions. El-Tayeb 
44 Original: “Völlig unpassend für jemanden, der sich seinen Lebensunterhalt mit den Füßen verdi-
enen muss.” (Udolph, Fitzek 2005:111, translated by EH).
45 Cf. Federation Internationale de Powerchair – Football Association (FIPFA), contact via website: 
http://fipfa.org. Germany and Sweden have not yet been assigned membership.
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declares for the German context that in this way, Black people were de_classified as well 
as belittled and thus de_ableized on an ‘intellectual’ level (El-Tayeb 2001:23, cf. chapter 
6.2.2.1). Hence, this form of naming people that seeks to name and mark their 
discriminatory social localization in society is regarded as an example for name 
pejorization (cf. chapter 1.3).
In comparison to naming conventions in Sweden (cf. chapter 3.2.3) it seems that in the 
‘German’ context, last names are less self-chosen and more assigned from others within 
the speech community. Thus, it needs to be asked if all people who were disableized 
before registration was institutionalized were actually recognized as people/citizens and 
assigned a last name. Furthermore, what forms of ability were recognized and 
negotiated as dis/abled needs to be discussed. As it can be assumed that only disableized 
people received a pejorizing last name, it remains an open question whether all other 
last names were assigned to ableized people only. Consequently, all last names that did 
not interpellate disability could have been negotiated as signifiers for ability. These 
questions must be investigated further.
2.3.4 When an ableist perception of names is unintelligible
The negotiation of last names as ableized is a practice still common today, not on the  
grounds of the negotiation of their meaning but on the grounds of the conventionalized 
perception of people as ableized – or according to Linton – as the default non-disabled 
(cf. chapter 1.1.4). Linton states:
“In this book [the disability studies reader, EH], the terms disabled and non-
disabled are used frequently to designate membership within or outside the 
community. The use of non-disabled is strategic: to center disability. [...] This 
action is similar to the strategy of marking and articulating ‘whiteness’. The 
assumed position in scholarship has always been the male, white, non-disabled 
scholar; it is the default category. As recent scholarship has shown, these positions 
are not only presumptively hegemonic because they are the assumed universal 
stance, as well as the presumed neutral or objective stance, but also 
undertheorized. The non-disabled stance, like the white stance, is veiled. […] 
Therefore, centering the disabled position and labeling its opposite non-disabled 
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focuses attention on both the structure of knowledge and the structure of society.” 
(Linton 2006:163)
Since the association with a default ableized name bearer is more implicit in the context 
of naming, it can be asked to which extent disableized people are made unintelligible in 
hegemonic naming contexts. Which consequences does this have for the recognition of 
disableized people as citizens (cf. chapter 6.2.3). They become evident when regarding 
conventionalized accustomed forms of politeness and respect. In conventionalized 
German discourse, at a certain age and status people are addressed by the personal 
appellation ‘Frau’ (Ms or Mrs) or ‘Herr’ (Mr) followed by their last name in order to 
comply with a hegemonic understanding of politeness. This understanding is not only 
constituted by the assumption of a binary-gender system but also by ableist 
conceptualizations of age and status. The web portal Leidmedien.de confirms that 
disableized people are often denied the same norms of politeness and respect (cf.  
chapter 6.2.3). This is why it suggests some strategies of how to address and talk to 
disableized people when they are accompanied by another person for an interview: They 
are the addressees, not the company (Masuhr n.d.a). The website also presents positive 
and negative examples of news reporting. Just to name a few that are linked to 
addressing people, positive examples would represent adult disableized people just like 
adult ableized persons with their full or last name in an article’s title (Maskos n.d.b)) 
and not with their first name only or with an appellation form that marks their ascribed 
disability in a discriminatory way (Maskos n.d.a, chapter 6.2.3). The refusal to address 
them with a personal appellation – though gendered and related to age – can also be 
regarded as a form of depersonalization in a society where genderization and the idea of 
a ‘legal age’ is conditional for the recognition of being a human, which also implies the 
recognition of ‘full legal capacity’. Also, poor people, migratized people, Black people 
and People of Color are often denied the same forms of politeness and respect that the 
privileged default group of people conventionally regards as being entitled to.
Centering disability would de_conventionalize hegemonic discourses in order to reflect 
upon their ableist exclusions. The conceptualization of my own research is constituted 
by ableist exclusions, as well. For instance, due to my present lack of knowledge of the 
German and Swedish sign languages, the analysis of naming practices in sign language 
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use is not a part of my research. As an example, Julia Probst explains that there are at 
least three different sign names for German chancellor Angela Merkel that interpellate 
different conceptualizations of Merkel e.g. by using a sign word for ‘Merkel’ that 
reminds of the chancellor’s name – ‘merken’ (to memorize). The other two express 
visual characteristics of Merkel (Probst 2010; Schulz 2012:00:35–00:58), which is one 
typical way the community assigns a sign name to a person.
2.3.5 When the perception of names is classist – and migratist
Returning to the historical establishment of last names as a more and more obligatory 
social practice, people were also classified and named in classist ways, such as poor. This 
was expressed in last names such as ‘Klum’, perhaps conventionally negotiated at the 
time as ‘short of money’ (Udolph, Fitzek 2005:90–91). However, this name today would 
not be associated with poverty. In fact, it appears that today also first names are 
perceived in a classist way. The knowledge that names are negotiable as signifiers for a 
lower class background has even entered the hegemonic discourses. However, this 
classist recognition of names applies only to names that pass as ‘German’ – thereby 
imagining their name bearers as non-migratized and white. Thus, the medial attention 
cannot be regarded as coincidental. This default association has already been confirmed 
by El-Tayeb, who stated for the German context that ‘classism’ is a white 
conceptualization (El-Tayeb 2001:70–71).
This is why the hegemonic reception of classist name perception in Germany concerns 
only a certain group of names (cf. Hayn 2015). In public discourse, giving children 
names of ascribed American or French ‘origin’ is identified as a trend that is derogatorily 
labeled as ‘Kevinism’ or ‘Chantalism’ and that, consequently, prototypes ‘Kevin’ and 
‘Chantal’ as ‘lower class’ names (cf.
Weiler 2007; Pribyl 2008; Bielefeld [2009]; Carl von Ossietzky-Universität Oldenburg 
16/09/2009; Chantalismus 2013). Mandy, Peggy, Ronny and Sandy, all names ending 
with ‘y’, fall under a similar stigmatizing classist perception (cf. Hähnig 2012) that 
builds upon a negative image of Eastern Germany. During the 1970s, these names were 
popular in the GDR (Nübling et al. 2012:141) as they, according to Denis Huschka, 
Jürgen Gerhards & Gert G. Wagner, were negotiated as counter-reaction to the 
oppressive political system. They conclude that
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“[a]lthough East Germany was part of the East European world, parents did not 
adopt names from their socialist friends but rather oriented their choices 
Westwards — and particularly across the Atlantic. This may be due to a widespread 
rejection of Communist ideology on many levels of society. Russian names were 
extremely unpopular, which can be regarded as a form of silent (but visible) 
protest.” (Huschka et al. 2009:224)
However, after the accession of the GDR to West Germany, hegemonic negotiations of 
names became dominated by Western discourses, which led to a change in the 
perception of these y-names. Educationalist Astrid Kaiser is quoted in the online version 
of the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit Online as saying that the stigmatized 
perceptions of names as typically Eastern as well as the lower-class phenomena have 
become fused (Hähnig 2012). Another form of perceptive fusion comprises migratized 
names that are simultaneously associated with an assumed lower-class background. 
However, this classist perception is subordinated by the immediate perception of 
migratized names as non-German, which implies an image of lower class. Hence, an 
analysis that only focuses on the classist perception of names would silence white 
privilege (cf. Steinmetz 2014).
As for the Swedish context, it is interesting to note that the hegemonic perception of 
names as classist is comparable to the hegemonic naming practices in Germany. The 
classist – hence migratist – perception of names also concerns in particular names that 
end with the letter ‘y’ (cf. Hayn 2015). Similarly, the so-called y-name syndrome (cf. e.g. 
Hagström 2006; Segerborg, Söderström 2010) was also vividly discussed in the media, 
especially since in 1996 Ronny Ambjörnsson, a Swedish white, non-migratized, cis-male 
academic and author, published his autobiography “My first name is Ronny” 
(Ambjörnsson 1996). The title of the book presupposes a prototypical classist perception 
of y-names in order to make sense. As in German hegemonic discourse, y-names are 
conceptualized as US-American/English names and thereby associated by default with 
images of white, non-migratized people with low economical and educational 
backgrounds who cannot be or become professors (cf. Hagström 2006; Segerborg, 
Söderström 2010). According to Charlotte Hagström, the latter is due to the assumption 
that names, which are negotiated as modern, are particularly used in communities that 
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want to demonstrate their recognition of modernity and progress through naming 
practices (Hagström 2006:60). Simultaneously, elitist and established communities use 
conservative names, which are also in line with social expectations (cf. Hagström 
2006:61). Thus, the sustainability and continuity of their high-class position is secured:
“An obvious sign that he [Ronny Ambjörnsson, EH] did not really belong, that he 
was not one of them was his name. It is a working-class name and a professor is not 
called Ronny! The same applies for most original American (nick) names. They 
signal a different origin, a different environment.”46
Hence, it might not be surprising that despite this hegemonic prejudice, it was 
nevertheless possible for white, non-migratized, cis-male Ronny Ambjörnsson to 
succeed as a well-known professor. Today, this case also demonstrates that the 
hegemonic classist associations with y-names may have changed due to the privilege of 
being positioned as a white, non-migratized, and cis-male person.47
This is the reason it is important to apply an interdependent perspective to the analysis 
of naming practices. ‘Ronny’, ‘Kevin’ and ‘Chantal’ may be negotiated in classist ways. 
However, the hegemonic perception of names as racialized, migratized and gendered 
can result in similar classist effects, such as higher unemployment rates. Several studies 
on social equality give reason for linking discrimination on the housing and labor 
market to the discriminatory perception of personal names as binary-gendered or 
migratized (cf. for instance Akman et al. 2005; Ahmed, Hammarstedt 2008; Bursell 
2007; Kaas, Manger 2010; Krause et al. 2012; Senatsverwaltung für Integration 2010). 
By dealing with classist questions such as income and education, these studies show 
how a sexist/genderist, racist and migratist perception of names also results in classist 
discrimination. A person with a migratizable name is often excluded from the job 
market because of a hegemonic discriminatory image that excludes migratized persons 
from being recognized as Germans. They are likewise also excluded from the housing 
46 Original: “Ett tydligt uttryck för att han [Ronny Ambjörnsson, EH] inte riktigt hör hemma, att han 
inte är en av Dem, är namnet. Det är ett arbetarnamn och en professor heter inte Ronny! Samma 
sak gäller för flertalet ursprungligen amerikanska (smek-)namn. De signalerar ett annat ursprung, 
en annan miljö.” (Hagström 2006:61–62, translated by EH).
47 I am grateful to Eva Brylla and Lann Hornscheidt for their feedback on the Ronny Ambjörnsson 
case when I presented my paper at the 8th Nordic Conference on Language and Gender at Södertörn 
University, 11 October 2013 (Brylla, Hornscheidt 2013).
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market. However, most of these studies have not yet applied an intersectional approach 
that recognizes ways of how the racializing, gendering and migratizing of names 
constitute an interdependent discriminatory situation. Based on the intersecting effects 
of structural power relations, it can be assumed that migratized womanisized persons 
are less likely invited to a job interview as migratized ‘men’, if their name is recognized 
as ‘female’. In comparison to non-migratized women, migratized ‘men’ are less likely to 
be chosen. Thus, there is a lack of statistics-oriented studies that take intersectional 
discrimination into account.
2.3.6 When cis-binary-gendering is a statisized naming practice
Another similarity between the hegemonic naming practices in Sweden and Germany 
concerns the nationalized conceptualization of names as ‘Swedish’ or ‘German’. Those 
naming practices can be identified as ‘statization’. Tudor 2010 as well as Hornscheidt 
2010 introduce and discuss statization as an interdependent conceptualization for the 
German and for the Swedish contexts48 that negotiates the localization privileged by 
migratism (Tudor 2010; Hornscheidt 2010). This means that names are not only 
constituted by non-migration, concepts of whiteness and pseudo-secularized 
Christianity but also by the practice of gendering people as cis (that is non-trans) and in 
accordance with the binary-gender system. Statization as a localization is usually either 
silenced or under-theorized49 in hegemonic discourse. Hence, when it comes to the 
perception and negotiation of last names in Germany and Sweden, cis-binary-
genderable names are mostly conceptualized as statisized.
As stated above, the genderability of names depends on their statisizability. El-Tayeb 
identifies the hegemonic conceptualization of gender in a German context as white. In 
this way, only the white subject is thought of when gender is at stake (cf. El-Tayeb 
2001:12). Additionally, the statisized gendering of names also comprises hetero- and 
repronormative naming practices. ‘Heteronormative’ means here the normalization of a 
48 Cf. workshop “Feminist Approaches on Racism and Migratism as Concepts for Analysing Swedish 
and German Realities from a Constructivist and postcolonial Perspective” at Institutionen för mod-
erna språk: Tyska, University of Uppsala/Sweden, 13.-15. May 2010. The workshop was organized 
and co-chaired by Lann Hornscheidt; Alyosxa Tudor introduced and discussed ‘migratism’ for the 
Swedish context.
49 A hegemonic conceptualization of ‘Swedish’ or ‘German’ as white makes identifications such as 
Jewish Swedes of Color or Muslim Black Germans unthinkable and unintelligible (cf. chapter 3.2).
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heterosexual, pseudo-secularized Christian form of lifestyle that is expressed through 
sexist or hetero- as well as androgenderist (AG Einleitung 2011) naming practices: In the 
case of a heteronormative marriage, the womanisized person assumes her husband’s last 
name. Thus, the sexist secularized-Christian idea of the ‘woman’s belonging’ to the 
household of a male person (cf. Limbach 2003) is re_produced and the ‘male’ (= andro) 
is re_centered (hence the conceptualization of ‘androgenderist’).50 With the legislative 
introduction of equal rights between people that identify as women and men in 1958, 
womanisized persons in West Germany51 were allowed to keep their ‘own’ (= their 
father’s) last name when marrying but only as a hyphenated last name (Wiegmann 
2003). Yet, this name would not be used as a ‘family’ name for the children; therefore,  
the androgenderist naming tradition was and mostly is still re_produced, since the 
woman’s last name is not passed on. Today the family name can be either the woman’s  
or her husband’s last name (Nübling et al. 2012:162). In the GDR, hyphenated names 
were accepted only in 1988, despite the fact that the legislative equalization of cis-
binary-gendered people was introduced earlier than in the FRG (Ministerium des 
Inneren 1954). Politician Katrin Göring-Eckardt is negotiated as a prominent example of 
one of the first married women bearing a hyphenated last name in the GDR. In an 
interview, she explains that the hyphenation was meant to prevent sharing the same 
name with a Nazi mass-murderer (cf. Zylka 2003, chapter 6.2.1). However, legislation 
did not prevent her from having to assume the last name of her husband, Göring, and 
the extent needs to be questioned to which hyphenation really helped to disrupt the Nazi 
appellation. This begs the question of why name legislation still favors and protects 
names that can interpellate trauma to people who were persecuted and lost their 
families, relatives and friends during the Holocaust and Porajmos.
The idea of ‘belonging’ is also realized in a racist repronormative or reprogenderist (AG 
Einleitung 2011) way: Since in Germany last names are distinguished and 
50 This stands in a historical continuity as also expressed in the RuStAG of 1913: Women assumed the 
citizenship of their husbands. That is, a non-German womanisized citizen became a German citizen 
by marriage, whereas a German womanisized citizen lost German citizenship and took on the citi-
zenship of her non-German husband. This did not apply for men. Despite the advances of women’s 
suffrage, the law was not changed and therefore re_produced the hetero-repronormative concept of 
‘family’ as highly patriarchic. This was only changed in 1969. Cf. Ehmann, Stark 2008:22–23.
51 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
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institutionalized as names of the ‘marriage’ as well as ‘family’ (Nübling et al. 2012:161–
164; cf. chapter 6.1.2) they interpellate the idea of families as mostly biologically 
connected communities. These communities of ‘German families’ have been 
institutionalized as w h i t e and pseudo-secularized Christian52. They are still 
conceptualized as such in hegemonic discourse in the context of default-setting. In 
Germany, belonging to a family is realized through a shared name with the supposed 
‘father’. In Sweden, the repronormative practice has additionally and even more 
explicitly been expressed through patronymics and less often metronymics: The 
‘father’s’ or mother’s first name was put into the genitive and the suffixes -son 
(interpellating ‘male’ child) or -dotter (interpellating ‘female’ child) were added. 
According to Brylla this was a normalized practice in rural areas of Sweden until the 
second half of the 19th century, when last patronymics and less often metronymics 
ending with -son became more established as shared family names (Brylla 2002). 
However, this did not apply to names ending with -dotter (cf. Brylla 2002:70). This 
omission of the ‘daughterized’ form of the metronymics or patronymics as a generic 
valid family name is still re_produced with the name legislation of 1982. Although it 
enabled to create the own last name according to the former metronymic/patronymic 
practice, it is still regulated by sexist/cis-binary-androgenderist norms: Fatimasson can 
be the metronymic for both Fatima’s daughter and son but Fatimasdotter is restricted 
for the womanisized child only (cf. chapter 6.1.2). However, before the establishment of  
the personal name law in 1963 that made having a last name obligatory, only names 
ending with -son were used as family names (Brylla 2002). With the name law of 1982, 
the chronology of the reprogenderist practice of the metro- and patronymic in some 
cases is disrupted by the daughter’s first name as the root, for example Nathaliespappa53. 
The new name law that shall enter into force on July 1st, 2017 is expected to be even 
more liberal with regard to the passing, choosing and changing of names (cf. chapter 
3.1.2, Justitiedepartementet 2016).
52 Cf. debate on ‘interracial’ marriages as a political topic at the German Reichstag in 1912, as well as  
the establishment of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 which were repealed on September 20th 1945 by 
Law No. 1 of the Allied Control Council (cf. El-Tayeb 2001, Deutschland (Gebiet unter Alliierter Be-
satzung). Kontrollrat 20/09/1945).
53 ‘Nathaliespappa’ here means ‘Nathalie’s dad’.
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2.4 Summary
In this chapter I aimed to conceptualize accustoming as an approach for the analysis of  
why and how naming practices are and remain discriminatory. The conceptualizations 
of the dispositive and of default-setting provide an important methodological framework 
for the analysis of accustomed naming practices. I have focused on the structuralist way 
of how discriminatory naming practices are enacted in order to demonstrate on a 
structural level why and how the discriminatory way to conceptualize, perceive and 
negotiate names and naming practices are deeply rooted in hegemonic discourse and 
re_produced everyday, also cognitively. This is expressed e.g. through linguistic 
strategies such as the de_mentioning of counter-discourses and the denaming 
(Hornscheidt, Nduka-Agwu 2010) of the bias in hegemonic knowledge production: For 
example, in Swedish and German societies the invention of the binary-gender-system, of 
a nationalized ‘origin’, of (pseudo-secularized) Christianity and more implicitly of the 
ableized name bearer as well as of the migratized/racialized ‘Other’ is presupposed in 
naming practices and never questioned as historical constructions. These forms of 
silencing knowledge are just some examples of how hegemonic naming practices have 
been accustomed collectively on a structural level and how this form of accustoming is 
discriminatory (cf. chapter 2.2).
Accustoming can be understood as a central social process by which the conditions to 
perceive and negotiate the social world are constituted. Even without knowing a person, 
one makes powerful assumptions about them simply from the perception of their name. 
People became accustomed to differentiating names on the grounds of specific criteria, 
such as linguistic entities they learned to perceive as a German/non-German, 
female/male, Christian/non-Christian name (cf. chapter 5). This form of dichotomous 
classification is based on the idea and belief that there are structurally distinguishable 
languages as well as people that are not only labeled but that are substantially 
German/non-German, female/male, Christian/non-Christian. The idea of ‘being’ is an 
effect of the making and fixation of criteria according to which people and languages are 
differentiated. Children growing up in German and Swedish societies quickly accustom 
these forms of social differentiation as knowledge that plays an important and crucial 
role in society. Therefore, they get used to perceiving and negotiating people (and 
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languages) in a categorically fixed, distinct and inflexible way instead of understanding 
the identification and differentiation of people (and languages) as a process that is 
constantly re_produced by the linguistic assignment of categories and labels, for 
example. As this ongoing process of identity construction is barely questioned in 
hegemonic discourse, people conventionalize and normalize – accustom – the 
re_production and affirmation of the identity construction process as an existing 
structure or system on which a society is supposedly based. Hence the idea that a name 
is migratizable/non-migratizable, racializable as well as genderable is negotiated as an 
already existing, given and essential knowledge and not as a constructed, constantly 
re_produced and structurally and collectively ascribed idea and effect of ableism, 
migratism, racism and genderism. Furthermore, the fact that power relations constitute 
each other interdependently is made unintelligible in naming practices. In order to 
challenge one’s own accustomed discriminatory expectations and perceptions of people 
via their names, one can start to question the knowledge that one has accustomed, 
negotiated and made un/intelligible in naming contexts: Who do I think of, who do I 
expect to meet when I read the names ‘Andy Ismailsdotter’ or ‘Emel Müller’? What do I  
think I know about these persons without having met them? And what could I think of 
instead?
In the following chapter and by using the establishment of registrar offices’ as well as 
the introduction of citizenship and name laws in Germany and Sweden as examples, I 
will discuss how and where these structurally discriminatory naming practices have 
been institutionalized in and by hegemonic discourses, and how they provided an 
opportunity for accustoming.
106
Historical Continuities in Everyday Discrimination Through Names: Sedimentation of  
Accustomed Norms in Germany and Sweden
3. Historical Continuities in Everyday Discrimination Through 
Names: Sedimentation of Accustomed Norms in Germany and 
Sweden
This chapter focuses on the legal rules and institutions that are understood as 
materializations of sedimented accustomed norms in Germany and Sweden. As I have 
shown in the previous chapter, the perception and negotiation of names can be 
discriminatory on a structural level. The ‘structurality’ of this perception is linked to the 
shared way of how one learns and accustoms hegemonic norms as cognitive 
structuralizations while growing up. People participating in hegemonic discourse are so 
used to reading names as non/migratized, racialized and gendered that they are not 
aware of the discriminatory dimension when they perceive names and their 
conventionalized meaning as given and not as the effect of a structuralist way to talk and 
think about ‘identity’ (cf. Hornscheidt, Landqvist 2014:92). By being constantly 
re_produced everyday, this knowledge has structured societal order over time. Thus, 
people are usually not inspired to question the categorical classification of names as 
gendered, racialized and non/migratized while being confronted with hegemonic 
discourse and its re_production of longstanding norms (cf. Hornscheidt 2011a; Kelly 
2016). On the example of racism, David T. Goldberg provides a comprehensive 
definition of the discursive fields that constitute and are constituted by these historically 
accustomed norms:
“Included in racist culture, as in culture generally, are ideas, attitudes and 
dispositions, norms and rules, linguistic, literary and artistic expressions, 
architectural forms and media representations, practices and institutions. These 
cultural expressions and objects embed meanings and values that frame 
articulations, undertakings, and projects, that constitute a way of life. In this sense, 
a culture is both, and interrelatedly a signifying system and system of material 
production.” (Goldberg 1993:8)
By referring to Goldberg 1993, El-Tayeb points out that racist conceptualizations are 
continuously re_produced (El-Tayeb 2001:8–9). Discriminatory categories are 
conceptualized as a part of a person’s identity and negotiated as crucial knowledge about 
a person. However, not all categories are recognized the same way in every society: In 
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both Sweden and Germany, ‘race’ as a category (e.g. Habel 2011; Kelly 2016) and the 
establishment of an intersex and of a transgender position (e.g. IVIM/OII Deutschland 
2013; AG Einleitung 2011; Hornscheidt 2012; Berg, Summanen 2011) are often silenced 
in current hegemonic discourses54 in which a gender-free society is made unthinkable or 
met with aversion (cf. Hornscheidt 2011c; AG Feministisch Sprachhandeln der 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 2014/2105:44–48; Baum 2014; Wojahn 2015:154–
189). In the following, I want to discuss, using the legislative discourse on names as an 
example, how structuralist knowledge on people is institutionalized in and by naming 
laws, court decisions on naming, and the registration of people.
I focus on the discriminatory presuppositions of name perceptions and the  
consequences this institutionalization of structural discrimination has had for naming 
practices. Applying Critical Race and Critical Trans Theorists’ thoughts (cf. Bell 1980; 
Harris 1993 and Crenshaw 1995 as well as Spade 2011) and transferring them from the 
US to the German and Swedish contexts, I assume that the establishment of 
administrative registration and the introduction of legislative name regulations in 
Germany and Sweden have restricted the choice of naming and enhanced their 
discriminatory perception and negotiation. Therefore, current as well as past legislation, 
administrative instructions and juridical court decisions on naming serve as crucial 
material for analysis in this chapter in order to identify the impact of institutionalized 
legislation on people’s naming practices. For a better understanding of the  
implementation of German legislation, I conducted spontaneous qualitative interviews 
with two German registrars and one employee at the Namensänderungsbehörde, a local 
German authority responsible for (the prevention of) changing names.
54 This also despite the recent and false international reports that Germany had introduced a third 
gender option (cf. IVIM/OII Deutschland 2013).
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3.1 Current Naming Legislation in Germany and Sweden
There are different state authorities in Sweden and Germany that deal with names: the 
registry offices, Skatteverket in Sweden and Standesamt in Germany, for the 
registration and acknowledgement of personal names and for the authorization of name 
change, Skatteverket55 in Sweden and in Germany Namenänderungsbehörde and, in the 
case of name change on the grounds of transsexual discrimination, the local court 
(Amtsgericht). The registry offices are responsible for naming practices that are covered 
by repro- and heteronormative naming conventionalizations regulated in family 
legislation, such as changing the last name after marriage (Lag (2001:182) om 
behandling av personuppgifter i Skatteverkets folkbokföringsverksamhet,  
Finansdepartementet S3 1/01/2014; Lag (2016:1013), Justitiedepartementet L2 
17/11/2016, and Personenstandsgesetz, PStG, Deutscher Bundestag 1/01/2009), as well 
as the ‘assimilation’ of ‘post-war repatriate’s’ names with naturalization (PStG, 
Deutscher Bundestag 1/01/2009). Important to note here is that the Swedish legislation 
does not ask for the explicit denomination of gender during registration. However, after 
registration, Skatteverket issues a personalized number (personnummer) that in its 
co m p i l a t i o n i s c o n s t i t u t e d b y b i n a r y - g e n d e r i n g ( c f . Lag (2001:182), 
Finansdepartementet S3 1/01/2014; Skatteverket 2007, chapter 6.1.1).
Unlike in Germany, Sweden has one single law, Lag (2016:1013) – and until July 1st, 
2017 Namnlag (1982:670) – that covers the regulations on name registration as well as 
the changing of names. Until 2017, it was implemented by both Skatteverket and 
Patent- och registreringsverket (cf. Namnlagskommittén 2013: 477–478). In Germany, 
registration and the changing of names are regulated separately: the PStG for 
registration and the Namensänderungsgesetz (NamÄndG; Deutscher Bundestag 
1/09/2009), Erste56 Verordnung zur Durchführung des Gesetzes über die Änderung  
55 As of July 2017. Before, Patent- och registreringsverket (PRV) was in charge. This dissertation was 
submitted in July 2016 which is why this study analyzed the naming practices and conventions of 
PRV primarily.
56 The denomination “Erste Verordnung” (First Decree) implies the existence of at least one other de-
cree. The Second Decree was introduced on August 17th, 1938 to force Jews to bear specific names 
that would make them identiable as Jewish. It was abolished in 1945 by the Allied Control Council 
(cf. Deutschland (Gebiet unter Alliierter Besatzung). Kontrollrat 20/09/1945, chapter 6.2.2.3). In 
light of this, it needs to be questioned why this implication of an anti-Semitic regulation is still part  
of current legislation.
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von Familiennamen und Vornamen (FamNamÄndGDV 1, Bundesministerium des 
I n n e r e n 1 5 / 0 8 / 2 0 1 3 ) , Minderheitennamenänderungsgestz (MindNamÄndG; 
Deutscher Bundestag 30/07/1997) as well as the Transsexuellengesetz (TSG) 
(Deutscher Bundestag 23/07/2009) for the changing of names. Consequently, the legal 
acts are implemented by Namensänderungsbehörde and Amtsgericht. For the Swedish 
case, the responsibility for names might soon change with the expected introduction of 
the new name law on July 1st, 2017 establishing Skatteverket as the only naming 
authority (Namnlagskommittén 2013:13; Justitiedepartementet 2016).
3.1.1 Legalized naming in Germany
In Germany, the first legislation on registration, the Reichsgesetz über die  
Beurkundung des Personenstands und die Eheschließung, was introduced in 1875, 
shortly after the constitution of the German Empire. It intended to put an end to name 
changing and to control naming processes (cf. Nübling et al. 2012, cf. chapter 3.2). The 
NamÄndG was established in 1938 in order to systematically register Jews by enforcing 
them to bear specific names (cf. chapters 3.2.2 and 6.2.2.3). With the exception of the 
Second Decree which concerned name enforcement for Jews, NamÄndG is still in force 
today and negotiates name changes under the rule of German law as strictly exceptional 
(cf. NamÄndVwV, Bundesministerium des Inneren 2014: section 27, paragraph 1). 
However, as Michael Wagner-Kern points out, the extent to which the anti-Semitic 
context of NamÄndG’s establishment still constitutes this restriction needs to be 
questioned (cf. Wagner-Kern 2002:2). According to articles 3 and 11 of NamÄndG, “[a] 
family [and first] name may only be changed when an important reason justifies the 
change”.57
Wagner-Kern’s critique concerns the continuous constitutional and historical  
belittlement that legitimizes the application of the “important reason”. By analyzing 
legislative documents on the question of name change that are available dating from the 
18th century until today, Wagner-Kern could identify in his study that the reason the 
NamÄndG restricts name changing is still rooted in the anti-Semitic context in which 
the law was introduced: the preservation of the name’s controlling function for social 
57 Original: “[e]in Familien[- bzw. Vor]name darf nur geändert werden, wenn ein wichtiger Grund die  
Änderung rechtfertigt.” (NamÄndG, Deutscher Bundestag 1/09/2009: articles 3 and 11, translated 
by EH).
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order (cf. Wagner-Kern 2002:407, 414-415). Accordingly, the NamÄndG still seems to 
prioritize the same discriminatory understanding of social order and German citizenship 
that was promoted by the Nazi regime (cf. chapter 3.2.2).
This is why the NamÄndG’s instruction for implementation, laid down in Allgemeine 
Verwaltungsvorschrift zum Gesetz über die Änderung von Familiennamen und  
Vornamen (NamÄndVwV) of 1980, needs to be questioned. By seeming to focus on last 
names, the administrative regulation provides a list of typical cases according to which 
name change is acceptable. Although there is no explicit list of cases for first names, the 
one for last names is applicable to a certain extent.
Some of the typical cases for name change are the changing of children’s last names as a  
consequence of a divorce, as well as cases in which people face difficulties because their  
first and/or last name sounds ‘offensive’, is constantly spelled the ‘wrong way’ or is a  
collective name such as Müller, Meier and Schmidt, which leads to confusion due to its 
conventionality. The option to change the first name on the grounds of cis-binary-
genderist initial registration is not mentioned (cf. Bundesministerium des Inneren). 
However, instead of adding this ‘case’ to the list, an additional law was introduced in 
1980, the Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der  
Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen (Transsexuellengesetz, TSG, Deutscher 
Bundestag 23/07/2009). As the title implies, German legislation neglects the structural 
and society constituting dimension of discrimination against transsexual people by 
negotiating it as a “special case”. Thus, genderist discrimination is not recognized as an 
important reason that can be negotiated at Namensänderungsbehörde. Unlike for name 
changes under the NamÄndG, people who want to change their first names under TSG 
are forced to go to specific courts. As there are fewer of these local courts58, they are not 
as approachable as Namensänderungsbehörde, which can basically be found in any 
district. As NamÄndG does not apply to people who intend to change their name 
because of incorrectly gendered initial registration, they are not only forced to initiate a 
cost-intensive court procedure that might end up with them paying for their own 
58 According to the TSG, there are specific premises linked to the local courts, for example that they 
need to be located in the same place as the county court (cf. Deutscher Bundestag 23/07/2009: ar -
ticle 2).
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discrimination59; there are also fewer addresses they can refer to. Additionally, trans and 
gender non-conform people are made unintelligible under NamÄndG, which has not 
changed since the law’s introduction in 1938. However, according to a report from 
Jamie Pax Abad of July 2015, the Namensänderungsbehörde accepted the name change 
request of a gender non-conform person (Abad 2015), to my knowledge for the first 
time. Since the person did not identify as ‘transsexual’ according to TSG, the TSG could 
not be applied. According to Abad, the authority explained in their statement:
1. Current legal practice needed to adapt to current societal ‘change’ in terms of 
gender identification; and
2. Abad’s interpretation of a court decision on the grounds of which equal access to 
gender-neutral names for anyone could be claimed was correct (cf. Abad 2015:4, 
chapter 4.4).
This decision is a milestone in gender non-conform people’s fight against genderist 
name discrimination in Germany. Until now, a pseudonym was the only way for non-
binary trans*_genderqueer and gender non-conform people to identify with a self-
chosen name on their ID card. However, the changing of one’s name to a gender 
‘contrarian’ name might not be covered by the authority’s decision (cf. for the Swedish 
case chapter 3.1.2).
In this context, it needs to be asked to which extent the name change under NamÄndG 
is implemented without pathologization and the provision of two ‘professional’ e.g. 
medical or psychological ‘attestations’ as required under TSG (cf. TSG, Deutscher 
Bundestag 23/07/2009: article 4, paragraph 3). In comparison, people that marry are 
never asked to provide a psychological ‘attestation’ in which a professional declares that 
they are diagnosed with hetero- and reprogenderism, making them aware of the 
discriminatory implications and consequences of a heteronormative marriage for their 
children when they assume a common family name and/or name their children. A 
person working at the Namensänderungsbehörde said during one of my interviews that 
59 People initiating a court procedure in Germany are usually in the obligation to pay for it. Although 
people with lower income can apply for financial support, they are still forced to take care of the ap-
plication and agree with the risks specified for example in Bundesministerium der Justiz und für  
Verbraucherschutz 2011. For the complexity of the application cf. Bundesministerium der Justiz 
und für Verbraucherschutz 2014.
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it is not unusual to ask for proof of the necessity for a name change, for example, after a 
person has experienced sexual violence in the family. In comparison, when people want 
to change their name on the grounds of spelling difficulties, they may do so without 
attestation, since the case “speaks for itself” (Hayn 24/07/2012b). At the same time, the 
normalization of hetero- and repronormative naming practices silently re_confirms the 
nationalist idea of the reproduction of the nation.
People that are about to naturalize as German citizens are also ‘allowed’ to change their 
last name in the context of naturalization under NamÄndG. However, this is only 
possible if the “foreign origin of the name bearer” can be recognized to a certain degree 
(NamÄndVwV, Bundesministerium des Inneren 2014: section 37, paragraph 2). This is 
grounded in ‘the difficulties’ to write or pronounce the assumed non-German name and 
not because the name’s sound is assumed to be ‘non-German’. By denaming those who 
face these difficulties, the legislation normalizes hegemonic German language use. 
Surely, people with ‘non-German’ sounding names are not taken into consideration 
because for them, it is, ableized or not, most likely no problem to pronounce their name 
in their language specific way. However, in this context people who communicate by 
ways of sign language are most likely also silenced. The idea of having difficulties with a 
name’s pronunciation conventionally interpellates oral expression, whereas a name’s 
expression by hand sign and facial expression might not cause the same difficulties. 
Thus, it is highly possible that people who have difficulties in pronouncing names can be 
identified as ableized German L1 speakers who simultaneously are also imagined as 
statisized (cf. chapters 1.1.3 and 1.1.4).
With the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe on the protection of national 
minorities from February 1st, 1995 Germany was obligated to introduce a law on name 
changes by minorities (Minderheitennamensänderungsgesetz). According to articles 1, 
2 and 3, a person belonging to a recognized national minority in Germany can change 
their first and last name (cf. MindNamÄndG, Deutscher Bundestag 30/07/1997). This 
currently applies to the Danish minority of Southern Schleswig, Frisians in East and 
North Frisia, Sorbs and Roma (cf. Bundesministerium des Inneren 2014). Roma people 
as well as Sorbs, Danes and Frisians of Color have also faced racist discrimination by 
being neglected as Germans (cf. chapter 3.2.2.1). The name change can be performed 
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free of charge by translating the current name either conceptually or phonetically to the 
respective language of the national minority. The law also enables the person to revert to 
a former name if the name was Germanized or exchanged for another name. However, 
the law does not allow one to take on a name that is not linked to the current naming 
practice. Thus, it re_produces the German restriction of changing names and silences 
the normalization of statisized names.
To summarize, current legislation on name change favors cis-gendered statisized 
ableized German L1 speakers and protects hegemonically accustomed knowledge on 
names that are perceived as German. Instead of challenging this knowledge on ‘German 
names’ by expanding the perception of names that should be recognized as German (e.g. 
Kiran, Fatima and Ali), the privilege re_produced by statisizable names remains 
unquestioned and denamed. Thus, German legislation appears to have no interest in 
helping newly naturalized migratized people to ‘succeed’ in German society and to 
jointly fight against migratist as well as ableist and genderist discrimination on the labor 
and housing markets. Rather, German legislation manifests the normalization of a 
hegemonic conceptualization of ‘Germanness’, here by example of a standardized 
German pronunciation and orthography of names, in order for statisized ableized 
German L1 speakers to accustom and remain accustomed to the dominance of the 
standardized German spoken language. The protection of the name’s function for ‘social 
order’ as well as the ‘public interest’, which again can be assumed to represent the 
hegemonic discourse, are indicated as central arguments for the prevention of name 
change (cf. NamÄndVwV, Bundesministerium des Inneren 2014: section 28). The 
perpetuation of the social order is in the state’s interest, whereas ‘public interest’ 
privileges statisized Germans. The interest of the individual person who experiences 
structural discrimination is not taken into account but is subordinated to the public 
interest. Transsexual people’s attempt to change their first names is negotiated as ‘a 
special case’ and hence individualized and pathologized. The same applies for people 
experiencing sexual violence. Name changes by non-binary trans*_genderqueer and 
gender non-conform people has become intelligible in legal practice but not yet in 
legislation. Thus, German jurisdiction mistrusts people who aim to change their names 
on the grounds of structural discrimination and violence. Therefore, German legislation 
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does not actually protect citizens who experience structural discrimination but instead 
perpetuates discrimination, despite the fact that there is an awareness for the harmful 
impact conventionalized hegemonic discourse can have on people: Namely, when names 
that sound ‘offensive’ or ‘ridiculous’ are allowed to be changed (cf. NamÄndVwV, 
Bundesministerium des Inneren 2014: sections 35. and 66.).
3.1.2 Legalized naming in Sweden
Unlike in Germany, the changing of names is not negotiated as exceptional in Sweden. 
In addition to establishing a systematic registration of last names and a ‘copyright’ that 
aims at protecting already existing and in particular aristocratic last names, the first 
Swedish naming regulation of 1901, Släktnamnsförordningen, was also introduced to 
motivate citizens to change their last names (Brylla 2002). Before the new name law 
entered into force on July 1st, 2017 (Lag (2016:1013), Justitiedepartementet L2 
17/11/2016), Namnlag (1982:670) (Justitiedepartementet L2 1/03/2012), in force since 
January 1st, 1982 regulated both first and last naming practices by particularly focusing 
on the regulation of the latter. Besides regulating name changes in the context of birth, 
adoption or heteronormative marriage that are monitored by Skatteverket, it also 
defined the rules for the creation of new last names that were supervised by PRV until 
2017. In 2013, a commission report presented to the Swedish government 
recommended to put the adoption of a new name law into effect on January 1st, 2015 
(Namnlagskommittén 2013). One of the changes included in the report was to establish 
Skatteverket as the only naming authority, thus relieving PRV from its responsibilities. 
Both authorities were still in charge when this dissertation was submitted in July 2016 
as the law’s passing was delayed. The Swedish Government submitted the bill 
(proposition) for the new name law to the Swedish Council on Legislation (Lagrådet) 
only on April 14th, 2016 to have them pronounce on the bill’s legal validity 
(Justitiedepartementet 2016), and to the Swedish Parliament (Riksdaget) only on June 
16th, 2016 to have them adopt or reject the bill (Justitiedepartementet 2016). According 
to the bill, the new name was to enter into force on July 1st, 2017 (cf. also 
Regieringskansliet 14/04/2016; Regieringskansliet 29/06/2016).
Skatteverket’s and, at the time, PRV’s websites on name change were quite informative 
and supportive in comparison to (the lack of) websites in Germany, where it is up to the 
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individual administrative district (Landkreis) to decide how much information to 
provide about the im_possibilities of name change60. Swedish citizens can change their 
names without being forced to provide a reason that needs to be supported by a 
professional attestation. However, just like PRV, Skatteverket requires the motivation 
for name change on their forms.61
Although both the past and the current Swedish name law still offer more options to 
change one’s name than the German legislation, the freedom to choose one’s name is 
still restricted. For example, existing last names as well as names and name parts that 
interpellate nobility such as ‘von’ and ‘de’ are protected and neglected. A classist naming 
privilege is maintained and re_produced particularly in the latter case. The protection of 
names also applies to a family’s and a person’s right to their individual names according 
to the family’s naming tradition or if a person is commonly known under their artist 
name, for example (Namnlag (1982:670), Justitiedepartementet L2 1/03/2012: articles 
20 and 21, Lag (2016:1013), Justitiedepartementet L2 17/11/2016; cf. chapter 6.1.4).
Some of the restrictions on both first and last names are summarized by Brylla as 
Swedish naming conventionalizations and can also be found in German legislation (cf. 
above): the prohibition of offensive names to others, of names that cause discomfort for 
the name bearer or of names that are used as first name(s) (cf. Brylla 2002: 53; 
Namnlag (1982:670), Justitiedepartementet L2 1/03/2012: articles 12 and 34; 
Namnlagskommittén 2013:460; Lag (2016:1013), Justitiedepartementet L2 17/11/2016 
article 14). Before July 2017, also the number of name changes allowed determined the 
freedom of choice: A first and a last name could only be changed once without having to  
60 The websites of the respective Namensänderungsbehörden in Germany differ in terms of informa-
tion. For example, the website of the Namensänderungsbehörde for Berlin Steglitz-Zehlendorf in-
forms about the implications of various motivations for name change by referring to the responsi-
ble authority. However, it does not refer to the implications according to TSG (Bezirksamt Steglitz-
Zehlendorf n.d.). In comparison, the Namensänderungsbehörde of Landkreis Dachau provides the 
respective forms for name change but no further information on the motivations for name change.  
It suggests that the most prominent motivation for name change is emotional distress, without re-
flecting upon the reasons that might have triggered such distress, for example genderism. There is 
also no reference to the TSG (Landratsamt Dachau n.d.).
61 Ansökan om fornamn: Patent- och Registreringsverket 2014b, Ansökan om efternamn (nybildat  
namn): Patent- och Registreringsverket 2014a, Förnamnsändring. Ansökan: Skatteverket 2018a, 
Efternamn, byte. Ansökan: Skatteverket 2018b, Efternamn, byte – avgift. Ansökan: Skatteverket 
2018c, Nybildat efternamn, byte – avgift. Ansökan: Skatteverket 2018d. The reasons mentioned in 
Anökan om efternamn (befindligt namn) were similar: Patent- och Registreringsverket 2014c.
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submit particular reasons (Namnlag (1982:670), Justitiedepartementet L2 1/03/2012: 
articles 11 and 31). According to the proposal for a new name law, this was suggested to 
be thrown out (cf. Namnlagskommittén 2013:13). Accordingly, there are no longer any 
restrictions to be found in the new legislation in this respect (Lag (2016:1013), 
Justitiedepartementet L2 17/11/2016 no articles). However, the indication of a reason is 
still required on the Skatteverket’s forms (cf. above).
Brylla states that compared to the law of 1963, which pursued the ‘public interest’ in 
name stability, the current name law of 1982 aimed at taking the individual’s freedom of  
choice into account, as well as questions of equality “between on the one side women 
and men and on the other side children born within and outside marriage” (cf. Brylla 
2002:87–88). Under Namnlag (1982:670) it was possible to change, add or delete first 
names that were initially assigned to a person during registration, as long as one of the 
initial names is retained (cf. Namnlag (1982:670), Justitiedepartementet L2 1/03/2012: 
article 31). In their recommendations for a new name law, the members of  
Namnlagskommittén propose amendments to the current name law, which would 
increase the previously assumed ‘freedom of name choice’ with regard to the gendering 
of both first names. They would also accept various naming conventionalizations 
regarding last names, which go beyond Swedish naming traditions. 
The implementation of current regulations on first names has resulted in 
recommendations to parents to give their child at least one gender-distinct name (cf. 
Brylla 2002:58) that ‘meets’ the assigned birth gender (cf. Namnlagskommittén 
2013:126–127). Yet, names hegemonically negotiated as gender-neutral have been 
broadly accepted for both children and adults by the Swedish naming authorities (cf. 
Namnlagskommittén 2013: 249). However, this did not apply to so-called 
gender-’contrarian’ names until 2009: A person who juridically was identified as ‘male’ 
had to go to court before she could have a ‘female’ identified name added to her initial 
gender-distinct first name (cf. Namnlagskommittén 2013:128–129). Previously, it was 
only possible for trans and gender non-conform people to add a gender-neutral name to 
their initial gender-distinct one (cf. Lagerblad 2010d). To assign ‘gender-contrarian’ 
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names62 to children is still a subject for consideration and might remain a case-to-case 
decision under the new law. Thus, though seemingly more liberal than the German 
jurisdiction in terms of accepting first names regarded as ‘appropriate for both gender’,  
as well as even partial gender-contrarian names, Swedish legislation nevertheless 
re_produces the perception of names as cis-binary-gendered and makes the gender-free 
conceptualization of names unintelligible (cf. chapter 4).
As for migratized names, the 1982 name law sought to establish the principle that 
“immigrants should be able to keep their country of origin’s culture, habits and language 
as long as possible”63. In this context, the Swedish government also aimed at 
determining that changing a ‘non-Swedish’ last name’s gendering should not be 
recognized as a name change under the 1982 name law. For example, a name that ended 
in -ova and thus interpellated ‘femaleness’ could be changed free of charge when people 
register. According to Namnlagskommittén’s report, in this way the government 
promoted the interests of migratized people (cf. Namnlagskommittén 2013:387) who 
wanted to change their hetero- and/or reprogendered last names.
Nevertheless, the discussions surrounding the introduction of the 1982 name law also 
provided the context for migratist naming discrimination. Changing, deleting or adding 
a name, which previously underlined the principle of ‘only one name and one option are 
possible’ should be made easier. The idea behind this was to provide migratized Swedish 
citizens and statisized Swedish parents who adopted children from abroad more options 
to change their own or their children’s names by adding names hegemonically 
negotiated as ‘Swedish’ (cf. Lagerblad 2010a) and/or delete migratized names free of 
charge, as the example Namnlagskommittén suggests (Namnlagskommittén 2013:455). 
In this way, statisized names are, as in Germany, hegemonically normalized and 
presented as the desired and only option to succeed in society. This is also confirmed in 
statements that argue for taking the hegemonic perception of names as the decisive 
authority in unresolved naming cases which are ‘against Swedish naming traditions’, 
although these claims were sometimes overruled by upholding court decisions.
62 Cf. Skatteverket Dec 14, 2009 to gender-contrarian names, cf. talk by Leibring (2015) at Rufnamen-
tagung 2015 in Mainz.
63 Original: “invandrare så långt som möjligt bör kunna behålla sitt ursprungslands kultur, vanor och 
språk” (Namnlagskommittén 2013:191, translated by EH).
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The principle that migratized citizens did not need to or should not be forced to 
assimilate to Swedish naming practices was also adopted in the case of Beatriz del 
Carmen as a first name, that had been initially denied. The reason for its rejection was 
the assumption that ‘del’ was inappropriate and would not reflect a first name. The 
Swedish administrative court of appeals, however, finally accepted the name in 1995, 
arguing that it should be respected that “first names from different foreign cultures have 
been brought to Sweden through the great immigration. This should apply especially 
when the registered name comes from a culture where the one that shall bear the name 
has their origin.”64. This case, however, proves this was not implemented. Although the 
1982 legislation suggested accepting name forms that were not perceived as Swedish but 
were appropriate elsewhere, in 1995 the authorities still refused to recognize a non-
Swedish form. Thus, to what extent the changes of the new naming law will contribute to 
a broader acceptance of migratized and thus assumably non-Swedish naming traditions 
at Skatteverket needs to be questioned. By agreeing to accept double last names in the 
future, Namnlagskommittén aims at promoting the opportunity for people socialized in 
all different kinds of naming traditions to choose the name they want 
(Namnlagskommittén 2013:527). Yet, by simultaneously promoting the Swedish naming 
tradition as equally acceptable without deconstructing privilege, there is a high 
probability that the hegemonic discourse remains biased.
Before the 2009 court decision on ‘gender-contrarian’ names, migratized names were 
also negotiated as acceptable only when the names complied with the hegemonic way to 
perceive them as gender-distinct and in its distinctivity as ‘gender-conform’. As brought 
forth in a court case, parents wanted to assign the additional name of Bent Mohamed 
Moncef to their child’s first name Nadia, which according to Tunisian naming 
conventionalization, represents a patronymic that is also a hegemonic naming tradition 
in Sweden. However, it was first rejected with the argument that “here in this country, it  
could give the false impression that the girl received three male first names in addition 
to Nadia”65. The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court did agree with the previous 
64 Original: “förnamn från olika främmande kulturer har förts in till Sverige genom den stora invan-
dringen. Inte minst bör detta gälla när det anmälda namnet kommer från en kultur där den som 
skall bära namnet har sitt ursprung” (Namnlagskommittén 2013:625–626, translated by EH).
65 Original: “här i landet skulle kunna ge det felaktiga intrycket att flickan utöver Nadia erhållit tre  
manliga förnamn” (Namnlagskommittén 2013:641, translated by EH).
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authorities’ impressions but accepted the name in the end on the grounds that the child 
possessed double citizenship and should be allowed to have the same name in both 
passports (cf. Namnlagskommittén 2013:641). In this way, the principle of non-
assimilation to Swedish naming conventionalization was respected. However, just like in 
Germany, gender-distinctivity is negotiated here against the ability of the hegemonic 
discourse to gender a migratized name (cf. chapter 2.3.1).
As previously suggested, despite the new naming law’s assumed liberal attitude towards 
the provision of freedom of choice for trans, gender non-conform and migratized people, 
the hegemonic discourse beyond Swedish legislation might not accept the changes 
immediately.
According to a poll commissioned by Namnlagskommittén to Statistiska Centralbyrån 
(Statistics Sweden) in 2012 and which distinguished between migratized and statisized 
Swedes, the latter group showed a larger unwillingness to accept offensive and 
discomfort-provoking names as well as gender-contrarian names (cf. 
Namnlagskommittén 2013:243). The committee explained the more positive attitude of 
migratized Swedes towards gender-contrarian first names with the (certainly  
experienced and proved) assumption that the Swedish authorities did not have a 
comprehensive understanding of non-Swedish naming traditions. Similar results can be 
found for grammatically non-conform names, i.e. names spelled or pronounced in a 
non-conventionalized way according to hegemonic Swedish discourse.66
Although there was no positive majority in either group, there seems to be a more liberal 
attitude towards hegemonically non-conforming names among migratized Swedes. The 
committee did not think the established court practice towards gender-contrarian 
caused any problems: Gender non-conforming names are admitted for adults in the 
context of name changing, since they are in the position to define for themselves which 
name is comfortable. However, for children decisions are taken on a case-to-case level, 
which shows that gender-conformity is still re_produced (cf. Namnlagskommittén 
2013:248–249). Bearing in mind that until 2013, enforced sterilization was obligatory in 
66 This might not be surprising given that all conventionalized examples showed statisizable names 
and did not include any migratizable names. Cf. chapter 5.4 for a short analysis of Namnlagskom-
mittén’s comments on these results.
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Sweden to transition from one gender to the other according to the binary-gender 
system, it should be questioned why gender-conformity is still regarded as a necessity  
for socialization when the case that allowed a gender-contrarian first name proved the 
opposite.
One the one hand, the committee members concluded that there was an integrated 
conservative attitude among Swedes against the question of gender-contrarian names. 
On the other hand, they declared that after their acknowledgement by Swedish naming 
authorities, hegemonically nonconforming names might sooner or later be regarded as 
acceptable from a linguistic perspective, thus being negotiated as grammatically correct 
(cf. chapter 5). In this way, the authorities as well as courts were more liberal than what  
“commonly would be regarded as adequate” (Namnlagskommittén 2013:250). With 
regard to their statement that “a country’s legislation is always the result of varying 
considerations in which different interests need to be balanced”, it is interesting to learn 
about Namnlagskommittén’s negotiation of Swedish jurisdiction and what they call 
“public opinion”67. I transfer the latter to the conceptualization of hegemonic discourse I 
use in this study, which the committee explains as meaningful in the context of 
legislation but which also “may never solely dictate a particular legislation’s content”68. 
In the best operable case, the legislation on names would respond to the majority’s 
opinion on what is right, wrong and appropriate and satisfy their needs (cf.  
Namnlagskommittén 2013:241).
With regard to the majority’s objection against gender-contrarian names as well as the 
Swedish jurisdiction’s recently established acknowledgment of gender-contrarian names 
for at least adults, it seems that Swedish legislation did not respond to the majority’s 
opinion but to the needs of trans persons. Legislation aims to serve both sides, the 
hegemonic discourse (here the so-called majority) and the counter-discourse of 
marginalized people. However, as hegemonic discourse is still equated with 
marginalized counter-discourses, discriminatory naming practices are only addressed 
one-way when responding to marginalized group’s ‘needs’. The consequences of 
67 Original: “Ett lands lagstiftning är resultatet av skilda överväganden, där olika intressen balanseras 
mot varandra.” And “[f]olkliga opinioner” (Namnlagskommittén 2013:241, translated by EH).
68 Original: “aldrig ensamma bör få diktera innehållet i en viss lagstiftning” (Namnlagskommittén 
2013:241, translated by EH).
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privilege are not addressed: Swedish naming conventionalization still remains the 
desired norm and is even promoted without critically reflecting on the exclusionary 
impact this hegemonic support has for the perception of names as migratized and thus 
non-Swedish.
In the following, I aim to contribute to an understanding of historically accustomed 
similarities and differences in the constitution and implementation of hegemonic 
German and Swedish naming practices by analyzing the historical contexts and 
presuppositions of legislation on naming, the constitution of nationality and citizenship.
3.1.3 Similarities and differences in German and Swedish hegemonic 
naming practices
Swedish and German legislation share several naming principles not only among 
themselves but also with other Western societies. One of those norms is the idea of last  
names being passed down as family names. This naming tradition does not only support 
the hetero_repronormative perception that a person – mostly through biological birth 
(cf. chapter 6.1.1) – belongs to a family but it also seems to simultaneously re_produce 
the idea that ‘families’ are more easily recognizable as statisized Swedish or German 
with a commonly shared last name, a ‘family name’, than with first names. The focus on 
last names in both German and Swedish legislation can be regarded as an expression of  
that thought. Thus, the idea of belonging to a family symbolizes belonging to a state. The 
Swedish administrative regulation on naming encourages statisized people to change 
their last names. As the ‘suggested’ change of last names prioritizes Swedisizable 
morphological structures69, for migratized people this ‘encouragement’ from topdown 
can be understood not as a suggestion for unsolicited name change but as enforcement 
(cf. chapter 6.2.2.4). This practice follows a tradition that forced Sami or Finnish people 
as recognized national minorities and entitled to Swedish citizenship to make their first 
and last names sound and look as Swedish as possible (cf. chapter 3.2.3). The 
encouragement and the enforcement to Swedisize the last name is an example for the 
normalization of what is hegemonically regarded as ‘Swedish’. As it is addressed to both 
69 If people want to change their last names and create a new one, Patent- och Registreringsverket of-
fers a list of pre- and suffixes to facilitate the creation of the new name. However, they all are per-
ceivable as ‘Swedish’ according to hegemonic structuralist discourse: Patent- och Registreringsver-
ket n.d.a.
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non-migratized and migratized Swedes, it might also support the hegemonic idea in 
Swedish society of presumably making everyone equal (cf. Hornscheidt 2008b).
In contrast, German legislation aims at preventing their citizens from changing names, 
with the exception of heteronormative marriage and recently also of naturalization, as I 
will show. Instead of equating both marginalized and hegemonic naming practices like 
in Sweden, German jurisdiction focuses on the preservation of hegemonic norms. In this 
way, legislation ensures that statisized, cis-binary-gendered, ableized citizens as 
representatives of the public interest will always be able to identify the names of German 
citizens as what is considered a ‘German name’. In other words, names that are 
hegemonically negotiable as German will help privileged Germans identify fellow 
German citizens. Both the German and Swedish strategies presuppose an understanding 
that names will be classified as ‘Swedish’ or non-Swedish and ‘German’ or nonGerman, 
and both naming practices are intrinsically bound to conceptualizations of citizenship 
and nationality. Through the more restrictive administrative practice in Germany, 
people who lived and worked in Germany without German citizenship could not 
officially assimilate and Germanize their full names according to German law until 
January 1st 199070, not because they necessarily did not want to but because of a biologist 
legislative principle, ius sanguinis, that links Germanness and citizenship to blood 
relations (with the exception of adopting people as German citizens but not ius 
sanguinis Germans). Prior to this date, naturalization and thus the changing of names 
was only possible for a limited number of people,71 mainly those who were considered 
‘ius sanguinis Germans’ without German citizenship (Statusdeutsche according to 
article 116 paragraph 1 German Basic Constitutional Law (GG, Deutscher Bundestag 
31/12/2014), cf. (Bergmann, Korth 1989:31)), as well as people who with the Second law 
regulating questions of nationality of 1956 (Zweites Gesetz zur Regelung von Fragen 
der Staatsangehörigkeit) could retrospectively naturalize after their heteronormative 
70 Cf. so-called simplification of naturalization according to AuslG of 09.07.1990 which enables adult 
non-German citizens to apply for German citizenship after residing in Germany for at least 15 
years, giving up their previous citizenship, having no criminal convictions and are able to make a 
living independently from state subsidies (cf. Deutscher Bundestag, cf. below).
71 According to NamÄndVwV article 37, paragraph 2 of 11. August 1980, non-German citizens were 
‘allowed’ to change their family name in the context of naturalization; cf. Bundesministerium des  
Inneren 11/08/1980:6.
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marriage (cf. Bundesministerium des Inneren; Bundesministerium der Finanzen 
23/05/1956: article 3, paragraph 2).72 Although RuStAG before 1990 mentions the 
opportunity for non-German people to naturalize according to ius domicilii, it must be 
considered as a theoretical option only since it was left to the authorities’ discretion to 
decide whether or not a person’s naturalization was considered to be in the state’s 
interest (cf. Bergmann, Korth 1989:56–59 and therein in particular the 
conceptualization of Ermessenseinbürgerung, discretionary naturalization).73 In this 
way, the general principles for naturalization prioritized ‘public interest’ before a 
person’s interest and put the previously mentioned focus on the hegemonic discourse in 
German legislation. As indicated, ‘non-German’ or non-European names (cf. chapter 5) 
could be and still are read as synonymous with non-German citizenship as well as 
nationality that is hegemonically considered to be white Christian-secularized. The 
Germanization of names has been an institutional tool to mark and distinguish people 
as ‘ius sanguinis Germans’ and ‘non-Germans’. This name marking practice stands in a 
72 The introduction of the Second law regulating questions of nationality suggests that married wom-
en were considered as belonging to a male household and would therefore acquire their husband’s 
citizenship. Furthermore, since the change in RuStAG on 20.12.1974, children whose mothers are 
German citizens can become German regardless of their father’s citizenship (cf. Bergmann, Korth 
1989:44–45).
73 Cf. also Bergmann, Korth 1989:41–54, appendix: “Gesetz- und Verordnungstexte zum Staatsange-
hörigkeitsrecht (Auswahl)”, chapter 10. “Einbürgerungsrichtlinien of 15.12.1977 (ergänzt durch Rd-
schr. Vom 13.11.1984)” for the juridical premises for naturalization:
paragraph 2.2: “Die Verleihung der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit kann nur in Betracht kommen, 
wenn ein öffentliches Interesse an der Einbürgerung besteht. Öffentliches Interesse ist hier ein 
staatliches Interesse oder ein gesellschaftliches Interesse von gleichem Rang; die persönlichen 
Wünsche und wirtschaftlichen Interessen des Einbürgerungsbewerbers können nicht auss-
chlaggebend sein, zumal auch die hier ansässigen Ausländer nach der deutschen Rechtsordnung 
weitgehende Rechte und Freiheiten genießen.”
paragraph 2.3.: “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland; sie strebt nicht an, 
die Anzahl der deutschen Staatsangehörigen gezielt durch Einbürgerung zu vermehren.”
paragraph 3.1.1.: “Die freiwillige und dauernde Hinwendung zu Deutschland wird aus der nach dem 
bisherigen Gesamtverhalten zu beurteilenden grundsätzlichen Einstellung zum deutschen Kul-
turkreis zu schließen sein. Eine dauernde Hinwendung zu Deutschland ist grundsätzlich nicht 
anzunehmen, wenn sich der Einbürgerungsbewerber in einer politischen Emigrantenorganisation 
betätigt.”
paragraph 5.2.1: “Die Einbürgerung von Angehörigen der Entwicklungsländer, die im Bundesgebiet 
oder in anderen Industriestaaten im Rahmen der personellen Entwicklungshilfe eine Aus- oder 
Weiterbildung erfahren haben soll deshalb unterbleiben.”
paragraph 6.4.2: “Für heimatlose Ausländer gelten […] die allgemeinen Vorschriften über die Ein-
bürgerung. […] Es ist davon auszugehen, daß ein gewisses öffentliches Interesses [sic!] an der Ein-
bürgerung heimatloser Ausländer vorgezeichnet ist.”
paragraph 6.4.3: “[...] die Einbürgerung der Asylberechtigten und der in die deutsche Obhut über-
nommenen ausländischen Flüchtlinge [soll] erleichtert […] werden”. paragraph 6.4.4: “[...] die Ein-
bürgerung der Staatenlosen [soll] erleichtert […] werden”.
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historical continuity to when Jewish people were marked as non-German/non-Aryan 
through enforced name practices (cf. chapter 6.2.2.3). In both cases, the hegemonic 
distinction between ‘German’ or ‘Swedish’ and ‘non-German’ or ‘non-Swedish’ names 
leads to discrimination e.g. on the job or housing markets because ‘non-German’ or 
‘non-Swedish’ names are prevented to be recognized as possible ‘German’ or ‘Swedish’ 
names in the hegemonic mindset.
In the following I will attempt to sketch and compare the historical contexts and 
repeated consequences of the introduction and establishment of registration offices and 
legislation in both Sweden and Germany. I negotiate them as material results for the 
institutionalization of accustoming that constitute the similarities and differences in the 
naming practices in Sweden and Germany.
3.2 The Institutionalization of Discriminatory Naming  
Practices in the German and Swedish Nation States in  
Modern and Contemporary History
The present study is built around the assumption that discriminatory hegemonic 
naming practices are co-constituted and confirmed but not necessarily recognized as 
such by legal discourses. As mentioned before, I link this presupposition back to the 
findings of Critical Race Theory (CRT) scholars that identified how racism became and 
still is an intrinsic part of the institutional system of the USA:
“CRT recognizes that racism is engrained in the fabric and system of the American 
society. The individual racist need not exist to note that institutional racism is 
pervasive in the dominant culture. This is the analytical lens that CRT uses in 
examining existing power structures. CRT identifies that these power structures are 
b a s e d o n white privi lege and white supremacy, which perpetuates the 
marginalization of people of Color.” (UCLA School of Public Affairs, Critical Race 
Studies)
The findings of Critical Race theorists are transferable to the European context. 
Hegemonic requirements and conceptualizations such as the gender-distinctivity of 
names (cf. chapter 4) that need to respond to an imagined German sprachgefühl (cf. 
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chapter 5) are not only grounded in institutionalized discriminatory perceptions of 
people but re_produce and re_inforce them. By referring to Critical Race Theory, Spade 
exposes legislation as a hegemonic instrument to maintain white, male, 
heteronormative, and capitalist power (Spade 2011:19).74 In his book Normal Life Spade 
shows how within US politics of civil society security and social equality, legislation does 
not prevent violence but rather enables and performs it. This is also due to an 
accustomed essentialist belief that differences among people are natural and given. As I  
will demonstrate later on (cf. chapter 6.2.2), the example of naming practices in German 
legislation and its administrative implementation do not prevent discrimination and 
unequal treatment.
In a so-called democracy it seems contradictory to state that the legal system that should 
‘guarantee’ equality is actually discriminatory. By using the example of naming 
legislation, I identify in the following some strategies and presuppositions that are so 
normalized and accustomed in everyday practices that their discriminatory effects are 
not recognized by mainstream discourse.
3.2.1 Names as indicators for nationality and citizenship
In Sweden and Germany, the name of a person is made official as soon as it is registered 
by a legal state authority. To become registered and simultaneously authorized as a 
citizen by a Swedish or German state authority is already a privilege in a world where 
citizenship status enables or disables access to state subsidies, freedom of movement 
and citizens’ rights. Non-citizens whose residence permit status is illegalized by national 
legislation are in constant danger of being deported or sentenced if they register. In this 
respect, those persons that are born to at least one parent with Swedish or German 
citizenship are privileged with regard to their residence title. It is an accustomed and 
institutionalized practice that with registration, they not only receive ‘official’ 
documents that are often required in hegemonic discourse for identification but that are 
also institutionalized as citizens, a status that often is still equated with the idea of 
nationals. As long as the person is perceived as a prototypical ‘German’ citizen, concepts 
such as citizenship and nationality coincide. Citizenship is constituted by legislation that 
74 For an example of how critical trans politics can contribute to law reform and movement building 
(cf. Spade 2011:171–204).
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regulates who can become a German or Swedish citizen and who cannot. To acquire 
German or Swedish citizenship is based on concepts and principles that define 
nationality: ius sanguinis, ius domicilii and ius soli.75
• Ius sanguinis is enacted on the assumption that citizenship is only assigned 
through a person’s parents. Thus, the concept of ius sanguinis negotiates 
nationality on the idea of a relationship that is defined by blood. In this way, ius 
sanguinis is conceptualized as the ‘right of blood’. The concept is a predominant 
principle according to which people in Germany have been abled or disabled to 
naturalize as Germans (cf. Beauftragte für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 
2007:38). In Sweden ius sanguinis was applied until March 31st, 2015, when the 
mother had Swedish citizenship or when the father had Swedish citizenship and 
the child was born in Sweden or the father with Swedish citizenship was married 
to the mother of the child regardless of the mother’s citizenship. Since April 1st, 
2015, any child that is born to a Swedish parent will automatically assume 
Swedish citizenship at birth, regardless of where the child is born (cf. Lag 
(2001:82), Justitiedepartementet L7 2001: article 2).
• Ius domicilii is enacted on the idea that a person who lives in the territory of a 
nation state for a certain period of time is entitled to citizenship of this state. In 
Germany, nonGerman adult citizens who have resided in Germany for at least 
three years and who have been married for at least two of those years to a 
German citizen can acquire citizenship the quickest, given they have completed 
all the requirements. Non-German adult citizens who are not married to a 
German citizen usually must reside in Germany for at least eight years (StAG, 
Deutscher Bundestag 1/01/2000: article 10). Compared to Sweden, Germany 
requires a longer duration of legal residence. Currently, Sweden demands five 
years for people with non-Nordic citizenship by application. Nordic citizens can 
naturalize on notification after only two years, stateless people or refugees after 
four years (cf. Lag (2001:82), Justitiedepartementet L7 2001).
75 Cf. for all requirements for different cases of naturalization in Germany: StAG, Deutscher Bun-
destag 1/01/2000: article 3 paragraph 1, article 4, articles 8-16 as well as articles 40b and 40c. Cf.  
Swedish requirements for naturalization: Justitiedepartementet L7 2001: articles 2, 3, 4, 6-13; cf. 
also Migrationsverket n.d.
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• Ius soli is enacted on the idea that a person who is born in the territory of a 
nation state is entitled to acquire the citizenship of this state. In Germany, 
children born after January 1st, 2000 have the right to German citizenship only if 
their parents have resided in Germany permanently for at least eight years while 
possessing a permanent residence permit (cf. StAG, Deutscher Bundestag 
1/01/2000: article 4, paragraph 3; Kissrow 2007:38–39).
In the following chapters I aim to analyze the accustoming of the conceptualizations of 
nationality and citizenship in the context of naming. A focus will be on the extent to 
which personal names are negotiated as indicators for citizenship and nationality and 
for the person’s belonging to an imagined nation (cf. Anderson 1983). I assume that 
names play a crucial role in the identification of a person as a nationalized citizen, since 
they are likewise negotiated in nationalized terms, such as when wondering whether 
Evelyn is a German or a non-German name. A person with a name that hegemonically is 
not negotiated as German, like Kiran for example, might consequently not be perceived 
as German although they possesses German citizenship and might identify themselves 
as German. In contrast, a person with a name that linguistically is not negotiated as 
‘German’ but Western such as Evelyn is nevertheless perceived as German. Hence, it 
needs to be questioned which non-German names pass as German, which ones do not 
(cf. also chapter 5) and what consequences this entails for their bearers.
I assume that the juridical institutionalization of the concepts of both German and 
Swedish citizenship in the late 19th and early 20th century have repeated consequences 
for people in the context of naming today. Thus, I wonder about the assumptions and 
effects that people experience when they are nationalized on the grounds of historically 
accustomed perceptions and negotiations of names. To what extent is the idea of 
perceiving and negotiating a person and/or name as German or non-German, Swedish 
or non-Swedish historically linked to the idea of the nation state? How and when do 
naming practices reveal a nationalist understanding of names? In today’s jurisdiction 
names are still perceived as indicators for belonging to a family as well as a nation state: 
Last names indicate belonging to a family and family names belonging to a state when, 
for example, Swedish naming traditions are met. First names are hegemonically 
negotiated as ‘showing’ gender but only when the name’s ‘origin’ aka ‘nationality’ can be 
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identified (cf. for example chapter 4). A reason why the categorization of a person’s 
name invokes expectations towards that person might be the role naming processes 
have played in German and Swedish societies: to register people who lived in a territory 
of a nation state. In order to identify their citizens, the conceptualization of the ‘nation’ 
has been constituted by hegemonic definitions of belonging and exclusion: Who should 
belong and who should not? As previously shown in chapter 2.3, racialization, 
migratization, genderization as well as disabilization of persons have been negotiated as 
relevant ways to distinguish people. This distinction also constitutes the manner in 
which people are defined as citizens with full citizen rights, citizens with only partial 
citizen rights and non-citizens with no or minor rights. It found its manifestation in 
legislation, for example in laws on citizenship, on civil status and enforced naming (cf. 
following chapters). That is why I assume it to be important for my study on names to 
analyze the institutionalization of citizenship in Swedish as well as German legislation 
and its links to concepts of nationality.
The establishment and institutionalization of the German nation state in 1871 can be 
negotiated as a result of the rise of the national idea in Europe in the aftermath of the  
French Revolution at the end of the 18th century. In European societies, ‘the nation’ was 
conventionally negotiated as a homogeneous community of people sharing an assumed 
cultural and/or linguistic, ‘national’ or ‘ethnic’ commonality, the latter usually 
conceptualized via ius sanguinis (cf. for example Wodak et al. 1999:20–40). Already at 
this time, this invention of the national idea was supported and had materialized 
through successive and continuous institutionalization. One example is the publication 
and dissemination of books. The book business can be understood as a promotion of the 
national idea by providing a common written language and canon of literary and 
historical knowledge (cf. Anderson 1983) that also included knowledge on personal 
names and, in Protestant areas, in particular Biblical ones76. This is especially important 
for the German and Swedish contexts, as in both Sweden and Germany, the knowledge 
76 Cf. Anderson’s analysis of “[t]he coalition between Protestantism and print-capitalism […] [that] 
quickly created large new reading publics – not least among merchants and women […] – and si -
multaneously mobilized them for politico-religious purposes“ (Anderson 1983:40). Thus, it can be 
assumed that people and in particular women in choosing their children’s names were also influ-
enced by personal names from religious books (cf. also Nübling et al. 2012:114–116 for hegemonic 
naming conventionalizations in Germany following the Reformation).
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and use of Swedish or German as a common language have been negotiated as central  
indicators for the national idea (cf. chapters 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, cf. Wodak et al. 1999:20–
40). Hence, it can be assumed that through the dissemination of imprinted knowledge, 
awareness was also spread and conventionalized that especially Christian names can be 
perceived and negotiated as Swedish or German.
As previously mentioned, the idea of this chapter is based on the assumption that names 
are negotiated as indicators for hegemonic conceptualizations of nationality and 
citizenship. However, it needs to be borne in mind that in the German context, the 
concepts of ‘nation’ or ‘ethnicity’ are merged with the concept of ‘the people’ (‘das 
Volk’77) (cf. GG, Deutscher Bundestag 31/12/2014: article 116 paragraph 1). Despite the 
conceptual national-socialist continuities in its use78, the term “das Deutsche Volk” is 
still employed in the German Basic Constitutional Law (cf. GG, Deutscher Bundestag 
31/12/2014:preamble).
Who belongs to the nation – understood in territorial as well as ethnic, cultural and/or 
linguistic terms – and who does not is regulated today by citizenship laws such as the 
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, StAG, (formerly RuStAG) in Germany and the Lag om 
svenskt medborgarskap in Sweden. The citizenship laws define the scope of state 
legislation since they name and re_produce structural categorical perceptions of people 
as citizens or non-citizens to whom ‘national’ legislation on registration and naming 
77 For a critical reflection on the Nazi use of the concept ‘das Volk’ cf. Gasche 2014. Before and after 
the fall of the Wall, the notion was increasingly used in order to make a public statement against 
the GDR dictatorship and to initiate political change in the form of a democratic movement that is 
also described as ‘the peaceful revolution’. However, as Ritz states, the ‘We’ in the slogan ‘We are  
the Volk’ was conceptualized as white and the ‘revolution’ only peaceful for white people. This be-
came particularly evident when the slogan changed to ‘We are one Volk’ and ‘Germany for Germans 
only’. Ritz concludes that the new Germany after 1989 has provided space for ideas that were only 
thought but now could be uttered in hegemonic discourse (cf. Ritz 2009:45–48). Thus, the political 
‘turning-point’ (Wende) helped to re_vitalize the explicit normalization of the racist conceptualiza-
tion of Volk as white.
78 The term ‘ethnic German’ in its translation consisting of the entities ‘Volk’ and ‘Deutsch’ was not 
only but particularly used by the Nazis for the racialized group of ‘Germans’ that were living outside 
the state. This conceptualization is still employed in article 116 of the German Basic Constitutional  
Law that deals with post-war repatriates (cf. Deutscher Bundestag 31/12/2014: article 116 para-
graph 1). Additionally, the concept is still actively used by groups that identify themselves with the 
conventionalized Nazi meaning (e.g. the so-called Federation of ‘Expellees’ or Bund der ‘Vertriebe-
nen’) which due to its nationalist use, is often interpellated by the single use of one of the terms 
(‘Volk’ or ‘Deutsch’).
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apply. Non-citizens of the Swedish and German states who only possess a residence 
permit are subject to the juridical practices on personal names only to a certain extent.
The registration of a person depends on the person’s citizenship. In Germany, stateless 
people and refugees are subject to both the NamÄndG (Deutscher Bundestag 
1/09/2009: article 1) and PStG (Deutscher Bundestag 1/01/2009:chapter 7, section 1). 
However, a person with non-German citizenship comes under their respective 
legislation and might have access to specific rights that are defined in such laws as 
Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Ausländerrechts (AuslG, cf. Deutscher Bundestag 1990), 
while the registration of German citizenship is – not surprisingly – regulated by the 
remaining German laws. Administrative regulations instruct registrars in Germany to 
register a newborn non-German citizen according to the legislation of the state of which 
the child is a citizen (cf. Bundesministerium des Inneren 2015, cf. Mergenthaler et al. 
1987). Therefore, German registrars may re_produce the discriminatory practices of a 
state. At a conference, sociologist and migration researcher Umut Erel79 made me aware 
of the fact that Turkish citizens who wanted to register their children with a Kurdish 
name in Germany could not do so because German registrars were instructed to follow 
Turkish naming law: Until the ban on the Kurdish language was lifted in 1991, it was 
forbidden to assign children Kurdish names under Turkish law (cf. Aslan 2009).80
People with a non-Nordic citizenship residing in Sweden can apply for name change 
according to Swedish law but might need to verify their state’s regulations on name 
change in order to ensure that the change will be accepted (Lag (2016:1013), 
Justitiedepartementet L2 17/11/2016: article 32; Patent- och Registreringsverket n.d.i). 
In other words, to have the name changed in one’s non-Nordic passport depends 
nevertheless on the non-Nordic country’s rules and not on Swedish law. There are also 
79 I am grateful to the remark by Umut Erel during my paper presentation entitled “How naming pro-
cesses reproduce (hetero)sexist, migratist and racist conceptualizations of citizenship“ at the inter-
national conference “Thought as Action: Gender, Democracy, Freedom“ on August 18th, 2012 at the 
Admiral Hotel in Bergen/Norway, organized by the Senter for kvinne- og kjønnsforskning (SKOK),  
University of Bergen (cf. Erel 2012).
80 Today, Kurdish names are allowed but only if they do “not violate moral norms and offend the pub-
lic and [are] spelled in accordance with the official Turkish alphabet” (cf. Aslan 2009). As Aslan  
2009 describes how Turkish authorities tackle Kurdish naming practices differently in post-2000 
Aslan 2009; thus, there still are some cases where Kurdish names are prohibited by Turkish au-
thorities. Cf. Uso Kurdman’s portrait in Svenska Dagbladet for a self-empowering intervention in 
Turkish naming legislation (Lagerblad 2010b).
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specific rules for stateless people and people recognized as refugees under Swedish 
legislation (cf. Lag (2001:82), Justitiedepartementet L2 1/03/2012: article 51; Lag 
(2001:82), Justitiedepartementet L7 2001: articles 6–8, 11). Lag (2001:182) om 
behandling av personuppgifter i Skatteverkets folkbokföringsverksamhet applies to 
anyone who resides in Sweden and wants, needs or is entitled or forced to be registered 
at Skatteverket.
In Sweden as well as in Germany, both the naming and registering of people became 
more and more regulated in the 19th and early 20th century (cf. following chapters). With 
a state regulated system for registration, the classification of people along presupposed 
categories such as ‘religion’ and ‘nationality’ became distinctive for their status as 
citizens. Structuralizing hegemonic conceptions of ‘gender’ and ‘race’ also constituted 
those categorizations. Yet, those classifications are not self-explanatory nor are all of 
them explicitly used for the census or the administrative registration of people81 and 
their names: According to Swedish Personal Data Act (Personuppgiftslag), it is 
forbidden in Sweden to collect personal data that reveals “race or ethnic origin”82. Yet, 
this does not prevent politicians such as the former Swedish Prime Minister Reinfeldt 
from re_producing this categorization in a racist way in public discourse on Swedish 
labor market statistics (cf. Stiernstedt, Paulsson Rönnbäck 2012). According to the 
German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt), neither ‘race’ nor 
‘ethnicity’ seem to be assessed in Germany (cf. Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik et al. 2010). However, 
data on ‘religion’ is still collected during current registration procedures though on an 
optional basis (cf. chapter 3.2.2). Since Judaism was assessed as a racial classification 
during registration, specifically under the Nazi regime (cf. Reichsministerium des 
Inneren 1938:37; 175-178), and given the different forms of racist discrimination on the 
grounds of, for example, anti-Semitism and anti-Muslimism (cf. Kuria 2015:35) today, 
the indication of ‘religion’ at registration offices needs to be regarded in its historical 
continuity as an indicator for racialization. As shown above, the social categorization of 
people is constituted by accustomed hegemonic and prototypical ways of perceiving, 
negotiating and conceptualizing people. Although not always made explicit on, for 
81 Cf. Hà 2009 for the People of Color approach as an alternative to and intervention in ethnic moni -
toring.
82 Original: “ras eller etniskt ursprung” (Justitiedepartementet L6: article 13, translated by EH).
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example, registration templates83, hegemonic ‘defaultism’ (cf. chapters 1.1.4 and 2.3.4) 
enables the interpellation of ideas of nationality and religion as well as race and gender 
when names are categorized and perceived as Swedish’ and/or ‘German’. The 
composition of the registration templates has sustainable consequences for the 
conceptual expectation of how to perceive and identify the name bearer categorically: 
When it comes to gender and citizenship/nationality concepts, a person with a name 
such as Katrin Müller will most probably be identified as a German womanisized person 
with citizenship just like a person with a name like Karin Svensson would be considered 
womanisized and Swedish with citizenship. Moreover, both names would be more 
implicitly perceived as being linked to white Western European Christian heritage. To 
wit, no one would be shocked if Katrin Müller or Karin Svensson were Christian and 
white. However, the names in their stereotypical usage only serve as indicators for 
genderization, nationalization and thus racialization and non/-migratization. The link 
between naming and national legislation provides evidence for the underlying implicit 
norm that a person can be and needs to be gendered and ‘originated’ in the context of  
registration – of which the choice of name supposedly should give proof. In contrast, a 
person with a name such as Fatima Ahmed will not be considered German or Swedish in 
the respective hegemonic discourses. However, according to the name legislation in 
Sweden and Germany, it would be possible to register a person and/or newborn with 
this name as a Swedish or German citizen as long as it complies with the current  
national naming norms, such as the principle of gender-evidence and gender-
distinctivity (Geschlechtsoffenkundigkeit84, cf. chapter 4).
3.2.2 The German citizenship of names
In this section I aim to analyze the presuppositions that are taken for granted in the 
context of name laws. Conceptualizations and definitions of ‘citizenship’ and 
‘nationality’ are decisive for how legislation on names is applied to citizens and non-
citizens in both Germany and Sweden. German laws on names only apply to German 
83 Cf. Standesamt Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf von Berlin n.d., Verlag für Standesamtswesen GmbH 
2009 and Skatteverket 2010.
84 Cf. article 262 paragraph 4 of Dienstanweisung für die Standesbeamten und ihre Aufsichtsbehör-
den (Gensior 1987:236), Verlag für Standesamtswesen GmbH 2009 and Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
Beschluss of 5/12/2008.
133
Historical Continuities in Everyday Discrimination Through Names: Sedimentation of 
Accustomed Norms in Germany and Sweden
citizens. However, these laws presuppose a certain image of German citizenship that is 
not necessarily made explicit today. Since presuppositions are understood as historically 
accustomed and silenced knowledge productions in this study, it is necessary to 
investigate ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ in their historical contexts on which current 
laws such as the German Nationality Act (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, StAG), the 
German Law on Civil Status (Personenstandsgesetz, PStG), and the German Law on 
Name Change (Namensänderungsgesetz, NamÄndG), are based.
Thus, I question who is implicitly conceptualized as German and who is excluded from 
this hegemonic conceptualization and how. By applying the dispositive approach that 
regards the interdependency of structural power relations as constitutive for social 
norms, I aim at focusing on research that investigated the extent to which those laws 
have been constituted by _racism_genderism_ableism_migratism_classism_, in 
particular against minorities who had been persecuted and discriminated against during 
centuries in the territory that today is recognized as Germany, namely German Jews, 
Afro-Germans and German Roma.
However, before I start with the analysis, it is methodologically necessary to explain why 
other socially marginalized groups who have been living in Germany are less taken into 
account in this section.85 For a start, there is a lack of research questioning the extent to 
which the hegemonic conceptualization of ‘Germanness’ has been constituted by 
ableism, by classism and by conceptualizations such as ‘German minorities’ and 
‘minorities in Germany’.
The Frisian people living in East and North Frisia and the Danish people living in 
Southern Schleswig are today recognized minorities with specific local rights such as 
schooling in Frisian and Danish, just like the Sorbs living in Lusatia and the Roma 
people living throughout Germany. The hegemonic conceptualization of the Frisian and 
Danish minorities as white Christian Western Europeans leads to the assumption that 
they have experienced privilege by statization and migratism (cf. chapter 3.1.1) on a 
structural level, different from the experiences of the Sorbs and Roma people as well as 
85 I am grateful to Izabela A. Dahl, who made me take a stance on the relevance of minorities and in  
particular of Polish people as the largest minority group in the German Empire on the constitution 
of ‘Germanness’ (Dahl 2015b).
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Afro-Germans and Jews. Nevertheless, beyond the regional focus, little research has 
been conducted on the extent to which the Danish and Frisian people had been explicitly 
excluded from the conceptualization of ‘Germanness’ beyond the regional focus. The 
same applies to research on the Sorbs. Thus, it is unclear how a member of one of these 
regionalized minorities is conceptualized when living beyond the region to which they 
are assigned. Compared to the Roma people, the Danish, Frisian and Sorbian people 
have been regarded as local minorities only, which makes them less instrumentizable as 
a threat to the conceptualization of a German nationality and easier to control, due to 
their locality.
Thus, most research on the Sorbs also focusses on the regional statutes of the minority 
group. However, in contrast to the Danish and Frisian people, the Sorbs have 
experienced structural discrimination on the grounds of anti-Slavism for centuries. The 
use of the Sorbian language in legislation and administration was forbidden during the 
Prussian regime in the 19th century. According to Ludwig Elle, the Germanization of 
Sorbs was intensified with the establishment of the German Empire, for example by 
restricting and banning Sorbian language classes from school in Upper Lusatia (Elle 
1995:456). The ban was lifted during the Weimar Republic; however, the language 
classes were not supported by the state. Elle reports that the National Socialist Regime 
initially aimed at negotiating Sorbs as ‘Wendish speaking Germans’, using the German 
expression for Sorbian, and, thus, at neglecting their Slavic decent. However, due to 
Sorbian resistance to NS assimilation politics, after 1937 the public use of the Sorbian 
language was forbidden, Sorbian teachers were expelled from Lusatia and local leaders 
were arrested, tried and convicted of treason (cf. Elle 1995:458–459). The Sorbs were 
also forced to Germanize their traditional toponyms (Teidelbaum 2012). After World 
War II, the German Democratic Republic officially ‘supported’ the Sorbian minority by 
granting them the use of Sorbian in schools, administrations and courts. However, as 
Elle points out, this ‘support’ must be regarded against the background of socialist 
ideology for which the minority politics were instrumentalized (Elle 1995:460).
As for the status of Polish people in Germany, at the time of the German Empire’s 
constitution, they were the largest group among nationalized minorities in the German 
Empire because the former territory of Poland had been divided between Prussia, 
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Austria and Russia. Their – unofficial – minority status changed after Poland 
reestablished their sovereignty and territory. However, regarding the status of those 
Poles that remained in the German Empire, Andrzej Kaluza explains “that the thought of 
actively supporting own national minorities in their identity won recognition under 
international law only after World War II”86. By referring to international law, Kaluza 
compares the Danish minority group in Northern Germany with the Poles who had been 
living in Polish territory that was taken under the Prussian regime. Unlike Southern 
Schleswig, the partitioned territory once again belongs to the Polish state. Whereas 
Danes as well as Frisians and Sorbs are assigned to local territories in Germany and, 
thus, have only locally assured minority rights (cf. Kaluza 2011, cf. Bundesministerium 
des Inneren 2014), there is no specific area in Germany that is assigned to Poles. In this 
respect, the partitions of Poland from 1772 until 1918 challenge the conceptualizations of 
territory, nationalized people and nation state. As there was no Polish nation state, 
Polish people were living in Prussian, i.e. German, (as well as Russian and Austrian) 
territory. Therefore, the claim can be made that generations of Poles lived in a territory 
that was regarded as German for over 120 years. The minority status of Polish people in 
Germany becomes even more an issue because the historical fact that Germans moved 
to the Prussian part of former Poland gives their descendants a minority status in 
Poland (cf. Kaluza 2011). Thus, the fact that Poland reestablished its sovereignty and 
regained its territory in 1918 and 1945 might explain why Poles are not among the 
groups Germany officially recognizes today as national minorities. Current research on 
the discriminatory effects of laws against minorities in Germany also negotiates the 
status of Poles in the context of ‘immigration’ and not as a localized national minority. 
In this respect, the hegemonic perception and negotiation of Polish people as Slavic and 
thus non-German constituted German legislation during the Weimar Republic and, 
consequently, is taken into account in this research.
With regard to the need for more research on how Afro-Germans, Roma people and 
Sorbs have been historically discriminated against by nationalized legislation, it appears 
that even less research has been conducted on how disableized people have been 
86 Original: “dass sich der Gedanke, eigene nationale Minderheiten aktiv in ihrer Identität zu fördern, 
erst nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg völkerrechtlich durchgesetzt hatte.” (Kaluza 2011, translated by 
EH).
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conceptualized in the context of German citizenship and nationality. The same applies to 
the question of what impact classism has on the conceptualization of ‘Germanness’. For 
the analysis of citizenship and nationality, I chose knowledge productions that question 
how naming constitutes citizenship and personhood and how citizenship and 
personhood are constituted by hegemonic legal and medical discourse (cf. below, cf. 
chapter 6). As a result, these knowledge productions seem to associate citizenship and 
nationality more closely with racist, migratist and genderist images of social groups. 
Consequently, this causes a gap in my attempt to sketch the historical continuities of  
discrimination against people that have not been conceptualized as the default white, 
non-migratized, cis-binary-gendered, male, ableized middle-class German. However, 
the gap may not only be attributed to a lack of research in academic discourse but also to 
my level of knowledge on both the topic, ableist and classist discrimination in the 
context of nationality and citizenship, and the methodology used to research for 
answers.
3.2.2.1 The re_construction of statization in German ‘nationality’
For the German context, citizenship has been closely linked with the principles of 
‘nationality’ and in particular with ius sanguinis. Before the reform of the German 
nationality act (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, StAG) in 2000, citizenship primarily was 
assigned to people who were conceptualized as ‘Germans’ by birth according to the ius 
sanguinis citizenship concept, as manifested and defined in the Reichs- und 
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (RuStAG) of July 22nd, 1913 (cf. Magnus 1917:34–42). El-
Tayeb demonstrates in her discussion on the interdependency of the concepts of ‘Volk’, 
‘nation’ and ‘race’ in the German context that ‘blood’ was invented as the crucial 
metaphor: For the adoption of political and legal acts, the concept of ius sanguinis 
would serve as the essential criterion to define ‘Germanness’, also before the German 
Empire was founded in 1871. Since 1842, only those were considered Prussian whose 
fathers were Prussian (cf. El-Tayeb 2001:133–136), a principle that is still applied today 
in the German Constitution to guarantee citizenship beyond residence in Germany (cf. 
GG, Deutscher Bundestag 31/12/2014: article 116 paragraph 1). However, at the 
beginning of the 20th century, this did not necessarily mean that everyone with a 
German parent, in particular father, could naturalize as German.
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By using the debate on the legal status of interracial marriages and the rights of Afro-
Germans as an example, El-Tayeb shows that the terms ‘Volk’ and ‘race’ were used in an 
interchangeable, biological manner (El-Tayeb 2001:118–148). ‘Volk’ was linked to ‘race’ 
and ‘race’ was considered as being linked to blood. El-Tayeb states that ‘German blood’ 
would always imply “white’ blood” (El-Tayeb 2001:135); this is also to be understood as 
‘non-Jewish blood’87. In this respect, the adoption of the ius sanguinis citizenship 
concept in 1913 can be regarded as the legal manifestation and institutionalization of the 
racist conceptualization of Germanness that dominated public discourse at the turn of 
the century (cf. also Trevisiol 2004:63–64).
The definition of the geopolitical and racial dimension of the German Empire coincided 
with the appropriation of colonies in 1884. For example, for the people in the territory of 
modern-day Namibia that came under German colonial rule in 1884, the identification 
as ‘German’ was crucial because it would enable access to education, employment and, 
most of all, recognition as a free person. National belonging and citizenship were 
discussed against the background of societal racist perceptions. Before 1913, German 
citizenship could be acquired through marriage and birth to a German citizen as 
conceptualized and negotiated since the foundation of the German Empire in 1871. 
Thus, according to El-Tayeb, non-German citizens of Namibia could ‘naturalize’ as 
Germans in 1884. However, as El-Tayeb also states (El-Tayeb 2001:116-117; 125), the 
heterogenderist_racist objectification of Black women as well as the absence of white 
women in Namibia to please white men must be seen as the reasons why interracial 
relationships were initially accepted. With the introduction of the so-called Protectorate 
Law (Schutzgebietsgesetz) in 1900, marriage no longer necessarily guaranteed 
naturalization (cf. El-Tayeb 2001:116-117; 125). In 1904, the year the Herero Wars 
began, Governor Lindequist prohibited so-called interracial marriage between white 
males and Black females. With the amendment of article 17 of the bylaw 
(Gemeindeverordnung) in 1908, all interracial marriages that had been concluded 
before 1905 were annulled. This was accompanied and perpetuated by also prohibiting 
87 Cf. Shohat, Stam 1994:137 on the implications of the trope of racial ‘blood’ that “has historically 
served to signify religious affiliation (‘Jewish blood’), class belonging (‘blue blood’), national appur-
tenance (‘German blood’), and race (‘Black blood’)”. As she points out, although the social construc-
tion of ‘blood’ is used in an ideologically loaded, metaphorical way, it has its concrete discriminato-
ry effects in society (cf. the ideology of ‘purity’, cf. Shohat, Stam 1994:137).
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church weddings, despite the fact they would not have any legal consequences in terms 
of acquiring citizenship. Interracial marriages as well as children were not to be 
tolerated at any level of society (cf. El-Tayeb 2001:94, 103). Thus, it should be 
questioned what impact these racist regulations had when the RuStAG was introduced 
in 1913 in Germany. To what extent were people with German citizenship who had lived 
in Namibia recognized by German legislation, given that the law was, according to 
Oliver Trevisiol, specifically addressed against to people from territories in what is today 
negotiated as Eastern Europe88, particularly Polish people and among them especially 
Jews (cf. Trevisiol 2004:56–66)?
As El-Tayeb states, in order to be recognized as non-indigene the racist ‘one drop rule’ 
was applied: If a person’s ancestor was perceived as Black, this person would not be 
considered white even if this person had previously been considered white (cf. El-Tayeb 
2001:101-102, 107). Thus, with the application of the rule in 1907 (cf. Dietrich 
2007:221), people with German citizenship living in Namibia were imagined white. This 
racist conceptualization of Germanness prohibited Afro-Germans from being considered 
German by blood according to ius sanguinis (El-Tayeb 2001:139). As El-Tayeb states, 
t h e Reichskolonialamt generally neglected to acknowledge any naturalization 
applications that were submitted by “African people” (cf. El-Tayeb 2001:137).
The amendment of the former citizenship legislation and introduction of RuStAG in 
1913 based on the application of ius sanguinis is also an effect of structural anti-
Semitism, anti-Slavism and anti-Romaism. Since 1899, naturalization applications by 
people who were Polish and Jewish were subject to an extraordinary investigation by the 
Prussian minister of internal affairs, although this was without legal basis. As Eugen 
Ehmann & Heinz Stark state, this legislative principle also intended to prevent poor and 
Jewish ‘migrants’ from Poland or Russia from naturalizing their children as soon as they 
were born in German territory according to ius soli (Ehmann, Stark 2008:20–21). In 
this context, it is important to remember that at the time, Poland did not exist as a state  
(cf. above). Thus, ius soli applied not only to ‘migrants’, as Ehmann & Stark illustrate, 
but also to a population occupied by the German Empire (cf. Dahl 2015a). Given the 
88 I am grateful to Izabela A. Dahl, who informed me that in 1913, Polish people have not been con-
ceptualized as Eastern Europeans, as they are today (cf. Dahl 2015b).
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number of discriminatory edicts against Roma people after the foundation of the 
German Empire, which resulted in the establishment of a central Roma registry in 1899 
in Munich (cf. Hehemann 1987:243–403, cf. chapter 3.2.2.2.3) it must be assumed that 
Roma people were also not conceptionally thought of as German citizens under RuStAG. 
Thus, the hegemonic idea that ‘Volk’, ‘nation’ and ‘race’ could be interchangeable 
concepts shaped and constituted the debate on German citizenship when the RuStAG 
was introduced (cf. El-Tayeb 2001:107, 121).
The principle of ius sanguinis was applied more often after the Great War in order to 
secure “ethnic-cultural homogeneity” (Trevisiol 2004:72). However, as Trevisiol shows, 
until 1933 naturalization was implemented differently within the states of the German 
Empire because each one was allowed to decide individually based on federalism (cf. 
Trevisiol 2004:68–72). On July 14th, 1933 the National Socialist regime introduced a 
l a w , Gesetz über den Widerruf von Einbürgerungen und die Aberkennung der  
deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit, which allowed naturalizations between September 9th, 
1918 and January 1st, 1933 to be withdrawn and German citizenship deprived (cf. 
Reichsregierung 14/07/1933:480). The law was again particularly addressed against 
Jews from Eastern Europe but also against people who were considered criminals or 
who otherwise had behaved “in a deleterious way against Volk and state”89. Since Roma 
people had already been systematically criminalized (cf. following chapter), the law 
made it possible to deprive them of their citizenship. The introduction of the Reich 
Citizenship Law (Reichsbürgergesetz) divided the citizens of Germany into different 
groups: Reich citizens who were all statisized Germans and citizens who were Jews (cf.  
Reichstag 16/09/1935). In this way, Jews were already deprived of full citizenship but 
the twelfth decree in the Reichsbürgergesetz of 1943 finally revoked citizenship from all 
Jews and Roma in Germany who had managed to remain undiscovered by the National 
Socialist regime (Reichsministerium des Inneren 30/04/1943).
In his autobiography, Gert Schramm, confirms that the withdrawal of citizenship also 
included Afro-Germans. In May 1941, Schramm’s grandmother received a letter that 
stated her twelve-year-old grandson would eventually be excluded from the German 
89 Original: “in einer dem Wohle von Staat und Volk abträglichen Weise” (Reichsministerium des In-
neren:538–539, translated by EH).
140
Historical Continuities in Everyday Discrimination Through Names: Sedimentation of  
Accustomed Norms in Germany and Sweden
‘Volksgemeinschaft’ (Schramm 2011:25). A few months later, the youth ‘welfare’ office 
(Jugendamt) decided Schramm should leave home and school and be put in a home for 
‘non-Aryans’ (Heim für ‘Nichtarier’) (Schramm 2011:26–28). However, the ‘home’ 
denied him access on the grounds of his age and racist prejudices, which saved 
Schramm’s life because the children were murdered in Auschwitz. Nevertheless, in May 
1943 he was imprisoned by the Gestapo in Erfurt and Weimar and in June 1944 
deported to KZ Buchenwald, where he survived the Holocaust deprived of his citizen’s 
rights (cf. Schramm 2011:53–76).
Although the racist, anti-Semitic, anti-Romaist and anti-Slavic conceptualizations were 
not expressed as explicitly as in the legislation of 1933, the racist, anti-Semitic, anti-
Romaist and anti-Slavic context in which the RuStAG was appointed cannot be 
neglected, in particular with regard to its basic principle of ius sanguinis, which was 
valid throughout the 20th century until the RuStAG was amended and renamed 
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (StAG) in 2000. Prior to this date, it was basically 
impossible for people who did not have a parent with German citizenship to naturalize 
as German (cf. chapter 3.2). Nevertheless, as the principle of ius sanguinis was not 
rejected but complemented by a version of ius soli, the racist, anti-Semitic, anti-Romaist 
and Anti-Slavic implications of the RuStAG were legally manifested, since they are 
historically based on the racist, anti-Semitic, anti-Romaist and anti-Slavic exclusion of 
Afro-, Jewish, Roma- and Polish Germans. As long as people are systematically 
categorized according to hegemonic conceptualizations of origin, the subtle change in 
legislation might not have the immediate effect in perceiving Germanness in an altered 
way. A permanent exhibition on the deprivation of citizenship during the regime of the 
National Socialist Party in Germany at the Federal Office of Administration 
(Bundesverwaltungsamt) documents the de_mentioning of the racist conceptualization 
of German citizenship (cf. Bundesverwaltungsamt). As the title “Human Destinies” 
(Menschenschicksale) implies, the exhibition does not focus on the discriminatory 
conceptualization of ius sanguinis as a systematic structural activity of exclusion that 
still has its continuities. Instead, it presents the life stories of individuals who were 
deprived citizenship from a historical perspective, suggesting that it affected only some 
people and only during the National Socialist Regime in Germany. In this way, the 
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privileging effects of ius sanguinis for those it has and still applies to are de_named, and 
includes the denial of historical continuities, re_productions and effects of structural 
power relations in today’s StAG (cf. above).
Therefore, to the question of how to perceive and imagine a person with a name that is 
negotiated as German, the racist, blood-related default image of the ‘ius sanguinis 
German’ continues to be the underlying implied norm. Since blood-relation still 
constitutes the law, those who can prove a biological blood-relation to a family with an 
‘acknowledged’ family tree as introduced by the Nuremberg Laws are still particularly 
privileged (cf. family book, Familienstammbuch Reichsverband der Standesbeamten 
Deutschlands n.d. [1940]). This shows that the reproduction of the ‘ius sanguinis  
German’ also implies ableist hetero- as well as repronormative practices that are 
performed by ableized white, non-migratized, cis-gendered persons fitting the binary-
gender norm.
3.2.2.2 Registration and German naming practices: preserving the pre-
eminence of hegemonic discourse
With the introduction of legislation on naming and personal/civil status in 1875, as well 
as the establishment of registry offices in 1876, the link between accustomed genderist, 
migratist and racist perceptions of naming practices and conceptualizations of 
citizenship and nationality became manifested and institutionalized in the German 
Empire. Before it was constituted in 1871, there had been several individual attempts in 
the prior ‘German’ identified territories to restrict the citizens’ right to freely choose 
their names, for example in 1677 by Ferdinand Maria, Elector of Bavaria (cf. Wagner-
Kern 2002:27; cf. Döllinger 1836:391). In the territory of what was considered Germany 
on January 1st, 1876, the registration of births, marriages and deaths by state authorities 
became obligatory. Together with the new legislation and its civil registry, a new 
bureaucratic system was introduced that obliged people to bear a fixed name (cf. 
Wagner-Kern 2002:67–68), which led to a better surveillance of civil society. Registry 
offices were to be the only authorities that could document civil status (cf. Reichstag 
9/02/1875:23). Therefore, the monopoly by the churches to record people’s data was 
undermined. However, during the regime of the National Socialist Party the church 
regained their central role in registration issues, as their parish registers were used and 
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duplicated to provide evidence for anti-Semitic, racist privilege of so-called Aryans (cf. 
Gailus 2008).
The first legislation on civil status and marriage registration (Gesetz über die  
Beurkundung des Personenstandes und die Eheschließung) from February 1875 
(Reichstag 9/02/1875) demanded the following information about living newborn 
children, and according to PStG is still requested today, with the exception of number 
one and the indication of rank, occupation and optional information on the parents’ 
religious affiliation (cf. PStG, Deutscher Bundestag 1/01/2009: article 21, paragraph 1):
“In case of birth, the entry shall contain:
1. first and family name, profession or business and residence of the person 
making the announcement;
2. place, day and hour of birth; 
3. the child’s gender;
4. the child’s first names;
5. the parents’ first and family names, religion, profession or business and 
residence.90
In this way, the social categorization of people and their cis-binary-genderization and 
religious affiliation has been manifested and normalized as an institutional practice, 
going beyond civic registration.91 In the following, I will investigate the effects of 
requesting information on gender and in particular on religion and their implications 
for naming practices.
90 Original: “Die Eintragung des Geburtsfalles soll enthalten:
1. Vor- und Familiennamen, Stand oder Gewerbe und Wohnort des Anzeigenden;
2. Ort, Tag und Stunde der Geburt;
3. Geschlecht des Kindes;
4. Vornamen des Kindes;
5. Vor- und Familiennamen, Religion, Stand oder Gewerbe und Wohnort der Eltern.
(Reichstag 9/02/1875:28, translated by EH).
91 Cf. for example the Income Tax Lax (Einkommenssteuergesetz, EStG) for the implications and im-
pact of cis-binary-gendering and religious affiliation on taxation (Bundesministerium der Fi-
nanzen). Cf. chapter 3.2.3.2 for the historical connection between registration and taxation in Swe-
den.
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3.2.2.2.1 Institutionalization of binominalism as a genderist practice
With the 1875 registration law, the indication of gender as well as the adaption of a 
binary-name system (or binominalism) became obligatory. In other words, the 
accustomed hegemonic practice of gendering people and of re_producing a hereditary 
surname system became institutionalized on a juridical level. According to Nübling, 
Fahlbusch & Heuser, the consequent use of a hereditary surname system in Germany 
only ended with the establishment of registry offices (cf. Nübling et al. 2012:145–146). 
From then on, last names could no longer be assigned or changed individually but 
required state consent. The institutionalized regulation of naming demanded clarity 
because names would now serve as the means to identify a person (cf. chapter 6.1.4). 
This naming practice to disambiguate a person had been accustomed since the 16th 
century, when the androgenderist use of last names as family names was more or less 
conventionalized in order to pass them on to ‘males’/’sons’ for succession (cf. Nübling et  
al. 2012:145–146). With the institutionalization, the accustomed discrimination of 
womanisized persons to subordinate them to either ‘father’ or ‘husband’ in a repro- and 
heteronormative manner became legalized. Yet, the discrimination of trans and gender 
non-conform people who are positioned beyond a static and unchangeable binary-
gender-system is still not recognized on a juridical level.
The idea of marking the belonging to a ‘family’ has become more enforced by 
administrative regulations only since the 17th century: According to Nübling & Dammel, 
one of the reasons was hegemonic society’s growing identification with Christianity by 
naming children after their godparents, saints, or sovereigns (cf. Nübling, Dammel 
2007:139), the latter because they may claimed to have been chosen by God. Due to this 
trend, many shared the same first names within the German-speaking community. In 
some areas it could be that half of the population was assigned one of the seven most 
common first names (cf. Kunze 1998:45). As a consequence, some of the most 
traditional first names that have hegemonically been categorized as ‘Germanic’ were no 
longer used as a popular first name. If they were used, they were transferred to and 
passed on as ‘family names’. In order to distinguish between people who shared the 
same names, the system of having two fixed names became more and more common. 
One reason could have been the wish and need for uniqueness in a society where more 
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and more people were connected by written resources, such as books or official 
documentation (cf. chapter 3.2.1). Also, the living conditions in denser populated areas 
such as cities made it necessary to separate individuals who shared the same first names 
(cf. Nübling, Dammel 2007:139–140).
3.2.2.2.2 Institutionalization of binominalism as an anti-Semitic practice
However, it needs to be borne in mind that, as Wagner-Kern states, until the end of the 
18th century the majority of European Jews lived isolated from the hegemonic 
communities of Christians and usually did not use fixed family names. Instead, a 
patronymic was added to the first name (cf. Wagner-Kern 2002:33). Thus, the extent to 
which the assignment of fixed last names was discriminatory after binominalism 
became hegemonically obligatory needs to be analyzed (cf. chapter 3.2.2.2.1) for an 
analysis of repro- and heterogenderist discrimination). In the context of ‘Jewish 
emancipation’ in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, which aimed at socially including 
Jews in hegemonic society for power-political reasons, a last name was also mandatory 
in order to become entitled to civic rights (cf. Wagner-Kern 2002:35–38). But in some 
German territories, Jews as non-Christians were also restricted in their choice of 
possible last names.
Benzion C. Kaganoff, Wagner-Kern and Lars Menk identify Emperor Joseph II of 
Austria as being the first regent to introduce an anti-Semitic law in 1787 (Kaganoff 1996; 
Wagner-Kern 2002; Menk 2005)92 which enforced last names on Jews while prohibiting 
the names to be identifiable as Hebrew or denominating a person’s place of residence 
(Menk 2005:3). With regard to first names, Wagner-Kern mentions a list that was 
circulated as a consequence of the law limiting the choice to 109 ‘male’ and 35 ‘female’  
first names (cf. Wagner-Kern 2002:39). During their occupation of Poland from 1794 to 
1806, Prussia also “imposed German-sounding names on its Polish Jews” (Kaganoff 
1996:21). Both Kaganoff and Siegfried Maruhn inform that Jews in the occupied Polish 
territories of Prussia and Austria had to pay a higher fee if they wanted to assume a 
noble-sounding name such as Rosenthal or Edelstein; those who could not afford higher 
fees were assigned derogatory last names such as Schmalz (grease) (cf. Kaganoff 
1996:23) or Saumagen (pig’s stomach) (Maruhn 2002:147) by the authorities. As these 
92 Cf. Kropatschek 1787:534–538 for the original version of the law.
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names were forcefully assigned to Jews in an anti-Semitic manner, they can 
simultaneously be regarded as pejorative according to Hornscheidt’s model (cf. chapter 
1.3.5). In any case, all names should look German according to hegemonic grammatical  
rules. As for their meaning, journalist Elon Gilad reports in Haaretz that those forced
“[a]rtificial or ornamental names indicate nothing except for the fact that their 
bearers are Ashkenazi Jews. The names were mostly given to Jews by government 
officials of the Austrian Empire in the late 18th and early 20th centuries. The officials 
used a small bank of German words, either alone or in pairs, sometimes with the 
suffix ‘-man’.” (Gilad 2014)
Yet, some Jews managed to resist these oppressive mechanisms. Kaganoff describes 
several interventions in the enforced Germanization of Jews’ names. For example, 
Hebraisms were combined with German components such as Katzenstein (with Katz- 
representing an acronym for the priestly caste Cohen) and Herzberg (with Herz- 
interpellating symbolic meaning, here: heart); another strategy was to translate Hebrew 
first names such as Solomon or the characteristic of a Biblical figure, such as ‘strength’ 
for Samson, into German, i.e. Fried and Starkman (cf. Kaganoff 1996:23–25). In this 
way, it was possible to maintain hereditary naming practices in which the Biblical 
implications of family names could be passed on.
A last strategy, which I find important to mention, in particular with regard to the 
Swedish context, is the use of patronymics. Similar to the naming practice of Christian 
Swedes, Austrian and German Jews added – in an androgenderist manner – the suffix 
-sohn and Slavic Jews the suffix -vitch to the fathers’ first names (such as Mendelsohn 
and Abramovitch) (cf. Kaganoff 1996: 25, cf. also chapter 6.2.2.4). In comparison, both 
metronymics and patronymics were common among Slavic Jewish communities. Thus,
“[...] the suffixes -ov, -off, -eff, and -kin […] denote[d] ‘descendant of’, and to this 
day we find a host of metronymics and patronymics built on this principle: Baskin 
(from Basyah, or Batyah), Chaikin (from Chayyah, or Hayyah), Rivkin (from Rivke, 
or Rebecca), Sorkin (from Sarah), Malkov (from Malkah), Aronoff (from Aaron).” 
(Kaganoff 1996:25)
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However, as the hereditary naming practice is also common in the Slavic hegemonic 
gentile society, the individual first name on which the patro- or metronymic is based 
might be a stronger indicator for perceiving the last names mentioned above as Jewish.
At the beginning of the 19th century, more German speaking territories issued restricting 
decrees on the fixation of names (Wagner-Kern 2002:40–51): Menk lists, for example, 
the Kingdom of Westphalia as well as the Duchy of Lippe-Detmold, which both forbade 
location names and “surnames of well-known Christian families” (Menk 2005:3). In 
Prussia, the enforced adoption of last names was strengthened by an edict in 1812, 
which decreed that Jews could only be emancipated if they assumed a last name (cf. 
(Kaganoff 1996:22–23). This form of enforced customization to the hegemonic society 
was intended to prevent identifying Jews by their names, thus making them 
undistinguishable from Christians (Wagner-Kern 2002:47). However, in the following 
years, this would increasingly apply for binominalism only. For example, in 1816, the 
Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm forbade Christian names for Jewish children that were 
not baptized (cf. Wagner-Kern 2002:54–55) and reinforced the prohibition in 1825 (as 
was also done in the following decades) by forbidding Jews to take on any names that 
would make them appear Christian and unidentifiable as Jewish (cf. Wagner-Kern 
2002:61–63; 82-110). Although the political will that Jews were to be identifiable by 
their names could not be implemented, WagnerKern states that questions regarding the 
choice or changing of names need to be understood as a “political controlling tool […] 
for politics against Jews that was of restorative, and more precisely: excluding 
character”93. Thus, when statewide legislation on civil status and marriage registration 
was introduced in February 1875, the necessity to specify not only religious affiliation 
but to indicate a fixed and unchangeable name that was previously constituted by 
regulations specifically addressed against Jews must be understood as indications for a 
racist distinction and marking that led to genocide between 1939 and 1945.
3.2.2.2.3 Prohibition of changing names as a racist practice against German Jews,  
German Roma and Afro-Germans
As Wagner-Kern shows, in the following years until the end of the German Empire the 
hegemonic discourse on the right to change one’s name was not only characterized by an 
93 Original: “politische[s] Steuerungsinstrument [...] für eine Judenpolitik restaurativer, genauer: aus-
grenzender Prägung” (Wagner-Kern 2002:64, translated by EH).
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authoritarian interest in a personal name as means for identification, which 
presupposed not changing one’s name. It was also constituted by anti-Semitic 
conspiracy imputations concerning the motivation of Jews to change their names: 
Whereas assimilation was negotiated as desirable for the manifestation of a German 
state’s power during the period of ‘Jewish emancipation’, the idea was now 
conceptualized as a threat to ‘German’ names, which implied that they were also 
considered as Christian; thus, Jews were simultaneously identified as non-German (cf. 
WagnerKern 2002:90–94; 135–137). Throughout the years of the Weimar Republic, the 
discussions on names also centered on the change of ‘Jewish’ names, thus manifesting 
the anti-Semitic presuppositions that limited Jews’ right to change their names. Only 
offensive names that could provoke ‘railleries’ could be replaced by an assonant name 
(cf. Wagner-Kern 2002:217–222), which ensured the name’s function as a tool of 
identification. According to Maruhn, in 1932, the Prussian Ministry of Internal Affairs 
transferred the competence for the changing of names from the court to the 
administration; this assigned the responsibility to the individual registrars. In this 
context, the Ministry introduced guidelines that should prevent Jews from changing 
their name to one that was not identifiable as Jewish. The law to prohibit misfeasance in 
marriage and in the adoption of a child (Missbräuche bei der Eheschließung und der  
Annahme an Kindes Statt) introduced under the NS regime on November 30th, 1933 
enabled registrars to invalidate name changes by Jews which, according to the 
hegemonic discourse at the time, were regarded as gentile ‘German’ names 
(Reichsministerium der Justiz 23/11/1933; Reichsministerium der Justiz 15/12/1933; 
Maruhn 2002:147–149).
Consequently, the introduction of NamÄndG on January 5th, 1938 confirms the 
historical continuity of institutionalized anti-Semitic naming practices by German 
authorities (cf. chapter 3.1.1) which specifically addressed Jews in order to control and 
register them as such. Jewishness had been defined by the Nuremberg Laws of 
September 1935 and used a person’s bloodline as the fundament for their judgement (cf.  
Reichstag 16/09/1935 and Reichsregierung 14/11/1935). Thus, Jews were racialized on 
the grounds of the Nuremberg Laws and registered as such according to the Law on Civil 
Status (Personenstandsgesetz) of November 3rd, 1937 – independent of whether they 
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recognized themselves as Jewish or had ended their religious affiliation (cf.  
Reichsministerium des Inneren, Reichsministerium der Justiz 21/05/1938; 
Reichsministerium des Inneren 1938:37; 175-178). According to Maruhn (2002:149-
150), some Jewish and non-Jewish family names were difficult to distinguish, since 
many gentiles bore names with a morphology similar to Jewish naming tradition which 
caused gentiles to ‘defend and prove their Aryan heritage’. This might be a reason why 
the Second Decree on the Execution of the Law regarding the Changing of Surnames 
and Forenames (Zweite Verordnung zur Durchführung des Gesetzes über die  
Änderung von Familiennamen und Vornamen) introduced on August 18th, 1938 
specifically addressed first names (cf. Reichsministerium des Inneren, 
Reichsministerium der Justiz 18/08/1938; cf. chapter 6.2.2.3). However, the circular 
directive that was issued by the Reichsinnenministerium on January 6th, 1939 also 
included last names and shows that specific names such as Deutscher or Deutschmann 
were assigned as symbolic meaning in the context of NS ideology and should be reserved 
for ‘Aryans’ only. This prompted local authorities to make Jews who bore one of those 
last names to change them (cf. WagnerKern 2002:328). Yet, according to Wagner-Kern, 
the local authorities were unable to identify any of these names in their district (cf. 
Wagner-Kern 2002:329, footnote 341).
These legislative provisions re_produced a racialized understanding of ‘religion’ based 
on racial ascription to Judaism as a category for registration. The racial categorization 
did not only allow registrars and authorities to mark Jews but to also compile 
deportation lists. Against this historical background of registration practices in 
Germany, it is striking that religion is still a category that can be filled in on registration 
forms today (cf. above).
Although optional, the indication of religious affiliation is innocent enough for people 
privileged by Christianity who have not experienced any form of systematic violence 
expressed through racist oppression, persecution and extermination based on racist 
perceptions of religious affiliation committed by the state. In this way, the optional 
indication of religion privileges Christianity and discriminates other religious 
affiliations. NamÄndG’s current restrictiveness is historically linked to the anti-Semitic 
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practice of registering Jewish affiliation. Thus, it re_produces its anti-Semitic 
background
• by assuming that a personal name functionally ensures the perpetuation of ‘social 
order’ and implicitly suggests that said order is disturbed when a person changes 
their name, regardless of who experiences discrimination,
• by requiring an ‘important reason’ for name change instead of supporting people 
in their wish to change their name,
• by having authorities decide to which extent the indicated reason is ‘acceptable’ 
according to their reading of NamÄndG (cf. chapter 6.2.2.4).
This is why Wagner-Kern regards a revision of the current NamÄndG as necessary 
(Wagner-Kern 2002:407, 414-416).
It is important to note that racialization at the registry offices was not only expressed 
through religious affiliation. As the Jews, Roma had also been subject to racist 
discrimination for years by the time registry offices were established in 1876. They had 
been criminalized by the authorities and subjected to policing activities initially 
conducted by the German police in the German states. With the establishment of a 
Roma registry center in 1899 in Munich, an institutionalized fundament was provided 
for the centralized collection of Roma’s personal data during the Weimar Republic, the 
regime of the National Socialist Party, and the first 25 years of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (cf. Knudsen 2004; Lucassen 1997). As a consequence, legislation and 
authorities in the counties of the German Empire introduced and implemented decrees 
against Roma’s occupations and living conditions, which resulted in a comprehensive 
surveillance of Roma’s whereabouts in the Weimar Republic. According to Maruhn, the 
registrars were instructed to provide information on the Roma’s location to the county 
criminal investigation department (cf. Maruhn 2002:184). The surveillance of Roma 
was intensified with article 157 of the administrative regulations Dienstanweisung für  
die Standesbeamten und ihre Aufsichtsbehörden (DA) in 1938: The registrars were 
required to also report every birth, marriage and death of any Roma they registered and 
add marginal notes in the respective civil registry (cf. Reichsministerium des Inneren 
1938:51). As Lucassen concludes, the regime of the National Socialist Party continued 
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the existing practices to register Roma, which served their extermination policy (cf. 
Lucassen 1997; cf. also Rose 1999). The anti-Romaist criminalization and registration of 
Roma remained after 1945; the Center in Munich was only closed in 1970, seven years 
after the Federal Court of Justice recognized the persecution of Roma since 1938 as 
racist (cf. Lucassen 1997; Knudsen 2004; Randjelovic 2011). Nevertheless, according to 
Randjelovic and Lauré al-Samarai, the historic discriminatory perception and 
criminalization of Roma in hegemonic everyday discourses is still persistent today (cf. 
Randjelovic 2011:675–676; Lauré Al-Samarai 2008:99–100).
Article 157 of the DA also included Black people who were racialized in a similar way as 
Jews and Roma by being excluded from the racial conceptualization of Germanness and 
thus deported to labor and concentration camps (cf. for example Michael 2014; 
Schramm 2011; Achenbach 2004). Even prior to 1938, Afro-German children living in 
the Rhineland were registered in specific lists that enabled the Nazi regime to perform 
enforced sterilizations in 1937 (Lauré Al-Samarai 2008:98).
In summary, since the establishment of registry offices during the German Empire, 
registration has been characterized by nationalist ideas of Germanness. These 
hegemonic presuppositions have been constituted by anti-Semitic, anti-Romaist, 
colonial racist, anti-Slavic and repro- and heteronormative conceptualizations of the 
prototypical German citizen. Naming practices have been closely linked to the 
hegemonic idea of Germanness: Names have served as tools for the identification as well 
as differentiation of people as Germans and non-Germans in the context of nationality 
and citizenship. In particular, Jews were subject to discriminatory naming practices. 
However, as Roma and Afro-Germans were not conceptualized as Germans according to 
hegemonic interpretation of ius sanguinis, they were not considered when the idea to 
protect ‘German names’ was re_produced and promoted at the end of the 19th and 
beginning of the 20th century. Their names were kept in specific registries that served 
their persecution, enforced sterilization and deportation. Given the conceptualization of 
whiteness presupposed in the context of ius sanguinis, it must be assumed that the 
exclusion from the concept of German nationality has also included other racialized, 
ethnicized and migratized minorities that might have been silenced (cf. introduction to 
chapter 3.2.2).
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Names have also been negotiated as a means for belonging to a family that subordinated 
womanisized people to their fathers or husbands with the introduction of compulsory 
binominalism re_producing cis-binary-genderism. In this context, trans and gender 
non-conform people are made unintelligible in registration practices and consequently 
also in the hegemonic perception of the function of personal names as contributing to 
cis-binary-gendered ‘social order’.94
As for disableized people, it must be assumed that they have also been excluded and 
silenced from the historically accustomed hegemonic conceptualization of German 
citizenship. The 1933 law for forced sterilization (Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken 
Nachwuchses), the consecutive state-ordered murder of disableized people under the 
Nazi regime, the late amendment to the German Basic Constitutional Law protecting the 
rights of disableized people in 1994 (cf. Masuhr n.d.b) and continuous episodes of 
everyday ableisms such as those presented on website Leidmedien.de (cf. also chapter 
6.2.3) lead to this conclusion.
These intersecting perceptions and conceptualizations of personal names have their 
continuities in modern naming practices. These naming practices still promote the 
preeminence of hegemonic discourse and neglect to acknowledge counter-activist 
discourses as necessary and empowering interventions in discriminatory naming 
practices, which I will discuss in chapters 4 and 5.
3.2.3 The Swedish citizenship of names
By applying the dispositive approach to the Swedish context, I attempt to illustrate in 
the following section the extent to which the hegemonic conceptualization of  
Swedishness is constituted by genderism, racism and migratism on the example of 
naming. Thus, I aim to reveal who has historically been negotiated as Swedish in 
hegemonic discourse and who has been excluded. The lack of analysis on the impact of  
ableism and classism on the conceptualization of nationality and citizenship I perceived 
for the German discourse also applies to the Swedish discourse. As in the German 
94 Homosexuals were also listed in specific registries during the Nazi period that became known as 
‘Rosa Listen’, in reference to the pink triangles worn by homosexuals in concentration camps. With 
the introduction of Strafgesetzbuch’s article 175 in 1872, homosexuality was juridically negotiated 
as a criminal act and remained criminalized until its abolition in 1994 (cf. Deutscher Bundestag 
10/06/1994).
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context, research on Swedish citizenship and nationality focuses more on the 
racialization, migratization and genderization of social groups. A reason might be that 
Swedishness is also historically manifested by the cognitive institutionalization of ius  
sanguinis as the distinctive right to be considered as Swedish.
Starting my analysis with an example of how ‘Swedishness’ is currently negotiated in 
hegemonic discourse, I aim to sketch how ‘being Swedish’ has historically been 
constituted particularly by hegemonic legal discourse. The analysis of the historical 
development of Sweden’s Citizenship Law is conducted against the background of the 
interdependency of structural power relations and on the grounds of a jurisprudential 
article which describes the law’s history from a hegemonic point of view. The article is  
contested by counter-activist knowledge productions that challenge the implicitly racist, 
migratist and anti-Semitic Swedish self-perception that is re_produced when 
conceptualizing the hegemonic Swedish society as tolerant and anti-racist. In this way, I 
aim to approach and describe how the institutionally denamed but presupposed ius 
sanguinis principle has actually been fundamental for Swedish legislation on citizenship 
and, consequently, for registration practices.
Regarding the registration of people, I focus on the historical development of its 
institutions and links to citizenship, and the perception and recognition of people as 
Swedish citizens: Who can be registered (as a Swedish citizen) and under what 
conditions? What authorities have been established in the context of registration? Did 
registration practices have an influence on the naming of people? To what extent could 
and can a person’s name be regarded as a distinct marker for a person’s ‘Swedishness’ in 
terms of racist and/or migratist conceptualizations and ascriptions? Consequently, I 
take into account knowledge productions that sketch the history of systematic 
registration in Sweden on the one side and describe the consequences of registration for 
the naming practices of racialized Swedish minorities, in particular the Sami and Roma 
people, on the other. I focus specifically on these two Swedish minority groups because 
they have been explicitly discriminated by hegemonic conceptualizations of Swedish 
citizenship, by registration and by naming practices with the first Swedish law on names 
from 1901. Other minorities that experienced a similar form of exclusion by the 
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conceptualization of ‘Swedishness’, such as Finnish people, are partly taken into account 
in the analysis.
The chapter concludes with an analysis of the impact of the Swedish naming legislation 
on the conceptualization of ‘inclusion’ while being constituted by the hegemonic 
genderist, classist, and migratist perception of names. With regard to the sources I used 
in order to analyze how name change is conceptualized in Swedish legislation, name 
change in Sweden seems to be taken up by onomastic research whereas in Germany, it is 
a topic in historical research. A reason might be that in Sweden, the legislation on names 
was introduced in order to encourage name change. German name legislation, however, 
aimed at prohibiting name changes.
3.2.3.1 The re_construction of Swedish nationality
A current example from the Swedish hegemonic discourse shows some similarities 
between the hegemonic conceptualization of ‘nationality’ in Germany and Sweden that 
has an impact on the conceptualization of citizenship, registration, and naming 
processes in both states. Given the evidence of studies which prove the discrimination of 
racialized and migratized people on the Swedish labor market (cf. Bursell 2007; 
Carlsson, Rooth 2007), the following example shows that the conceptualization of 
statization as the process that re_produces privilege for non-migratized people can also 
be applied to Sweden.
Following publication of the most current unemployment statistics in May 2012, the 
Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt evaluated the results by distinguishing 
between migratized and non-migratized Swedes. Instead of acknowledging the impact of 
migratized discrimination on the Swedish labor market, which has been proved by 
scholarly results (cf. Ahmed, Hammarstedt 2008; Bursell 2007), he presented non-
migratized Swedes as ‘more successful’ because they are employed. By silencing the 
conditions within the labor market which privilege and prioritize statisized Swedes and 
which discriminate against migratized Swedes, Reinfeldt presents these two groups as 
homogenous and equally responsible for their status on the labor market. By labelling 
the more successful group of people as ‘ethnic Swedes’95, Reinfeldt used an essentialist, 
95 Original: “etniska svenskar“ (cf. Svenska Dagbladet Online 2012, translated by Martin 2012).
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migratist, ius sanguinis term, thereby re_producing the nationalist idea of a 
homogeneous nation that shares a common ethnicity. Similarly, his terminology 
interpellated the idea of a prototypical Swedish person as being white and ‘without 
migration background’, as could be observed by the media response.
One of Sweden’s largest newspapers, Svenska Dagbladet, published an open counter-
activist letter written by Afro-Swedish politician Mikael Trolin in response to Reinfeldt’s 
statement. In his letter, he underlines how Reinfeldt ignores the racist discrimination on 
the job market that Trolin experiences and thus confirms that Reinfeldt’s idea of 
‘nationality’ does indeed invoke the racist conceptualization of Swedish people as being 
white only.96 The Swedish magazine Arena also alluded to Reinfeldt’s expression “ethnic 
Swedes at the prime of their life”97 as being racist by releasing the issue following 
Reinfeldt’s statement with the headline “Racist Swedes at the prime of their life”98.
What I want to challenge here is not only that ‘ethnicity’ was explicitly re_produced as a  
classification for nationality but following Trolin and Arena, I specifically want to 
question how the rather blurry conceptualization of ‘ethnicity’99 was used by Reinfeldt in 
order to explain why some people are more successful on the labor market than others. 
By suggesting to explain occupational success with ‘ethnicity’ re_produces not only 
essentialist racist and migratist images; it also ignores and silences the racist and 
migratist effects of distinguishing people in Swedish and non-Swedish in the context of 
citizenship and nationality. Hence, how has being Swedish been negotiated in 
hegemonic discourse thus far? To what extent has ‘Swedishness’ been institutionalized 
and, more specifically, been defined as a concept for citizenship by the law?
96 Cf. anti-racist intervention of Trolin 2012.
97 Original: “etniska svenskar mitt i livet”, translated by Martin 2012.
98 Original: “Rasistiska svenskar mitt i livet”, title of issue 5 of Swedish magazine Arena (Arenagrup-
pen 2012). Cf. also Feldman 2012.
99 Reinfeldt’s use of the concept of ‘ethnicity’ distinguishes the group of default Swedes from migra-
tized Swedes and Swedish Sami people. However, as the use of ‘ethnicity’ in sociological research is  
blurry because it is interchangeably used for the concept of ‘nationality’ on the one side and ‘race’ 
on the other (cf. also Dahl 2013), it is not used or further discussed in this study.
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Utlänningslag defines who is categorized as a non-Swede (‘foreigner’): “A foreigner is, 
according to Utlänningslag, a person that is not a Swedish citizen.”100 Thus, ‘being 
Swedish’ seems to be determined by citizenship. Consequently, who has historically 
been entitled to citizenship and who has not needs to be investigated.
In her jurisprudential article on Swedish citizenship, Hedvig Lokrantz Bernitz states 
that “the ius sanguinis tradition has been predominant in Sweden […] and has remained 
the principle rule” (Lokrantz Bernitz 2010:1). The Citizenship Act of 1894, considered as 
the first to define regulations for Swedish citizenship, only formalized what had already 
been negotiated as customary law. Consequently, ius sanguinis is negotiated in the 
initial paragraph of the current Swedish Citizenship Act of 2001 (Lag om svenskt  
medborgarskap), entitled Förarv av svenskt medborgarskap vid födelsen 
(Justitiedepartementet L7 2001). In it, this historically accustomed and hegemonically 
normalized convention is described as the principle way for people to acquire Swedish 
citizenship:
“A child acquires Swedish citizenship at birth if
1. a parent to the child is a Swedish citizen, or
2. a deceased parent to the child was a Swedish citizen at their death. Lag 
(2014:481)”.101
Thus, with the exception of adoption, ‘Swedishness’ which concerns everything Swedish, 
is – just like ‘Germanness’ – historically negotiated as being necessarily linked to a 
Swedish bloodrelation. Therefore, the first paragraph of the Swedish Citizenship Act 
interpellates heteronormative, repronormative and, as I will show, racialized 
conceptions of its citizens. These ideas are based on cis-binary-gendering, which 
simultaneously is the hegemonic norm used to recognize anyone. However, ius  
sanguinis applies to parents only since April 2015. With the introduction of the 1894 
Citizenship Act, ius sanguinis was applicable only if the father of the child was Swedish. 
100 Original: “En utlänning är enligt utlänningslagen en person som inte är svensk medborgare.” (Mi-
grationsverket 2015, translated by EH).
101 Original: “Ett barn förvärvar svenskt medborgarskap vid födelsen, om
1. en förälder till barnet är svensk medborgare, eller
2. en avliden förälder till barnet var svensk medborgare vid sin död. Lag (2014:481).”
(Lag (2001:82), Justitiedepartementet L7 2001: article 2, translated by EH).
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This practice was not changed until 1979, when it was decided that ius sanguinis should 
only fully apply when the mother was a Swedish citizen. Ius soli and the parent’s marital 
status also became decisive for the child’s citizenship (cf. Lokrantz Bernitz 2010:1). This 
principle remained part of the 2001 reform of the law and was applied to newborn 
children until March 2015:
“Children born between 1 July 2001 and 31 March 2015 will receive Swedish 
citizenship at birth, if
• The mother was a Swedish citizen.
• The father was a Swedish citizen and married to the child’s mother.
• The father was a Swedish citizen and the child was born in Sweden. In this 
case, the Swedish citizenship is registered when the confirmation of 
paternity has been received by the Swedish Tax Agency.
• The father is deceased but, at the time of death, was a Swedish citizen and 
married to the child’s mother.
• The father is deceased but, at his death, was a Swedish citizen, was not 
married to the child’s mother and the child was born in Sweden.”102
Compared to German practices, the civil (marital) status of the parents as well as the 
child’s place of birth has played a larger role in the determination of citizenship in 
Sweden. However, what is more important to note is that “[s]ince 2005, the provisions 
concerning acquisition from a Swedish father also applies [sic!] to a child born from 
artificial insemination, if the child has a foreign mother who is married to, legally 
102 Original: “Barn födda mellan den 1 juli 2001 och den 31 mars 2015 får svenskt medborgarskap vid 
födseln, om
• Mamman var svensk medborgare.
• Pappan var svensk medborgare och gift med barnets mor.
• Pappan var svensk medborgare och barnet föddes i Sverige. Det svenska medborgarskapet 
registreras i detta fall när faderskapsbekräftelse kommit in till Skatteverket.
• Pappan var avliden men var vid sin död svensk medborgare och gift med barnets mor.
• Pappan var avliden men vid sin död var svensk medborgare, inte var gift med barnets mor 
och barnet föddes i Sverige.” 
(Skatteverket n.d., translated by EH)
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registered for partnership or cohabiting with a Swedish woman” (Lokrantz Bernitz 
2010:10).
The submission of married womanisized persons under their husbands was subject to 
people classified as but also to ius sanguinis Swedes and people classified as non-
Swedish. With the Citizenship Act of 1950, married womanisized peoples’ citizenship no 
longer depended on their husbands’ citizenship. A non-Swedish womanisized person 
who married a Swedish (cis-)male-identified citizen could choose between their current 
or Swedish citizenship. The choice also applied to a womanisized person with Swedish 
citizenship who married a (cis-)male-identified person with non-Swedish citizenship (cf. 
Lokrantz Bernitz 2010:4).
As to the question of the naturalization of ‘foreign’ people, which until 1894 meant ‘men’ 
only, a Royal Decree issued on February 27th, 1858 urged ‘foreigners’ to register as 
Swedish while simultaneously providing proof that they were “no longer subject of a 
foreign state” (Lokrantz Bernitz 2010:2). With the 1894 Citizenship Act, Swedish 
citizenship could also be – unlike the German Empire’s RuStAG of 1913 – automatically 
acquired with socialization: ‘Foreign’ men (comprising wife and children) and 
unmarried women who were born in Sweden and resided there became Swedish at the 
age of 22, given they could not prove that they possessed a different citizenship (cf. 
Lokrantz Bernitz 2010:3). The practice of naturalization was revised with the 1924 
reform. According to Lokrantz Bernitz, “a foreigner who had reached the age of 21, who 
had been residing in the country for five years, who was known to lead a respectable life 
and who could support his family, could be naturalized” (Lokrantz Bernitz 2010:4). By 
introducing the requirement of a ‘respectable life’, a discriminatory legal interpretation 
of the terminology is enabled. Thus, the ‘respectable life’ requirement needs to be 
regarded as a hegemonic opportunity to deny citizenship to those who were negotiated 
as unwanted according to hegemonic norm setting. As in Germany (cf. chapter 3.2.2.1) 
this particularly concerned Roma people (cf. so-called Swedish Roma in chapter 
3.2.3.2.2). The requirement of proving the extent to which one (usually cis-man) was 
capable of supporting one’s family was only abolished in 1976. The requirement for good 
conduct still applies (Lokrantz Bernitz 2010:13–14).
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Nevertheless, in her historical synopsis, Lokrantz Bernitz seems to be unable to specify 
the criteria on the grounds of which the conceptualization of ‘being foreign’ is 
distinguished from that of ‘being Swedish’. Rather, Lokrantz Bernitz explains the 
criteria’s omission as follows: “One explanation for the lack of a definition [of 
citizenship] may be that for a long time Swedish population was easy to distinguish and 
citizenship was viewed as something obvious, and therefore not considered in need of a 
legal definition” (Lokrantz Bernitz 2010:20). Given the hegemonic ways to categorize 
people (cf. chapter 1.1.1) it seems that Lokrantz Bernitz, when describing the distinction 
as ‘easy’ and ‘obvious’, pinpoints the racist and migratist ways to distinguish people 
visually.
This denaming and lack of specification of ius sanguinis can be explained with the 
hegemonic silencing of the existence and relevance of racism and its impact on white 
privilege in Swedish society as, for example, discussed by Ylva (Habel 2011)). As Habel 
shows, Afro-Swedes are constantly denied as being Swedish nationals, thus imagining 
Sweden (as well as Europe) as white spaces (Habel 2011:111). Habel refers to Katarina 
Schough’s study on Swedish self-perception as ‘hyperborean’ (Schough 2008) – as being 
exceptionally white which allows white Swedes to “ascribe themselves a morally and 
culturally superior position in the world” (Habel 2011:101). This is “underpinned […] by 
a widespread conviction that Sweden as a nation has had no real part in the imperial 
adventure and, therefore remains untouched by colonial and postcolonial social 
dynamics” (Habel 2011:101). Thus, Habel argues, this self-perception makes it difficult  
to discuss whiteness and structural racism in Sweden, particularly against the 
background that hegemonic Swedish identity is imagined as being tolerant and anti-
racist. The latter would be another reason why racialization is constantly silenced and 
the presence of racism in Sweden denied until just recently, when an openly racist party 
was elected to the Swedish Parliament in 2010 (cf. Habel 2011:102–103, cf. chapter 
6.2.1). Consequently, this current hegemonic self-perception confirms the need to 
regard the idea of an ius sanguinis Swede as being white as a historically accustomed 
racist continuity.
Whiteness as an implied default criterion of ius sanguinis becomes even more evident 
with regard to the following reforms of the Citizenship Act. The 1950 reform was 
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initiated in the context of Nordic cooperation. Given the metaphorical self-perception of 
the ‘hyperborean’ and the historical and linguistic vicinity to default Norwegians, Danes, 
Icelanders and Faeroese, the cooperation among the Nordic countries can be regarded 
as the establishment of a joint Nordic white superiority (cf. Schough 2008:13). Although 
in 1950 the required period of domicile for non-Swedish citizens was extended from five 
to seven years, the Citizenship Act was amended in 1976 in order to explicitly prioritize 
the naturalization of (white) ius sanguinis citizens from the Nordic countries: People 
considered as non-Nordic could naturalize after five years’ domicile in Sweden, whereas 
‘Nordic’ citizens could become Swedish after only two years of residency (cf. Lokrantz 
Bernitz 2010:9). This ‘exceptionalism’ still applies today, where it is also possible for 
people from the Nordic countries to acquire Swedish citizenship simply through 
notification that they have resided in Sweden for at least five years (Lag (2001:82), 
Justitiedepartementet L7 2001: articles 11 and 18).
Thus, just as other unions of international collaboration such as the European Union, 
the so-called Nordic cooperation serves as a tool for the distinction between first and 
second-class citizens, especially in light of the increased migration from ‘non-Nordic’ 
and particularly migratizable people after World War II. In the early 20th century, the 
number of Swedish citizens that emigrated was larger than the number of those that 
immigrated to Sweden. However, between the 1930s and the creation of legislation on 
Swedish citizenship in 1950, a restricted policy applied to the naturalization of groups of 
migratized Swedes that particularly consisted of Russian refugees and Jews (Dahl 2013). 
Dahl states that although this group fulfilled the requirements for naturalization, only a 
limited number was accepted and assigned Swedish citizenship. The fact that the Allies 
had established a commission that controlled the naturalization practices in Sweden 
after World War II by analyzing connections to and sympathies towards Germany leads 
to question the mythical Swedish self-image of a neutral state during both the Second 
World War and the Cold War, as also Dahl suggests (Dahl 2013).
Lokrantz Bernitz documents that in the late 1960s, immigration of non-Nordic citizens 
became regulated. People without a Nordic passport could only enter Sweden as long as 
they were in possession of a valid residence permit. The latter was only issued if the 
person in question could meet labor specific demands. In the 1970s, the acquisition of 
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Swedish citizenship was encouraged and led to an increased naturalization of non-
Nordic citizens (Lokrantz Bernitz 2010:6). However, it needs to be borne in mind that 
naturalization was by no means a free choice.
For example, Dahl demonstrates how anti-Semitism forced the ‘migration’ of Polish 
Jews to Sweden after World War II and in the 1960s. Since returning to Poland was not 
an option, Swedish naturalization appeared as one imposed alternative which, however, 
would not prevent anti-Semitic discrimination in Sweden (cf. Dahl 2013). Thus, for 
people categorized as non-Nordic, the conditions of entering the country became more 
difficult and consequently, only those non-Nordic people could naturalize that had 
already been in the country. Additionally, migratized non-Nordic people had to face 
constant threats such as debates on the possibility of denaturalizing people or on the re-
introduction of a Swedish language requirement. The requirement to provide proof of 
one’s identity during the naturalization process was also tightened (Lokrantz Bernitz 
2010:7; 14). According to Lokrantz Bernitz’ examples, denaturalization is only discussed 
in the context of crimes that are to be regarded as atypically Swedish from a hegemonic 
perspective (such as murders in the name of honor or naturalization through bribing). 
Thus, Lokrantz Bernitz does not list any examples for crimes that would be regarded as 
being typically committed by ius sanguinis Swedes, such as murders in the name of 
racism (cf. Lokrantz Bernitz 2010:18). With the acceptance of dual citizenship in 2001, it 
would be even easier to denaturalize a citizen should the person possess a second 
citizenship, since the loss of Swedish citizenship is currently prohibited only if it should 
result in the person being stateless (cf. Lag (2001:82), Justitiedepartementet L7 2001: 
article 14). The ID requirement seems to be unnecessary for assuming citizenship 
according to ius sanguinis (cf. Lag (2001:82), Justitiedepartementet L7 2001: article 1) 
but makes naturalization impossible for refugees or stateless people without papers (cf. 
Lag (2001:82), Justitiedepartementet L7 2001: article 11b).
By silencing structural racism as constitutive for the idea of the prototypical Swede as 
being white, as well as by tightening regulations to enter the country and assume 
Swedish citizenship via naturalization, the positive hegemonic self-image of the Swedish 
state as tolerant and striving for equality for all its citizens could have been preserved 
over the years in hegemonic discourse. Yet, there are numerous accounts of People of 
161
Historical Continuities in Everyday Discrimination Through Names: Sedimentation of 
Accustomed Norms in Germany and Sweden
Color facing racist discrimination every day. For example, the necessity to enter one’s 
personal name on every ticket issued from the Swedish railway operator SJ103 makes 
identity display obligatory and traveling a risky endeavor for non-citizens without 
papers, particularly for those of Color. A person can only use public transportation as 
long as their personal name is confirmed by a corresponding and legally accepted piece 
of identification. Thus, a personal name confirmed by an officially valid document 
became a new requirement for local traveling. As a white non-migratized person, I have 
made the experience that I never had to show my non-Nordic ID card when traveling by 
train and never when crossing the Swedish border at the airport, unlike People of Color. 
This practice of racial profiling in order to identify people without papers is part of the 
institutionalized discourse as it was defended in 2013 by Sweden’s minister of justice 
and member of the Moderate Party, Beatrice Ask.104
Structurally, there are also strong links between conceptions of Swedishness and 
Christianity based on the historical ties between the Church of Sweden and the Swedish 
state, two entities that remained united until their ‘divorce’ on January 1, 2000 
(Tomasson 2002). Registration practices were – as in Germany – performed by the 
parishes but remained in the hands of the Church of Sweden until 1991, when the 
population registration law (Folkbokföringslagen (1991:481), Finansdepartementet S3 
2014) was introduced, which abolished the previous church bookkeeping 
(kyrkobokföring) and merged with census (mantalsskrivningen).
3.2.3.2 Registration and Swedish naming practices: equating hegemonic 
and marginalized discourses through assimilation?
The systematic registration of people was established in the mid-18th century, after the 
Swedish state had undergone considerable changes in the aftermath of the Great 
Northern War. The Russian Empire annexed the Balkan territories that had been 
appropriated by Sweden. The number of soldiers that died in the war had a tremendous 
impact on the development of the Swedish population. According to Peter Sköld, there 
was an articulated need to collect information on the number of – mostly male – people 
living in Sweden, their occupation, their diseases and causes, as well as on the 
103 Formerly named Statens Järnvägar, State’s Railways.
104 Cf. open letter and article by Jonas Hassen Khemiri (Hassen Khemiri 2013a; Hassen Khemiri 
2013b) for numerous examples of racial profiling over the last 30 years.
162
Historical Continuities in Everyday Discrimination Through Names: Sedimentation of  
Accustomed Norms in Germany and Sweden
reproduction of their descendants (Sköld 2001:13). Sweden is regarded as being the first  
state to establish a nationwide register, Tabellverket, of its inhabitants, in 1749 (cf. 
Sköld 2001:book cover). Since the 16th century, people living in Sweden were listed by 
their names in parish registers (cf. Committee on the population register at the Swedish 
Ministry of Finance, Finansdepartementet Folkbokföringsutredningen). The data in the 
parish registers was essential for work done by the priests in schools and welfare, as well 
as for census registration, conscription and tax purposes (Folkbokföringsutredningen 
2009:119; Sköld 2001:18–26; Wannerdt [1982]). The juridical institutionalization of 
naming by the Swedish state was preceded in 1686 by the royal governmental 
institutionalization of rules on how to register people in the parish books. The following 
details, which subsequently became fundamental to population statistics, were required 
in order to list a child’s birth or baptism:
“The priest shall note place and day in the church book, where and when a child is  
born, and when the baptism took place, also the child’s and the parents’ name as 
well as the name of the godparent.”105
It is interesting to note that ‘gender’ was not included on this list of requirements, 
although the registration authorities in both Sweden106 and Germany require its 
indication now (cf. chapter 4). However, ‘gender’ was arguably implied in the personal 
name and it is unclear to what extent womanisized newborns were registered the same 
way as male-identified children. One of the first academic articles on the Swedish 
census, published in 1744, stated a surplus of men between the years 1694 and 1743,  
which gives reason to speculate on whether womanisized people might have been 
omitted from registration because so many (male-identified) soldiers had died in the 
105 Original: “Prästen skal uti Kyrckeboken anteckna Orten och Dagen, hwar och när ett Barn födt är,  
såsom och när thet döpt warder, jämwäl Barnetz, dess Föräldrars och theras Namn, som Wittnen til  
dess döpelse warit hafwa” (from the 1686 Church Law (kyrkolag), quoted in Wannerdt [1982], 
translated by EH). In the first Episcopal decree of 1608 it was suggested that the parish books 
should register baptisms, weddings and betrothals. However, this was not implemented, and, in  
some parishes, deaths were also listed. In 1622 another more detailed and more strictly observed 
regulation for parish book-keeping was introduced in Västerås bishopric that may have inspired the 
state’s interest in parish registers. According to a royal instruction of 1631, all churches in 
Linköping bishopric were required to register births and deaths (cf. Wannerdt [1982]).
106 In Sweden, genderization is expressed by one fundamental digit of the personal number introduced 
in 1947. This makes it even more difficult to challenge, since it became a part of the system based  
on the binary of the binary-gender system: “Könet framgår av näst sista siffran i personnumret som 
är udda för män och jämn för kvinnor” (Patent- och Registreringsverket n.d.e).
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Great War (cf. Wannerdt [1982]) or because the number of ‘female’ cases and causes of 
death such as in childbirth outnumbered the ‘male’ ones.
Although the legislative power over ecclesiastical bookkeeping rested with the king, it 
was the bishops and priests who had control over the registration of their parishioners,  
for example by annual visits to their homes. During these visits, the priests verified 
whether the information about the household in the parish book was up to date. The 
data for the latter was soon used as the basis for census and tax collecting by officials,  
though not without resistance from the priests (cf. Wannerdt [1982]). This shows the 
close connections that the state and the Christian church had in Sweden. Right from its 
inception, population registration remained in the hands of the Church of Sweden, 
which was a political part of the Swedish state system until 2000. Furthermore, it 
explains why today the Swedish Tax Agency (Skatteverket) as the Church’s successor is 
also responsible for population registration, including the registration of births.107 It is 
also important to question how and to what extent the Church of Sweden registered 
people who were considered non-Swedish, such as the Sami (Frändén 2010:61), and 
explicitly excluded from the hegemonic Swedish society, such as the Roma (cf. 
Montesino Parra; Palosuo 2009; Brisenstam 2012; Romska Ungdomsförbundet, 
Romska Kulturcentret i Malmö n.d.). On the grounds of their institutionally strong ties 
to the Swedish state, the history of the Church of Sweden might simultaneously be 
regarded as a part of hegemonic Swedish national historiography.
3.2.3.2.1 Forced assimilation of Swedish Sami names
Similar to other minorities living in Sweden, such as Roma or Jews, Sami history is 
officially not part of the national history of Sweden. Sami might be negotiated as 
belonging to Swedish society but only from a folkloristic point of view. Hegemonic 
knowledge productions on Swedish history do neither respect nor reflect upon the 
violence that was addressed against Sami and which also constituted hegemonic 
Swedish historiography. It seems that neither the Church of Sweden nor the Swedish 
Parliament and Government regard it as their responsibility to contribute to providing 
historical knowledge on Sami and the relationship between the hegemonic non-Sami 
107 Yet in Germany, the Federal Statistical Office is subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior (Statis-
tisches Bundesamt n.d.).
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Swedes and Swedish Sami. Instead, the Swedish Parliament, Riksdagen, tasked the 
Swedish Sami Parliament, Sameting, to establish a Sami Information Center in the 
2000s to enhance knowledge on Sami history and society. Consequently, their website, 
samer.se, provides a first overview of Sami history as being constituted by the 
oppressive practices of hegemonic Swedish towards Sami society. Not surprisingly, the 
website’s historical and societal presentation contradicts the positive image of  
sweden.se, “the official site of Sweden” (cf. sweden.se), which is publicly funded by the 
Swedish Government. The same applies to the Church of Sweden, which narrates its 
own history rather positively (Svenska Kyrkan 2016a). Thus, the question is how much 
will change after the White book on the Church of Sweden’s relation to Sami was 
published in April 2016 (Svenska Kyrkan 2016b; Junkka 2016; cf. also Sandberg).
The institutions present different images of Sami on their websites. When talking about 
the Sami population in Sweden, the “official site of Sweden” romanticizes them as 
people that “have lived in the Arctic region for thousands of years” and that “today 
maintain their rich culture and long-established traditions” while being “as much part of 
modern society as any other person in Sweden” (Swedish Institute 2014:[1])108. Despite 
the fact that the Sami’s status as indigenous people who have lived in Swedish territory 
for thousands of years is acknowledged, the website loses out on the opportunity to 
inform comprehensively about the hegemonic racist history against Sami that includes 
forced evangelization, colonization, racialization and forced relocalization (cf. Samiskt 
informationscentrum n.d.c). This hegemonic self-perception of an inclusive state and 
the silencing of the own agency as a violent oppressor is conform to the metaphor of the 
hyperborean mentioned above (cf. chapter 3.2.3.1). Thus, instead of providing 
information on the hegemonic oppressive history of non-indigenous statisized Swedes 
towards Sami on the website about Sweden, the Sami were given the task of educating. 
This is a typical scheme of privileged people silencing their liability. Lorde describes this 
strategy as a “constant drain of energy” in order for the “oppressors [to] maintain their 
position and evade responsibility for their own actions” (cf. Lorde 2007:115). In this 
way, among the websites analyzed only Sameting’s website provides information on 
Sami history and in particular on Sami’s naming tradition in the context of hegemonic 
108 Cf. also updated website version that includes some changes in the description of Sami Swedish In-
stitute 2016.
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Swedish evangelization. The following quotation gives proof of Sami’s oppression but 
also resistance in the hegemonic Swedish society:
“In the past, it was a tradition among Sami that children were named after dead 
relatives. [...] Once the church had settled in the Sami area, Sami names, which 
were considered pagan, were no longer approved. Instead, the Sami were forced to 
give their children Biblical names at the christening. But for Sami, it was still  
important that the child had a Sami name after an ancestor. Hence, when they got 
home from church after baptism, another ritual was held where the child got their 
Sami name. Then the Swedish name was never used in the Sami community. [...] 
Eventually, however, the Christian names came to dominate in the Sami 
community gradually. Then the children got Christian names in Sami form. 
Nowadays, Sami children bear all kinds of names. But there are also some names 
that are distinctive and typically Sami, slightly different in different areas. Double 
names are not entirely unusual.”109
As pointed out on Sameting’s website, most of the site’s information on Sami’s religious 
history is based upon sources which consist of written reports by missionaries or priests 
(Samiskt informationscentrum n.d.a). Thus, not surprisingly, the parish books that kept 
record of a parish’s inhabitants were usually kept outside the Sami community (cf. 
Frändén 2010:60). Although the quotation gives evidence of Sami people being listed in 
registers, naming traditions of the Sami were not respected: Märit Frändén states that 
while writing down their names, the priest may have Swedisized Sami’s family names 
(Frändén 2010:60–61). This could be expressed either by phonological assimilation to 
an accustomed set of phonemes perceived as Swedish (cf. Frändén 2010:60–61) or – 
most probable, according to the website samer.de (Samiskt informationscentrum n.d.b) 
– by imposing a Swedisizable name upon the newly baptized Sami child. Frändén 
109 Original: “Förr i tiden var det en tradition bland samerna att barnen fick namn efter döda släktin-
gar. [...] När kyrkan hade etablerat sig i det samiska området godkändes inte längre de samiska 
namnen, som ansågs hedniska. Istället tvingades samerna ge sina barn bibliska namn vid det krist-
na dopet. Men för samerna var det fortfarande viktigt att barnet fick ett samiskt namn efter en för-
fader. Så när man kom hem från kyrkan efter dopet hölls ännu en ritual där barnet fick sitt samiska 
namn. Sedan användes det svenska namnet aldrig mer i den samiska närmiljön. […] Så småningom 
kom dock de kristna namnen att dominera i det samiska samhället. Då fick barnen kristna namn i  
samisk form. Nuförtiden heter samebarn allt möjligt. Men visst finns det också namn som är sär-
präglade och typiskt samiska, lite olika i olika områden. Det är inte helt ovanligt med dubbelnamn.” 
(cf. Samiskt informationscentrum n.d.b, translated by EH).
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further suggests that the priests might also not have been able to recognize first or 
middle names as such and treated them as last names (cf. Frändén 2010:60–61). Hence, 
it needs to be kept in mind that priests, unfamiliar with the Sami languages, might have 
relied on their own accustomed way of perceiving names, instead of asking the Sami 
how they wanted to be registered.
The patronizing silencing of Sami’s oral naming traditions is also grounded in the 
predominant role that has been ascribed to the written language of hegemonically 
dominating communities in Western societies (Hanson [2009]; Lee 2007). It also can be 
regarded as an early attempt to equalize all people living in Sweden under a 
comprehensive hegemonic understanding of Swedishness. While examining the 
negative reactions towards linguistic counter-activism, Daniel Wojahn confirms that this 
response is based on a hegemonically presupposed Swedish self-perception and myth 
about having established equality among everyone living in the country (Wojahn 
2015:187–188). It is this positive image of an equalized society that enables the 
hegemonic self-perception of a tolerant nation, which was pointed out by Habel in 
reference to other Swedish scholars of Critical Whiteness and discussed earlier in this 
study (cf. Habel 2011, chapter 3.2.3.1). Schough identifies for the early 20th century “an 
inclination to integrate, cultivate, love and Swedisize all territories [from South to 
North] in order to incorporate them as a part of a Swedish self-image”110 which 
according to Schough resulted in the consolidation of “viljan till Detsamma” (Schough 
2008:78), which can be translated as “the desire for the same” and “the desire for 
sameness”. This hegemonic understanding of an ‘all Swedish equality’ was 
simultaneously constituted by the effort to keep differences alive. Thus, the hegemonic 
attitude towards Sami as the one people that populated Swedish territory first had been 
two-fold and contradictory within the early 20th century’s nationalist discourses on 
racialized belonging and Othering (Schough 2008:79–85). A reason surely is the need to 
justify the presence and predominance of non-indigenous Swedes in the territory of 
Sweden.
110 Original: “en dragning mot att integrera, kultivera, älska och försvenska alla områden [från söder 
till norr] för att införliva dem som del av en svensk självbild” (Schough 2008:78, translated by EH).
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Another form of forced customization can be recognized for the time period between 
1920 and 1969. This period was analyzed by Frändén in order to identify Sami people’s 
reasons for name change (Frändén 2010:190). Since 1921, a number of name suggestion 
books have been published to motivate Swedish citizens with last names that were not 
considered Swedish to take on a Swedisizable one (cf. Frändén 2010:26, cf. chapter 
3.2.3.2.3). And indeed, one of the motivations mentioned by Sami was the wish to have 
“a more Swedish sounding family name”111 (cf. chapter 5). As Frändén suggests, this wish 
for linguistic assimilation was motivated by the discriminatory perception of Sami’s 
names.
3.2.3.2.2 Forced assimilation of Roma names and exclusion of Roma in Sweden
The politics of customization also concerned Roma people only to the extent that the 
Roma are hegemonically negotiated as a distinct group. The history of white hegemonic 
oppression of the Roma by gaje112 neglects the self-perception and self-denomination of 
the Roma113. In the late 1800s, Swedish gaje took ‘migration’ as the point of reference for 
their perception of Roma people within a legislative context and distinguished between 
“Swedish, Finnish, and non-Nordic Roma including Travelers and newly arrived 
Roma”114. This approach entails that in hegemonic Swedish gaje discourse, all Roma 
groups are conceptualized as being ‘migrated’ to Sweden at one point in history by 
considering
• one group of Roma who migrated to Sweden by the end of the 19th century, as 
being ‘Swedish’;
• another group of Roma who were deported from Sweden to Finland in the 16th 
century, as being ‘Finnish’;
111 Original: “ett mera svenskt klingande släktnamn” (Frändén 2010:196, translated by EH).
112 Romani/Romanes nomination of non-Roma (plural), also spelled as Gadjé or gadzhe (Selling 
2013:14).
113 The use of the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is also problematic, since according to Lundqvist, the self-per-
ception of Resande Folket is different from hegemonic differentiation because they do not identify 
themselves with ‘Roma’ (Lundqvist 2013). Cf. footnote 10 for the use of the terminology in this  
study.
114 Original: “svenska, finska, och utomnordiska romer samt resande och nyanlända” (Delegationen 
för romska frågor 2010:114, translated by EH).
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• and the third group as ‘Travelers’ that are considered to be the first Roma group 
that ‘migrated’ from Germany or France to Sweden in the 16th century.
This differentiation had legislative implications that affected the lives of the various 
Roma groups and Travelers in a divide-et-impera style. Consequently, Roma people and 
Travelers usually could not be categorized and homogenized under one umbrella name, 
given that the legislation addressed the Roma groups in different ways. When talking 
about the Roma in 17th century Sweden, the Roma groups considered are usually those 
categorized as Swedish and/or Finnish Roma as well as Travelers. These groups are 
distinguished in time and geography from so-called non-Nordic or non-Scandinavian 
Roma who are classified as Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovakian Roma migrating to 
Sweden in the 1960-70s (cf. Delegationen för romska frågor 2010:114). Hence, the 
following ecclesiastical legislation did concern so-called Swedish and Finnish Roma, as 
well as Travelers. Before the introduction of a new church law (Kyrkolag) in 1686 that 
would allow Christian Roma people to baptize their children (cf. Svensson:80), 
Sweden’s first protestant bishop, Laurentius Petri Nericius, denied the Roma the 
opportunity to be baptized and buried by the church in 1560 (cf. Brisenstam 2012):
“In the mid-16th century, Laurentius Petri described [...] the Roma people as 
godless and forbade the priests to deal with them: ‘The wicked people’ should 
neither be baptized nor buried. Priests who resisted were dismissed.”115
Despite Nericius’ role in the explicit exclusion of the Roma from society, he is – not 
surprisingly – still commemorated today by the Evangelical Church in Germany as well 
as the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (cf. Schäfer 2015, cf. chapter 6.2.1) along 
with his brother Olaus Petri. The discriminatory actions by the church against the Roma 
also included decrees which prohibited priests from administering to them (Montesino 
Parra: 35) and which demanded their expulsion from the Swedish state:
“At Riksdagen in Örebro in 1617, the clergy demanded that all Roma people should 
be expelled from the country. In 1637, ‘Tattarplakatet’, Sweden’s grimmest law, 
115 Original: “På mitten av 1500-talet kallade Laurentius Petri [...] romer för gudlösa och förbjöd 
prästerna att befatta sig med dem: ‘Det onda folket’ skulle varken döpas eller begravas. Präster som 
gjorde motstånd blev avskedade.” (Romska Ungdomsförbundet, Romska Kulturcentret i Malmö 
n.d., translated by EH).
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was released which resembles ethnic cleansing. After a period of a few months, all 
Roma people should have left the country by November 8th. It is unknown how the 
law was handled, but probably many Roma people flew to Finland and Germany. 
During Roma people’s long residence in Sweden, the Church of Sweden 
participated in various attempts to expel Roma people from Sweden with various 
laws and decrees, regulations.”116
The hegemonic Swedish system of registering people in church books might have failed 
to keep records of Roma people because they could or did not live in any one same place 
permanently (Romska Ungdomsförbundet, Romska Kulturcentret i Malmö n.d.),  
contributing to the collective prosecution of the Roma and their forced migration to 
Finland and Germany117. In fact, the new church law of 1686 was introduced after a 
period of racist prosecution and exclusion by the church. It is questionable to what 
extent this legislation provided Roma access to the same rights as gaje and Buro, i.e. 
non-Travelers (Selling 2013:14; Brisenstam 2011), given that the structural  
discrimination against Roma people most likely changed very slowly. In this context, the 
legislation could be understood as a consequence of the convergence of the Swedish 
state and church:
“On King Karl IX's initiative, in 1686, Roman children were to be baptized and 
parents were to be taught and become part of the Christian community. However, 
it is doubtful whether this historical document reflects the reality. In the 1700s and 
1800s, new fierce provisions recurred – as well as voices that wanted to protect 
Roma, such as, for example, a bill, proposal, in the Riksdag [Swedish Parliament, 
EH] in 1897: We cannot ‘treat these unfortunate people as if they were troublesome 
116 Original: “På Riksdagen i Örebro 1617 krävde prästerskapet att alla romer skulle förvisas ur landet. 
1637 kom ‘Tattarplakatet’, Sveriges grymmaste lag som liknar en etnisk rensning. Efter en tidsfrist 
på några månader skulle alla romer den 8 november ha lämnat landet. Man vet inte hur lagen  
hanterades men troligen flydde många romer till Finland och Tyskland. Den Svenska Kyrkan har 
under romernas långa vistelse i Sverige på olika sätt varit delaktig till försöken att driva romerna ur 
Sverige med olika lagar och förordningar, bestämmelser.” (Romska Ungdomsförbundet, Romska 
Kulturcentret i Malmö n.d., translated by EH).
117 “Det finns inte heller några siffror på antalet romska kvinnor och män som pga. lagar mot trolldom  
och spådomskonst mördades på 1600-talet.” (Romska Ungdomsförbundet, Romska Kulturcentret i 
Malmö n.d.).
170
Historical Continuities in Everyday Discrimination Through Names: Sedimentation of  
Accustomed Norms in Germany and Sweden
social vermin’, without charity and mercy. Instead, Roma people shall be treated as 
fellow human beings.”118
In those cases where Roma people were registered, the record only consisted of 
notifications in the Church of Sweden’s birth books. According to Birgitta Svensson, 
these entries suggest that Roma children were mostly baptized at the places where they 
were born, that is outside of the church building itself – a practice that was also applied 
to children whose birth was not recognized as legitimate at the time (Svensson 1993:80). 
Svensson continues that the first names most commonly chosen went against the 
hegemonic understanding of ‘decorum’ among peasant society, since they were 
interpellating a higher-class background such as nobility, priesthood, magistrate and 
craftspeople. Also, a tradition of multi-nominalism was followed where people were 
given two or more first names. Some of the names (such as Hindrich, Friedrich and 
Christian) also interpellate German background. The last names were – according to 
Svensson’s sources – typical for soldiers, officers or craftspeople (Svensson 1993:80). 
Working for the military did provide Roma with access to some privileges, such as an 
employment relationship regulated by law or protection against forced migration to 
Finland, which was an appropriated part of the Swedish Kingdom. However, one must 
question whether such employment relationships could be regarded as a choice, given 
that military careers appear to be – even today – one of the sole occupations in which 
people from discriminated groups have the chance to make a career. If that is the case,  
the military names also need to be regarded as enforced names, since the choice of those 
names was constituted by hegemonic norms, which determined the chances for survival 
in a society.
What is interesting to note is, as Svensson points out, that all the members of Roma 
families did not share the same last name. According to Svensson, this differing naming 
practice was not regarded as typical among the hegemonic society (Svensson 1993:80). 
118 Original: “På kung Karl IX initiativ bestämdes 1686 att romska barn skulle få döpas och föräldrar 
skulle undervisas och bli en del av den kristna gemenskapen. Det är dock tveksamt om detta his-
toriska dokument speglar verkligheten. På 1700- och 1800-talet kom på nytt hårda bestämmelser – 
samt röster som ville skydda romer, som t.ex. en motion, förslag, i riksdagen 1897: Vi kan inte ‘be -
handla dessa olyckliga endast såsom en besvärlig samhällsohyra’, utan människokärlek och 
barmhärtigheten. I stället ska man behandla romer som medmänniskor.” (Romska Ungdomsför-
bundet, Romska Kulturcentret i Malmö n.d., translated by EH).
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Regarding the conventional Swedish naming practices, however, differing last names 
within one family was not that atypical. On the contrary, one of the reasons why the first 
naming laws were introduced in Sweden was because of patronymic name use – many 
people shared the same names but not necessarily in the same family (cf. chapter 
3.2.3.2.3). A daughter could have a different last name than her father and mother. 
Nevertheless, the particularity of naming among Roma communities can be regarded as 
a form of empowerment, motivated as a response to structural discrimination and 
exclusion from society and in order to maintain independent agency within their own 
community.
The omission of entries of Roma people in other parish books, which tracked personal 
lives (confirmation books, books on banns, wedding books, death books, funeral books) 
provides evidence of the exclusion of Roma from society. Svensson states from a rather 
anti-Romaist perspective (cf. also Hazell 2002:298–300) that the Roma could only 
become a part of the hegemonic society if they adapted to the hegemonic norm: In the 
19th century they were incorporated into society in folk narratives “at the very bottom, 
but [being] now people with names and a service to perform […] that was needed in the 
community” (Svensson 1993:246).
From 1954 on, (Swedish) Roma were imagined as being more integrated in society after 
they adapted to a conduct of living regarded as “acceptable to society” (Svensson 
1993:248) and to the hegemonic implementation of the Citizenship Act’s requirements 
on ‘good conduct’ (cf. chapter 3.2.3.1). It is interesting to note how Svensson uses the 
phrase of ‘having a name’ as a metaphor for being a part of society, thus reconfirming 
the necessity of a name that interpellates a certain status in order to be recognized as a 
notable human (cf. chapter 6). Nevertheless, these perceptions of Roma people as a part 
of Swedish society stands in opposition to the history of omission and exclusion of Roma 
not only in Svensson’s own research119 but also in the Swedish population registration 
and the resultant negation of civic rights and obligations, such as attending school 
(Romska Ungdomsförbundet, Romska Kulturcentret i Malmö n.d.).
119 Cf. also Hazell who criticizes Svensson for building her research on the Travellers’ lives around the  
(anti-Romaist) narratives of Buro only (Hazell 2002:300).
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According to the delegation for Roma related questions, Delegationen för romska 
frågor, Roma people were already displaced during the 16th century to the then Finnish 
part of the Kingdom of Sweden and excluded from both the Swedish state and church 
(Delegationen för romska frågor 2010:137). Hence, these Roma groups were denied 
membership and thus citizenship under the Swedish crown and church and, since the 
19th century, also de_perceived as citizens of the Swedish nation state. As a result, they 
were usually not registered (Delegationen för romska frågor 2010:138). Together with 
Finnish, Jewish and Italian people, Swedish Roma were subject to regulations on 
immigration and hence conceptualized as migratized people that were “difficult to 
monitor in statistical reports”120. This is just one example of how the Church of Sweden’s 
refusal to register Roma people resulted in the exclusion of Roma people in Sweden by 
the Swedish authorities, which denied them access to public welfare (Delegationen för 
romska frågor 2010:142). However, as previously stated, the Roma in Sweden are not a 
homogeneous group. Quoting Pulma 2009, Mikael Demetri, Angelina Dimiter-Taikon & 
Christina Rodell Olgaç point out that a differentiation between Roma people as Swedish 
and non-Swedish was already introduced by church law in 1686 and was revived by the 
end of the 19th century with the pass regulations (Demetri et al. 2010:6). Distinguished 
from groups of recently immigrated Roma, the group of Roma categorized as the 
domestic ethnicized minority ‘Travelers’ became recognized as Swedish citizens. Their 
situation, however, was defined as ‘vagrancy’ which, in the first half of the 20th century, 
meant the institutionalization of enforced settlement and forced customization. Non-
Swedish Roma were not welcomed by the state and were prohibited from immigrating to 
Sweden between 1914 and 1954 (Selling 2013:190). Swedish Roma were not welcomed 
by established Swedish gaje (Delegationen för romska frågor 2010:143–144) and were 
thus unable to settle down (Demetri et al. 2010:12–13) and to trade in their conventional 
ways, which forced them to leave the country. In this context, Roma were refused 
registration as citizens by the church and the authorities (Selling 2013:190–191). 
‘Permanent settlement’ was institutionalized as a prerequisite for Swedish Roma to 
retain custody of their children (cf. Delegationen för romska frågor 2010:142–144) or be 
registered (cf. Demetri et al. 2010:67). After the establishment of the law on child care 
120 Original: “svåra att kontrollera i statistiska rapporter” (Delegationen för romska frågor 2010:140, 
translated by EH).
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(Barnvårdslag) in 1924, it became possible to withdraw custody and forcefully place 
children in homes or educational institutions in order to customize them to the 
hegemonic norm (cf. Delegationen för romska frågor 2010:142–144). The laws on 
sterilization in 1934 and 1941 legally enabled enforced sterilization of Roma. Although 
current research claims that forced foster care for children and forced sterilizations were 
not “actually introduced full-scale in Sweden” and that the threat of these strategies was 
mainly “used as tools of discipline”, the introduction of these legislations had an adverse 
impact on the registration of both Travelers and Swedish Roma by Swedish authorities.  
Travelers were not only recognized as such but were also assigned and labelled (cf. 
Selling 2013:191), with the aim of controlling and identifying them in the event that the 
legislation would be implemented. Conversely, Swedish Roma such as Kelderash were 
not recognized and registered as Swedish citizens (cf. chapter 3.2.3.1) and hence were 
denied social welfare and rights. A Kelderash Roma woman who was born in Sweden in 
the 1930s reports that she and her family were ‘stateless’ until 1964 and therefore denied 
access to social welfare.
“NN: [...] But we did not get real homes because we were stateless in our own 
country of birth, so we were neither registered in the census nor in the church 
books. We neither had housing nor schools nor work.
ADT: But you were born in Sweden, right?
NN: Yes.
ADT: And yet you were not registered?
NN: No. Both my parents, both my parents [sic!], both my mother and father, are 
born in Sweden. Dad was born in 1912 in Härnösand and mom in 1916 in 
Södertälje.
ADT: And you did not have any, did you have a passport at the time?
NN: No, we did not get a passport.
ADT: Then you were more or less stateless.
NN: Yes, we were stateless in our own country of birth.
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ADT: But then when you came under wartime, did your parents receive these 
ration cards so that they could eat?
NN: Absolutely not because we were not registered, so we did not exist anywhere 
on any paper, so we did not get any of those cards to shop for food or gas for 
example or anything like that, without them they worked with tin or played music,  
the Roma people are known for the music, and the women engaging in fortune 
telling. And often, instead of getting money, they requested these ration cards to 
buy food and gas.”121
These practices of discrimination, exclusion and forced customization of the Sami and 
Roma people illustrate the hegemonic societal framework that existed when the first 
legislation on last names was introduced in order to manifest and regulate naming 
practices in Sweden in 1901. It is important to review the historical registration of 
people in order to understand the norms that were institutionalized by the naming laws 
and which defined who was regarded as Swedish and to whom the laws applied.
3.2.3.2.3 Becoming Swedish through name change
When the first name legislation was introduced in Sweden in 1901, it prevented people 
from assuming already existing family names, particularly names that were regarded as 
aristocratic. According to Brylla, officials such as the general director of the Swedish 
121 Original: “NN: […] Men riktiga bostäder fick vi inte för vi var ju statslösa i vårt eget födelseland, så 
vi var inte mantalsskrivna, inte kyrkobokförda. Vi hade varken bostäder eller skolor eller arbete.
ADT: Men du var ju född i Sverige eller hur?
NN: Ja.
ADT: Och ändå var du inte mantalsskriven?
NN: Nej. Båda mina föräldrar, båda mina föräldrar [sic!], både min mor och far, är födda i Sverige.  
Pappa är född 1912 i Härnösand och mamma 1916 i Södertälje.
ADT: Och ni hade inga, hade ni pass på den tiden?
NN: Nej, vi fick inga pass.
ADT: Då var ni mer eller mindre statslösa.
NN: Ja, vi var statslösa i vårt eget födelseland.
ADT: Men då när ni kom under krigstiden, fick dina föräldrar sådana här ransoneringskort så att  
de kunde äta?
NN: Absolut inte, eftersom vi var inte mantalsskrivna, inte kyrkobokförda så då fanns vi inte nå-
gonstans på några papper, så vi fick inte sådana här kort att handla mat med eller handla bensin till 
exempel eller nånting sådant, utan de arbetade med förtenning eller spelade musik, romerna är ju 
kända för musiken, och kvinnorna spådde. Och många gånger i stället för att få pengar, så begärde 
de de här ransoneringskorten för att kunna köpa mat och bensin.”
(Demetri et al. 2010:12, translated by EH)
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Prison and Probation Service, Fångvårdsstyrelsen, convinced the Swedish Parliament 
to establish a decree on family names by creating a police register that provided the last 
names assumed by everyone (Brylla 2002:75–76). In 1918, the discussion on how to 
limit the choice of last names was extended to the question of how ‘Swedish’ last names 
should actually appear. With his petition, the influential Swedish linguist Adolf Noréen 
provided some arguments against the inclusion of names that re_produced 
racist_migratist ways of perceiving people and their names as ‘foreign’ and non-
Swedish. His arguments seemingly played into the nationalist conceptualizations of 
Swedishness in the hegemonic discourse at the time, and his interference resulted in the 
compilation of a register of existing last names, as well as proposals for new names, by 
the Ministry of Education, Ecklesiastikdepartementet (Brylla 2002:76).
Whereas in Germany, the first legislation on names resulted in the fixation of names and 
the prevention of possible name change, in Sweden people with patronymics were 
encouraged to take on “‘proper’ surnames” (Brylla 2011:17) because the number of 
people with the same names was too high and led to difficulties in identifying people 
(Brylla 2002:76). Noréen argued against ‘non-Swedish’ names and expressed that only 
Swedisizable, non-patronymic surnames were desirable. In a racist address to the 
Ministry of Education (that at the time had clear links to the Christian church), he 
defined his understanding of how ‘Swedish’ and the ‘Swedish nation’ should look. This 
was followed by the publication of the Book of Swedish names, Svensk namnbok, edited 
by Noréen and Anders Grape in 1921, that aimed to ‘guide’ people in their choice of a  
new name by providing a list of over 15,000 non-migratizable ‘Swedish’ names (Noréen, 
Grape 1921). The book can be understood as a grammar book on Swedisized names in 
terms of name composition and morphology. Specific morphemes were assigned to 
Swedishness and some of them chosen despite the fact that they were also considered as 
‘borrowed’ from other languages such as Latin or Low German, for example -ander, 
-elius, -ell, -én, -enius, -stedt, or -bom (the latter two with ‘Swedish’ prefixes, cf. Brylla 
2002:78). In this context, it can be questioned why the following morphemes were not 
considered Swedish: -é, -eli, -eni, -ertz, -i, ini, -o, -off, -ow, -sky, and -witz (cf. Brylla 
2002:78). Instead, names should be created based on suffixes that were also used in 
place names or ‘Swedish’ toponyms such as -fjäll, -hamn, -sjö or -skog (Brylla 2009:54). 
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The Book of Swedish Names was published at a time when the regulations of name 
choice were tightened and the Ministry of Justice became the responsible authority for 
name changes. Brylla states that “[n]ames of foreign sound and derivation had been 
difficult to get approved. Nor have been names whose spelling differed from the current 
orthographic rules” (Brylla 2002:79).122 In this context, names perceived and negotiated 
as ‘Sami’ and ‘Finnish’ were unwelcome despite the fact that Finnish and Sami were and 
still are recognized as domestic languages in Sweden (cf. Frändén 2010:26). Phonetic 
sound is here negotiated as an indicator of the Swedisizability of names, even though the 
pronunciation of the Swedish language is expressed through different variations and has 
changed over time (cf. chapter 5). However, according to Brylla’s reading of the journal 
Social-Demokraten dated July 27, 1923, it seems that the restrictive attempts to regulate 
the changing of names resulted in a decrease of actual changes (Brylla 2002:79).
Two further volumes of the same title, edited by another linguist, Jöran Sahlgren, 
followed Noréen’s name book. According to Brylla
“[t]hese two name books have left deep marks in the Swedish surname tradition. 
The construction of the Swedish family name undergoes a major change, when 
unknown place name elements are taken to the public which provide associations 
with well-known word material. From now on, the way is smoothed to empty sound 
compositions in family names. It is enough that they sound Swedish.
The linguistic scrutiny of newly formed family names became more important as of 
1946, when Statistics Sweden took over the responsibility for the examination of 
new family names. From now on, a language expert was hired as an advisor on the 
name issue. This arrangement was valid until 2010, when the current Swedish 
name authority, Patent- och registreringsverket (PRV), chose to refrain from 
linguistic expertise.”123
122 Original: “Namn med utländsk klang och härledning var det svårt att få godkända. Inte heller god-
tog man namn som till stavning avvek från gällande ortografiska regler” (Brylla 2002:79, translated 
by EH).
123 Original: “[d]essa två namnförslagsböcker har satt djupa spår i det svenska efternamnsskicket. De 
svenska släktnamnens byggnad undergår en kraftig förändring, när man nu väljer att ta inför 
allmänheten okända ortnamnselement som ger associationer till välbekant ordmaterial. Man jäm-
nar från och med nu vägen för innehållslösa ljudsammansättningar i släktnamnen. Det räcker med 
att de låter svenska. Den språkliga granskningen av nybildade släktnamn fick större betydelse från 
och med 1946, då Statistiska centralbyrån övertog ansvaret för prövningen av nya släktnamn. Från 
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Thus, it might not be surprising that until July 1st, 2017 when PRV was still in charge for 
name change, it promoted last names that followed both Noréen’s and Sahlgren’s 
suggestions for Swedish suffixes (cf. chapter 5.4). The PRV online service for name 
change provided a set of morphemes that, according to Brylla’s reading of Noréen 
(Brylla 2002:78), has been negotiated as Swedish as well as heraldic, which recalls the 
aristocracy (cf. Patent- och Registreringsverket n.d.d, cf. chapter 5.4). As illustrated in 
chapter 3.2.2, Slavic Jews used suffixes such as -vitch, -ov, -off, -eff, and -kin in the 
same androgenderist hereditary way as white Christian Swedes using -son. Given the 
similarities in the building and usage of patronymics and metronymics, it is remarkable 
that these suffixes are not considered by the PRV as possible endings for new Swedish 
last names. As such, it must be assumed that the omission of such suffixes that are 
hegemonically not regarded as Swedish also has an anti-Slavic and anti-Semitic 
implication.
The law of 1901 was also established for monetary reasons. Many people sharing the 
same first and last names made it difficult to clearly identify which person was entitled 
to receive a pension or who had to pay taxes. The legislation sought to regulate and even 
change the accustomed hereditary system into a system with fixed last names that would 
not change from generation to generation: “The family name regulation laid down that 
everyone should bear a fixed, hereditary surname, i.e. no longer patronymics that 
alternated between the generations” (Frändén 2013:129).124
According to Brylla, the necessity to manifest a fixed name system was justified as being 
in ‘the state’s interest’, which protected not only existing aristocratic names but also 
encouraged changing Sami and Finnish names – a motivation which Brylla mentions 
only as second to changing names that would be regarded as ridiculous or offensive 
(Brylla 2013). In this way, she suggests conceptual vicinity between these two groups of 
names:
och med nu anlitades en språkexpert som rådgivare vid namnfrågorna. Denna ordning kom att gäl -
la t.o.m. 2010, varefter den nuvarande svenska namnmyndigheten Patent- och registreringsverket  
(PRV), har valt att avstå från språklig expertis.” (Brylla 2013:137, translated by EH)
124 Original: “I släktnamnsförordningen fastslogs att alla skulle bära fasta, ärftliga släktnamn, dvs. inte 
längre patronymika som växlade mellan generationerna.” (Frändén 2013:129, translated by EH).
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“The Riksdag [Swedish Parliament, EH] acknowledged the need for legislation, 
partly for laws that should protect family names, and partly for provisions that 
would ‘strongly promote the construction of real family names’. It was emphasized 
that it was a real ‘state interest’ that the name issue would be resolved. There were 
far too many Anderssons and Petterssons. The law would also provide protection of 
existing names and even develop forms for changing family names. [...] In order to 
change one’s name, there must have been a reason such as that the name one 
wanted to replace was ridiculous or offensive. One could also replace Sami or 
Finnish names. Existing names got name protection.125
The hereditary system was constituted by the genderist, classist, and migratist  
perception of last names, conceptualized as the non-migratized names of the nobility, 
the clergy, the bourgeoisie and the peasants (Brylla 2011). According to Brylla, these 
names could be differentiated on a semantic as well as morphological level. Names of 
the nobility were, for example, “often warlike names” (Brylla 2011:15) like Adelswärd or 
the prefix von was used as a “noble prefix” (Brylla 2011:15). Latinization was often a 
signifier for the last name of a scholar or clergyperson, such as Bothniensis, which 
means “from the counties of Norrbotten [or] Västerbotten” (Brylla 2011:15). The names 
used by peasants followed the tradition of patronymics. The characterization of 
bourgeoisie surnames was, according to Brylla, exceptional for the Swedish case: Their 
diverse compositions were inspired by the names of the nobility and the use of suffixes 
or free morphemes “were derived from natural phenomena” (Brylla 2011:16) and 
German name morphology (Brylla 2011). This linguistic knowledge on the name’s 
assumed perception as typical for a specific social ‘stratum’ can be interpreted as 
awareness of the classist and genderist effects the hegemonic perception of last names 
has on the negotiation of their male ‘Swedish’ name bearers’ societal position. This 
assumed awareness might also be a reason why last names are associated with 
conventionalized meaning and are ascribed a historical origin in traditional onomastic 
125 Original: “Riksdagen erkände behovet av en lagstiftning, dels till lag som skydd för släktnamnenen, 
dels bestämmelser som skulle ‘kraftigt främja anläggandet av verkliga släktnamn’. Det framhölls att 
det var ett verkligt ‘statsintresse’ att namnfrågan skulle lösas. Det fanns alldeles för många Ander-
ssöner och Petterssöner. Lagen skulle också ge ett skydd för befintliga namn och även utarbeta for-
mer för ändring av släktnamn. [...] För att byta namn måste det finnas en orsak, t.ex. att det namn  
man ville byta ut var löjeväckande eller kunde väcka anstöt. Man kunde också få byta ut samiska  
eller finska namn. Existerande namn fick namnskydd.” (Brylla 2013:136, translated by EH).
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research (cf. Brylla 2002:68–73, cf. Nübling et al. 2012:144–155). It also re_confirms 
that names have constantly invoked migratist, classist, and genderist associations:
• migratist by perceiving them as Swedish/German or of Swedish/German ‘origin’ 
or not,
• classist by perceiving non-migratized names as representative for a 
Swedish/German rank, status or profession and migratized names for exclusively 
low rank, status or profession in Swedish and German society, and
• genderist associations by perceiving these ‘status-negotiating’ names as a 
designation of a Swedish/German cis-male person if not explicitly hallmarked as 
womanisized, e.g. patronymics ending with -dotter [daughter] and thereby 
re_producing the binary-gender system associations.
Such associations might have changed with the accustoming and institutionalization of 
the hereditary system to a limited, class-related extent: a person with a name that 
conventionally interpellates a profession does not necessarily work in the profession 
that their name ‘implies’.
For example, a person with the last name ‘Müller’ only very rarely (and most likely 
coincidentally) works in a mill. However, classist privilege is often still re_produced 
through upper class families keeping and guarding their specific naming tradition 
and/or family names, which are also protected by German and Swedish law. Thus, 
names like ‘Müller’ still do evoke the idea of the low or middle class more than a name 
like von Weizsäcker in Germany (cf. Nübling 1997) – as do Svensson or Bergström in 
comparison to Gyllenstierna in Sweden (Ryman 2013:120), especially since German 
regulation and Swedish law protect nobility names (NamÄndVwV, Bundesministerium 
des Inneren 2014: sect ions 45 and 53, paragraph 4; Lag (2016:1013), 
Justitiedepartementet L2 17/11/2016: articles 15 and 18). Given that last names like 
Müller might even no longer be perceived as a profession and given that last names like  
Svensson and Andersson do not indicate that the name bearer is the son of Sven or 
Anders, is it possible that the name can still be understood as ‘having that original 
meaning’ (cf. onomastik.com 2005, chapter 5). To what extent is the initial classification 
of a name as low or upper class still re_produced? And to what extent is the changing of 
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names in Sweden motivated by these forms of social classification? These questions 
need to followed-up by further research.
Looking at the Swedish discourses on personal names, it seems that a different 
hegemonic naming strategy is employed than in Germany. When comparing both 
hegemonic naming practices, it is much easier to change one’s name in Sweden. As has 
been shown, the first Swedish naming law especially encouraged the changing of last 
names whereas in Germany, legislation aimed at restricting the changing of names, 
specifically those of German Jews (cf. chapter 3.2.2.2.2). Since the legislation on names 
in both countries only applies to citizens, the Swedish naming practices also seem to be 
more ‘inclusive’ at first glance: Non-Swedes have been able to naturalize more easily 
since 1950, which made the legislation on name change applicable to them. Given that 
the Swedisization of names has been promoted through the law, it needs to be pointed 
out that the changing of names is not necessarily a free choice but rather a form of  
strategic, forced customization for ‘inclusion’ (cf. chapter 6.2.2.4). Considering the 
individual person’s social positioning is crucial for the analysis of the various 
motivations and reasons to change one’s name. Here, customization is considered to be 
a reaction to structural power relations.
In contrast, according to Språktidningen, a popular scientific magazine addressing 
people interested in language issues, the changing of a name can also be motivated by 
boredom or tiredness: “But not only Svensson is tired of their name.”126 Svensson here 
serves as a metaphor for a stereotypical Swedish person that is white, straight, cis and 
not perceived with pejorative migratist associations. Thus, compared to the structural 
discrimination of people by the labor and housing markets on the basis of their names,  
the social condition of Svensson being bored or tired of their own name needs to be 
regarded as privilege. This is also confirmed by their motivation and choice of name: 
These Svenssons changed their names to names that arouse feelings127 and that are 
hegemonically perceived as romantic, which evokes associations with nature and fairy 
126 Original: “Men det är inte bara Svensson som tröttnat på sitt namn.” (Karlsson 2013:19, translated 
by EH).
127 Original: “Alla tycker de om att ha ett namn som väcker känslor” (Karlsson 2013:18, translated by 
EH).
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tales128. Thus, they are consistent with Noréen and Grape’s nationalist demands on 
‘Swedish’ names (cf. above). Nationalists have used concepts of romanticism that are 
linked to idealized perceptions of nature as national propaganda (Rosenblad, Söderholm 
n.d.). Although the changing of names here might not be motivated by this ideology, one 
needs to bear in mind that those associations can be interpellated and transferred 
nevertheless.
Språktidningen also mentions the changing of names of migratized persons. When 
looking closely at the effects of perception of their name change by Språktidningen, it 
becomes evident that the change was most probably not motivated by boredom:
“The trend that people with foreign background change [their names, EH] to more 
Swedish-sounding names [...] is broken, according to PRV. Instead, many change 
[their names] to new names that originate from their own language, such as 
Bouzhanieilam, Halbori, Albadini, Cordiani, Zazzio, Egelbach, Usopov and 
Yeshuel.”129
Descriptions such as “people with foreign backgrounds”, “Swedish-sounding name”, and 
“name originating from their own language”130 show that these persons are not 
perceived like those described as Svensson. Hence, the different motivations and 
strategies of name change cannot be compared. Unlike Svensson, migratized people are 
conceptualized as not belonging to Swedish society. They are associated with an 
imagined place of origin or home outside of Sweden. Hence, how can they be bored by 
their name in the same way as Svensson? Svensson is symbolic for the ‘original’ and 
‘authentic’ Swedish person. Being (negotiated as) the most frequent last name in 
Sweden, ‘Svensson’ might be perceived as boring. In contrast, people that are migratized 
on the grounds of a migratist or racist perception of their looks or names experience 
128 Original: “Namn som tas vid giftermål är däremot sällan tuffa eller farliga, trenden är att de ska 
vara vackra och romantiska. Det är särskilt populärt med inslag av naturlyrik och sagomystik” 
(Karlsson 2013:18, translated by EH).
129 Original: “Trenden att personer med utländsk bakgrund byter till mer svenskklingande namn […] 
är bruten, enligt PRV. I stället byter många till nya namn med utgångspunkt i sitt eget språk, som  
Bouzhanieilam, Halbori, Albadini, Cordiani, Zazzio, Egelbach, Usopov och Yeshuel.” (Karlsson 
2013:19, translated by EH).
130 Original: “personer med utländsk bakgrund”, “svenskklingande namn”, and “namn med ut-
gångspunkt i sitt eget språk” (Karlsson 2013:19, translated by EH).
182
Historical Continuities in Everyday Discrimination Through Names: Sedimentation of  
Accustomed Norms in Germany and Sweden
exclusion from Swedish society. Hence, the perception of their name is never a boring 
enterprise but decides their place in Swedish society.
Although the Swedish practice of naturalization seems to be more inclusive,  
racist_migratist discrimination nevertheless exists. First of all, the legislation on name 
change results in the exclusion of non-Swedish names. Second, although migratized 
people with ‘Swedish names’ might be invited to job interviews, they face 
_racism_migratism_ at the interview (cf. chapter 2.3.5). And third, as soon as the 
Swedish state realized that an increasing number of people migrating to Sweden after 
World War II did not comply with the image of the hyperborean Nordic person, 
immigration regulations became more restrictive. For example, migratized people could 
only receive a residence permit if they met labor specific demands. But also naturalized 
migratized Swedes still face constant threats such as debates on denaturalization that 
seem to be tailored against practices hegemonically perceived as non-Swedish.
As to the question of the extent to which linguistic name assimilation helps marginalized 
people obtain equal chances to succeed in society, it can be stated that although name 
assimilation might temporarily ease the living conditions of marginalized people, it 
simultaneously prevents migratizable names from being perceived as Swedish. Even if 
marginalized naming traditions such as those of the Sami become part of the history of 
Swedish minorities, hegemonic naming traditions are still negotiated as the normalized 
and thus preferred naming practice in Sweden. As long as hegemonic naming practices 
are prioritized and the powerful discriminatory impact caused by the constant and 
unbroken implicit preference of Swedisizable names remains silenced, it is doubtful that 
equation in legislation leads to equal chances in society.
3.3 Summary: Naming Legislation. The Registration of  
Personal Names
As shown, the regulations on registration are constituted by regulations and definitions 
of citizenship. They also constitute an understanding and image of the nation where a 
person becomes a citizen. This influences expectations, perceptions and negotiations 
when it comes to people’s names. As previously stated, in hegemonic discourse names 
are often nationalized and understood as a part of a nation’s language. Naming practices 
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in the registration offices are regulated by legislation and administrative instructions on 
naming. These regulations define which names are intelligible within hegemonic 
discourse; that is, which names are considered to be a part of the hegemonic discourse.
Before introducing the legislation on personal status, registration was mostly monitored 
and performed by parishes in the territories that today are conceptualized as Germany 
and Sweden (cf. Wagner-Kern 2002; Gailus 2008; Wannerdt [1982]; Sköld 2001). In 
parish registers, it was primarily baptism, marriages and burials that were recorded. In 
addition to the names of the parents, the couple or the deceased, the profession and 
domicile were listed. Womanisized persons were negotiated as belonging to a household 
that was dominated by males. In comparison with US-American registries at the time 
(The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints n.d.), racialized perception of white 
people was not explicitly mentioned in Sweden and Germany since it was, and still is, a 
normalized default perception. In general, it was the priests’ convention and knowledge 
about the people that dictated what information was taken into account. Hence, it can 
be asked whether and how people that were, and still are, discriminated by racism and 
migratism have been registered. What happens to people that are not (considered) a 
part of the Christian community? To what extent have they been registered?
The hegemonic Swedish attitude against recognizing and registering people as Swedish 
is different from the tradition and practices in Germany. The dominant naming practice 
in the German territories and then German Empire was a strategy to keep those people 
marked as different who were excluded from the ius sanguinis image of the German 
nation (cf. chapter 6.2.2.4). Non-indigenous Swedish priests, however, assimilated 
names they perceived as non-Swedish to a hegemonically accustomed set of names 
perceived as Swedish (cf. chapter 5). This also had an effect on how people should be  
registered and under which name.
As stated, the legislation, acceptability and practices of changing one’s name differ in the 
German and Swedish contexts. In Germany, introducing name regulations aimed at 
preventing name change, whereas in Sweden, people were encouraged to come up with 
new names that were negotiated as more Swedish on the grounds of a presupposed 
Swedish phonology and morphology, based on a nationalist perspective, as well as to 
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prevent confusion because many people shared the same name, based on a tax 
perspective.
Accustoming stands within a historical continuity. Hegemonic methods and societal 
norms to perceive personal names in a specific way are not only invented at a specific 
moment but have been negotiated through time. Hegemonic naming practices 
re_produce to a certain extent the knowledge that was negotiated before. With the 
making and labeling of ‘importance’, hegemonic knowledge is negotiated constantly in a 
way that becomes commonplace to people and makes them accept this knowledge as 
given. Although this knowledge, e.g. on how to gender and migratize names, is applied 
to a specific context, it is also negotiated and manifested anew. I challenge this 
accustomed reproduction of knowledge. Since any given moment is constituted by a 
certain context that only applies at this moment, the knowledge that I try to re_produce 
is never the exact same as the one that I have negotiated before. As mentioned in 
chapter 1.1.2, Hornscheidt introduced the concept of re_production with an underscore 
to show that the hegemonic knowledge that I might attempt to reproduce may 
interpellate a different concept when uttered in another context at another time. This 
negotiation offers the possibility of changing the perception of a name. Although I might 
have a hegemonic perception of names in mind, I might at any given moment challenge 
the accustoming of this specific knowledge. Instead of thinking of a person’s name – 
and, thereby, of the person – in a migratist or genderist way, I might choose to perceive 
a name as German or non-gendered. In this way, I can challenge institutionalized 
structural discrimination. As shown above, the accustoming of structural discrimination 
is manifested by institutionalization, particularly through legislation. In Germany, the 
presumption that people have two names – a first and a last name – and the 
classification of people as gendered, racialized, and migratized was and still is 
negotiated as an unquestioned and accustomed implication of the naming process. Even 
today, it is mandatory to be registered as one of two genders and to adapt binominalism 
as an unquestioned norm of identifying German citizens:
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“Assimilation of your foreign name: the structure of your name is unknown within 
the German legislation and you want to assimilate your name according to the 
German legislation.”131
This implies that these categorizations are important and indicate something about a 
person. The unquestioned implementation of binominalism as well as the classification 
of people (cf. Butler 2008) can be identified as historically constructed, accustomed 
discriminatory practices that are still enacted today. In the following chapter 4 I analyze 
the presuppositions and effects of current legislation on naming and personal status in 
Germany and Sweden.
131 Original: “Angleichung Ihres ausländischen Namens: Sie führen Ihren Namen in einer Struktur, die 
im deutschen Recht unbekannt ist und wollen diesen nun dem deutschen Recht angleichen” (Bun-
desverband der Deutschen Standesbeamten n.d., translated by EH).
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4. What Is Best for the Child? The Child’s Welfare as a Strategy 
for Accustomed, Individualized, Structural as well as 
Institutional Discrimination
The child’s welfare seems to be one of the main reasons German registrars pitch when 
they justify the rejection of a name. In a press release on children’s welfare, the Federal 
Association of German Registrars, Bundesverband der deutschen Standesbeamtinnen  
und Standesbeamten, states that ‘silly’ first names such as Poopy or Fify are considered 
to be harmful (cf. also NamÄndVwV, Bundesministerium des Inneren 2014: sections 35. 
and 66.).132 Gender-distinct names are likewise negotiated as a necessity for the child’s 
well-being. A migratizable name is also listed as a threat to the child’s well-being since it 
would make the child a subject for ‘teasing’ (cf. Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Standesbeamten 14/11/2008). Awareness of this form of discrimination, however, shows 
that the association implicitly understands the impact of structural migratism and 
privilege that is provided by non-migratizable names.
This might be a reason why registrars negotiate names such as Adolf as acceptable with 
legal capacity (cf. Hayn 23/07/2012; Hayn 24/07/2012a), thus silencing not only the 
traumatic interpellation this name may invoke but also playing down the historical and 
ethical implications associated with this name: What are the intentions of parents who 
assign to their child the first name of a world-known mass murderer, dictator and war 
criminal?133 Due to their authoritative powers, it is initially up to the registrars to decide 
whether or not a personal name contributes to the welfare of the child. Several court 
cases on the suitability of a (first) name serve as the legal basis for a registrar’s decision. 
For the most part, these decisions show disagreement on whether a first name is 
genderable as ‘female’ or ‘male’ and whether a name is acceptable as a (first) name at all.  
The latter includes cases where the name interpellates associations with a 
stereo/prototyped name giver (such as Judas or Jesus, which re_produces Christian 
default-setting) or where confusion with a surname is possible (such as Cézanne or 
Holgerson;
132 The same applies to the Swedish context: “Ett namn får till exempel inte väcka anstöt eller leda till  
obehag för den som bär det” (Patent- och Registreringsverket n.d.d).
133 Cf. movie Le Prénom in which this question is discussed (Delaporte, La Patellière 2012).
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Namenberatungsstelle an der Universität Leipzig n.d.). Therefore, the right to (choose) a 
name seems to be limited.
In this chapter, I analyze the implementation of legislation. In particular, I want to 
question the conventionalized criteria which prompt registrars to reject a name as 
harmful and unacceptable and examine how these criteria are justified. As I 
demonstrated with the institutionalization of legislation on naming, citizenship and 
personal status in the form of written laws, the implementation of naming practices is 
constituted and manifested by interdependent legislative constraints and demands (cf. 
also chapter 6.1.2). For example, in order for a newborn child to be registered in 
Germany, the name must consist of a first and last name; the child must also be  
assigned a gender (one of two possible, either female or male). Yet, these demands are 
not self-explanatory but are negotiated in juridical spaces such as registry offices and 
courts.
In the following, I discuss how these requirements are met in the registry offices and 
what consequences the naming decisions entail. How does a registrar decide which 
names are ‘appropriate’ according to their interpretation of the law? Which names are 
not ‘appropriate’ and why? What are the legal means to intervene in the decision-
making process? How does legislation and its implementation through the registrars, 
interact and constitute each other? And how does this affect, and how is this affected by, 
the dispositive of power relations?
By using the example of two court cases which explicitly deal with the extent to which 
the child’s interest is threatened by the choice of name, I examine how a 
genderist_racist_migratist conceptualization of the child’s well-being is 
instrumentalized as a strategy to re_produce and maintain structural discrimination on 
an institutional level in Germany. I chose to analyze the conceptualization of the child’s 
well-being in court cases, since it seems to be a hegemonic state strategy to restrict the 
choice of a personal name. A section follows which reveals the hegemonically silenced 
presuppositions that equip juridical discourses with authority. Particular attention is 
given to the individualization of discrimination by institutional discourses that negotiate 
discriminatory actions as activities that happened to individuals only by accident and 
thus disregard them as a constitutive part of societal normalizing activities. Also, 
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presuppositions that authorize registrars to define the child’s well-being are specifically 
taken into account. The chapter concludes with a comparison of similar court cases on 
children’s welfare in Sweden.
4.1 The Limits of Naming in Germany
In an interview, a cis-female identified registrar at a German municipality explained the 
registration procedure for a newborn child. When asked how the decision on the 
acceptability and, thus, institutional intelligibility of a name for registration is taken, the 
registrar informed me that it is actually the individual decision of each registrar. She 
illustrates this with the example of how a colleague took another decision she would not 
have taken (cf. Hayn 23/07/2012). Thus, it is up to the individual registrar to decide 
whether or not the registration of a name complies with their perception, interpretation 
and implementation of the existing legislative norms. However, their administrative 
decision is conceptualized as the decision of the ‘state’: a representative of the state  
makes the decision on behalf of the state (and thus on behalf of the citizens134) while 
following the law. Their decision is thus institutionalized as being in the state’s interest, 
despite the fact that every decision with respect to naming is made on an individual 
basis (Hayn 2011). Simultaneously, the interpretation of the legislative demands is also 
limited by the conditions of intelligibility. If the idea that people need to be recognized 
as gendered humans and then only as either female or male is hegemonically negotiated 
as a fundamental way to recognize people, a person will not be registered as gender non-
conform, inter- or transgender, whether or not it is in the interest of this person, who is 
also a citizen of the state. As previously mentioned (cf. chapter 2.3), usually first names 
are primarily perceived and negotiated as gendered, as well as ethnicized and 
nationalized. This is illustrated by media, such as the registrars’ handbook for first 
names (e.g. Nüssler 2002) or the numerous books that deal with the question of what 
name to give a newborn ‘girl’ or ‘boy’. They support the registrar’s statement that the 
‘identification with gender’ would be in the child’s interest. However, in this case, only 
the interest of cis-binary-gendered people or citizens of the state is taken into account, 
134 Cf. introductory clause on German court orders “Im Namen des Volkes”, for example in Bundesver-
fassungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008 (translated by EH).
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thus silencing the interest of gender-free, gender-fluid, gender non-conform, inter- or 
transgender citizens. Cis-binary-gender norms are implicitly presupposed as normal and 
relevant for society, which is why a child who does not fit the cis-binary-gender system 
is regarded as harmful.
According to the interviewed registrars (cf. Hayn 23/07/2012; Hayn 24/07/2012b; 
H a y n 2 4 / 0 7 / 2 0 1 2 a ) a n d t h e c o u r t d e c i s i o n s o n n a m i n g n e w b o r n s 
(Namenberatungsstelle an der Universität Leipzig n.d.), the invulnerability of the child’s 
well-being appears to be the leading principle applied by registrars in Germany. 
However, there are no clear criteria that would define this principle from a legal 
perspective. Rather, some naming practices seem to be so normalized that they remain 
unspecified and silenced, which is why in this chapter the child’s invulnerability is 
negotiated as an example for the conventionalized juridical practice to individualize 
structural discrimination and to dename the discriminatory effects of the structural 
framework in which persons and personal names are made unintelligible (cf. chapter 
2.3). What is perceived as ‘harmful’ to the child’s well-being is defined by the assumed 
child’s will to take on a position as a cis-binary-gendered and ‘German’ person on the 
basis of their name. A name that is perceived as non-West-European, and thus non-
German, can be subject to a recommended name change during naturalization (cf. 
chapter 6.2.2.4 cf; BGBEG, Deutscher Bundestag 2016: article 47, paragraph 1, point 3). 
A name that is not clearly genderable according to a hegemonic reading is negotiated as 
an assumed threat to the child or, more precisely, to the hegemonic accustomed norm to 
gender people. Following this logic, non-West-European names can also be read as a 
threat to the hegemonic gendered norms and structures of the German state. As the 
intersecting structural conditions that constitute and re_produce normative ideas of 
gender and migration_non-migration_nationality_ethnicity are silenced, any deviance 
from the norm is marked as an individual case, whereas any assimilation to the norm is  
welcomed and silenced as an individual’s decision. Hence, some decisions are 
negotiated as more individual than others, although both are reactions to and the effect 
of normative naming practices. This is why the following court cases only deal with so-
perceived deviances from hegemonic gender and nationality/ethnicity norms. For cases 
of assimilation ‘recommended’ by legislation, there is no need to call on the court (cf. 
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chapter 6.2.2.4). The court cases are negotiated as interventions in individual decision-
making processes, although they are constituted by the same power relations as the 
decision for assimilation. Finally, the fact that powerful norms actually play a crucial 
role in naming practices is confirmed by the strategies mentioned above to Germanize 
and gender the name, thereby maintaining the nationalist norm.
 
4.2 Who Can Choose a Name?
The choice of name is also an effect of structural power relations. Just like every single 
person’s social position as either privileged or discriminated is constituted by 
_racism_genderism_ableism_migratism_classism_, so is every person’s choice. The 
place and position from which this decision is taken plays a crucial role, as Tudor points  
out:
“[...] To assume that critical positioning focusses on the political fights of an 
individual person instead of on deprivileging localizations within hegemonic 
structures is politically unbearable, since all fights are determined by specific 
political positionings – whether consciously reflected upon or not. It does make a 
difference whether the fight against sexism is conducted from a cis-male socialized, 
hence a privileged position or from a non-privileged position with regard to sexism. 
It also makes a difference whether racism is fought against from a white or from a 
Black and PoC perspective. It is not the question to focus on essentialized and 
biologized states of being but to reflect upon the societal localizations that are 
constituted and generated by power relations; they can be chosen just as little as 
the fight against discrimination.” (Tudor 2011:71)135
135 Original: “Wie sich […] zeigt, ist die These, die oft gegen kritische Ver_Ortungen* in politischen 
Praktiken hervorgebracht wird, es gehe ausschließlich um die politischen Kämpfe, die ein Individu-
um führe, und nicht um De_Privilegierungen in hegemonialen Gefügen, politisch nicht tragfähig, 
da alle Kämpfe auch schon aus bestimmten Ver_Ortungen heraus stattfinden – seien sie nun re-
flektiert oder nicht. Es ist eben nicht egal, ob aus einer männlich sozialisierten bio-männlichen, 
also privilegierten Position gegen Sexismus gekämpft wird, oder aus einer in sexistischen Gefügen 
nichtprivilegierten Position. Ebenso ist es nicht egal, ob aus weißer oder aus Schwarzer bzw. PoC-
Perspektive gegen Rassismus vorgegangen wird. Es geht hier nicht um essentialisierte oder biolo-
gisierte Seinszustände, sondern um gesellschaftliche Positionierungen, die durch Machtverhält-
nisse hervorgebracht werden und die nicht frei wählbar sind und die Positionierung, aus der heraus 
Kämpfe führt werden, ebenso wenig.” (Tudor 2011:71, translated by EH).
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Tudor specifies the idea of fights and puts it in relation to the risk a person takes while 
fighting:
“I would not define fighting on the basis of the desired aims but also on the basis of 
risks. Every fight as well as every political activity is already determined by these 
risks, whether reflected or not.” (Tudor 2011:71)136
Tudor distinguishes clearly between a social position that actually cannot be chosen and 
the action that is chosen. As shown in the first quotation above, this distinction was 
previously made by Black and transnational feminist scholarship in the context of Black 
feminist self-empowerment, survival and self-definition (Collins 2000; Lorde 2007), 
and in response to hegemonic “active or passive complicity in oppressive systems and 
discourses” (Shohat, Stam 1994:344). The effects and risks of the chosen action against 
oppressive systems and discourses depend on the very position from which the action is  
performed. If a person discriminated by racism chooses to change their name to a name 
that is read and perceived as ‘German’ or ‘Swedish’ on the grounds of 
_racism_migratism_, then the ‘choice’ is constituted by the racist_migratist  
discrimination that influences this person’s chance in society. Thus, the extent is unclear 
to which naming is an actual choice or rather an enforced necessity to get a job and 
housing. One of the effects of this enforced change of name is the reinforcement of the 
racist_migratist norm to accept and prioritize statisizable names.137 Against this 
background it needs to be questioned how a concept such as the child’s well-being is  
defined and negotiated with regard to structural power relations. What does this 
definition mean for the child’s assumed ‘well-being’ in society? What ‘choices’ do 
parents or guardians have in naming and registering the child?
The German state claims to limit only the choice of a first name in cases where ‘the 
child’s wellbeing’ is affected. This was – according to the central registration office in 
Berlin – explicitly declared in a decision by Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court in 
136 Original: “Ich würde Kämpfen nicht nur über Ziele, sondern auch über Risiken definieren. Und 
jedes Kämpfen ist schon über diese Risiken ver_ortet, jede politische Handlung ist über diese 
Risiken ver_ortet, sei dies nun reflektiert oder nicht.” (Tudor 2011:71, translated by EH).
137 To take on a migratizable name from a racialized and_or migratized position is a counter-action 
and an intervention that can disrupt the racist_migratist normalism of what is ‘German’ or 
‘Swedish’. However, the same action performed from a privileged position with a similar intention 
is in danger to appropriate the fight since in this case, there are no risks (cf. chapter 6.2.2.2).
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2005 (cf. Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten, Standesamt I in Berlin 
n.d.; Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 3/11/2005), although there have been 
court decisions on names in West Germany at least since 1978. This limitation is 
explained and justified by Germany’s constitutionally ascribed ‘obligation’ to retain 
control over a child’s care and education by their guardians or parents (as to GG, 
Deutscher Bundestag 31/12/2014: article 6, paragraph 2), for example by preventing 
parents from making irresponsible choices when naming the child.
Genderist and migratist arguments appear to be more explicitly raised in naming 
processes at registry offices. An indicator for this assumption is the immediate 
interpellation of gender and the ‘origination’ of a name. Registrars in Germany usually 
insist that parents or guardians assign their child a hegemonically assumed gender-
distinct first name if the child is to be registered under German law. To my knowledge, 
Germany is the only European state that enforces the genderization of children through 
their names. If the registrars are in doubt about the genderization of the proposed name, 
they consult references such as the International Handbook of Forenames (Nüssler 
2002) to verify the name’s gender and origin. These references usually indicate both the 
conventionalized gender as well as linguistic nationality conceptualization of the first 
name, e.g. according to Otto Nüssler ‘Evelyn’ is a name that is conventionally used in the 
Danish, German, English and Gaelic speaking communities. In the Danish and German 
speaking communities, it is conceptualized as a first name for female persons only. The 
English and Gaelic speaking communities ‘allow’ a ‘unisex’ use (Nüssler 2002:147). 
Hence, hegemonic discourses in the respective linguistic communities determine the 
ways in which personal names are perceived and negotiated on an individual level. 
However, I want to stress here that individuals have the opportunity to choose how they 
perceive and negotiate personal names, even if this challenges, irritates and threatens 
their (own) hegemonic discourse knowledge (cf. Baum 2014).
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4.3 ‘Anderson’: Confronting Genderism, Migratism and Racism  
from a Privileged Position
A 2005 court case discussed whether it would be a responsible decision to recognize 
‘Anderson’ as a first name in the German context and not as a surname, as the registrar 
in this case had suggested (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 3/11/2005). The 
Federal Constitutional Court quoted from a previous decision by the local district court 
stating that the first name chosen by the complainants was an acceptable first name in 
the ‘relevant references’. The same court questioned the local district court’s assumption 
that Anderson would be a solid threat for the child, since the name might not be 
distinctive enough to be recognized as a first name: ‘Anderson’ was already used as a 
first name or by-name ‘in Germany’, as certified by institutions such as the name 
information center at Leipzig University (Namenberatungsstelle der Universität  
Leipzig) and the International Handbook of Forenames.
‘Anderson’ would also be regarded as an established ‘male’ first name in English 
speaking communities. In addition to the categorical distinctability between first and 
last name (Ordnungsfunktion des Namens, cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 
3/11/2005)138, the Federal Constitutional Court also seemed to be in line with the local 
district’s argumentation that the change of conventions – as a result of the assumed 
internationalization of name use – was an acceptable condition for a word’s suitability 
as a first name as long as respective sound and content conventions would ‘allow’ this. 
Interestingly, the abstract conceptualization of ‘convention’ was personalized in order to 
become an authority that would decide upon whether or not a name was appropriate. 
‘Convention’ can here be translated as ‘hegemonic discourse knowledge’ (cf. chapter 
2.3). This form of accustomed knowledge production is also an authorized instance in 
traditional onomastic research. Seibicke negotiates ‘convention’ as a means to support 
German speakers’ ability to identify a name as either ‘female’ or ‘male’ (Seibicke 
2008:106). Thus, the binary gender distinction of a name seems to be based on a 
138 The same principle is applied in the Swedish context: “Namnlagen ställer ett antal krav och det  
finns vissa regler för hur efternamn får användas och vilka namn som kan godkännas. […] Du kan 
inte [...] ta ett förnamn som efternamn eller tvärtom” (Patent- och Registreringsverket n.d.d). Cf. 
also Justitiedepartementet L7 2001: article 13.
194
What Is Best for the Child? The Child’s Welfare as a Strategy for Accustomed, Individualized,  
Structural as well as Institutional Discrimination
conventionalized and accustomed perception of the names’ sound139124 and content. 
Here, ‘sound and content’ represent the conventionalized appellation and stereotypical 
idea of how and for whom a name is used. This interpellates not only images of a 
migratized or non-migratized, cis-binary-gendered person but also images of a 
racialized, ableized person of a certain age with a certain class background (cf. chapter 
1.1.4).
As for the assumed internationalization of names, it is crucial to question how this 
hegemonic concept is linked to the migratization of names. In this court case, the 
‘internationalization’ of naming was mentioned right after the observation that 
Anderson had become an established first name in the English-speaking community. In 
this way, it seems that the conceptualization of ‘internationalization’ is particularly 
linked to the predominance of the English language in the hegemonic Western 
discourse. According to Tudor’s migratization concept, these names would not be 
regarded as migratized since they are negotiated as stemming from Western Europe 
(Tudor 2010:410). Thus, the question remains when and to what extent migratized 
names are regarded as contributing to the internationalization of naming (cf. chapter 5).
In addition to the categorical distinctability between first and last names, the acceptance 
of the hegemonic internationalization of names was further specified as conditional for 
the child’s wellbeing in that the name should not interpellate ridiculous, derogative or 
obnoxious associations. Nor should the name prevent its bearer from developing their 
personality. Both these necessities would be met by the name Anderson.
Here, it is important to note that legal regulations on names focus on the individual’s 
development while neglecting the normative effects of power relations that constitute 
naming processes on a structural level. As previously shown (cf. chapter 2.3), although it 
might be a challenge for the individual to deal with the structural framing of power 
relations, the individual’s positioning as privileged or deprivileged in a given context will 
have the final decisive effect on whether or not the legislation will support the 
individual’s development. For example, a migratized, a gender non-conform and a 
migratized gender non-conform person that cannot identify with the name Anderson is 
139 Cf. Nübling 2009) for the tendency of name genderization becoming less and less specific during 
the 1970s and 1990s on the grounds of a conventionalized phonological perception.
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not recognized but instead silenced and abjectified by the law. As noted in the court 
decision, following the personal development argument, a name should also be gender-
distinct. Hence, the structural level is neither problematized nor recognized as relevant 
for social inequalities. Instead the focus is on the individual’s ability to deal with the 
effects of genderism and migratism on naming processes (cf. chapter 5 and chapter 4.4) 
while people are enforced to choose a recognized gender-distinct name. In this way, 
German name legislation supports and re_produces both genderist and migratist 
discrimination. Unsurprisingly, the same legislation accepts a traumatic name such as 
‘Adolf’ as a possible first name (cf. Hayn 24/07/2012a, chapter 6.2.1).
Returning to the question of who can choose a name, parents and guardians are limited 
by German legislation in their options of a name for their children. The child’s well-
being is determined by institutionalized as well as conventionalized regulations on 
names, such as the distinctability between first and last name, ‘internationally’ accepted 
sound and content, as well as a binary gender-distinctability. Other factors that can 
constitute the child’s well-being such as traumatic associations with historical figures or 
binary genderism are ignored. The extent to which the social positioning of the 
guardians or parents and children is decisive for the perception and negotiation of a 
complaint against the limitation of individual name choice is further discussed in the 
example of the following court case.
4.4 ‘Kiran’: Confronting Genderism, Migratism and Racism  
from a Deprivileged Position
In 2006 German authorities denied a child’s legal parents to name them Kiran (cf.  
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008, cf. Hayn 2015). According to the 
online database ‘Behind the name’, Kiran is a negotiated unisex name in the Indian 
communities of England and Wales and is used slightly more frequently for ‘girls’ than 
for ‘boys’ (Behind the Name n.d.). However, according to the local court (Amtsgericht) 
in Memmingen, the name could not be accepted in German language communities 
because the perception of the child’s gender according to their name was not in line with 
an assumed ‘German sprachgefühl’. Unlike Anderson’s guardians, Kiran’s parents were 
explicitly categorized in a migratist way. They were described as migratized parents with 
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different citizenship – German “of Indian descent” and “Indian” (cf. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008) – and were racialized through 
religiousization for being Hindu. In the court submission, migratization was taken as the 
main point of reference to argue the extent to which Kiran, as a unisex name, would be 
acceptable for a German citizen.
First, Kiran’s parents were deprived of their ability to comply with a so-called German 
feel for language, despite the fact that the family lived in Germany and one parent 
actually was a German citizen. As I will show later in chapter 5 by interpellating the 
concept of a German ‘sprachgefühl’ (feeling), the use of the German language is 
negotiated as being detached from speakers that have learned German as a second 
language (L2). This detachment enables the conceptualization of German first language 
(L1) speakers as the one that are in the position to feel the language, that is, to feel 
whether German is used in a (grammatically) right or wrong way. As a result, the ability 
to communicate in German correctly is negotiated as a competence that is internalized 
and thus can be felt on an individual and assumed emotional level. Any confusion or 
questioning of this emotionally internalized feeling can then be perceived as disturbing 
and unwelcome and excludes and de_mentions German L2 speakers as competent 
German speakers that can feel the German language authentically. However, not all 
cases address this conceptualization of a German feel for language. As shown above, as 
long as a name complies with the conventions within a Western language community 
such as English, sprachgefühl is not relied on to challenge the name.
This leads to the second incidence of migratist discrimination in the court case – the 
identification of first names as ‘female’ and ‘male’. Morphological ‘evidence’ was taken 
as a reason for why the name did not comply with the German sprachgefühl. According 
to the Federal Constitutional Court, the Higher Regional Court in Munich stated:
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“In German language use, first names that end with ‘an’ more often signify persons 
of male gender, for example Christian, Florian, Julian, Jonathan, Kilian, 
Maximilian, Sebastian, Stefan, Tristan.”140
The Federal Constitutional Court cites the plaintiff’s response as following:
“As far as the Oberlandesgericht refers to the general use of the German language, 
whereupon first names with the suffix ‘an’ are more likely given to persons of male 
gender, this cannot withstand legal scrutiny. [… E]ven within the German language 
framework, female first names that end with ‘an’ are not that seldom: Lilian, Arian, 
Aslihan, Bahan, Nalan, Nuran, Susan, Selcan.”141
It is not only striking that the relevance of the genderization of names (instead of 
people) is not questioned here, but also that the Higher Regional Court listed only a 
small selection of all possible names in the German language that end with ‘-an’. A 
comparison between the latter group and the names identified by the plaintiff suggests 
that the Higher Regional Court limited its choice of names to those that the 
International Handbook of Forenames identify as ‘German’, thereby silencing names 
140 Original: “Im deutschen Sprachgebrauch bezeichneten Vornamen mit der Endsilbe ‘an‘ eher Perso-
nen männlichen Geschlechts wie zum Beispiel Christian, Florian, Julian, Jonathan, Kilian, Maxim-
ilian, Sebastian, Stefan, Tristan“ (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008, translated by 
EH). Nüssler 2002) negotiates the following names as current names in his respective sources: 
Christian: m in DA, DE, EN, FR, GA, SV, f in EN, GA (Nüssler 2002:94); Florian: m in DA, DE, EN,  
ES, FR, NL, PL, RM, SV (Nüssler 2002:156); Julian: m in DA, DE, EN, FR, PL, RM, SV (Nüssler 
2002:239); Jonathan: m in BI, DA, DE, EN, FR, GA, NL, SV (Nüssler 2002:236); Kilian: m in DE,  
EN, SV (Nüssler 2002:247); Maximilian: m in DA, DE, EN, SV (Nüssler 2002:293); Sebastian: m in 
DA, DE, EN, PL, SV (Nüssler 2002:375); Stefan: m in DA, DE, EN, PL, RM, SV (Nüssler 2002:391); 
Tristan: m in DE, EN, FR, NL, SV (Nüssler 2002:415). ‘ES’ for the Spanish source is missing here, 
since Nüssler differentiated the various ways of how a name is transliterated: For instance, Sebas-
tian and Sebastián (for the Spanishized version) are assigned two different entries.
141 Original: “Soweit das Oberlandesgericht auf den deutschen Sprachgebrauch abstelle, wonach Vor-
namen mit der Endsilbe ‘an’ eher Personen männlichen Geschlechts gegeben würden, könne dies 
einer rechtlichen Überprüfung nicht standhalten. […] Aber selbst im deutschen Sprachrahmen 
seien weibliche Vornamen mit der Endung ‘an’ nicht selten: Lilian, Arian, Aslihan, Behan, Nalan, 
Nuran, Susan, Selcan“ (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008, translated by EH). 
Nüssler 2002) negotiates the following names as current names in his respective sources: Lilian: f 
in DA, DE, EN, NL, SV, m in FR, PL (Nüssler 2002:264); Arian: m in DE, NL (Nüssler 2002:49).  
Aslihan: f in TR source (original, non-Germanized orthography: Aslıhan) (Nüssler 2002:53), Bahan 
(is missing in Nüssler 2002), Nalan: f in TR (Nüssler 2002:309), Nuran: f in TR (Nüssler  
2002:318), Susan: f in DA, DE EN, GA, SV, m in TR (Nüssler 2002:394; Selcan: f in TR, m in TR 
(Nüssler 2002:377). In this case, all names that are recognized in German name books are also in  
Swedish name books (or vice versa). As for the spelling of Aslıhan, I use the original spelling of the  
name except for where it is quoted from an original text. By negotiating ‘ı’ as an intelligible letter  
for German names, a revision of the hegemonic understanding on what names are considered ‘Ger-
man’ is encouraged.
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that, according to this grammar-governed conceptualization of names, are not be 
categorized as a conventional female German name.
Third, it was argued that the parents’ ‘cultural’ context was Indian despite the fact that 
the family lived in Germany. Hence, their imagined ‘cultural’ context was excluded from 
being a part of German society. This migratization and racialization of people on the 
grounds of a homogeneous and exclusive understanding of ‘culture’ instead of a 
permeable one (cf. for example Steyerl, Gutiérrez Rodriguez 2003, Eggers et al. 2005b; 
Hà et al. 2007; Tudor 2010 and Tudor 2014; Nduka-Agwu, Hornscheidt 2010, Arndt, 
Ofuatey-Alazard 2011) is realized by claiming not only L1 knowledge but also – by way of 
silencing – using whiteness and both Christianity and secularism as in-group indicators. 
However, the regional court (Landgericht) that brought this argument up for the first 
time used it in favor of acknowledging the name. By adding another first name, the 
parents “might possibly be forced to violate religious proscriptions [...]. Restricting the 
choice of name could have a major impact on the family and could interfere with their  
development.”142
Although the court interpellated the fundamental right to freedom of faith (GG, 
Deutscher Bundestag 31/12/2014: article 4), it is important to note that this was only 
necessary because the parents’ assumed belief was not considered the ‘norm’. No 
registrar would have objected to Maria being the second name for a boy-identified child 
(as long as the first name was gender-distinct; cf. NamÄndVwV, Bundesministerium 
des Inneren 2014: section 67). Therefore, it would not have been necessary to demand 
that fundamental rights be granted. Christianity does not need to be protected because it 
is normalized.
Fourth, the perception of names in hegemonic German language communities is 
generalized and negotiated as the only possible one. In February 2007, the higher 
regional court again dismissed the decision made by the lower court, arguing that it did 
not respect the principle of the child’s interest. This interest could only be guaranteed if  
the first name clearly ‘identifies’ (one of two) gender. By referring to the previous 
142 Original: “Diese würden unter Umständen dazu veranlasst, gegen religiöse Verbote zu verstoßen, 
wenn sie einen weiteren Vornamen hinzufügen müssten. Eine Beschränkung der Vornamenswahl 
würde die Familie in erheblicher Weise beeinträchtigen und in ihrer Entfaltung stören” (Bun-
desverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008, translated by EH).
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regional court’s decision, the higher regional court claimed that only the ‘cultural’ (here 
racialized_religiousized) background of the parents was acknowledged but not the 
environment in which the child would grow up and which would require gender-distinct 
names. In this way, the court did not only deny the parents’ ‘cultural’ background as 
German but also claimed to be in the position to speak on behalf of the German 
‘cultural’ environment and an assumed ‘German public’. This is also confirmed by the 
following quotation wherein a single case (name of a famous Indian author) is used to 
generate a universal narrative on how ‘Kiran’ is perceived as a first name in Germany. 
The hegemonic perspective is generalized and negotiated as being the only possible and 
crucial one.
“The parents could not prove that in India, the name ‘Kiran’ is customarily used as 
a distinctively female first name. [...] The quantity of parts of India in which the 
name ‘Kiran’ is assigned to male persons cannot be neglected. This is confirmed by 
the supervisory authority with a reference to a cultural television program on the 
Frankfurt Book Fair 2006, which, among other things, was about one of the most 
important Indian writers, Kiran Nagarkar. As a result from this report, it became 
apparent to the German public that ‘Kiran’ is (also) used as a male name in 
India.”143 (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008)
The different use of names for binary-gendered people also applies to names like 
‘Andrea’. In Italy, it is a name conventionally used for boy-identified children (cf. 
Oberlandesgericht Hamm, Beschluss of 29/04/2004; Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am 
Main, Beschluss of 27/01/1995, Nüssler 2002:38). ‘Evelyn’ is also a name that is 
recognized as ‘unisex’ in the English-speaking environments (cf. Nüssler 2002:147). 
Nevertheless, it does not prevent registrars in Germany from accepting Andrea and 
Evelyn as girls’ names in Germany. However, in the case of Kiran it is argued that
143 “Die Eltern hätten nicht nachzuweisen vermocht, dass der Name ‘Kiran’ in Indien als eindeutig 
weiblicher Vorname gebräuchlich sei. [...] [I]n einem nicht zu vernachlässigenden Teil Indiens 
[werde] der Name ‘Kiran’ männlichen Personen zugeordnet. Dies belege die Aufsichtsbehörde mit 
einem Hinweis auf eine kulturelle Fernsehsendung zur Frankfurter Buchmesse 2006, die unter an-
derem einen der bedeutendsten Schriftsteller Indiens mit Namen Kiran Nagarkar, behandle. Aus 
diesem Bericht ergebe sich, dass auch in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit offenbar geworden sei, dass 
in Indien ‘Kiran’ (auch) als männlicher Name verwendet werde.“ (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
Beschluss of 5/12/2008, translated by EH).
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“[t]he differentiation made by the complainants as to in which states of India the 
name ‘Kiran’ is considered female, in which male and in which it is not known at 
all, is not comprehended in Germany generally and thus, cannot be regarded as 
s t a n d a r d o f j u d g m e n t f o r t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a f i r s t n a me . “ 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008)144
The ‘lack of knowledge’ that concerns naming practices in Indian states is not 
problematized as being a form of migratist silencing of both the knowledge and people 
living in Germany who ‘possess’ this knowledge. Instead, it is used as another argument 
against Kiran being accepted as a name for a girl. Apparently, if Kiran had already been 
established as a gender-distinct name in the hegemonic mind-set in Germany, it might 
have been more readily accepted. Although they are gendered differently outside of 
Germany, Andrea and Evelyn are simultaneously negotiable as ‘German names’ (cf. 
Nüssler 2002:38, Nüssler 2002:147). The knowledge of their ambiguous gendered use is 
not taken into consideration as an argument that the child’s well-being would be 
threatened:
“Also this name which is commonly used as a girl’s name in Germany [Andrea, EH] 
may continue to be used as a girl’s name without adding another female name, 
although the name is used as a boy’s name in Italian and, for this reason, has also 
been allowed in Germany (cf. OLG Frankfurt NJW-RR 1995, 774). Contrary to the 
opinion of the regional court, the starting point of the legal assessment, also with 
regard to the so-called Geschlechtsoffenkundigkeit [the principle of gender-
evidence and gender-distinctivity, EH], is not an assumed customary law, but 
solely the aspect of the child’s welfare.“ (Oberlandesgericht Hamm, Beschluss of 
29/04/2004)145
In 1995, the Higher Regional Court in Frankfurt accepted Andrea as a name for boys 
because it is recognized as such in Italy (Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, 
Beschluss of 27/01/1995). My assumption here is again that the differing negotiation on 
144 “Die von den Beschwerdeführern vorgetragene Differenzierung, in welchen Bundesstaaten Indiens 
die Bezeichnung ‘Kiran’ weiblich, in welchen sie männlich und in welchen sie überhaupt nicht 
bekannt sei, werde in Deutschland gemeinhin nicht nachvollzogen und könne somit nicht 
Beurteilungsmaßstab für die Bestimmung eines Vornamens sein.“ (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
Beschluss of 5/12/2008, translated by EH).
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the acceptance of how a name is gendered is based on the hegemonic way in which 
people have become accustomed to the perception of names. The child’s well-being in 
Germany is defined by accustomed perceptions of names.
As stated in chapter 2.3 and to summarize this chapter, accustoming is constituted by 
power relations which establish names as migratizable or non-migratizable and binary-
genderable as either female or male. Instead of negotiating a perceived ambiguity of 
names as an enrichment or intervention to forced genderization, the inability of a 
person to clearly identify with one of two genders based on how the name is gendered in 
the hegemonic environment is considered a threat to the child’s well-being. The only 
‘ambiguous’ names that seem to be acceptable are those that comply with the hegemonic 
sprachgefühl, e.g. through the gendered grammar of names on a morphological level 
whose contextual use is considered as being established foremost in Germany. 
Migratizable names that are assumed to be unfamiliar in Germany and that seem to 
follow a different grammar are instead negotiated as a threat to the child’s well-being.
In December 2008, Kiran’s parents won the case but not because the argument that a 
child should have the opportunity to identify with one of two genders was ultimately 
rejected. There were two different reasons for the decision: First, it was judged that the 
parents’ fundamental right to freedom of faith had been violated. The Federal 
Constitutional Court concluded that the previous courts’ decisions did not respect the 
parents’ rights and the child’s best interest, since the parents should decide what name 
the child should receive according to their belief and tradition. Second, it was concluded 
that the principle of Geschlechtsoffenkundigkeit lacked legal basis. There are names in 
Germany which are used for both genders, and the argument that a name must clearly 
show a person’s gender cannot be supported. The German Law on Civil Status 
(Personenstandsgesetz, PStG) requires a name and requires the indication of gender146 
145 “Auch dieser in Deutschland als Mädchenname gebräuchliche Name [Andrea, EH] darf weiterhin 
als Mädchenname ohne Hinzufügen eines weiteren weiblichen Namens verwandt werden, obwohl 
der Name im Italienischen als Jungenname gebräuchlich ist und aus diesem Grund auch in 
Deutschland zugelassen wurde (vgl. hierzu OLG Frankfurt NJW-RR 1995, 774). Ausgangspunkt der 
rechtlichen Bewertung auch hinsichtlich der sog. Geschlechtsoffenkundigkeit ist nämlich, entgegen 
der Ansicht des Landgerichts, nicht ein vermeintliches Gewohnheitsrecht, sondern allein der As-
pekt des Kindeswohls.“ (Oberlandesgericht Hamm, Beschluss of 29/04/2004, translated by EH).
146 Cf. consequences of the changed law for intersex people, chapter 6.2.2.5).
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but it does not say that these need to be related or that the name must be readable as  
gender-distinct.
When the registrar who refused to accept Kiran as a girl’s name mentioned that the 
name “raises doubts about the gender of the child”, they147 referred to suggested 
administrative regulations that were initially introduced in 1938 and in place until the 
end of 2008 (DA; cf. Bundesverband der Deutschen Standesbeamten 3/12/2008). 
Those regulations stated that in case of doubt, the child should be given a second name 
which resolves all doubt about the child’s gender. In this way, they were re_affirming a 
structuralist_genderist belief that people ‘have’ (a) gender and are not ascribed (a) 
gender. The only recourse for the parents was to take court action. This raises the 
question as to what extent the DA complied with German legislation. The same applies 
to the general regulations for the implementation of NamÄndG, Allgemeine 
Verwaltungsvorschrift zum Gesetz über die Änderung von Familiennamen und  
Vornamen, which demands gender-distinctivity for people who want to change their 
first name (cf. NamÄndVwV, Bundesministerium des Inneren 2014: section 67). As 
previously mentioned, this denames structural discrimination by defining name change 
as ‘exceptional’ and thereby discriminates trans and gender non-conform people (cf. 
chapter 3).
This court case is an example of how accustomed perceptions of names as genderable 
lead to a hegemonic interpretation of legislation on personal status. This results in the 
perception of names as genderable and creates a legislative requirement to register a 
person as a German citizen. However, the court stated that the child’s interest would 
indeed be harmed if the name did not allow the child to identify their gender through 
their name. Therefore, the identification of a person as gendered is perceived as being in 
the best interest of a child growing up in a binary-genderist, cis-heterosexist, migratist 
and racist society.
147 In this case, the genderization of the registrar is unknown which is why I refer to them with a gen-
der-neutral pronoun.
203
What Is Best for the Child? The Child’s Welfare as a Strategy for Accustomed, Individualized, 
Structural as well as Institutional Discrimination
4.5 On Behalf of the Citizens – Who Defines the Child’s Well-
Being?
Based on the analysis of these two court cases, it can be argued that choosing a child’s  
name is not necessarily an individual activity but is constituted and limited by power 
relations on a structural and institutional level. By arguing that the child’s well-being 
might indeed be threatened by hegemonic naming decisions on a structural level, I will 
focus in this section on how accustomed discriminatory knowledge about names is 
individualized by institutional discourses, for example, when registering a child.
It is typical for legislative acts to focus on the activities of an individual person instead of 
on the structural powers constituting the social positioning of an individual person. By 
establishing Critical Trans Politics, Spade shows in his book Normal Life how the 
legislation of US civil society security and social equality does not prevent violence but 
enables and performs it. Legislation is exposed as a hegemonic instrument to maintain 
white, male, heteronormative, and capitalist power (cf. Spade 2011). Spade’s approach 
links back to a Critical Race Theory’s perspective according to which Kimberlé W. 
Crenshaw identifies “the rule of law as guarantor of racial progress” (Crenshaw 
2011:1261). Thus, according to Crenshaw, legislation does not fight racism as a 
structural and institutional discrimination but instead perpetuates it.
German legislation and its administrative implementation also do not prevent 
discrimination and unequal treatment. The accustomed silenced discrimination in legal 
discourse is based on an accustomed essentialist belief that differences among people 
are natural and given. As previously shown, the hegemonic and accustomed perception 
of people as Black, of Color, Jewish and Roma or white and Christian, migratized or 
non-migratized as well as cis-binary-gendered is not questioned but is institutionalized 
in legislation. Thus, the principle of the child’s well-being is based on the hegemonic 
identification of the child with one of two possible gender conceptualizations. The 
genderability of a name is assumed as one way to ensure this form of identification. 
Hence, genderization is not considered as an option but is enforced as a necessity for 
every child. This hegemonic knowledge on how to gender a name intersects with 
migratism and racism. The gender convention of a name is interpellated on the grounds 
of accustomed grammatical structures that are shared within the hegemonic language 
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community. In this way, migratizable and racialized religious names such as 
Mohammed and Judas are less likely to be perceived as conforming to the hegemonic 
norm. In contrast, choosing ‘Maria’ as a conventionalized Christian second name for 
newborn babies identified as boys is less likely to result in an argument at the 
registration office. In this way, accustomed genderist, migratist and racist norms are 
re_affirmed by legislation instead of being questioned and challenged.
However, when people attempt to question these structural norms, their intervention 
becomes the case of an individual person fighting against an institutionalized, 
accustomed practice. What counts in the end is whether or not the right to choose a 
hegemonically non-conforming name is granted by the court, who is right and who is 
wrong, who defends the child’s well-being, and who threatens it. In contrast, registrars 
are hegemonically negotiated as ‘objective authorities’ legally representing the state in 
questions concerning the child’s well-being, despite the fact that their naming decisions 
are based on their individually accustomed point of view. According to a local registrar I 
interviewed, the decision of a registrar is irrevocable, unless the child’s guardians decide 
to take court action (cf. Hayn 23/07/2012). In this way, registrars are in the position to 
decide and take action against naming discrimination. Their authoritative decisive 
position is based on presuppositions that are taken for granted.
First, citizens need to agree that it is legitimate that ‘the state’ interferes in naming 
processes and that decisions need to be made on an institutionalized level by the 
registration offices or courts. This interfering role of the state is normalized in citizens’ 
everyday lives and this form of normalization exists from an early stage. It is found not  
only at the registrar office but also in books, road safety education148 or among specific 
toys149. Children are made to believe that state authorities such as the police (or even the 
registrar office) ‘provide’ for the citizen’s well-being. Additionally, by means of a 
hegemonic understanding of democracy as representing the legislative part of the 
separation of powers, institutional decisions by German state authorities are based on 
148 Cf. the police as cooperational partner: Sekretariat der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der 
Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2012.
149 Cf. website of a popular toy company that offers police themed toys: Playmobil n.d. These toys offer 
in particular ableized, often but not exclusively white, non-migratized, cis-boys suggested role mod-
els for identification, thus providing and re_producing discriminatory stereotypes for the percep-
tion of state authorities.
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parliamentary adopted legislation and are therefore legitimatized by the citizens. In this 
way, people are made to believe that institutional interference in naming practices 
happens in their own name. This notion is also expressed in the introductory clauses of  
German court orders that claim to speak “in the name of the people”150.
Second, several principles that ‘nationalize’ a personal name are powerfully applied and 
conventionalized and therefore should be accepted. For example, it became an 
accustomed norm that a child’s name in Germany ‘needs’ to follow the principle of 
binominalism that clearly distinguishes between a first name and a surname. 
Consequently, binominalism is legally specified and negotiated as “name building 
according to German legislation”151. According to article 47, paragraph 1 of 
Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche and article 21, paragraph 1 of PStG, 
binominalism is defined as the norm according to which a name registered under the 
German rule of law consists of two parts: (a) first name(s) and a surname (cf. BGBEG, 
Deutscher Bundestag 2016: article 47, paragraph 1, point 3; PStG, Deutscher Bundestag 
1/01/2009: article 21, paragraph 1). Moreover, the Federal Association of German 
Registrars specifies which name structures are not considered as applicable under 
German law: “a chain of names, one single name only, patronymics (father’s names), a 
middle name or the like”152. Hence, the legal ‘appropriateness’ of a personal name in 
Germany is based on the assumption that names ‘have’ inherited grammatical structure. 
Thus, during naturalization, future German citizens can ‘assimilate’ their non-
conforming name to a structure that is “recognized by German law”153. The idea of 
‘assimilation’ is only enabled by the presumption of a given structure. Assigning names a 
structure grammaticalizes what a name that hegemonically will be perceived as German 
must look like. Names that deviate from this institutionalized name structure or 
150 Original: “Im Namen des Volkes“ for example in Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 
5/12/2008 (translated by EH).
151 Original: “Bildung eines Namens nach deutschem Recht” (Deutscher Bundestag: article 47, 2, 
translated by EH).
152 Original: “eine Namenskette, einen einzelnen Eigennamen, einen Vatersnamen, einen Zwischenna-
men, einen Mittelnamen o.ä“. (Bundesverband der Deutschen Standesbeamten n.d., translated by 
EH.
153 Original: “Sie führen Ihren Namen in einer Struktur, die im deutschen Recht unbekannt ist und 
wollen diesen nun dem deutschen Recht angleichen” (Bundesverband der Deutschen Standes-
beamten n.d., translated by EH).
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grammar will not be recognized as German. Additionally, personalizing the law as 
having agency silences the fact that it is actually up to the individual registrars to decide 
on names (cf. chapter 3.2.2 and chapter 5).
Third, by assuming that the act of naming a person gender-specifically would support 
the untainted development of the name bearer’s personality154, gendering is presupposed 
to be a necessity to a person’s self-perception and self-identification. Therefore, the 
cognitive sedimentation of identifying a person by one of two genders and of 
assuming/thinking of persons as gendered is not questioned but is presupposed as a 
given. This implies that binary genderization would contribute to the child’s well-being. 
In this way, trans_xing, gender nonconforming or gender-free people and names are not 
only silenced but also made unintelligible. By claiming authority on what is best for the 
child, genderization is understood as a given and acceptable necessity and is 
institutionalized as another form of control. Here again, the focus is upon the individual 
person rather than on the discriminating as well as privileging structures in which the 
individual lives. Genderism with its re_enforcement of the cis-binary-gender norm is 
not considered as discrimination in hegemonic discourse but is re_produced and 
maintained, for example by the genderization of names. In this way, structures and 
institutions are not negotiated as hindering the development of one’s personality but 
instead the individual is perceived as not fitting the norm and thus disrupting 
accustomed hegemonic norms and orders.
Finally, another prerequisite for the hegemonic authorization of registrars’ decision-
making with regard to naming concerns how the child’s well-being is identified. 
According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the child’s well-being depends on the way 
the child’s name is perceived ‘in Germany’ with respect to the “German speech 
intelligibility”155. In the Anderson court case described above, it is required that the 
child’s name is recognized as a distinctive first name according to German legislation 
154 Original: “Die Grenze sei vielmehr nach der neueren Rechtsprechung dort zu ziehen, wo das 
gewählte Wort [...] den Namensträger in der Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit beeinträchtige. Der 
Vorname Anderson [...] sei auch geschlechtsoffenkundig und werde durch die beiden weiteren 
männlichen Vornamen zweifelsfrei diesen Anforderungen gerecht“ (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
Beschluss of 3/11/2005, translated by EH).
155 Original: “nach deutschem Sprachverständnis“ (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 
3/11/2005, translated by EH).
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name structure. Therefore, the institutionalized ‘grammaticalization’ of personal names 
under German law and the ‘German feel for language’ are linked to the child’s well-
being. In chapter 5 I will elaborate on the dynamics and effects of this relationship by 
questioning the evidence by which the ‘German feel for language’ determines that the 
child’s well-being is threatened.
4.6 Children’s Welfare in Sweden
In Swedish legislation, the conceptualization of the child’s well-being has been basically 
constituted by the hetero- and repronormative context of name change, for example 
following a divorce (cf. Namnlag (1982:670), Justitiedepartementet L2 1/03/2012: 
articles 6, 8, 11, 45, 49a; Lag (2016:1013), Justitiedepartementet L2 17/11/2016: articles 
34, 44, 46). However, in 2009 a person that juridically was identified as male won the 
right to have another, hegemonically ‘female’-identified name, Madeleine, added to her 
gender-distinct first name (cf. Namnlagskommittén 2013:128–129). Before she went to 
court, the regional Skatteverket’s representative rejected the additional name, arguing 
that according to the Swedish naming tradition, ‘Madeleine’ is not recognized as a ‘male’ 
or ‘gender-neutral’ name and cannot be assigned to a juridically male person (cf. 
Regeringsrätten, of 28/09/2009). Based on judicial decisions made in 1983 on the 
relevant phrase in the law, “obviously not appropriate as a first name”156, this seems 
nevertheless to have been interpreted rather subjectively, according to the Swedish 
government agency for language policy and language planning, Institutet för språk och 
folkminnen (cf. Namnlagskommittén 2013:459, 595–646; cf. also Brylla 2002:55). 
Reading through the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court’s ‘significant judgments’, 
an argumentation strategy comparable to the one in German jurisdiction on the child’s 
well-being can be found. It specifically concerns the appropriateness of giving a child a 
name whose assigned birth gender does not comply with the hegemonically accustomed 
gender perception of the name:
“In assessing this question, it may sometimes be questioned whether a name is 
suitable as the first name of the child in question, for instance when parents want 
156 Original: “uppenbarligen inte är lämpliga som förnamn” (Justitiedepartementet L2 1/03/2012: ar-
ticle 34, translated by EH).
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to give a girl a boy’s name. [...] What is important in this context is to prevent the 
child from being burdened with a curious or repellent first name” (Regeringsrätten, 
of 28/09/2009). 157
In the lawsuit, the plaintiff quoted this historical phrase from preparatory documents 
for the 1963 name law in order to argue that in the present case, she is of age and chose 
the name herself. Thus, the Supreme Administrative Court agreed that there is no 
reason why the name Madeleine would not be appropriate for the plaintiff. However, 
although the case simultaneously proved that an initial gender-distinct name can be 
inappropriate for a person, the final court decision does not provide the chance for 
parents to assign their child a name that, according to hegemonic naming traditions, 
does not correspond to the assigned birth gender (Regeringsrätten, of 28/09/2009).
Therefore, the child’s well-being seemed to be constituted by gender-distinctivity as well 
as conformity also in Swedish legislative discourse. Yet, on December 14th of the same 
year, Skatteverket released a statement declaring that it is the parents’ responsibility to 
decide which name their child should receive, independent of whether or not a name is 
considered as gender-contrarian.
“The fact that a particular name is usually borne by persons of a particular gender 
should not be deemed implying that the name is inappropriate for persons of the 
opposite gender. This also applies when such a name is registered for a child under 
18 years of age. Also in this case, it is the guardian who needs to be deemed as the 
one that decides whether the name can be regarded as causing discomfort.”158
Returning to the poll carried out by Namnlagskommittén (cf. chapter 3.1.2) it confirms 
my assumption that Swedish legislation and its implementation seem to be more 
progressive than public attitudes towards minority naming practices. In the survey, a 
majority of non-migratized and migratized Swedes negotiated gender-contrarian names 
157 Original: “Vid bedömningen av denna fråga kan ock ibland ifrågasättas, om ett namn är ägnat så-
som förnamn för det barn som avses, såsom då föräldrar önska giva en flicka ett gossnamn [...] Vad 
som i detta sammanhang är väsentligt är att förhindra att barn belastas med kuriösa eller frånstö-
tande förnamn” (Regeringsrätten, of 28/09/2009, translated by EH).
158 Original: “Det förhållandet att ett visst namn normalt bärs av personer av ett visst kön bör inte ans-
es medföra att namnet är olämpligt för personer av motsatt kön. Detta gäller även när ett sådant 
namn anmäls för ett barn under 18 år. Det är även i det fallet vårdnadshavaren som får anses göra 
bedömningen av om namnet kan antas leda till obehag.” (Skatteverket 2009, translated by EH).
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as non-acceptable. Yet, for trans persons, both the court decision and change in 
legislative implementation mark turning points, since they are now able to officially 
register additional self-chosen names that hegemonically are considered as gender non-
conforming. Also, since the first name change can be made at Skatteverket, it is free of 
charge. In comparison, according to the binary-gender-system, trans*_genderqueer 
people in Germany must first register under ‘the opposite gender’ and also pay the 
administrative fees (Bundesministerium des Inneren 15/08/2013: article 3).
 
4.7 Summary
That the state decides names on the basis of its citizens’ well-being, that binominalism is 
the implied name structure in Germany, that gendering is necessary for a person’s 
development and that a person’s well-being is linked to the ‘German feel for language’ 
are all powerful institutionalized norms. They are particularly relevant because they are 
presupposed and implied and are thus, in hegemonic discourse, taken for granted. In 
traditional semantics, this presupposed and implied knowledge that creates meaning is 
even negotiated as ‘empirical knowledge’. Presupposing something also means 
rendering the truth of a statement less questionable (cf. Christie 2000). To claim that 
gender-distinctivity is necessary for personal development leaves out the option of 
questioning gendering in general; otherwise, the idea that a child’s well-being is legally 
tied to the categorical perception of the child as either female or male would not be 
meaningful. As presuppositions require silenced knowledge in order to make sense, and 
as they are accustomed when growing up, it might be difficult to question this silenced 
knowledge. As a privileged, non-migratized person, I have never had to learn to question 
binominalism; my name follows the hegemonic structure. While being socialized as well 
as socializing myself as cis-female, I always experienced privilege through my first name 
in Germany, since Evelyn is only negotiated as a name for females. Only in the context of 
this research did I begin to reflect on the conditions and institutionalized decisions 
related to name giving. It is necessary to reflect on what grounds institutions decide and 
on what grounds jurisdiction is negotiated as a way to approach equity and justice, as 
well as on what grounds I normalized, accepted and accustomed institutions as a 
framework for regulation. As discussed in Crenshaw’s and Spade’s works, legislation 
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manifests inequality and injustice. Giving institutions such as registry offices and 
academic information centers decision-making powers implies the normalized belief 
that these institutions can decide top-down which names are grammatically acceptable 
and socially appropriate. Thus, naming is by no means intended to be a bottom-up 
approach, given that interventions are usually regarded as an individual activity. 
Understanding that democracy privileges the will and knowledge of the majority, 
counter-knowledge that disrupts hegemonic norms is only made negotiable in the 
context of minority politics. Here again, ‘minorities’ as agents are focused upon and not 
the discriminatory structures that privilege the ‘majority’. The right to a name is not 
absolute but is constituted and limited by institutionalized naming principles and their 
accustomed presuppositions.
Normative conventions and naming traditions have also been discussed in Sweden 
against the background of controlling and restricting the choice of names. However, it 
seems that compared to German juridical discourses, Swedish jurisdiction has become 
less restrictive, enabling trans and gender non-conform people and new parents to 
choose gender-’contrarian’, ‘unisex’ or gender non-conform names.
However, in both societies name restricting discourses exist and re_produce ideas of 
naming traditions that are typical to either Swedish or German society. In this context, 
the idea of a Swedish and German feel for language in naming has been brought up 
which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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5. Feeling Grammar: ‘Sprachgefühl’, Metaphors and Emotive 
Names
This chapter deals with the question of the extent to which a presupposed German and 
Swedish feel for language influences hegemonic decisions on naming. It is inspired by 
the previously discussed court case of ‘Kiran’. When the local court rejected the parents’ 
complaint about not being allowed to name their child Kiran, it argued that “[t]he 
assignment of a foreign name is only acceptable if the first name clearly reveals the 
child’s gender according to the German feel for language.”159
Against the background of dealing with accustomed normalizations in hegemonic 
discourse, I was curious to learn how German as a language can be felt or sensed, and to 
analyze the extent to which a nationalized ‘feel for language’ is negotiated as an 
acceptable parameter for hegemonic decisions on personal names. I suspect that the 
sprachgefühl argumentation is based on a racist_migratist belief that only people with a 
‘right’ or ‘natural’ feeling for the German language can authentically identify what 
gender a name is supposed to ‘have’ within the German language community. 
Consequently, I analyze academic, government and popular scientific discourses that 
aim to educate the ‘public’ on grammatical regularities in the German and Swedish 
languages in order to identify the extent to which a hegemonic grammatical  
classification of names and languages contributes to the accustoming of a naturalized 
feel for language. Juridical and legislative discourses are analyzed against the 
background of their additional impact on the institutionalization of a feel for a 
nationalized language in addition to educational discourses, whereas media and 
everyday discourses are examined for the extent to which the institutionalization of a 
feel for languages and names is expressed and re_produced on a day-today level. 
Furthermore, I wanted to question whether this emotive metaphor of feeling a 
nationalized language could also be applied to the Swedish context, given the conceptual 
similarities identified in hegemonic naming practices within the context of nation 
building (cf. chapter 3.1.3). By discussing the hegemonic use of family metaphors to 
describe and categorize nations and languages, I illustrate how this cis-binary-
159 Original: “Die Erteilung eines ausländischen Vornamens sei nur dann zulässig, wenn der Vorname 
das Geschlecht des Kindes nach deutschem Sprachgefühl eindeutig erkennen lasse” (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008, translated by EH).
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reprogenderist, racist metaphorization of people constitutes the accustoming of feelings 
and emotions directed against trans and gender non-conform people, Roma, Jews and 
Blacks. Using the example of a personal life story, I illustrate how emotionalized anti-
Semitic associations of Jewish names influence the choice of names and how power 
relations constitute these emotive associations.
5.1 ‘Grammaticalization’ of Names
As implied in the court decision by the BVerfG in 2008, the feel for language was based 
on grammatical entities such as semantic meaning, pragmatic use or morphological 
structure that would make a name identifiable as female or male (cf. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008, chapter 4.4). In order to assess the 
impact of the presupposition of grammatical features on naming decisions, I browsed 
through central publications that concern name and language use in Germany and 
Sweden on an institutionalized public level. The following quotations prove the 
relevance of social as well as grammatical categorization (or ‘grammaticalization’) in the 
context of naming.
The first abstract is taken from the preface of the revised 2002 edition of the 
International Handbook of Forenames. The handbook is one of the main resources used 
by registrars in Germany to check the ‘gender of a name’, or rather, the gender that is 
conventionally ascribed to a name. Thus, the handbook presupposes that every name 
‘has’ one of two genders and in this way re_produces the hegemonic social  
categorization of binary-genderization:
“This handbook that compiles first names from all European languages, has been 
out of print for some time but is repeatedly requested by registry offices. For 
decades, parents have been increasingly asking for first names from other 
languages, sometimes isolated, exotic forms, and there is also a trend towards 
internationalization in the world of first names. [...] Errors […] were corrected. For 
example, the gender markers for Freja, Jade (female), Fabien and Till (male) were 
corrected, and digressive, accidentally recorded name forms (e.g. Andreè, 
Lufthansa, Renéé, Supha) were eliminated. In addition, here and there, where a 
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first name has evolved into gender neutrality – such as Jonah, Luca –, the genus 
markers were changed accordingly. Names such as Aliyah and Cheyenne were 
added after they have prevailed [in the hegemonic German-speaking environment, 
EH] recently and, therefore, could not be ignored.”160
The second quotation is taken from one of the most popular and widely read scientific 
journals on language use in Sweden, Språktidningen, which targets a mainstream 
audience and was initially co-funded by two of the leading Swedish research funding 
institutions, Vetenskapsrådet and Riksbankens jubileumsfond (cf. Hadenius 2007), as 
well as Svenska Akademien, one of the most influential institutions to regulate and 
norm Swedish language use. The journal categorizes names and distinguishes them as 
Swedish or non-Swedish based on their phonetical sound:
“But not only Svensson is tired of their name. The trend that people with foreign 
background change [their names, EH] to more Swedish-sounding names [...] is 
broken, according to PRV. Instead, many change [their names] to new names 
originating from their own language, such as Bouzhanieilam, Halbori, Albadini, 
Cordiani, Zazzio, Egelbach, Usopov and Yeshuel. After the requirement for new 
names to be Swedish-sounding was dropped in 1982, also more and more 
[statisized, EH] Swedes started looking for a foreign touch, with former acting 
couple Ola and Noomi Rapace and writing couple Alexander and Alexandra 
Ahndoril as well-known trend-setters.”161
160 Original: “Dieses Handbuch, das Vornamen aus allen Sprachen Europas zusammenstellt, war seit 
einiger Zeit vergriffen, wird aber immer wieder von den Standesämtern verlangt. Seit einigen 
Jahrzehnten werden von Eltern Rufnamen aus anderen Sprachen, mitunter entlegene, exotische 
Formen vermehrt gewünscht, und auch in der Vornamenwelt zeichnet sich ein Trend zur Interna-
tionalisierung ab. […] Korrigiert wurden Irrtümer […]. So wurde etwa die Geschlechtskennzeich-
nung bei Freja, Jade (weiblich) oder bei Fabien und Till (männlich) korrigiert, und abseitige, verse-
hentlich aufgenommene Namensformen (z.B. Andreè, Lufthansa, Renéé, Supha) wurden aus-
geschieden. Außerdem wurde hie und da, wo sich ein Vorname zur Geschlechtsneutralität hin en-
twickelt hat – etwa Jona, Luca –, die Genuskennzeichnung entsprechend geändert. Neu aufgenom-
men wurden Vornamen wie Aliyah und Cheyenne, die sich in der letzten Zeit durchgesetzt haben 
und darum nicht übergangen werden durften.” (Nüssler 2002:[7], translated by EH).
161 Original: “Men der är inte bara Svensson som tröttnat på sitt namn. Trenden att personer med 
utenländsk bakgrund byter till mer svenskklingande namn […] är bruten, enligt PRV. I stället byter 
många till nya namn med utgångspunkt i sitt eget språk, som Bouzhanieilam, Halbori, Albadini, 
Cordiani, Zazzio, Egelbach, Usopov och Yeshuel. Sedan kravet på att nya namn ska vara svenskklin-
gande släpptes 1982 söker även allt fler svennar en främande touch, med tidigare skådespelarparet 
Ola och Noomi Rapace och författarparet Alexander och Alexandra Ahndoril som kända trend-
sättare.” (Karlsson 2013:19, translated by EH).
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The last example is from a decision by the administrative court in Göttingen, Germany. 
The court rejected the application by a family from Azerbaijan to change their name to a  
‘German’ name that conforms to German pragmatic name conventions:
“By decision of 25.1.2011, the defendant refused to change the name because the 
name’s linguistically foreign origin is not a significant reason for a name change. 
There is no evidence for difficulties with spelling or pronunciation. Moreover, the 
plaintiffs have the possibility of assimilating their name. [...] It is true that the 
plaintiffs’ concerns […] of being exposed to discrimination on the labor market due 
to their foreign name cannot be completely ruled out. However, this is not 
considered a significant reason for name change.”162
All examples, including that of BVerfG of 2008, show how personal names are 
conventionally categorized, differentiated and regulated in the hegemonic discourses in 
both Germany and Sweden. In order to make sense of them, the following 
presuppositions must be accepted:
• Primarily, names are intelligible as being a part of an often nationalized language 
such as ‘German’ or ‘Swedish’ (“Vornamen aus allen Sprachen Europas”, 
“Rufnamen aus anderen Sprachen”, “svenskklingande”, “nya namn med 
utgångspunkt i sitt eget språk”, “fremdsprachiger Ursprung des Namens”, 
“ausländischer Vorname”, “deutsches Sprachgefühl”). Phonetical conventions, as 
well as a so-called ‘feel for language’, are negotiable as indicators for the language 
to which a name ‘belongs’.
• First names are also often classified within and according to these linguistic 
frameworks. For example, they are unquestionably distinguished as ‘female’, 
‘male’ and ‘unisex’ or ‘neutral ’ (“da, wo sich ein Vorname zur 
Geschlechtsneutralität hin entwickelt hat”), which again presupposes an 
162 Original: “Mit Bescheid vom 25.1.2011 lehnte die Beklagte die Namensänderung ab, weil ein fremd-
sprachiger Ursprung des Namens kein wichtiger Grund für eine Namensänderung sei. 
Schwierigkeiten mit der Schreibweise oder Aussprache seien nicht erkennbar. Im Übrigen stehe 
den Klägern die Möglichkeit einer zivilrechtlichen Namensangleichung offen. […] Die Befürchtung 
der Kläger […]., aufgrund ihres ausländischen Namens Diskriminierungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt 
ausgesetzt zu sein, ist zwar nicht ganz auszuschließen. Jedoch stellt diese keinen wichtigen Grund 
für eine Namensänderung dar.” (Verwaltungsgericht Göttingen, Urteil of 25/04/2012, translated by 
EH).
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imagined and taken-for-granted binary-gender-system. The genderization itself is 
based on categorizations of names as migratized and non-migratized (“wenn der 
Vorname das Geschlecht des Kindes nach deutschem Sprachgefühl eindeutig 
erkennen lasse”), thus co-constituting the idea of an often nationalized language 
system.
• Names can be personified as agents that “asserted themselves”, thus omitting and 
denaming the hegemonic context and reasons for why these names became 
popular (“Neu aufgenommen wurden Vornamen wie Aliyah und Cheyenne, die 
sich in der letzten Zeit durchgesetzt haben [=asserted themselves] und darum 
nicht übergangen werden durften.”). Moreover, the process of gendering a name 
can even be based on a feel for the language to which the name is hegemonically 
assigned (“wenn der Vorname das Geschlecht des Kindes nach deutschem 
Sprachgefühl eindeutig erkennen lasse”). In this way, the ‘feel for language’ is 
generalized as well as detached from the individual person that might ‘feel’ the 
categorization of a name within its linguistic framework. What is significant is the 
observation that in both cases, the impact of power relations is silenced: Power 
relations constitute the hegemonic discourse and its privileged positions. 
Personification, as well as generalization, neglects this impact of human beings as 
agents, thus focusing on assumed agent-less events that ‘just happen’ or feelings 
that are ‘just there’.
• As names seem to be mostly conceptualized as gendered and non-/migratized, as 
well as related to the social positioning of a person as gendered and 
non-/migratized, intersecting forms of oppression are silenced in the context of 
naming. However, as stated previously (cf. chapter 2.3), the recognition of people 
via their names is co-constituted by accustomed default conceptualizations. A 
person with a name will foremost be considered as ableized if not otherwise 
determined by a specific context: Either the very person is explicitly marked as 
disabled, for example when presented as a participant of the Paralympics or 
Special Olympics – or ability is negotiated as the norm when, for example, the 
last name of a person (such as Lahm, cf. chapter 2.3) interpellates disabilization,  
in which the very person is not necessarily positioned.
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As stated, the presuppositions need to be taken for true in order to make sense of the 
linguistic categorization and distinction of names as Swedish or German. I argue that it  
is this form of structuralist ‘grammaticalization’ that leads to discriminatory and 
exclusionary hegemonic negotiation and perception of personal names as gendered, 
exotified (cf. Hayn, Hornscheidt 2010) and (inter)national: Through phonetic or 
graphematic classifications that are assumed to be grounded in a nationalized feel for 
language as well as through dichotomous standardization. For example, by identifying 
the use of a name as right or wrong or changeable (cf. from introductory quotations 
above: “Geschlechtskennzeichnung […] korrigiert”, “abseitige, versehentlich 
aufgenommene Namensformen”, “Genuskennzeichnung [...] geändert”), migratizable 
names are excluded from the nationalized linguistic context while gender-free, gender 
non-conform names, names that are conceptualized as neither ‘female’ nor ‘male’ nor 
‘unisex’ are made unintelligible.
In court decisions, (cf. chapter 4.4) this structuralist grammaticalization is identified as 
a German sprachgefühl. Here, a ‘feel for language’ seems to represent specific linguistic 
structures that have been accustomed and normalized as ‘typical German’ in hegemonic 
discourse. ‘Typical German’ as a migratist conceptualization of both language and 
nationality is interdependent with racist genderist perceptions. For example, names 
ending with - a are hegemonically conceptualized as stereotypically ‘female’ within the 
German linguistic community (cf. chapter 2 whereas names ending with -an are 
regarded as stereotypically ‘male’ (cf. chapter 4.4). In this way, those ‘typical German’ 
names are simultaneously recognized as genderable, whereas names that do not comply 
with this structuralist hegemonic speech pattern are not. Lann Hornscheidt 
demonstrates the intersectionality of migratizing as well as gendering strategies on the 
example of their first name:
“LANN
NO – A NAME
NO – COMES OUT OF ME
COMES FROM ME
DOES NOT COME FROM ANY PLACE
THAT MIGHT EXPLAIN YOUR IRRITATION AWAY
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(AH – NOT FROM HERE – THIS IS WHY I CANNOT ALLOCATE AND CLASSIFY 
THE NAME: WHERE IS IT FROM? WHAT DOES IT MEAN? IS IT A WOMEN’S 
NAME THERE? A MEN’S NAME; THERE?) WHERE?
NO – COMES OUT OF ME
COMES FROM ME
THE GENDER IRRITATION CAN NOT BE REGIONALIZED AWAY
CANNOT BE LOCALIZED AWAY
THE GENDER AMBIGUITY
IS HERE
IS NOW […]”163
Although the combination of phoneme segments – /lan/ – is grammatically ‘correct’ 
and therefore ‘grammatical’, according to conventionalized phonotactic ‘internal rules’ 
for the German language (cf. Hall 2000) the name is not recognized as German. Hence,  
when a name is not recognized as German, it is apparently not genderable and if a name 
is not genderable, it is not recognized as German. “Is it a female name? Is it a male 
name?” Thus, the question arises as to what extent structuralist grammaticalization is 
re_produced in the context of naming:
• The grammatical framework of a language as well as hegemonic gender and non-
migration classifications co-constitute each other while silencing their normative 
discriminatory effects and re_productions. Emel, Kiran and Noomi will neither 
163 Original: “LANN
NEIN – EIN NAME
NEIN – KOMMT AUS MIR
KOMMT VON MIR
KOMMT NICHT VON IRGENDEINEM ORT
DER DEINE IRRITATION WEGERKLÄREN KÖNNTE
(AH – NICHT VON HIER – DESHALB KANN ICH DEN NAMEN NICHT ZU- UND EINORDNEN: 
VON WO DENN? WAS BEDEUTET ER DENN? IST ES EIN FRAUENNAME DORT? EIN MÄN-
NERNAME; DORT?) WO?
NEIN – KOMMT AUS MIR
KOMMT VON MIR
DIE GENDERVERUNSICHERUNG LÄSST SICH NICHT WEG REGIONALISIEREN
LÄSST SICH NICHT WEG LOKALISIEREN
DIE GENDERVERUNEINDEUTIGUNG
IST HIER
IST JETZT [...]”
(Hornscheidt 2016, translated by EH).
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be regarded nor ‘felt’ as German or Swedish or, within this linguistic framework, 
as immediately gender-distinct names, despite the fact that the phoneme 
segments comply with the hegemonic understanding of the phonotactic rules for 
the German language and that persons with these names are born and raised in 
Germany, possess German citizenship and live in communities that are well 
aware of the conventionalized genderization of their names. Due to this lack of 
hegemonic recognition, these names are subject to linguistic Othering.
• Simultaneously, the hegemonic perception of names is not necessarily identical 
with the social positioning of the person that bears the name: Linguistic 
frameworks of names are ‘flexible’ and permeable when it comes to 
hegemonically fashionable names (cf. from introductory quotations above: “Seit 
einigen Jahrzehnten werden von Eltern Rufnamen aus anderen Sprachen [...] 
vermehrt gewünscht, und auch in der Vornamenwelt zeichnet sich ein Trend zur 
Internationalisierung ab”, „Sedan kravet på att nya namn ska vara 
svenskklingande släpptes 1982 söker även allt fler svennar en främande touch.”). 
Yet, this does not necessarily lead to the incorporation of migratized German or 
Swedish citizens and their names into the nationalized grammatical and cognitive 
framework of a language. As the example shows, svennar aka Swedish people are 
conceptualized as privileged non-migratized Swedish citizens with non-
migratized names who look for non-Swedish names to take on or appropriate as 
their own. As I will discuss in chapter 6.2.2.1, only migratizable names are subject 
to appropriation. What names are subject to Othering and what names to 
appropriation by privileged people is negotiated and defined by hegemonic 
‘fashion’ discourses. Not surprisingly, with time ‘fashionable’ names will be 
recognized and ‘felt’ as not migratizable.164
• Regarding the change of names, discrimination and privilege constitute limits 
and possibilities of name change as well as define the motivation of people who 
aim to change their names. The name changes of migratized and/or trans and 
gender non-conform persons might not be motivated by boredom or tiredness as 
suggested by Språktidningen (cf. from introductory quotations above: “tired of 
164 Cf. chapter 6.2.2.2, footnote 227 on appropriation of names and for rejection cf. basically all chap-
ters.
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their name”) but by the experience of discrimination in naming practices. In 
various situations in both Sweden and Germany, people are routinely asked to 
present their ID card when applying for a job or bank account165, registering at a 
library or at the municipality’s registration office. In these contexts, the 
identification of an individual can lead to a false perception, namely, if a person 
does not identify with their registered first name and the way it is conventionally 
gendered and_or migratized (cf. from introductory quotations above: “Die 
Befürchtung der Kläger zu 1. und 2., aufgrund ihres ausländischen Namens 
Diskriminierungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt ausgesetzt zu sein, ist zwar nicht ganz 
auszuschließen.”). However, in Språktidningen’s article, name changes on the 
grounds of discrimination are not discussed, thus silencing the different 
motivations, challenges and consequences name changes may have depending on 
the individual person’s social positioning in institutionalized contexts (cf. chapter 
6.2.2). Privilege, in comparison to discrimination, is experienced when non-
migratized people with a conventionalized ‘German’ name are not confronted 
with criminalized imputations of active involvement in German nationalist 
terrorism, such as crimes committed by the NSU166 or other Nazis, despite their 
name’s perception as ‘German’.
In the following subchapter, I will focus on the grammaticalization of names, that is on 
the grammatical structure on which names are identified and differentiated as ‘German’, 
‘female’ and correctly used or not. I will show that grammaticalization is another 
expression of accustoming (cf. chapter 2.3) that is defined by hegemonic institutions, 
such as the editorial team of Duden, the name consulting office in Leipzig, or traditional 
academic discourse in linguistics and specifically in onomastics. Particular attention is 
given to the impact of a presupposed feel for language, which I assume to be an 
internalized and thus naturalized hegemonic strategy that enables and silences 
discrimination and exclusion in the context of nation building.
165 I am grateful to two friends that shared their own and a reported experience with the German 
Sparkasse, a savings bank, with me. In both cases, Sparkasse inquired about the citizenship of their 
clients. Both clients were cis-male identified and had migratizable names. Since both names were 
on suspected terrorist lists, the Sparkasse doubted their identity as German citizens and asked 
them to provide proof of citizenship (Anonymous friend * 2007; Anonymous friend ** 2012).
166 German racist and far-right terrorist group called the National Socialist Underground.
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5.2 How to Feel Languages, Nationalities and Names
In the following I argue that a feel for language – sprachgefühl – is an accustomed as 
well as internalized kind of knowledge which enables people to decide how to perceive 
and label languages. In this context, personal names are regarded and negotiated as part 
of an often nationalized language (cf. Suleiman 2006). In the quotations below, a feel for 
language is negotiated as a preexisting structure which identifies linguistic expressions 
as German or Swedish. For reasons of illustration, I repeat this chapter’s initial 
quotation taken from the court case discussed in chapter 4.4: “The assignment of a 
foreign name is only acceptable if the first name clearly reveals the child’s gender 
according to the German feel for language.”167
The local court quoted in the decision by the Federal Constitutional Court, the highest 
German court, identifies the German feel for language as a benchmark for the ability to 
gender a child unambiguously via its name. Thus, the local court regards the German 
feel for language as a valid foundation for legal decision-making. Although the highest 
German court objects to the idea that a name’s ascribed gender conventionalization 
needs to comply with the German sprachgefühl, it does not object to the idea that there 
actually exists a German feel for language:
“The reason given by court that a gender-distinct first name, whose gender is 
revealed by the German sprachgefühl, is in the child’s interest is just as little 
justified in restricting the parents’ right to determine [the child’s name, EH].”168
Similarly, in the Swedish context the extent is discussed to which a feel for language can 
be decisive for a correct use of language by the Swedish journal Språktidningen without 
rejecting the idea of the existence of a nationalized feel:
“The feel for language is what enables us, often without schooling, to determine 
what is correct language use. [...] The feel for language also enables Swedes to 
167 Original: “Die Erteilung eines ausländischen Vornamens sei nur dann zulässig, wenn der Vorname 
das Geschlecht des Kindes nach deutschem Sprachgefühl eindeutig erkennen lasse“ (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008, translated by EH).
168 Original: “Ebenso wenig kann vorliegend die von den Gerichten angeführte Begründung zum Inter-
esse des Kindes an einem sein Geschlecht eindeutig im deutschen Sprachgefühl offenbarenden Vor-
namen eine Begrenzung des elterlichen Bestimmungsrechts rechtfertigen.” (Bundesverfassungs-
gericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008, translated by EH).
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transform unswedish expressions into passable ones […] The feel for language […] 
reacts to deviant pronunciation and intonation, perhaps even faster. We can tell 
immediately if someone speaks with an accent, even if he or she masters the order 
and choice of words perfectly well.”169
However, both the German local court and the Swedish journal silence powerful norms 
that are re_produced by their statements. Instead of regarding language use as a process 
that understands linguistic meaning as something that can shift depending on a person’s 
social positioning, language is negotiated as a pre-determined, standardized structure. 
Thus, language use can be treated as compliant with the hegemonic norms to identify it  
in a structuralist and nationalized way as right or wrong, as well as to identify a personal  
name as gender-distinct or not. Furthermore, both authorities privilege those languages 
users that are assigned to possess a feel for language.
As the quotation from Språktidningen suggests, those language users are 
conceptualized as having a feel for language that are identified as ‘Swedish’ in a 
hegemonic migratist way. By claiming that one does not even need to have studied 
linguistics or know much about languages in order to be able to distinguish names as 
‘female’, ‘male’, ‘unknown gender’, non-migratized and migratized, non-migratized 
Swedish people are negotiated as decisive authorities of the Swedish language. As I will 
show later, the same applies to the German context.
Traditionally trained linguists would base the distinction of names on inherent 
structures that define rules and ir/regularities and that separate one language from 
another. This knowledge about linguistic structures is wide-spread
• in classrooms where languages are distinguished and taught as so-called first (L1) 
or second (L2) language170;
169 Original: “Språkkänslan är det som gör att vi, ofta helt utan skolning, kan avgöra vad som är kor-
rekt språk. [...] Språkkänslan gör också att svenskar kan formulera om det osvenska till helt gång-
bara yttranden [...] Språkkänslan reagerar […], kanske ännu snabbare, på avvikande uttal och 
satsmelodi. Vi hör direkt om någon bryter, även om han eller hon behärskar ordföljden och valet av  
ord perfekt.” (Engdahl 2010, translated by EH).
170 Cf. for a critique of this form of migratist hierarchization of language acquisition and use: Dirim 
2013 as well as Knappik, Dirim 2013.
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• in grammar books and language teaching material such as published by the 
German editor Duden or by the Swedish Academy (Svenska Akademien);
• on the websites of national government agencies on language, such as the 
Swedish Institute for Language and Folklore (Institutet för språk och 
folkeminnen n.d.);
• but also in the media, such as Fråga om språket in the Swedish online newspaper 
Dagens Nyheter (Dagens Nyheter Online n.d.) or the Zwiebelfisch column in the 
online version of the German magazine Spiegel (Sick 2003–2012).
Thus, in hegemonic discourse people are confronted with an authorized form of 
knowledge production that they – if not aware of otherwise – might be willing to spread 
and share. From a deconstructivist cognitivist pragmatic perspective on language, 
however, I argue that these structures are ascribed to language only as ir/regular and 
that these structures are not given but a result of constant hegemonic social interaction, 
sedimentation and accustoming (cf. chapter 2 cf. Marmaridou 2000).
But what happens when I, as a non-migratized person that is hegemonically negotiated 
as a L1 user, hear a personal name pronounced in a way I am not accustomed to? If 
someone uses a personal name I am not able to gender according to my assumed 
‘German feel for language’? Following hegemonic discourse, one would identify the 
speakers as non-L1, or non-native speakers and their non-L1 names as non-German 
names. Yet, this creates enough questions for another dissertation: How does one 
become an authorized L1 user who possesses a feel for language? What is the difference 
between L1 and L2 in terms of the ability to feel the language? On what basis do I judge 
whether language is used in the right or wrong way? Can I learn to develop a 
sprachgefühl? Is it something that humans can learn or is it something that should 
rather be left to modern technology, as the following citation from an article about a 
mobile phone suggests:
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“Statistics gives your mobile phone a feel for language. Now you can speak to your 
phone in English and receive a translation in Chinese in response. The technique is 
based on an idea that engineers advocated in the 1970s.”171
If it is possible to acquire a feel for language, what is it that I actually learn? Is it some  
kind of linguistic knowledge about the grammatical structures of a language? Or can it 
also be something that I can react to emotionally when, for example, a grammatical rule 
is breached?
The conceptualization of a ‘feel for language’ might not interpellate the same 
associations as nationalist feelings. Nevertheless, I claim that there are some similarities 
in the way these ‘emotions’ are powerfully constituted, acquired and re_produced. Both 
a feel for language and nationalist feelings presuppose the idea of a pre-existing 
nationalized concept towards which feels, feelings and emotions can be directed: the 
possibly emotional feel for a language and the emotional feelings for a group of people 
that both are conceptualized as German. Sara Ahmed conceptualizes emotions as 
emerging from the contact a person has with a subject or an object (Ahmed 2004a:119). 
In an article on Affective Economics, Ahmed argues that
“emotions play a crucial role in the ‘surfacing’ of individual and collective bodies 
through the way in which emotions circulate between bodies and signs. Such an 
argument clearly challenges any assumption that emotions are a private matter, 
that they simply belong to individuals, or even that they come from within and then 
move outward toward others. It suggests that emotions are not simply ‘within’ or 
‘without’ but that they create the very effect of the surfaces or boundaries of bodies 
and worlds.” (Ahmed 2004a:117)
As Ahmed suggests, it is doubtful that emotions are conceptualized and felt on an 
individual or private level only. This is contrary to a conventionalized belief that 
emotions are ‘authentic’ and ‘real’. As shown above, the very idea of authenticity is also 
interpellated and presupposed in discourses about a feel for a nationalized language.
171 Original: “Statistiken ger din mobil språkkänsla. Nu kan du prata till mobilen på engelska och få en 
översättning uppläst på kinesiska. Tekniken bygger på en idé som ingenjörer förespråkade på 1970-
talet.” (Lewan 2011, translated by EH).
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Thus, when analyzing the assumed German feel for language quoted in the court 
statement following Ahmed, this kind of ‘emotion’ can barely be understood as 
something individual but rather shared. By authorizing the feel for language to be 
potentially fundamental for linguistic decisions on the ‘nature’ of a name, it is 
constructed as an emotion that is generally shared in hegemonic German discourse. I 
suggest understanding the feel for language as an accustomed normative perception of 
language that is constituted and affected by hegemonic discourse. As Ahmed argues, 
“emotions are […] assumed to come from without and move inward” (Ahmed 
2004b:28). Hence, the way people and language use are emotionally perceived is 
influenced and determined by the hegemonic way people have learned to feel about 
them. The distinction between the individual (inside) and society (outside) is then, 
according to Ahmed, constituted and affected by feelings (cf. Ahmed 2004b:24; 29). 
Thus, feelings interpellate associations about others as well as about oneself that are are 
“shaped by histories that stick” and in this way are perceived as true (Ahmed 2004b:39).  
With regard to conventionalized negotiations of language as a symbolization of the 
nation, these sticky histories can be read as historically accustomed knowledge. This can 
be the experience that a hegemonically assumed ‘correct’ and ‘appropriate’ use of the 
German language helps to ‘succeed’ in German society and remain employed (cf. 
Bundesarbeitsgericht, of 28/01/2010); it can also recall the relevance of the German 
language for nation building that continuously re_produces collectively imagined and 
shared boundaries between the self and the other. The initiative of the Association 
German Language to anchor the German language in the German Constitution as a 
national symbol exemplifies the link between language and nation for the German 
context (cf. Krämer 2008), in particular as it seems to be broadly supported according to 
a public opinion poll conducted in 2009 (cf. Schaal et al. 2009). The conceptualization 
of language as something one can feel e.g. when language has been used in a right or 
wrong way, is, thus, not only presupposed because people have been in contact with the 
language; by adapting Ahmed (Ahmed 2004a:118), the presupposed feel for language 
can also be explained by the emotional reading of a ‘non-conforming’ use of the 
nationalized language that works to bind L1 speakers and nation together. This 
presupposes an understanding of a ‘conform’ use of language as well as an emotive 
attitude towards the conceptualization of ‘the nation’. Among the many languages and 
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variations of German that are used every day, it is the migratized set of language use 
that is hegemonically constructed as non-conform with the German feel for language. In 
this way, perceiving migratized names as German is made unintelligible in a similar way 
as perceiving names as non-gendered are made abject (cf. chapter 2.3). As shown in the 
court statement, the German feel for language constitutes the genderability of names, as 
gender conventionalization constitute the German feel for language. Following this 
logic, a hegemonically non-conforming name identification might then ‘hurt the 
language feeling’ which – as Ahmed has shown using the example of ‘love for the nation’  
– can lead to “the reading of others as hateful” (Ahmed 2004a:118), and to the “aligning 
[of] subjects with collectives by attributing ‘others’ as the ‘source’ of our172 feelings” 
(Ahmed 2004b:[1]). I argue that the emotional perception of non-conforming names 
also depends on the ways people become accustomed when acquiring ‘the feel’ for a 
hegemonically conform language and name use.
In German linguistics, there is a distinction between ‘German’ and ‘German as a second 
language’ (DAZ) and ‘German as a foreign language’ (DAF) as teaching subjects173. Thus, 
‘German’ (as a first language) is not only conceptualized as the hegemonic norm, which 
it is not specified further, but the distinction between a(n) (implicitly) first and second 
as well as ‘foreign’ language also tackles the question of to whom a German 
sprachgefühl is assigned. In a handbook on German as a second language, the meaning 
of sprachgefühl is specified as something only non-migratized children ‘possess’:
“As regards learning aids and mnemonics, one must not resort to a German feel for 
language that these children do not and cannot have.”174
and
“Second language teaching is conflicting with native language teaching on the one 
hand and foreign language teaching on the other hand. It differs mostly from native 
172 I read ‘our’ here as conceptualized from a hegemonic perspective.
173 Cf. for example distinction made at the Department of Philosophy and Humanities between Ger-
man, German as a Second Language and German as a Foreign Language at the Freie Universität 
Berlin (Freie Universität Berlin n.d.).
174 Original: “Bei Hilfen und Lernbrücken darf nicht auf ein deutsches Sprachgefühl zurückgegriffen 
werden, das diese Kinder nicht haben (können).” (Rösch 2001:10, translated by EH).
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language teaching since the latter presupposes the unconscious acquisition of 
fundamental language skills and an already acquired feel for language.”175
In the handbook, ‘sprachgefühl’ is not only negotiated as something one can possess 
after learning it unconsciously but also negotiates how it can be acquired:
“The accustoming of vocabulary and structures is indispensable in order for a feel 
for language to evolve gradually and can, for example, be carried out by 
memorizing poems and songs (repeating the same sentence patterns) or dialogues 
and sketches (e.g. accustoming of verb forms).”176
This means that pupils are taught a specific use of language in order to acquire a feel for  
the German language. In line with Ahmed’s approach to identify the socialized 
connection between emotion and subject/object (Ahmed 2004a), the handbook suggests 
facilitating and support the language acquisition process by use of methods that tackle 
the emotions of the pupils (cf. Rösch 2001:53; 57). The constant repetition of vocabulary 
as well as structures in songs, poems, dialogues or sketches should foster the 
accustoming of a feel for German.
But what does it mean if children/pupils are encouraged to learn a feel for a 
standardized hegemonic version of German but not a critical reflective feeling for the 
social norms presupposed by the linguistic environment they grow up in and get 
accustomed to? What do children/pupils become accustomed to who grow up in a 
linguistic environment that is hegemonically recognized as a provider for a German 
sprachgefühl? What do children become accustomed to in an educational environment 
where pupils are split into two classes, one with and one without the feel for German? 
And what do they become accustomed to when it comes to the perception of people via 
their names? The feel children/pupils acquire is also a feel to categorize people socially 
175 Original: “Der Zweitsprachenunterricht steht im Spannungsfeld von muttersprachlichem Unter-
richt auf der einen Seite und Fremdsprachenunterricht auf der anderen Seite. Am stärksten unter-
scheidet er sich vom muttersprachlichen Unterricht, da dieser den unbewussten Erwerb der 
Sprache in ihren Grundzügen und ein bereits erworbenes Sprachgefühl voraussetzt.” (Rösch 
2001:33, translated by EH).
176 Original: “Das nötige Einschleifen von Wortschatz und Strukturen, das unabdingbar ist, um nach 
und nach ein Sprachgefühl entstehen zu lassen, kann beispielsweise durch Auswendiglernen von 
Gedichten und Liedern (Wiederholen gleiche Satzmuster) oder Dialogen und Sketchen (z.B. ein-
schleifen von Verbformen) erfolgen.” (Rösch 2001:38, translated by EH).
227
Feeling Grammar: ‘Sprachgefühl’, Metaphors and Emotive Names
and valuate them differently according to their ascribed societal role and social 
positioning as, for example, migratized and non-migratized Germans. In this way, they 
do not only learn how to structure and classify people but also how to feel about them. 
Thus, feelings and emotions can be understood as an internalized structure of how to 
perceive social orders and norms. Consequently, naming regularities and compliances 
with the norms evoke positive feelings, whereas linguistic counter-activist naming 
interventions interpellate negative feelings instead of appreciation of creativity and a 
diversity of ideas and linguistic perceptions.
The authors of the educational material designed for German as a first language are in 
danger of supporting the acquisition of positive and negative associations with naming 
practices in Germany. In their publication, they re_produce the distinction between 
pupils with and without a feel for German in a discriminatory way. Names such as 
Thanh Tien, Ahmed, Ayşe, Hasan and Ricardo which in hegemonic discourse are not 
negotiated as typical ‘German names’177 only appear in DAZ (and not DAE178) material as 
potential protagonists in exercises for DAZ students and are therefore, perhaps with the 
exception of Ricardo179, re_produced as migratized names (Rösch 2001:78). ‘Migratized’ 
here is assigned to names that in hegemonic discourse are considered as names for 
people that are denied being ascribed as ‘German’. Although Ricardo might be perceived 
as a non-German(ic) name, based on its record in Nüssler (Nüssler 2002:357; cf. below) 
it seems more likely that today Ricardo is negotiated as a ‘possible’ or intelligible name 
for people that are considered as ‘statisized’ – as non-migratized. Thus, associations of a  
white, cis-binary-gendered and Christianized/Christian socialized person ‘without 
migration background or experience’ (as far as ‘non-migration’ can be vaguely 
conceptualized on a hegemonic level) are interpellated. Therefore, when it comes to the 
conceptualization of a German sprachgefühl migratized children are made unthinkable 
or unintelligible in the DAE material as potential protagonists that have a German 
sprachgefühl, whereas children that are statisized and can position themselves within a 
177 Cf. Nüssler lists Ayşe and Hasan as Turkish names (Nüssler 2002:58;195), whereas Thanh Tien is  
not even mentioned; however, one source in Nüssler recognizes Ahmed as German (Nüssler 
2002:25), whereas Ricardo is listed in five German sources (Nüssler 2002:357).
178 Deutsch als Erstsprache (‘als Erstsprache’ = silenced).
179 Cf. footnote 177.
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hegemonic system that only recognizes people and people’s names as unchangeably 
gendered as well as either ‘female’ or ‘male’ become accustomed to a learning 
environment that always provides opportunities for identification. As I will show in 
chapter 6 the idea of non-migratization as well as the assigned authority of ‘possessing’ a 
feel for language serve as a resource for collective identification that enables the 
development of positive feelings for hegemonic German language use. Statisized trans 
and gender non-conform children that do not want to or can be positioned as cis-binary-
gendered are also made unthinkable as protagonists but not necessarily as not having a 
non-migratized German sprachgefühl.
This example also shows how the German ‘sprachgefühl’ is negotiated as a feel that only 
statisized people have, since they ‘know’ or have a ‘command’ of German as a first 
language. The German language is closely linked to images of nationality and 
citizenship, as it is conceptualized and shown on several websites that offer information 
in different languages, such as the ‘official’ website of the city of Berlin, where the 
German language is associated with and depicted by an image of the German flag.180
The relationship between speakers, language, nationality and citizenship is also 
negotiated within German legislation (cf. chapter 3.2). Until the year 2000, German 
citizenship was only assigned through ius sanguinis – meaning that one could only 
acquire German citizenship through the civil status of one’s guardians or parents who 
had German citizenship, irrespective of birthplace. Since changing legislation in 1999, 
individuals without ties to a parent or guardian with German citizenship are also 
entitled to become naturalized German citizens as long as they have ‘sufficient’ or a ‘fair 
command’ of the German language (StAG, Deutscher Bundestag 1/01/2000: section 3 
paragraph 5, sections 8, 9 and 10). People that acquire German citizenship via ius 
sanguinis, however, do not need to prove their command of German. Given the fact that 
an explanation for this unequal treatment remains de_mentioned in legislation, this 
180 Cf. drop down manual “Sprache”: BerlinOnline Stadtportal GmbH & Co. KG n.d.. The fact that Ger-
man is not the only language spoken in Germany and that it is also spoken elsewhere is ignored. A 
similar nationalized connection is applied to website of the city of Graz (Magistratsdirektion - 
Abteilung für Öffentlichkeitsarbeit n.d.). The German language version of the website is depicted by 
an image of the Austrian flag, although here it interpellates more that German is also spoken in 
Austria and not just in Germany. Hence, there are various conceptualizations that are interpellated 
with the notion of ‘Germany’, ‘German’ and the ‘German language’ that are interdependent with 
images of citizenship and nationality.
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institutional regulation re_produces the nationalist idea to classify ‘ethnic groups’ and 
thereby privileges those that are considered German citizens in hegemonic discourse on 
the grounds of genetically asserted, reprogendered ‘family’ ties rather than through any 
other connection, such as community, or reason, such as statelessness, asylum, 
residence, – conceptualizations that only make sense because of the powerful 
re_production of nationality and citizenship (cf. chapter 3.2.2).
Given these strong links between the concepts of language, citizenship and nationality, 
the effects of this relationship need to be questioned. What is normalized when the 
nation and citizenship idea of a German sprachgefühl is re_produced as an underlying 
presupposition that is taken for granted and not defined in contexts where it is, for 
example, made the basis of a court decision that concerns questions of citizenship in the 
context of naming? To accept the concept of “sprachgefühl” as an authority for those 
that are hegemonically assigned L1 speakers and who are thus made to decide upon 
linguistic in- or exclusion seems to be so normalized that it often is de_mentioned and 
silenced. Linguistic knowledge as something that is shared by a depersonalized and 
homogenized group of people is one expression of this form of silenced presupposition 
that needs to be accepted in order to authorize the court’s statement that “[t]he 
assignment of a foreign name is only acceptable if the first name clearly reveals the 
child’s gender according to the German feel for language”181.
5.3 How to Feel a Name’s German Grammar
As mentioned in chapter 4.4, in 2006 German authorities rejected ‘Kiran’ as the first 
name for a child. One of the crucial arguments for the name’s rejection by a local court 
was that a ‘foreign’ first name would only be acceptable if the perception of the child’s 
gender via their name was in line with a so-called ‘German sprachgefühl’. This 
statement was supported by the Higher Regional Court that stated that Kiran “as a sole 
first name raises doubts about the gender of the child”182, thus ignoring that the name is 
181 Original: “Die Erteilung eines ausländischen Vornamens sei nur dann zulässig, wenn der Vorname 
das Geschlecht des Kindes nach deutschem Sprachgefühl eindeutig erkennen lasse“ Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008, translated by EH).
182 Original: “als alleiniger Vorname lasse der Name Zweifel über das Geschlecht des Kindes aufkom-
men” (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008, translated by EH).
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conventionally used in a non-Western context that negotiates the idea of gendering 
people differently. Although the authorities did not specify what they meant by ‘feel for 
language’, it is implied that there must be a commonly known and (hegemonically) 
shared set of criteria that defines this ‘feel’. Hence, what criteria does this consist of?
Implying that the online Wiktionary of Wikipedia provides a conventionalized meaning, 
sprachgefühl (a notion that is also supposed to be used in English speaking 
environments though rarely) is negotiated as “the instinctive or intuitive grasp of the 
natural idiom of a language” (Wiktionary 2016). Therefore, it is conceptualized as 
something that comes from within or something that comes ‘naturally’. As discussed 
above, using the German sprachgefühl argument implies that Kiran’s parents do not 
have or respect this particular feel for the German language and hence do not ‘possess’ 
the ‘intuition’ or re_produce the knowledge of how to name a child accordingly. Despite 
the lack of definition, the authorities and courts could make use of the migratist 
sprachgefühl argument to dismiss the suggested name. As the re_production of 
migratist knowledge in this case is made intelligible as a valuable argument, 
sprachgefühl is also negotiated as something that either cannot be learned by the 
parents or does not want to be learned (despite the fact that one of them actually had 
German citizenship). If Kiran was thus considered a name that could not easily be 
gendered according to a Germanized sprachgefühl, which names are and why?
Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court took the final decision by approving Kiran as a 
possible binary-genderable name for both ‘girls’ and ‘boys’ and provides some clues on 
how a ‘German sprachgefühl’ can be negotiated and how names can be gendered on the 
basis of the ‘German sprachgefühl’.
The first clue is provided by an argumentation that supported the rejection of Kiran as a  
personal name for a girl-identified newborn:
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“In German language use, first names that end with ‘an’ signify persons of male 
gender, for example Christian, Florian, Julian, Jonathan, Kilian, Maximilian, 
Sebastian, Stefan, Tristan.”183
Identifying a name’s ‘gender’ grammatically through endings or morphemes is in line 
with traditional onomastic research, such as Seibicke’s “Die Personennamen im 
Deutschen” (Seibicke 2008), which classifies names as first names, as German as well as 
‘gender’- (or rather ‘genus’-) specific. Seibicke names several endings that 
conventionally are considered as interpellating cis-binary gendering: -borg, -tr(a)ud 
a n d -ina are considered ‘female’, and -bert, -mund, -(i)us184 are considered ‘male’. 
However when it comes to endings that do not provide any of the previously mentioned 
genderable markers or that are ‘shared’, such as -mut and -wig in ‘female’-considered 
(Almut, Hedwig) or ‘male’-considered names (Helmut, Ludwig), Seibicke suggests
“that ‘one knows’ what gender the respective name usually is for. Such a name is 
firmly rooted in the language possession of German speakers as either a male or a 
female first name because of its obvious connection to related name forms and/or 
simply through its use (convention).” (Seibicke 2008:106)185
Therefore, Seibicke implicitly provides a conceptualization of the ‘German sprachgefühl’ 
that is contrary to the suggested naturalized ‘instinct’ and ‘intuition’ above: grammatical 
structuralization and conventionalization. By use of the notion ‘grammatical  
structuralization’ I imagine here a linguistic systematization that negotiates language as 
a structured set of rules and relations (cf. Hayn 2011; Hayn 2015). This set of rules and 
relations can be acquired through learning and conventionalizing, whereby it provides 
the means to understand the notion of sprachgefühl as an internally residing affect and 
emotion (cf. chapter 5.2).
183 Original: “Im deutschen Sprachgebrauch bezeichneten Vornamen mit der Endsilbe ‘an’ eher Perso-
nen männlichen Geschlechts wie zum Beispiel Christian, Florian, Julian, Jonathan, Kilian, Maxim-
ilian, Sebastian, Stefan, Tristan.“ (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008, translated 
by EH).
184 Considered as a ‘loan’ suffix from Latin.
185 Original: “dass ‘man weiß’, auf welches Geschlecht der betreffende Name gewöhnlich angewendet 
wird. Ein solcher Name ist aufgrund seiner durchschaubaren Beziehung zu verwandten Na-
mensformen und/oder einfach durch Gebrauch (Konvention) fest als männlicher oder weiblicher 
Vorname im Sprachbesitz deutscher Sprecher verankert.“ (Seibicke 2008:106, translated by EH).
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The ‘Germanization’ of sprachgefühl becomes evident in an argumentation that was 
provided on behalf of the parents and that led to the complaint of unconstitutionality: 
The hegemonic grammatical argument that, according to German language use, first 
names ending with -an are usually given to ‘male’ identified persons was not convincing: 
“[E]ven within the German language framework ‘female’ identified first names that end 
with -an are not that seldom: Lilian, Arian, Aslihan, Bahan, Nalan, Nuran, Susan, 
Selcan.”186
These examples challenge the migratist and genderist conceptualization of first names 
in a German-speaking environment provided by the German authorities. Authorities 
had previously de_mentioned names which, according to, for example, Seibicke, would 
not be classified as ‘German’ or ‘Germanic’ but rather as loan names or ‘foreign’ 
(Seibicke 2008:107–112). It is interesting to note that Seibicke himself is not so sure 
about the pragmatic differentiation between ‘German’ and ‘foreign’ names, since the use 
of certain ‘loan names’ had became so ‘naturalized’ in Germany that they were barely 
recognized as loans and “mostly only by linguists”, he concludes (Seibicke 2008:109).187 
Also, many ‘German’ names such as “Arbogast, Erkenbald, Swidger, Roswitha, 
Kunigunde, Aleit” are considered more foreign than such names such “Hans, Paul, 
Peter, Grete, Bärbel, Marei, Stefan, Thomas und Christine” (Seibicke 2008:109). 
Nevertheless, those non-foreign ‘German’ names are still considered as ‘German’ and 
the listing of the latter names shows that Seibicke’s thesis only applies to a certain set of 
names that pass as ‘German’ or ‘non-foreign’.
The distinction he tries to make between ‘foreign’ and ‘German’ is based on the idea to 
ascribe names an etymological ‘origin’. The concept of ‘origin’ supports, maintains and 
re_produces the nationalization of names, thus excluding migratized people’s names 
from being perceived and negotiated as ‘German’. Interestingly, Seibicke’s concept of 
‘foreign’ here only comprises names which today would be considered as well known 
186 Original: “Aber selbst im deutschen Sprachrahmen seien weibliche Vornamen mit der Endung ‘an’ 
nicht selten: Lilian, Arian, Aslihan, Behan, Nalan, Nuran, Susan, Selcan“ (Bundesverfassungs-
gericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008, translated by EH).
187 Original: “Viele der entlehnten Namen haben sich im Laufe der Zeit so fest eingebürgert und sind 
auch in den Mundarten so umgestaltet und den heimischen Namen angepasst worden, dass sie 
nicht mehr als fremd empfunden werden und dass oft nur noch der Sprachwissenschaftler ihre 
Herkunft anzugeben vermag” (Seibicke 2008:109, translated by EH).
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and broadly used as ‘German’. According to Nüssler (2002), Hans, Paul, Peter, Grete, 
Bärbel, Marei, Stefan, Thomas and Christine are all recognized as first (genderable) 
names in the German language community with Hans, Peter, Thomas, Stefan, Paul and 
Christine ranking among the most popular since 1890 (Bielefeld n.d.a; Bielefeld n.d.c), 
and Hans used as a prototypical name for a statisized cis-male German by the Turkish-
German community (cf. Akyün 2007:8; 136-151, cf. chapter 1.3.1).
 
5.4 How to Feel a Name’s Swedish Grammar
A similar approach towards ‘feeling a name’s grammar’ can be applied in the Swedish 
context. With the institutionalization of personal names at the legal level, a hegemonic 
understanding of ‘feel for language’ is constantly authorized and re_produced. 
Retrospectively, Brylla comments on the concept as follows, referring to the 
introduction of the legislation on personal names in 1963 that should, among others, 
regulate the changing of last names. At the time,
“[o]ne should build on the name creation opportunities offered by the then existing 
system and connect the names with the Swedish feel for language. However, the 
feel for language has been subject to constant displacements. The year after, a new 
name reference book was published, in which a large number of empty prefixes,  
generated by computer, were suggested. Henceforth, there has existed a basically 
free combination of acceptable phonetic sequences in the prefixes and prevalent 
elements as suffixes. This is an example of the displacements of the feel for 
language that had principally been initiated by Jöran Sahlgren's name reference 
books of 1939 and 1940 in which place name elements were suggested.”188
As Brylla states, it becomes obvious that a ‘feel for language’ is not a fixed unchangeable 
conceptualization. Rather, it seems to be subject to constant shifts that depend on how 
188 Original: “Man skulle bygga på de namnbildningsmöjligheter som det dåvarande systemet erbjöd 
och dessutom ansluta namnen till svensk språkkänsla. Språkkänslan undergår emellertid ständiga 
förskjutningar. Året efter utkom åter en ny namnförslagsbok, där en stor mängd förslag med in-
nehållslösa förleder framtagna med datorns hjälp finns. Från och med nu förekommer en i princip 
fri kombination av godtagbara ljudföljder i förlederna och gängse element som slutleder. Detta är 
exempel på förskjutning av språkkänslan som i princip hade påbörjats i Jöran Sahlgrens namn-
förslagsböcker från 1939 och 1940, där förslagen bestod av ortnamnselement.” (Brylla 2009:58–59, 
translated by EH).
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språkkänslan is defined by a given authority. With the 1963 name law, Swedish 
authorities aimed at providing a legal foundation to change last names, thus ‘allowing’ 
already accustomed ‘non-Swedish’ linguistic elements to become a part of the Swedish 
grammar/language: “New family names should, with regard to word formation, 
pronunciation and spelling, comply ‘with native language use’. The wording was also 
supposed to cover Finnish and Sami family naming norms” (Brylla 2013:137).189
Thus, also in the Swedish context, the feel for language has been closely linked to 
conventionalized Swedish grammar which can be described phonologically and 
morphologically as “acceptable phonetic sequences in the prefixes and prevalent 
elements as suffixes” (Brylla 2009:58–59)190. Furthermore, as described for the German 
linguistic context above, some ‘non-Swedish’ names seem to have been already adapted 
and ‘included in’ the Swedish feel for language. Brylla identifies some of those 
morphemes as German, English, Italian as well as Slavic (Brylla 2009:96). However, as I 
will show in the following, not all of them are accepted in the Swedish hegemonic 
linguistic environment in the same way.
Until 2017, the Swedish Patent and Registration Office, Patent- och Registreringsverket 
(PRV), had authority to decide whether or not a ‘newly created’ last name is acceptable 
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e S w e d i s h n a m e l a w o f 1 9 8 2 , Namnlag (1982:670) 
(Justitiedepartementet L7 2001), thus enabling a name to be changed. It specified its 
understanding of how a ‘new’ surname should look by help of an e-service (e-tjänst) that 
offered a variety of different pre- and suffixes for the creation of the new name (Patent- 
och Registreringsverket n.d.a). The suggestions made follow a conventionalized 
perception of Swedisized surnames: For example, it suggests choosing a name that 
consists of a prefix such as Lind- or Borg- (Patent- och Registreringsverket n.d.c) and a 
suffix such as -kvist or -ström (Patent- och Registreringsverket n.d.b) which 
conventionally would be hegemonically recognized and negotiated as ‘Swedish’. 
However, it is important to note that those morphemes that Brylla identified as ‘Slavic’  
189 Original: “Nya släktnamn skulle till bildning, uttal och stavning överensstämma ‘med inhemskt 
språkbruk’. Formuleringen var tänkt att täcka även finskt och samiskt släktnamnsskick.” (Brylla 
2013:137, translated by EH).
190 Original: “godtagbara ljudföljder i förlederna och gängse element som slutleder” (Brylla 2009:58–
59, translated by EH).
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and ‘Italian’ (-ow, -ski, -witz as well as -andi, -ano, -ato, -ino, -iro, -oni, -ono) are not 
listed among PRV’s suggestions, whereas identical or assimilated morphemes of its 
German (-feldt, -stedt, -heim) examples can be found (-fält, -stedt, -hem) (Brylla 
2009:96). In this way, only older German identified morphemes are actually 
accustomed in such a way that they became intelligible as ‘Swedish’. Thus, if a person 
created a surname with the help of the PRV-service, it was most likely negotiable as 
Swedish, since the tool only offered a set of morphemes which are hegemonically 
accustomed as Swedish. A person who wanted to change their surname to Åsalm, which 
consists of affix suggestions Ås- and -alm, simply needed to have the name checked by 
the PRV to find out whether it is already taken by someone that has the right or is 
entitled to bear that name. This complied with the name law, Namnlag (1982:670), 
according to which a newly created name must not have to be already registered in 
Swedish municipalities nor must it be a “commonly known” last name from abroad or 
from an extinct family (Namnlag (1982:670), Justitiedepartementet L2 1/03/2012: 
article 13).
The phrase “commonly known” was not further defined by PRV, thus making it possible 
to reject, for example, the ‘foreign’ name Donadoni191 and left open the question of who 
decides which names should be ‘commonly’ available. In this way, those ‘new’ names 
might sooner or later easily be negotiated as conventional Swedish surnames, thus 
silencing and excluding names from the feel for the Swedish language that are 
hegemonically negotiated as non-Swedish. In this way, migratized Swedes are only 
offered a set of non-migratizable morphemes they are forced to identify with and thus 
forced to dis-identify with migratized name affixes.
The refusal to acknowledge migratizable name spellings and name pronunciations as 
Swedish is confirmed by a poll that the Namnlagskommittén tasked to Statistics Sweden 
(SCB) in 2012 in order to assess people’s attitudes towards the changes in the new 
Swedish naming law. The questions can be identified as biased and discriminatory, as 
they negotiated spelling and pronunciation already as non-Swedish and, with regard to 
the examples used (for example Qroqhztrömm, Razafindrandriatsaimaniry, 
191 According to PRV, Donadoni is supposed to be “ett allmänt känt utländskt efternamn” (Patent- och 
Registreringsverket n.d.d).
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Xenogiannakopoulidis), also migratized (cf. Namnlagskommittén 2013:Annex 4, p. 3). 
Namnlagskommittén’s explanation of the results in this case is particularly interesting 
because it tells something about the hegemonic de_perception of discriminatory naming 
practices. It assumed that the questions may have been ‘misunderstood’ and migratized 
people might have been given the impression that their own names were questioned to 
be acceptable in Sweden. The committee admitted that the query might not have been 
clear enough in distinguishing between already existing and newly created names to be 
accepted (cf. Namnlagskommittén 2013:249–250). However, this acknowledgement 
does not contribute to explaining the case, as it still re_produces the idea that newly 
created migratizable names that do not or are not known to exist in Sweden could be 
subject to rejection.
Simultaneously, it needs to be borne in mind that if non-migratized people assumed a 
name that consists of migratizable morphemes in order for them to benefit from a 
migratizable position (cf. footnote 227), this could then be regarded as an appropriation 
of a name and therefore a hegemonic ascription, which places the privileged in a fight 
that is not theirs.
5.5 Rational metaphors for emotive names
As personal names tend to refer to people first, those personal names that 
conventionally are negotiated as promoting an etymological explanation for people’s 
implied ‘nationality’ and ‘gender’ implicitly also support the discriminatory 
differentiation of people. In hegemonic discourse, ‘nationality’ is regarded from a 
national historical perspective: In this way, also those names will be negotiated as 
German that are identified as ‘Germanic’ (cf. Seibicke 2008). To identify an imagined, 
metaphoric and nationalizing and nationalized existence of ‘German(ic) roots’ or 
‘German(ic) family of languages’ during a time prior to the establishment of so-called 
nation states shows that ‘the national idea’ is a powerful hegemonic retroactive ex post 
invention (cf. Anderson 1983). Promoters of an etymological explanation for a 
nationality-based categorization attempt to differentiate and distinguish groups of 
people by using metaphors. A metaphor such as ‘family roots’ supports the 
sedimentation of ‘difference’ as a concept that is intrinsic and innate to people and 
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which, through its cis-binary-reprogenderist implications, abjectifies trans and gender 
non-conform people (cf. Fütty 2015). One either ‘belongs’ to a nation via family 
reprogendered ‘family’ relatedness and cis-binary performance or not. Additionally, the 
‘root’ metaphor implies the existence of a fixed location and/or territory. As Marianne 
Winther Jørgensen and Louise Phillips state, the constant re_production of this 
metaphor leads to exclusionary conceptualization (Winther Jørgensen, Phillips 1999). In 
this way, ‘nation’ can be regarded as a label for a group one is born into and/or for a  
territory one is rooted in. The idea of having an ‘age-long’ family history of being rooted 
in a specific location impedes or prevents ‘outsiders’ from migrating to and becoming a 
part of the settled community. This metaphor needs to be regarded as one of the central 
causes for the permanent exclusion of Roma people over the centuries (cf. chapter 
3.2.3.2.2). It is legally re_produced and confirmed by the implementation of ius 
sanguinis, ius soli and their mixed forms that are globally the most common principles 
to determine nationality and/or citizenship (cf. chapter 3.2).
With their work on metaphors, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson contributed to a 
pragma-cognitive understanding of language according to which daily interactions with 
the social and physical environment contest and shape people’s way to perceive the 
world (Lakoff, Johnson 2011:114):
“If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, 
then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much 
a matter of metaphor.” (Lakoff, Johnson 2011:130)
Lakoff and Johnson claim for hegemonic discourses in Western societies that metaphors 
can be regarded as means to grasp emotive experiences such as “feelings, aesthetic 
experiences, moral practices, and spiritual awareness” that are hegemonically 
conceptualized as subjective (Lakoff, Johnson 2011:114). In order to comply with the – 
as I would add – accustomed Western dogma of rationality, Lakoff and Johnson are 
convinced that metaphors can help to employ these experiences in “an imaginative 
rationality” (Lakoff, Johnson 2011:114). Applying this approach to the root metaphor 
above, feelings for an imagined nation and/or territory that from a universalizing, 
objectifying and neutralizing perspective (cf. chapters 1.2.1 1.2.2 and 1.2.3) would be 
regarded as emotive and subjective can be depersonalized and homogenized by 
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metaphors. In this way, metaphors appear as ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ knowledge that is 
shared in and authorized by hegemonic discourse.
However, the metaphorical conceptualization of what people experience is not detached 
from the impact of power relations and thus people’s different social positioning. What 
might be true for people that are privileged through hegemonic discourse is mostly 
contested for people whose knowledge about the oppressive nature of societal and 
cognitive structures does not comply with hegemonically shared experiences. Hence, as 
Kilomba (2010b) has shown regarding the racist constitution of German society, anti-
racist knowledge that is based on experience is denied validity. Kilomba demonstrates 
that these concepts are myths (cf. chapter 1.2) that persist in hegemonic discourse. Yet, 
only when knowledge, social practices or artifacts from groups that are discriminated in 
and by hegemonic discourse are appropriated, can they turn into matters of hegemonic 
discourse. In this way, they symbolize hegemonic conquest which can lead to hegemonic 
acceptance and use of these artifacts after a period of accustoming.
For example, at the time anti-Semitic guidelines on forced names were introduced by 
the Nazi regime, gentiles had already been using many names that traditionally names 
that traditionally have been negotiated as Jewish. In order to distinguish Jews from 
‘Aryans’, Nazi legislation enforced Jews to bear a second name; Sara for womanisized 
people and Israel for ‘males’. These names should mark them as Jewish, thus denying 
Jews the right to bear their traditional biblical names (cf. chapter 6.2.2.3). In this way, 
Sara and Israel were assigned a metaphorical anti-Semitic meaning.
I remember an anti-Semitic episode in my Catholic family in the early 1990s, when my 
younger cousin was born and their parents wondered whether they should call her 
‘Sarah’. Some family members objected to the name because it reminded them of a 
pejorative expression in which it was used in my regional vernacular. I remember that 
while growing up, I never fully understood what /za:ra:/ meant when used in that 
expression and why, only that it metaphorically meant someone that I should not be. 
Thus, it was only on the day my cousin was born that I finally realized the anti-Semitic 
meaning of the reason for not naming my cousin ‘Sarah’: The name interpellated ‘the 
unwanted’ as conceptualized by Nazi legislation. However, since the 1970s, Sarah and 
the variation Sara have become increasingly popular in Germany and ranked number 
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one in the year my cousin was born (Bielefeld n.d.b). Thus, it needs to be questioned to 
which extent, and where, the anti-Semitic metaphor of the name is still interpellated. On 
the grounds of its popularity it seems that after being appropriated by hegemonic 
discourse, the formerly racialized name is increasingly and broadly negotiated as ius  
sanguinis German. In this way, appropriation can affect and influence the 
conceptualization of the German sprachgefühl.
Additionally, names understood as being an integral part of languages that are 
hegemonically conceptualized as ‘related’ (another family metaphor used in traditional 
linguistics), such as Swedish and German, are more likely to be included in the imagined 
inventory of names of those nationalized languages and can be connected to and 
identified by a German sprachgefühl as non-migratized. I do not deny that names or 
languages can actually be perceived and negotiated as different, and that both names 
and languages usually need to be acquired and learned. What I would like to question 
and challenge here is how differences are negotiated, hierarchized and valuated. To 
metaphorize and group languages as related to each other by use of labels such as 
‘language families’ as it is done in the field of linguistics results in these languages being 
conceptualized as closer to each other. Against the background of a hegemonic 
understanding of ‘family’, emotive concepts such as closeness, trust and familiarity are 
interpellated. In this way, names ‘from’ ‘related’ languages can be conceptualized as 
non-foreign or familiar.
Other ways of how names that are not considered ‘German(ic)’ are made historically 
intelligible as non-foreign in Germany can be explained by their normalization through 
social conventionalization. Hence, what Seibicke negotiated as ‘foreign names’ are 
basically names that are intelligible as ‘familiar’ (cf. above). This conflicts with Seibicke’s 
second association of ‘foreign’ that he later re_produces in an attempt to define the 
‘loaning’ of names. Seibicke states that first names that are conventionally identified as 
‘Turkish’, ‘Greek’, ‘Albanian’ and ‘Yugoslavian’ were barely used for children of statisized 
parents. He concludes that actual personal or linguistic contact would not deliver a 
satisfying explanation to motivate the loaning of names (Seibicke 2008:112) – or as I 
would say – conceptualizing a name as ius sanguinis German. The explanation Seibicke 
provides focuses on the ascribed societal position of the people and not on the migratist  
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conditions migratized people are forced to live with in Germany. Hence, the source of 
discrimination and ‘Otherness’ is conceptualized as lying with migratized people and not 
as a consequence of the hegemonic discourse which invented ‘Otherness’ as non-
statisizable and which Seibicke re_produces. The idea of ‘the Other’ implies the 
existence of a statisized norm which is re_produced and homogenized by ideas such as 
the German sprachgefühl. Grammaticalization, structuralization and standardization 
construct and control the distinction between migratizable and statisizable names. 
Consequently, I argue that as soon as names are negotiated as ‘loan names’ (cf. Seibicke 
2008:107–112), they become negotiable as statisizable names.
 
5.6 Summary
The perception and negotiation of a name that complies with the idea of a German or 
Swedish feel for language and the feel for language as an argument in a court of law to 
justify rejection of a migratizable name depend on a set of presuppositions that need to 
be accepted as truths: for example, that a name can be regarded as part of a nationalized 
language system and that the binary gender system is taken for granted and regarded as 
a necessity for a person’s successful socialization. The presupposed existence and 
necessity of these systems to categorize language and people are fundamental for the 
structuralist ‘grammaticalization’ of names. By silencing the presence and impact of 
power relations on personal names, naming processes are de_perceived as processes 
that ascribe identities to names and thus persons. Thus, it becomes possible to claim 
that names as well as people ‘are’ German or Swedish, are ‘female’ or ‘male’. 
Accustoming this categorical structuralist knowledge enables the myth of a feel for 
language as decisive for the categorization of names to become intelligible, despite the 
fact that this ‘sprachgefühl’ is neither neutral nor complementary with hegemonic 
linguistic understanding: As demonstrated, some of the names that are migratized 
comply with the phonotactic rules of German grammar. Linguistic Othering is 
re_produced despite the fact that a historic comparison on the intelligibility of names 
being read as German shows that the linguistic framework is flexible enough to include 
names that previously were not that common in the hegemonic German linguistic 
community.
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Given that migratized names such as Kiran, Thanh Tien, Ahmed, Ayşe, Hasan and 
Ricardo have existed in the German language community for quite a while leads to the 
conclusion that apparently, only some names are chosen for Germanification and 
conventionalization by hegemonic discourse, while other names remain excluded. To 
explain this exclusion with a feel for language that is shared by L1 speakers means 
denying L2 speakers the chance to develop the same ‘sprachgefühl’. As the exclusion 
from both Germanification as well as Swedification concerns migratizable names, it  
seems likely that the feel for language is particularly denied migratized L2 speakers.
As demonstrated in both the German and Swedish context, a feel for language can be 
understood as a form of accustomed and internalized knowledge that only appears to be 
‘natural’ or ‘intuitive’: a knowledge of how to distinguish languages and people as well as 
how to feel about the groups of people that were separated from one another by way of 
structuralist distinction. The feel for names and their linguistic in- or exclusion by 
hegemonic discourse can go so far as to identify names metaphorically as 
representations of either the own or the unwanted Other. A personal name that is 
metaphorically conceptualized as linguistically ‘related’ to a language can invoke 
emotive aspects of closeness and familiarity, for example so-called ‘Germanic’ names in 
the Swedish and German hegemonic discourse, whereas a name that is perceived and 
constructed as ‘unrelated’ can interpellate emotive pejorization. In this way, the feel for 
a language, for a grammatical expression or for a name is an accustomed normative 
practice that has taught people how to feel about themselves as well as about ‘the Other’ 
and is thus never neutral but constituted by power relations.
In comparison, Swedish discourse on the Swedish grammar of names appears to focus 
more on the extent to which last names can be read as Swedish and less on how first 
names should be chosen. This opens up the question of what a last name interpellates 
and represents in hegemonic discourse and in comparison, to a first name. This will be  
discussed in the following chapter against the question how personhood is defined and 
denied through hegemonic naming practices.
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6.Naming  Me,  Naming  You?  Becoming  a  Person: the  Personal, 
the Collective and Their Name(s)
In the  movie “Nothing  personal” the  protagonist,  a solitarywhite  ableized cis-
womanisized person leaves her previous life behind to walk around Ireland. One day on 
the road, she is asked her name but refuses to tel it.
“Where’re you going?”
“I’m just going.”
[..]
“Why don’t you stay ‘n’ work for me? You can leave any time you want.”
“That’s right.”
“I won’t ask you anything and I won’t talk about myself.”
“Okay, deal.”
“Just – one question: What’s your name?”
“What do you need my name for?”
“It might come in handy. I might wanna cal you something.”
“If you wanna cal me, you can just cal me you.”
(Antoniak 2009:00:16:00–00:16:31)
Later in the  movie it is revealed that this refusal to tel  her  name  was  a refusal to tel 
anything  personal  at  al. In this  way,  while the  protagonist refuses to tel  anything 
personal about herself, the omission and silencing of one’s name can be considered as a 
form  of self-depersonalization:  A  person  without  a  name is (a)  nobody.  By remaining 
nameless, she  does  not  accomplish the  hegemonic  norm  according to  which it is 
expected that  people share such  personal information  as  her  name.  The  normalized 
expectation towards  a  person in  order to  be recognized is that  every  person  has  a 
personal name.
In Marica Bodrožić’s novelKirschholz und alte Gefühle, her protagonist makes a similar 
statement. She reminds the reader that humans have a name:
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“Life always had a face. A name. Was a human.” 192
Further in the  novel,  Bodrožić  describes  how the  protagonist realizes that  as  a child 
growing  up in  Europe, she conventionaly  experienced the  presence  of  her  name  as 
something  natural  and  antecedent, just like linguistic structures  and  hegemonic 
knowledge she becomes accustomed to (cf. chapter 2.2).
“At the age of three, I thought that my name begins withAra  and  ends  withlove, 
that al these words are one name, my name given to me by nature, and that I am 
al that what the single words say.”193
She  also refers to the  belief that  a  name individualizes  a  person  and  makes  everyone 
someone unique:
“I came  across  old  diaries,  photo  albums  and  address  books. [..]  While scroling 
around, I  also came  across  old  phone  numbers  of  Hiromi  and  Nadeshda. [..] I 
wonder what exactly an individual is worth when we al disappear at a certain point 
in time in the crowd of names, numbers and addresses. Or is this just an option to 
escape one’s own interchangeability?”194
Both the  examples from the  movie  and from the  novel show  how  a  personal  name 
confirms  personhood.  Or in  other  words, it  equates the  presence  of  a  personal  name 
with personhood and individuality by presupposing that people have names. However, 
the  expectations  and implications  generated from these introductory  quotations 
interpelate  hegemonic conceptualizations  of  personhood  which  people  need to relate 
and re_act to, in both the movie as wel as the novel.
192 Original: “Das Leben hatte immer ein Gesicht. Einen Namen. War ein Mensch.” (Bodrožić 2014:25, 
translated by EH).
193 Original: “Im Alter von drei Jahren dachte ich, dass mein Name mit Ara beginnt und mit Liebes en-
det, dass al diese Wörter ein Name sind, mein mir von der Natur zugeteilter Name, und ich al das 
bin, was die einzelnen Wörter sagen.” (Bodrožić 2014:121, translated by EH).
194 Original: “Ich  bin auf alte Tagebücher, Fotoalben  und Adressbücher  gestoßen. […] Ich stieß beim 
Herumblättern  auch  auf  alte  Telefonnummern  von  Hiromi  und  Nadeshda. [..] Ich frage  mich, 
worin genau der Wert von einem Einzelnen besteht, wenn wir doch ale ab einem bestimmten Zeit-
punkt in der Menge der Namen, Nummern und Adressen verschwinden. Oder ist das gerade eine 
Möglichkeit,  der  eigenen  Austauschbarkeit zu  entkommen?” (Bodrožić  2014:138, translated  by 
EH).
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As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the presence of power relations has an impact 
on people’s impressions and perceptions of personhood: Power relations constitute 
privileged as well as discriminatory images of humans by racializing, gendering, 
disabling and migratizing them and their personal names. The presence of a 
conventionally acceptable name enables registration, which is a prerequisite for the 
assignment of citizenship. Thus, a name does not only interpellate expectations about its 
presence and transfers an object into a subject, an unnamed living creature into a 
human being; it also provides access to civic rights and obligations such as working for a 
living. Only individuals with a subject status can have ID cards or passports, personal 
identity numbers, working contracts, families and other expressions of social regulation 
that symbolize the institutionalization and individualization of life.
This chapter discusses the implications of these name expectations interpellated by the 
quotations, as well as by the results of the previous chapters. First, I show how naming 
is based on legal and medical implications of personhood constituting Western 
hegemonic discourse by analyzing artistic discourse, in addition to academic, popular 
scientific educational, juridical and governmental discourses. A person whose 
personhood status is recognized by hegemonic legal and medical discourse must have a 
name. Thus, the idea of a nameless person does not exist, is not intelligible. In other 
words, only a name enables a person to become and be recognized as a person. Thus, if a 
person’s name is withdrawn and replaced, for example, by numbers or injurious names, 
they might be denied personhood in hegemonic discourse. Integrating artistic discourse 
enables to approach how initial and self-determined naming practices are expressed and 
experienced in counter-hegemonic discourses.
Secondly, based on these accustomed as well as institutionalized practices, I use nearly 
all discourse areas to analyze how hegemonic naming practices deny people personal 
rights and personhood, resulting in effects such as
• silencing of re_traumatization triggered by injurious names (Benson 2006) that 
were imposed as slave names, or by names of historical figures that caused pain 
and harm to specific groups of people and that have a symbolic effect;
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• enforced name change as assignment for ownership, as a tool for selection, as the 
marking of the other and as a form of assimilation;
• anonymization through the silencing of people’s initial names leading to the 
objectification and dehumanization of people and possibly also to genocide.
These effects are only distinguished on the grounds of analytic reasons. They do 
intersect with each other and need to be regarded as interdependent, i.e. mutually 
constituting and determining. The material consists of knowledge productions that 
addresses or had been produced in situations when these effects came into force.
6.1 Defining Personhood: Hegemonic Implications on Naming
When I ask myself whether I actually know a person who does not have a name or lives 
without a name, I have to admit that I actually never thought about it. I do expect  
everyone to have a name, a first name that this person has had since birth, and a last 
name that this person might have changed in the context of a heterogendered marriage. 
In the hegemonic Western contexts I live and grew up in, a person’s name is usually the 
first information one exchanges with someone one does not know. But why do people 
who participate in hegemonic Western discourse want to know this information about a 
person? Why do I assume that a person has a personal name which everybody is entitled 
to have access to? Why do I regard this exchange of information as a practice that I,  
from a privileged point of view, conceptualize as given and unproblematic, something 
everyone can or wants to share?
I may answer “because I am used to it” or “because this is how it’s done” based on 
accustomed knowledge about the role of names in Western societies. However, with 
these questions I attempt to re_focus on the fact that since personal names are 
negotiated as playing a central role in people’s lives, the presence as well as absence of  
names are based upon the hegemonic perception of an individual person’s personhood: 
From the very moment a human is recognized as a person by legal as well as medical  
discourse, they needs to have a personal name.
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In Germany, the recognition process is monitored and regulated on an institutionalized 
level through the Law on Civil Status, Personenstandsgesetz (PStG). By defining the 
moment when an unborn child can be acknowledged as a (civic) person, the PStG links 
naming to the official recognition of a human being as a person at an institutionalized 
level. If a fetus dies at a weight below 500 grams, it is not recognized as a person that 
needs to be registered, i.e. named. In this case, the dead fetus is negotiated as a 
‘miscarriage’. However, if they was alive but born too soon and died afterwards, then it 
is recognized as a ‘stillbirth’, which means it needs to be registered by name as well as 
gender (PStV, Bundesministerium des Inneren 2015: article 31). Hence, weight and 
signs of life serve as indicators of whether a fetus is negotiated as a person or not. The 
recognition as a person is then institutionally confirmed at the registry offices by 
attributing both name and gender to the child. The moment an unborn child is 
institutionally recognized as a person is interdependent with the moment an unborn 
child is recognized as a human by their parents or other people in whose company the 
child would live. In this way, the differentiation between miscarriage and stillbirth is not 
only a medical and legislative but also a cultural and ethical distinction that constitutes 
personhood and that, consequently, affects the concept of mourning.
6.1.1 One biological and one social birth?
For her study on how members of pregnancy support groups in the USA, mostly 
consisting of white, middle-class Catholics, Protestants and Jews, deal with miscarriage, 
Layne applies the distinction between the social and biological birth of a human being 
found in hegemonic USAmerican anthropological discourse and links this 
differentiation to naming practices (cf. Layne 2006:34–35). In this context, naming is 
seen as crucial for the recognition of an unborn child as a person one can think of and 
talk about:
“Social birth has been decoupled from biological birth, made manifest by the fact 
that fetuses are frequently being named during pregnancy. At the same time, new 
laws reflecting the increasing importance of fetal personhood are enabling stillborn 
infants to be named months after their birth/death.” (Layne 2006:32)
A child’s initial naming can be negotiated as the child’s social birth. According to Layne’s 
findings, parental bonding with their child seems to be initiated by naming them. Thus,  
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naming has not only symbolic significance; the results of Layne’s study show that 
naming has an impact on whether or not the dead child is assigned personhood as well 
as affection. Some reports seem to prove that naming makes parents become more 
attached to the lost child (Layne 2006:42–43). In order to avoid being reminded of their 
loss, other parents chose not to name their children. However, this could also change 
months or years after the child’s death: Naming would then help to facilitate mourning 
(Layne 2006:35–36). A deceased child with a name enables grieving, whereas a child 
without a name would be impossible to mourn. These examples show that naming 
indeed plays an important role for the social as well as emotional identification and 
perception of a person, born or unborn. The social world attributes feelings for the 
person and identifies them as someone to communicate with or to talk about (cf. chapter 
5.2). In this way, naming can also serve as a means to personalize a child beyond 
medical and juridical recognition, turning a ‘nobody’ into ‘somebody’ (Layne 2006:49; 
Nübling et al. 2012:183) and making the child’s social birth and death intelligible as 
events that happened to ‘somebody’ and not to ‘nobody’.
Following Nübling, Fahlbusch & Heuser’s summary of Layne’s observations, social birth 
can further be negotiated as an event that “is always affected by [a person’s] naming and 
can take place some time following the biological birth” (Nübling et al. 2012:183)195. 
Thus, naming can be delayed for a person that has already been born but still lives 
without a name, for example, children whose parents have not taken a decision on their 
name yet196. Another example is preterm naming. Guardians or parents apply it to a 
person that is not yet born but is already named. Coming out as trans*_genderqueer is 
sometimes accompanied by name change and can also initiate social birth and thus be 
empowering. Jayrôme C. Robinet uses the metaphor of (social) birth in his monologue 
play in which the protagonist reflects on his trans coming out while on the way to his  
parents:
“Tomorrow is my birthday, you know? yes
no, of course you don’t know and even my parents have no idea
195 Original: “erfolgt immer mit seiner Benennung und kann zeitlich von der biologischen Geburt ent-
fernt sein.“ (Nübling et al. 2012:183, translated by EH).
196 PStG article 22, paragraph 1 requires a first name one month after the child’s biological birth 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1/01/2009: article 22, paragraph 1).
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my parents do not even know that they don’t know
[...]
Tomorrow I turn one vraiment
Tomorrow is my first birthday
Tomorrow [...] it will be exactly 365 days ago that I had a second birth, let’s call it  
that way
Tomorrow, exactly one year ago, I [...] chose a new first name”.197
AK ProNa also quotes a text from a person who had changed their previous first names, 
E. and S., to Robin. In the text, the new name does not only signal the person’s social  
birth but also brings the person themselves to life and marks the death of E. and S. This  
is why E. and S. are not spelled out in the text, as explained by AK ProNa:
“Robin turned one yesterday
Robin has 2 siblings
E. and S.
Both have turned 20 last year
And then died for me
Just before Robin's birth
[...]
Robin can only really be here
When E. and S. disappear
Not just for me
But also for the university,
for my parents
and for you.
197 Original: “[M]orgen ist mein Geburtstag, wissen Sie? ja
nein, natürlich wissen Sie es nicht und meine Eltern auch nicht sie haben keine Ahnung
meine Eltern wissen nicht einmal, dass sie das nicht wissen
[…]
morgen werde ich eins vraiment
morgen ist mein erster Geburtstag
morgen […] wird es genau 365 Tage her sein, dass ich eine zweite Geburt erlebte nennen wir das  
mal so
morgen ist es exakt ein Jahr her, das ich mir […] meinen neuen Vornamen ausgewählt […] habe”
(Robinet 2015:88–90, translated by EH).
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I'm sorry.
But if you want to get to know
E. and S.
then without me.”198
In both examples, social birth is emphasized by the change of name. It can also be 
symbolized by the choice of name, for example ‘Renée’, which can also be translated 
from the French as ‘reborn’ (cf. Alford 1988:159). These examples show that, unlike 
‘biological birth’, social birth could potentially take place multiple times, as also 
illustrated in the following citation:
“There were nights that stretched past morning, but I knew if I could make it to 
sunrise, on the wall of the youth center would be hanging a white board that said:
Old name   New Name    Pronoun
Everyone knew to check it every day, because in our world, today’s new name could 
be tomorrow’s old news […] We were giving birth to our own lives, naming 
ourselves out of baby books or rebirthing ourselves with names that came to us, 
soaked and cold from a Portland rainstorm.” (Lowrey 2010:199–200)
198 Original: “Robin ist gestern 1 Jahr alt geworden 
Robin hat 2 Geschwister
E. und S.
Beide sind letztes Jahr 20 geworden
Und dann für mich gestorben
Kurz vor Robins Geburt
[...]
Robin kann nur wirklich da sein
Wenn E. und S. verschwinden
Nicht nur für mich
Sondern auch für die Uni,
für meine Eltern
und für dich.
Es tut mir leid.
Aber wenn du E. und S.
kennenlernen magst,
dann ohne mich.”
(AK ProNa 2015:30, translated by EH).
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Nevertheless, identifying ‘coming out’ as ‘social birth’ is hegemonically not recognized in 
the same way as the delayed or preterm naming of children who cannot choose their 
initial names themselves. In Germany, the latter is still recognized as conforming with 
the norms, whereas the change of first names in particular is hegemonically not 
intelligible (cf. chapter 6.2.2.5).
As shown above, the definitions in hegemonic legal and medical discourse are 
negotiated as decisive for a person to be recognized as ‘being alive’ as well as ‘having 
lived’. Layne states that “‘social birth’ is modeled on ‘biological birth’” (Layne 2006:37), 
of which the latter is understood to be “a one-time event” (Layne 2006:38) since a baby 
can only be born once. However, ‘biological birth’ is not only preconditional for ‘social 
birth’; it is also constituted by hegemonic perceptions of personhood. In both Sweden 
and Germany, the Law on Population Registration (Folkbokföringslag) and the Law on 
Civil Status (PStG) insist on gendering newborn children by indicating gender during 
registration and – in the Swedish case – also with the so-called personal identity 
number (personnummer). The latter is defined as
“a uniform identifier for natural persons. [...] Every person listed in the civil 
registration records must have a personal identity number. [...] The only 
information that can be read from a personal identity number is the birth date and 
gender.”199
Thus, in both countries the indication of one (out of only two possible) juridical gender 
when registering a child is required that shall also be ‘reflected’ by the name or personal 
identity number, although there is no legal basis demanding this. Courts in both 
countries have disagreed on whether or not a person can have a name whose 
conventionalized use is not in line with the assigned juridical ‘birth gender’. For 
Germany, I already discussed the Kiran court case in chapter 4.4). In Sweden, the 
situation has slightly changed in the context of naming. In 2001, the Swedish 
administrative court of appeals rejected a trans-woman’s petition to change her name to 
one that is conventionally negotiated as gender-contrarian because it was against 
199 Original: “en enhetlig identitetsbeteckning för fysiska personer. [...] Varje person som är registr-
erad i folkbokföringen ska ha ett personnummer som identitetsbeteckning. […] De enda uppgifter 
som kan utläsas ur ett personnummer är födelsetid och kön.” (Skatteverket 2007:[1], translated by 
EH).
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“Swedish naming tradition” (RFSL 2001). Thus, the authorities forced the person to 
adopt a name that is conventionally recognized as ‘gender neutral’ although there is – as 
in Germany – no legal basis for that decision. In this way, the Swedish naming tradition 
prevented the person from having their self-defined ‘social birth’ recognized and 
confirmed by her self-chosen name. However, in 2009 the Swedish Supreme 
Administrative Court decided that people twelve years of age and older can change their 
name regardless of their ascribed juridical ‘birth gender’ (Transföreningen FPES). At the 
end of that same year, Skatteverket declared that anyone could have a gender-
contrarian name. People who wish to change their names may do so and parents have 
been assigned the sole responsibility for the choice of name for their newborn child (cf. 
chapter 4.6).
Nevertheless, despite these developments and other recent legal changes that tackle 
questions of genderization200, binary-gendering, the enforced normalized assignment to 
gender a person as either ‘female’ or ‘male’, remains the only possible way of reference 
and response to enforced gendering in terms of recognized person status in both 
countries. Thus, it can be stated that a person’s social birth through naming is still 
hegemonically linked to their biologized recognition: When negotiating ‘biological birth’ 
as a one-time event the idea of ‘social birth’ also happens usually only once in 
hegemonic discourse. Additionally, the initiation of a person’s first social birth by initial 
naming is not only implied in delayed or preterm naming of (unborn) children but also 
seems to be normalized in general. In Germany, the substantial201 changing of people’s 
‘official’ names is almost made impossible by law (cf. chapter 3.2.2.2). In this context, 
only parents or guardians are entitled to choose another person’s name; someone else 
than the very person themselves. Until recently, assigning oneself a pseudonym or a 
religious name was the only possible option to register oneself with a self-chosen name, 
200 Since 2013, in cases where children are defined as ‘intersex,’ no gender assignment is indicated in 
German registries, which leaves enforced ‘gender specification’ blank and leaves no other options  
(cf. chapter 6.2.2.5).
201 I am not talking here about the only way to change the own name without further explicit discrimi-
nation, namely on the grounds of graphemic-phonetical reasons: When a person’s name is fre-
quently misspelled. This, however, needs to be regarded as a form of state control, since the state  
must have an interest in the right spelling of a person’s name for identification reasons (cf. Bun-
desministerium des Inneren:sections 34–50).
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given that relevant proof of conventionalized use was provided.202 As mentioned in 
chapter 3.1.1, the implementation of the German naming legislation might be about to 
change. In 2015, two persons were allowed to change their names to gender-neutral  
names under NamÄndG (Abad 2015). As such, the role of the parents and guardians as 
the sole first name givers may change. People will be more empowered to constitute 
their own identity via their self-chosen name. Consequently, parents might lose the 
constituting powers over their child’s social life. And hegemonic expectations and 
presuppositions towards the right to a person’s initial name may be challenged, as I will 
discuss in the following subchapter.
6.1.2 Everyone has the right to a name. What right to what name?
To think that a ‘person’ has a name is not only an accustomed conventionalization. 
Bearing a name is also considered a personal right as expressed by the Swedish PRV:
“You have the right to create a surname by using your father’s or mother’s first 
name and adding -son, -sson or -dotter. The main rule is that male applicants can 
add the endings son or -sson and female applicants can add the endings -son, -sson 
or -dotter.” (Patent- och Registreringsverket n.d.h)
Although it initially seems that womanisized persons in Sweden have more ‘rights’ to 
choose among the patronymic or metronymic suffixes, the limited choice is nevertheless 
discriminatory against them. The fact that ‘male’ applicants cannot or should not add or 
have a name ending with -dotter (cf. Namnlagskommittén 2013:277) is an accustomed 
convention and continuity of womanisized people’s submission under a male-dominated 
household (cf. 6.2.2.1). In Germany, the right to a first name is a customary right 
(Fröschle 2008:29) and is supposed to be guaranteed by German Civil Code article 12 
(BGB, Deutscher Bundestag 31/05/2016: article 12). Thus, from a privileged position, it 
might be inconceivable to imagine any circumstances in which this right could be denied 
in modern Germany and Sweden, given the fact that naming apparently constitutes 
personhood. Rather, a name is considered as obligatory or necessary.
202 As a consequence of a new Personal ID Act in 2007; this option was, however, not accessible be-
tween 2007 and 2010 (cf. Deutscher Bundestag 27/07/2007, Deutscher Bundestag 24/06/2009).
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As already mentioned, when communicating with people I usually expect that they will 
be willing to introduce themselves by name in exchange for mine. In the hegemonic 
environments I grew up in, I became accustomed to expect that I will not only be 
entitled to know the other person’s name after I present mine; I also anticipate that the 
name I am told will usually be the initial name that was externally given to this person 
and that everyone has access to. Hence, I can say I am accustomed to this convention of  
name exchange: That every person only has one official name that was given to them 
after their birth. This is a norm that I had not questioned or challenged before I began 
my research on the perception of names. Nor did I differentiate that the negotiation of 
initial names depended on people’s social positioning, thus provoking different effects 
and consequences as well as different meanings and significance in different contexts. 
The right to a name is so normalized that I was even surprised to learn that citizens have 
that right. However, since naming explored in this research is assumed to be constituted 
by hegemonic discriminatory norms, this institutionalized right does not apply in the 
same way to everyone.
People who are discriminated against by genderism might choose to conceal their initial 
name. Although through NamÄndVwV German jurisdiction is aware that people might 
have been assigned names in a forceful way in contexts outside of German legislation 
and ‘admits’ changing the name (cf. NamÄndVwV, Bundesministerium des Inneren 
2014: sections 44a. and 64.), the relevant paragraph does not seem to apply to initial 
naming practices. Instead, it suggests (cf. NamÄndVwV, Bundesministerium des 
Inneren 2014: section 44) that this option may only be applied to ius sanguinis 
Germans that experienced an unwanted assignment of a new name under the legislation 
of another country in which they were registered.
People that are discriminated against by racism and migratism might conceal their self- 
or community-chosen name which is only intended to be used as community marker. 
Investigating and learning about these self-empowering practices from a privileged 
research perspective might be regarded as appropriating knowledge. What other 
purpose do they serve than that of possessing and controlling203 knowledge that is not 
203 Cf. also the withdrawal of a person’s name as a form of control. This was practiced in slavery and vi-
olently disrupted enslaved Black people’s family history by imposing the colonial master’s name (cf. 
Benson 2006:178 and below).
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meant for hegemonic discourse? For example, minority communities might use 
different personal names when communicating within and outside of the community. 
There must be a reason for this and it needs to be questioned why a non-community 
researcher thinks that it is appropriate to reveal and investigate these community 
names.
Disableized people experience a similar form of withdrawal and silencing of their name 
when pathologized and only addressed with a name which interpellates their ascribed 
disability.204 In German hegemonic media discourse, this disrespectful form of address 
is often used with people that do not comply with the normative perceptions of 
‘Germanness’. This, again, is linked to the recognition of personhood, as explained 
above.
Hence, I need to ask myself what right do I as a privileged ableized, non-migratized, 
white, cis-womanisized researcher have to ask a person about the ‘origin’ and 
‘background’ of their name? In order to be able to understand and dismantle 
discrimination, I suggest to question and challenge the circumstances of my intersecting 
privilege which enables me to meet hegemonic expectations linked to and interpellated 
by my name. For example, I am not forced to change my name in order to be recognized 
as German (=non-migratized, white, Christian socialized, cis-binary-genderable) and 
therefore have access to the privileges of being
• more likely addressed by my personal name,
• more often and likely invited to job interviews (cf. Akman et al. 2005; Bursell 
2007; Kaas, Manger 2010; Krause et al. 2012),
• more likely offered a flat when applying for one (cf. Ahmed, Hammarstedt 2008; 
Senatsverwaltung für Integration 2010),
• never asked to explain where my family (name) originally comes from,
• never regarded as a terrorist, although my name is just as German as those of 
NSU members and other Nazis,
204 I am grateful to Lio Oppenländer, who made me aware that the right to a name and the right to  
choose a name are also constituted by ableism (Oppenländer 2013).
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• never asked what gender my name (and thus I) represents and thus never 
enforced to out myself, since in hegemonic discourse cis is considered the norm 
that does not require outing,
• thus, never asked to perceive cis-gendering as a constraint (cf. TSG, Deutscher 
Bundestag 23/07/2009: article 1) and to provide a medical attest stating why I 
want to keep my initial name (cf. TSG Deutscher Bundestag 23/07/2009: article 
4, paragraph 3),
• in the position to assume that in hegemonic German discourse, my name might 
be remembered more ‘easily’ because it complies with the phonetic set and 
phonotactic rules that are hegemonically negotiated as German sprachgefühl (cf. 
chapter 5).
So who has what right to what name? And what does this right entail? In the following, I  
attempt to summarize some of the presuppositions of the German right to a name. 
Those presupposed concepts determine the intelligibility of names by legally defining its 
boundaries as well as by generating privilege for those citizens that are intrinsically 
assigned personhood on the grounds of their positionality and who are thus included 
and addressed by the right to a name.
6.1.3 Default perception of names: In the names of whiteness, ability, 
middle-class, statization & binary-genderability
In the following citation, Susan Benson states that the identification of people via their 
names is constituted by power. With regard to the context in which Benson’s article was 
published, Western anthropological scholarship on names and naming, and the content 
the article negotiated, naming, disavowal and recuperation in contexts of slavery and 
emancipation, the pronouns ‘our’, ‘us’ and ‘we’ can both be read as interpellations of 
people positioned in Western societies and as a statement of an emancipated person 
speaking from a post-slavery perspective.
“[O]ur names are, in the most literal sense, what we call our selves: absolutely and 
indissolubly ‘us.’ Our names also both represent and define our selfhood in the 
social world: they are what we must ‘own up to.’ […] Yet names are never simply 
our own: they are conferred on us, and demand recognition by others to operate as 
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names at all. As such, they are constituted within and ratified by the symbolic 
order, the order of power and its inscriptions.” (Benson 2006:178)
In order to be identified as such, a person’s name needs to be recognized by others.  
However, this recognition presupposes – as Benson states – the ratification of 
hegemonic discourse. Thus, it needs to be questioned how people’s names are ratified 
and recognized. As illustrated in chapter 2.3, naming in Germany is hegemonically 
constituted by _genderism_racism_migratism_ableism_classism_. I have already 
mentioned some examples of how these norms are enacted and implemented 
interdependently, which I only briefly want to summarize here. All assumptions 
presuppose that _binary-genderability_whiteness_statization_ability_middle-class_ 
are negotiated as normalized and taken-for-granted categories for personhood:
• Names perceived as German are hegemonically negotiated and perceived as cis-
binary-gendered, exceptions can be explained by the normative and normalized 
and accepted impact of Christianity.
• Names perceived as German are hegemonically negotiated and perceived as non-
migratized.
• Naming practices perceived as typically German normalize and promote 
andro_hetero_repro_genderist family conceptualizations.
• Names perceived as German interpellate whiteness in hegemonic discourse.
• Names perceived as German interpellate ability in hegemonic discourse.
• People with names perceived as middle-class have higher chances to succeed in 
hegemonic discourse.
The invulnerability of a child’s well-being is negotiated as central principle when the 
child is registered with their name as a German citizen. In this context, the genderability 
of a name according to the binary-gender norm is made a requirement in Germany, 
although this is not determined by law (cf. chapter 4). Swedish legislative discourse links 
the child’s well-being in a similar way to binary-genderism but leaves the responsibility 
for the consequences of the name choice to the parents, thus enabling parents to choose 
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between conventionalized gender-conform, gender-neutral and gender-contrarian 
names (cf. chapter 4.6).
As also shown by the example of a court decision, genderability is constituted by the 
belief in a German feel for language that excludes migratizable names from being 
recognized as German and genderable, thus presupposing genderability as a default 
indication for Germanness (cf. chapter 5.3 However, normative regulations that derive 
from Christianity’s worship of Mary, mother of Jesus, break this otherwise firm 
normative practice of binary-gender-distinctivity by allowing boys to be named ‘Maria’ 
(cf . NamÄndVwV, Bundesministerium des Inneren: section 67). In comparison, in 
Swedish discourses on the feel for a name’s Swedish grammar, the statisizability of 
specifically last names seems to have played a larger role than the genderability of first 
names (cf. chapter 5.4).
By persisting in hereditary family names as well as in ius sanguinis, German legislation 
has used the biological reproduction norm as a tool to promote whiteness (cf. chapter 
3.2.2). For example, womanisized persons in Germany are still more likely to signal 
belonging to their husband or husband’s family by assuming their husband’s last name 
than the other way around. Greven Medien and the GfK market research institute 
conducted a study in 2014 to analyze name change in the context of heterogenderist 
name change. According to a press release, 61.9% of people who identified as men keep 
their names, compared to only 18.8% of people who identified as women (Greven 
Medien GmbH & Co. KG 22/05/2014). Similar trends can be stated for the Swedish 
context. In 2012, 63.9% of people who identified as women took their husband’s middle 
or last name, whereas only 21.1% of people who identified as women kept their name 
(Göransson 2013).
Thus, default perceptions of names are constituted by accustomed naming traditions 
and hegemonic normalized knowledge on personal names, as well as by the frequent 
re_production and confirmation of these traditions and this knowledge in 
hegemonically normalized naming practices. Consequently, these hegemonic 
implications and expectations towards naming practices have an impact on the extent to 
which a person is perceived, normalized and privileged as a person by default.
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6.1.4 Uniqueness through unique names?
Before I discuss how defaultism results in the denial of personhood and, thus,  
individuality, I revisit the thought that in hegemonic Western discourse a personal 
name, consisting of at least one first and one last name, also marks a person as an 
individual. Unlike collective nouns such as ‘Germans’, ‘Swedes’ or ‘humans’, a personal 
name not only serves to distinguish people from each other but also to individualize  
them. This is why the registry office in Germany will most probably not allow siblings to 
share the exact same first name(s), according to a report quoting Gabriele Rodríguez, a 
recognized name expert from Namensberatungsstelle in Leipzig (Zeh 2011). The 
following quotations seem to confirm this implication:
“The statement that a personal name designates a single person […] is incorrect: it 
identifies and individualizes them.”205
And for the Swedish context:
“The use of names arose [...] from the need to distinguish individuals from each 
other. The development from first name to surname to last name happened 
ususally spontaneously and reflected emerging societies’ need for better and more 
solid means of individualization.”206
Often and conventionally, the personal name is perceived and negotiated as an identifier 
for an individual (Kohlheim 2013). For example, when a specific person is searched for 
in the media after having committed a crime, the person’s name will be one of the main 
identifiers, if it is known. In order to be recognized as a unique person, people 
sometimes try to choose rare or artificial names – for their children as initial names (cf. 
Namenberatungsstelle an der Universität Leipzig n.d.; Namnlagskommittén 2013) and 
for themselves as an artist’s name (Kilian 2003–2012). There are different reasons why 
people choose a specific name. For example, some aim to use their self-chosen gender-
free ‘artist’s’ name in official contexts that were not possible before 2015, according to 
205 Original: “Die Aussage, der Personenname kennzeichne den einzelnen Menschen [...], ist unzutref-
fend: er identifiziert und individualisiert ihn” (Kohlheim 2013, translated by EH).
206 Original: “Bruket av namn uppstod […] ur ett behov av att särskilja individer. Utvecklingen från 
förnamn över tillnamn till efternamn har i allmänhet skett spontant och avspeglat det behov som 
invånarna i de framväxande samhällena har haft av bättre och stabilare medel för individualiser-
ing.” (Namnlagskommittén 2013:139, translated by EH).
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German juridical discourse (cf. Abad 2015). Another reason can be the re_establishment 
of an African family name that was deprived through slavery (cf. chapter 6.2.2.1). 
Considering these reasons which are provoked by structural discrimination, negotiating 
uniqueness as the only reason and criterion would suggest that this person chooses a 
rare and artificial name from a rather privileged position. I will illustrate this 
assumption by help of the following example.
In Sweden, where changing names has become a legal practice that does not pathologize 
people by requiring medical attestation as in Germany (cf. chapter 6.2.2.5) there has 
been a small and relatively stable trend since 2003 among Swedes to change their 
surnames into less conventionalized, existing ones207. Instead of a name like Svensson, 
people create their own ‘new’ surnames: “All new surnames shall signal that the bearers 
are different from the crowd. A unique name is a statement.”208 On the grounds of the 
examples Språktidningen chooses it can be assumed that ‘uniqueness’ is a desire that is 
shared among non-migratized Swedes:
“Slowly but surely, the crowd of Andersson, Johansson, Karlsson and Nilsson, our 
most common last names, diminishes. [...] Now we want to be called 
Gryningsdotter, Gyllenhorn, Brownström, Clinståhl, Tvetomte or Soldagg.”209
Here, non-migratized Swedes are not only interpellated by non-migratized last names 
but also by the pronouns used. The collective ‘we’ (“våra”, “vi”) is the agent of the name 
change, thus a so-called trendsetter. The trendsetter, however, changes their name not 
on the grounds of migratist, racist or genderist discrimination but because they want to 
exemplify “a statement”. In this way, migratism, racism and genderism are silenced as 
relevant reasons for name change in a genderist, racist, migratist society that hinders 
207 Statistics 2003-2012: Patent- och Registreringsverket n.d.g, statistics 2013- today: Patent- och Reg-
istreringsverket n.d.f.
208 Språktidningen Februar 2013, S.16: „Alla [nya efternamn] ska de signalera att bärarna skiljer sig  
från mängden. Ett unikt namn är ett statement“, translated by EH. Cf. also S.19: “Trenden att per-
soner med utländsk bakgrund byter till mer svenskklingande namn (Språktidningen 1/2010) är 
bruten, enligt PRV. I stället byter många till nya namn med utgångspunkt i sitt eget språk, som 
Bouzhanieilam, Halbori, Albadini, Cordiani, Zazzio, Engelbach, Usopov och Yeshuel.” And cf. 
Patent- och Registreringsverket n.d.g.
209 Original: “Sakta men säkert minskar skaran av Andersson, Johansson, Karlsson och Nilsson, våra 
allra vanligaste efternamn. [...] Nu vill vi heta Gryningsdotter, Gyllenhorn, Brownström, Clinståhl, 
Tvetomte eller Soldagg.” (Karlsson 2013:14, translated by EH).
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people from getting jobs or housing. In contrast, the desire for uniqueness by a 
homogenized group (“we”) is centered on which migratized people with migratizable 
names are excluded (cf. chapter 1.2.1). Thus, with regard to being included in the ‘we’, 
migratized people are forced to identify with the example and therefore, with the 
hegemonic homogenized collective of Svensson & Co. This migratist strategy is – as 
previously stated – also re_produced by the PRV name change tool that offers only non-
migratized affixes for the creation of new last names, as if these affixes were the only 
possible option (cf. chapter 5.4).
Uniqueness as a privileged conceptualization is also expressed in the following 
quotation that has already been cited: “But not only Svensson is tired of their name.” 210 
By using ‘boredom’ as reason for a name change and in comparison with the reasons 
given by people who face discrimination on the grounds of the hegemonic ways their 
names are perceived, the conceptualization of ‘uniqueness’ seems to be one that might 
more likely be articulated from a privileged position. The historical background of the 
implementation of a legislation on naming might be another indicator for this 
assumption: The Swedish law was introduced in order to provide a legal basis to prevent 
people from non-aristocratic families in assuming a name that has been traditionally 
negotiated as ‘belonging’ to an aristocratic family (Brylla 2002:74–75; 88–92). This 
resulted in the protection of already existing surnames (Namnlag (1982:670), 
Justitiedepartementet L2 1/03/2012: article 13 and articles 20–23; Lag (2016:1013), 
Justitiedepartementet L2 17/11/2016: article 15 and articles 23–25). In this way, 
aristocratic families can consider themselves as ‘unique’ by having name changes to 
their ‘family name’ forbidden by law. PRV stated on its website:
“The name law contains provisions on what names are not allowed. [...] It is not 
possible to take a [...] name starting with af, von or the like. [...] PRV cannot 
approve last names, be they newly formed or not, that can easily be confused with:
• A last name that another person bears or is entitled to bear by law.
• A commonly known last name that has been born by an extinct family.”211
210 Original: “Men det är inte bara Svensson som tröttnat på sitt namn” (Karlsson 2013:19, translated 
by EH).
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Simultaneously, this ‘uniqueness’ marks classist privilege to which aristocratic families 
have (had) access, such as reputation and networking among each other to maintain and 
control wealth. However, distinctive, i.e. already existing but non-conventional212 last 
names of anyone registered in Sweden are protected by Swedish name law. The same 
applies to company names and trademarks (cf. Patent- och Registreringsverket 2013; 
Patent- och Registreringsverket n.d.d). The new name law determines that a last name 
needs to be borne by at least 2,000 people in order for a name change to be possible for 
anyone (Lag (2016:1013), Justitiedepartementet L2 17/11/2016: article 16).
Yet, ‘uniqueness’ is not only a privileged concept because of the people’s wish for 
singularity; it is also a concept that needs to be contested in terms of the hegemonic 
perception of personal names. Names conventionally invoke expectations about the 
person’s gender, religion, and origin – categorizations that the person shares with others 
despite attempts at individualization; or, as Hagström states, it is “an important factor 
in the context of social and cultural categorization”.213 Thus, although a personal name 
provides a person with the status of individuality, the fact that names are perceived in a 
categorical way assigns people nevertheless membership to certain groups of people. 
Naming also implies the assignment of conceptual group membership, a collective, 
regardless if the person identifies with the assigned affiliation. For example, a person 
might be categorized as female via their name but does not necessarily identify with this 
hegemonic cis-binary-gendering categorization. A strategic way to intervene in this form 
of cis-binary-gendering would be to change practices of introducing oneself, such as 
having university students introduce themselves in class with the name(s) and 
pronoun(s) they want to be addressed with. This might be different from the juridical 
name the person has to present in official contexts, such as enrollment.
211 Original: “Namnlagen innehåller bestämmelser om vilka namn som inte är tillåtna. […] Det är inte 
möjligt att ta ett [...] namn som inleds med af, von eller liknande. [...] Som efternamn, vare sig det 
är nybildat eller inte, kan PRV inte godkänna namn som lätt kan förväxlas med:
• Ett efternamn som någon annan enligt lag bär eller har rätt att bära.
• Ett allmänt känt efternamn som har burits av en utdöd släkt.” 
(Patent- och Registreringsverket 2013, translated by EH).
212 Conventional names would be names like Svensson or Bergström.
213 Original: “en viktig faktor i den sociala och kulturella kategoriseringen” (Hagström 2006:13, trans-
lated by EH).
262
Naming Me, Naming You? Becoming a Person: the Personal, the Collective and Their Name(s)
6.2 Denying Personhood: Structural Discrimination Through  
Hegemonic Naming Practices
After having discussed hegemonic implications of personhood defined by Western 
medical and legal discourse, I now focus on the effects of these implications that result 
in the denial of personhood in different naming practices and the exclusion from access 
to privilege. In the following, some specific personhood denying practices are discussed 
by using examples which focus on some specific forms of discrimination, for example 
the hegemonic denial and silencing of re_traumatization through street names that 
interpellate racist colonial aggressors. However, that does not mean that these practices 
are not likewise applied in other discriminatory naming contexts. For example, public 
places interpellating the names of ableist politicians and Nobel Prize winners such as 
Hjalmar Branting and Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, who promoted the sterilization of 
disableized people in Sweden (cf. Korn 2013; Myrdal, Mydral 1934), can trigger similar 
trauma. By honoring these personalities for what they have achieved in their lifetimes, 
disableized people’s experience with and knowledge about sterilization on the grounds 
of ascribed disability are not taken into account. This is simultaneously a typical practice 
to deny disableized people personhood. Also, the silencing of trans*people as potential 
name givers of public places and, thus, the abjectification of transgender lives is a 
practice that might cause traumatization.
6.2.1 Hegemonic denial: silencing of re_traumatization through 
symbolic names
Denial is one of the most common reactions of hegemonic discourse on anti-
discriminatory interventions. Various anti-racist scholars have discussed and fleshed 
out the conceptualization of denial: Kilomba defines denial as the first step in a 
psychological process “when white people start dealing with racism. […] First, they’re 
dealing with denial and saying ‘No, that is not like that and I’m not white and I’m not 
racist, I’m different” (Kilomba 2010a:00:03:19). Mulinari & Neergaard also illustrate 
denial on the grounds of privileged people’s lack of awareness – when white people 
express their shock about racist events, which, from a white perspective, seem to have 
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happened unexpectedly (Mulinari, Neergaard 2012).214 As for personal names, trauma 
can be triggered by names that stand for people who committed violence, for example in 
an institutionalized form under the colonialist regime in the former German colonies 
and under the sterilization laws in Sweden. A privileged ignorance against the risk of 
re_traumatization through these symbolic names can be regarded as a form of denial. 
According to Kilomba, trauma in the context of racism interpellates the remembrance of 
racist violence that abruptly breaks the Black subject’s link to society and, thus places 
the person forcefully in a subordinated, vulnerable position that “revives a colonial 
trauma” (Kilomba 2010b:95). In this way, a name that reminds one of a colonial scene 
from the past connects this traumatic past with the present. The present usage of 
traumatic names re_produces colonial trauma, whereas structural racism enables to 
“restage [...] scenes of colonialism” (Kilomba 2010b:95) via traumatic names (cf. chapter 
2.3).
During an interview, I asked a registrar what names were regarded as violating a child’s 
wellbeing. I mentioned certain names and combinations of first and last names that 
symbolized sympathy with National Socialism and that I, consequently, assumed would 
be negotiated as a threat to not only the child’s well-being but also to people for whom 
these names invoke traumatic memories. I wanted to know how the registrar would 
react if parents wanted to name their child ‘Adolf’ or ‘Eva’ in combination with the last 
name ‘Braun’ (cf. Hayn 24/07/2012a). A friend of mine had just recently told me about 
an experience she had as a pupil on her first day in school, when all the classmates 
learned each other’s names: When checking attendance, the teacher inquired about a 
classmate named ‘Eva Braun’. Surprised, my friend realized that none of her classmates 
reacted to the name, as if they were not aware of its historic implication.215 However, I 
expected that as an official state representative, the registrar would not only have 
knowledge about the historical implications of these names but also give a clear 
statement that would show her awareness of the traumatic interpellation of the name. 
However, I was puzzled by the registrar’s answer – just like my friend:
214 This was specifically pointed out by Mulinari & Neergaard when they discussed the hegemonic 
shock about the effects of everyday racism in hegemonic Scandinavia which resulted in the Sweden 
Democrats’ winning the parliamentary representation in the 2010 election and in the bombing and 
massacre in Norway on 22 July 2011.
215 I am grateful to Anita Zech for this example (Zech 2013).
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“[When it comes to names, EH] it’s about the name and not about a historical 
person. Today, associations with historical names [such as Adolf and Eva Braun, 
EH] are no longer that strong. I would not give that name to my children, but I  
would not advise parents against doing so. As regards the child’s well-being, there 
must be an obvious reason in order to refuse to register a name.”216
What would actually be an obvious reason and for whom? Why would the registrar 
reject the name ‘Adolf’ for her children but simultaneously not discourage parents that 
do not mind assigning their child a name that prominently interpellates the image of a 
well-known racist dictator and mass murderer, a name that is difficult to resignify in 
current mainstream discourse (cf. Delaporte, La Patellière 2012)? How can she on one 
side claim that a name needs to ‘be’ gender-distinctive according to the customs of a  
society and in the name of the child’s well-being (cf. chapter 4) and on the other side say 
that names need to be regarded out of that society’s historical context? The denial of  
history’s impact on the perception of names seems even more questionable against the 
background of the traditional (linguistic) perception and migratization of names: that 
names can tell where a person ‘comes from’ and allows to get to know a person’s historic 
background when analyzing their last names (cf. Nübling et al. 2012:11).
Nevertheless, in this context I also need to scrutinize my own denial: Being puzzled or 
shocked shows that at the time, I did not imagine it to be intelligible and possible that 
someone working in public administration would argue as the registrar did. Applying 
Mulinari & Neergaard’s approach, to be shocked means to deny recognizing that within 
Germany’s hegemonic society, the registrar’s answer does not come unexpected. “To be 
shocked is to be in denial. To be shocked is to embody the privilege of white ‘innocence’” 
(Mulinari, Neergaard 2012:14). I share this privilege of mine with the hegemonic white 
majority in Germany. It is constantly re_produced by the joint experience of learning 
German history from a white, non-migratized, ableized, cis-binary-gendered perspective 
only. The powerful privileged position remains unchallenged and denamed. By singling 
out and demonizing the crimes of the Nazis and their leaders, it also silences how the 
216 Original: “Hier geht es um den Namen als Namen und nicht um die historische Person. Heute ist  
die Assoziation mit den historischen Namen nicht mehr so gegeben. Ich würde meinen Kindern den 
Namen ‘Adolf’ zwar nicht geben, Eltern aber auch nicht davon abraten. In Fragen des Kindeswohls  
muss bei einer Namensablehnung ein offensichtlicher Grund vorliegen.” (Hayn 24/07/2012a, 
translated by EH).
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hegemonic privileged society supported and implemented both Nazi ideology and 
crimes, and how these racist, ableist and genderist theories still find their continuities 
today (cf. chapter 2.3, cf. naming practices in my family below). This form of 
exceptionalism of an undesired part of national history implies the existence of a 
‘regular’ national history’s narrative that serves an assumed need to positively identify 
oneself with nation building. Consequently, the national history and experiences of 
deprivileged people are barely recognized and often remain untold and de_mentioned, 
such as the genocide of Herero and Nama people during Germany’s colonization of 
modern-day Namibia (cf. Hamann 2010). Both these historical periods, colonialism and 
National Socialism, are not only linked by their common racist theories but also by the 
people who represent this ideology. Historic names ‘lose’ their associations only if a 
society has an interest in silencing the continuities and effects of the ideological crimes 
linked to them, for example on the grounds of refusing reparation payments for 
deprivation, exploitation and genocide (cf. Hayn 2010).
Thus, both denaming and de_mentioning enable privileged people to play the 
‘innocent’, whereas only naming and mentioning the historic crimes can motivate 
recognition and understanding of the circumstances and presuppositions of privilege 
and discrimination. To declare that traumatic associations with historic names are “not 
that strong anymore” can only be uttered from a position that does not only successfully 
deny understanding history as an ongoing, continuous process but that is also selective 
when it needs to be decided what figures in ‘history’ are negotiated as relevant in order 
to provide a foundation for the prohibition of a name. Names from troublesome 
Christian figures such as Judas that – over centuries – has been negotiated as traitorous 
in hegemonic German society have actually been regarded as improper and have been 
forbidden (cf. Hayn 23/07/2012; Hayn 24/07/2012a; Fröschle 2008; Bielefeld; 
Bielefeld). Thus, by allowing ‘Adolf’ but forbidding ‘Judas’, one can jump to the 
conclusion that crimes committed under Adolf Hitler’s name should be less remembered 
than Judas’ betrayal. In this way, events that mainly are of relevance for Christian 
history only (and that happened 2000 years ago) are recognized, whereas comparatively 
recent historic events with a global humanitarian relevance due to their violent and 
sustainable impact caused by collective acknowledgement are silenced in current 
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naming practices in German registry offices. A reason might be that Judas’ betrayal 
might be negotiated as a threat against the religion of the privileged, whereas the crimes 
under Hitler were conducted by the privileged.
Thus, although the registrar’s answer was only an individual person speaking, it 
represents an official as well as general hegemonic perspective on the impact of 
traumatic names. The attempt to disconnect a linguistic expression such as a name from 
its historical and societal context is a strategy for the privileged not to deal with the 
continuities of their own historical crimes that are interpellated by traumatic names. 
Hence, if the name’s disconnection from context would be applied generally, there 
would not be any need to question the acceptability of a name at all.
This attempted disconnection seems to be even more astonishing with regard to section 
39 of the administrative regulation of NamÄndG. It demonstrates the awareness that 
names can indeed interpellate traumatic events. Nevertheless, the change of the 
perpetrator’s (!) and their family members’ last name is possible only if this facilitates 
resocialization:
“If, by way of the reporting of a criminal offense, a rare and conspicuous last name 
is so closely linked to the crime and the perpetrator that even after a long time, 
wide circles of the population keep making connections, the last name of both the 
perpetrator and their relatives can be changed in order to facilitate resocialization. 
This can happen even before the convict is released, given the approval of the 
correctional service [...]..”217
Consequently, the family members’ desire to distance themselves from the traumatic 
event that is invoked by the very last name they share with the perpetrator is not  
possible:
217 Original: “Ist ein seltener oder auffälliger Familienname durch die Berichterstattung über eine 
Straftat so eng mit Tat und Täter verbunden, daß in weiten Kreisen der Bevölkerung bei Nennung 
des Namens auch nach längerer Zeit noch immer ein Zusammenhang hergestellt wird, so kann der 
Familienname des Täters und gegebenenfalls auch der seiner Angehörigen zur Erleichterung der 
Resozialisierung geändert werden. Dies kann bereits vor der Haftentlassung geschehen, wenn die 
Strafvollzugsbehörde dies befürwortet […].” (Bundesministerium des Inneren: section 39, para-
graph 1, translated by EH).
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“The last name of the perpetrator’s relatives can be changed if it seems to be 
reasonable in connection with the change of residence, in order to prevent 
harassment. Should an objective obstruction not exist, and should the relatives 
only have the desire to dissociate and distance themselves from the offender, a 
name change is usually not justified.”218
Whatever “objective obstruction/impediment” (“objektive Behinderung”) is supposed to 
mean and however this is identified ‘objectively’ (cf. Kilomba 2010b, cf. chapter 1.2) it 
can be summarized that no matter how unlikely a change of name is, its feasibility 
basically takes into account an anticipated harassment by the environment of the 
perpetrator and not the probable re_traumatization of those affected by the crime(s) on 
both a structural and individual level. By justifying that there is a “public interest in 
retaining the inherited name”219, German jurisdiction confirms once more its focus on 
the conservation of well-established norms, whereas in the Swedish context, jurisdiction 
tends to incorporate the position and perspective of minorities with regard to the 
changing of names.
The next example illustrates the difference between being ‘accidentally’ and structurally 
affected by a criminal event. It simultaneously proves the relevance of the social position 
a person speaks and acts from when assigning and using traumatic historic names. In 
her novel “the things I am thinking while smiling politely”, Otoo discusses traumatic 
historical names whose contexts have been silenced in a way that these personal names 
do not seem to interpellate the colonial crimes and genocide linked to them. The 
denaming of German colonial history constitutes the systematic discriminatory 
framework in which the protagonist of Otoo’s novel meets a person with the last name 
‘Peters’. While initially on the grounds of _racism_migratism_220 relieved to be 
married221 to “[s]omeone with a surname so unambiguously of the country he was born, 
raised and lived in” (Otoo 2012:10), the protagonist soon learns about the historical 
218 Original: “Der Familienname von Angehörigen des Täters kann geändert werden, wenn dies etwa 
im Zusammenhang mit einem Wohnungswechsel, zur Vermeidung von Belästigungen sinnvoll er-
scheint. Besteht eine objektive Behinderung nicht und hat der Angehörige nur den Wunsch, sich 
von dem Täter loszusagen oder zu distanzieren, rechtfertigt dies eine Namensänderung im allge-
meinen nicht.” (Bundesministerium des Inneren: section 39, paragraph 2, translated by EH).
219 Original: “öffentliches Interesse an der Beibehaltung des überkommenen Namens” (Bundesminis-
terium des Inneren:section 30, paragraph 4, translated by EH).
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trauma ‘Peters’ evokes for Afro-Germans and indigenous people from countries formerly 
colonized by the German Empire:
“Several months after we were married, I discovered that ‘Peters’ was also the 
surname of a German colonial aggressor and, although I didn’t begin to hate it 
then, I stopped adorning myself with it, like it was some magnificent fur coat, but 
begun instead to treat it like an ugly scarf: functional and necessary in cold 
weather, but not my item of choice and it wouldn’t matter much if I misplaced it 
one day, or perhaps lent it to someone in need, and it was never returned.” (Otoo 
2012:10)
The lack of awareness of traumatic names in hegemonic discourses is again a political  
form of actively silencing the historical associations a name interpellates. It has been a 
German tradition to name streets after colonialist aggressors. Despite the fact that 
political counter-activism and interventions have been increasing in the public sphere 
over the last years222, there is still a hegemonic denial to reflect and acknowledge the 
colonial past in German society that also finds its expressions in existing colonialist 
public spaces. In Germany, there are plenty of streets and places named after Carl 
Peters, the colonial aggressor Otoo talks about. Thanks to anti-racist interventions, 
some of these places and streets have been renamed. Yet, the relevant authorities have 
not yet changed all the ‘Peters’ (cf. CulturCooperation e.V. 2010), which shows there is 
still either a hegemonic denial that prevents renaming them or an explanation that the 
street name now ‘refers’ to a different person is given. For example, Petersallee in Berlin 
220 Cf. project “Who is missing and why” on the impact to set locally the reasons for discriminated peo-
ple’s resistance: It is not their social positioning as Black, Jewish, trans or disabled that makes peo -
ple flee the country, rename themselves or made unable to perform certain tasks but racism, gen-
derism and ableism (Projekt Who is missing? And why? 2012).
221 I discussed the heteronormative implications of the specifically white_statisized woman’s assuming 
of her husband’s name in chapter 2.3.6.
222 To name a few: international conference ‘Decolonize the City!’ (cf. 2012); the project ‘Freedom 
Roads’ to name and rename colonial street names in Berlin (cf. Berlin Postkolonial e.V. n.d.), the  
joint initiative to name and intervene in street names re_constructing positive connections with 
colonialism in Berlin, their dossier and claim for renaming and its associations: AfricAvenir Inter-
national e.V., Berliner Entwicklungspolitischer Ratschlag e.V., Initiative Schwarze Menschen in 
Deutschland, Internationale Liga für Menschenrechte, Projekt „Unterm Teppich?“ – Rassistische 
Konzepte, Koloniale Fantasien am Beispiel eines Berliner Straßennamens, Tanzania-Network.de 
e.V., Uwatab e.V. and Werkstatt der Kulturen (cf. Kwesi Aikins, Kopp 2008). For a recent interven-
tion cf. ISD Online 2014.
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Wedding is supposed to honor the anti-Nazi partisan Hans Peters since 1986 (cf. 
CulturCooperation e.V. 2010). However, both the initial reason to name the street as 
such and the existing street names in the neighborhood of Petersallee interpellate 
Germany’s colonial racist history. Thus, the re_production of the traumatic cognitive 
connection and interpellation that is effected by the use of the name ‘Peters’ is denied 
and silenced. By believing that meaning can be reclaimed beyond power relations, the 
effects of the dispositive of discrimination (cf. chapter 2.3) are not taken into account. 
The general hegemonic neglect and avoidance to recognize the continuities of the 
colonial past in present German society by denaming Carl Peters’ colonial aggression 
does not lead to the resignification of the street name. In comparison, an active and 
explicit change such as the renaming of Gröbenufer into May-Ayim-Ufer in Berlin 
Kreuzberg (CulturCooperation e.V. 2010) shows a political will to eliminate traumatic 
interpellations. Thus, how names are perceived and negotiated also demonstrates the 
extent to which individuals take societal as well as structural implications of names into 
account. Otoo addresses this aspect in her novella:
“Till, who had never really known his father had had little understanding for my 
obsession with his surname […].” (Otoo 2012:10)
Till’s neglect to engage with the own surname’s privileging and traumatic implications is 
a sound indication for a privileged person’s choice to simultaneously engage in 
understanding and fighting structures of discrimination. A privileged person with a 
name ‘accidentally’ and, in this case, unknowingly linked to the crimes committed by 
someone with the same last name does not experience the traumatic discriminatory 
impact of naming. Thus, they do not necessarily experience the need for change. This is 
why discrimination and trauma are often negotiated as individual, subjective, specific, 
personal as well as partial experiences (Kilomba 2010b: 26-38), although and because 
they derive from accustomed hegemonic oppressive practices. As Kilomba 
(2010a:00:04:00) suggests, only when the “white person is able to position itself “are 
recognition and reparation, thus societal change, possible.
Other forms of naming that silence the name’s traumatic effects are the retention and 
assumption of traumatic names, for example, through institutionalized hetero- as well 
as reprogendering practices. Through her marriage, German politician Katrin Göring-
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Eckardt assumed her husband’s last name that shares the same last name with one of 
the most influential Nazi criminals, Hermann Göring. It needs to be questioned to what 
extent G.-Eckardt was forced to do so (e.g. not marrying might have been an option).  
Yet, at the time of marriage in 1988 in the GDR, cis-women had to assume their 
husbands surname according to the law at the time (cf. chapter 2.3.6). In this way, 
Katrin G.-Eckardt’s retention of her maiden name might be seen as a form of anti-sexist 
(but less as contra_racist) intervention, since at the time hyphenation was not as 
established, conventionalized and accustomed as it is today.
With regard to my own family, I also observed reprogendering naming practices that 
simultaneously invoke trauma for people that have been persecuted by the National 
Socialist regime. Passing on a last name that starts with an H as well as knowing about 
Nazi propaganda coding, and assigning a child with a first name that starts with either A 
or H re_produces – also unconsciously – discriminatory practices of Nazi symbolic 
language use.223 After 1945, giving a child a first name that was popular during the 
regime of the National Socialist Party or that was borne by prominent Nazis such as 
Hermann (cf. Göring case above) and that was in the NS-Family Register issued by the 
Nazi authorities (cf. annex) does not show any awareness of the trauma these names 
interpellate. Most of them are, according to traditional onomastics, negotiable as 
‘Germanic’ names, for example Helga (cf. chapter 5.3, cf. Maruhn 2002:151).  
Sometimes, they interpellate(d) a meaning which became symbolic for Nazism. For 
example, the name ‘Horst’ became very popular because the name reminded of Horst 
Wessel, who was negotiated as a martyr under the NS regime (cf. Lorenz 2006).
As described in chapter 1.1.2 for the identification of discriminatory naming practices, it 
does not matter whether the interpellation of trauma was intended when the name 
represented a family tradition of naming the child after a deceased relative. Also prior to 
1933, those names were negotiated as ‘typical German names’ and thus interpellate not 
only privilege but also nationalist ideology. Thus, naming children Hermann, Helga and 
Horst shortly after the end of World War II must be read and understood as – 
unintended or not – an indication and continuity of Nazi ideology, given the name’s 
popularity at the time (cf. Wolffsohn, Brechenmacher 1999:228–233).
223 Two subsequent capital H interpellate a Nazi salutation (cf. Udolph, Fitzek 2005:175).
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6.2.2 Hegemonic juridification of name change: enforcing norms and 
counter-activist empowerment
In this subchapter I focus on enforced naming practices and counter-activist ways of 
self-definition. I discuss how institutionalized normative naming practices that are 
regulated by legislation enforce discriminatory naming practices and, thus, deny 
personhood. The practices I investigated are directed against groups of people who are 
discriminated against by racism and genderism. Thus, the concept of ‘personhood’ does 
not interpellate the individual only but all group members’ opportunity to freely choose 
and keep a personal name that relates to the community’s history (enslaved People of 
Color and Black people) and/or self-determination (German Jews under the Nazi 
regime, trans and gender non-conform people). Again, naming is understood as an act 
which from a hegemonic point of view, denominates both the individual as well as the 
collective. One counter-activist example for empowering name change is analyzed in 
Patricia Hill Collins’ “Fighting Word”. She quotes Sojourner Truth, “an illiterate, newly 
emancipated, poor Black woman” born into slavery who “dare[d] to name herself” 
(Collins 1998:229):
“My name was Isabella; but when I left the house of bondage, I left everything 
behind. I wa’n’t goin’ to keep nothin’ of Egypt on me, an’ so I went to the Lord an’ 
asked him to give me a new name. And the Lord gave me Sojourner, because I was 
to travel up an’ down the land, showin’ the people their sins, an’ bein’ a sign unto 
them. Afterward I told the Lord I wanted another name, ‘cause everybody else had 
two names; and the Lord gave me Truth, because i was to declare the truth to the 
people.” (Sojourner Truth quoted in Collins 1998:229)
The quotation and the context of slavery in which it was expressed shows the 
interconnection of empowering naming practices and the discriminatory environment 
that constitutes the person’s condition as the oppressed from which they is to be 
empowered. Collins emphasizes the symbolism Truth’s name change involved and states 
that
“[s]tepping outside the conventions of 1832, Truth created her own identity and 
invoked naming as a symbolic act imbued with meaning. Refusing to be silenced, 
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Truth claimed the authority of her own experiences to challenge racism, sexism, 
and class privilege of her time.” (Collins 1998:229)
Legislation and institutionalized practices constitute the circumstances of the disavowal 
of personal names, the enforcement of injurious names and the recuperation and 
emancipation224 from oppressive institutions such as slavery, forced marriage and forced 
registration. As Benson has shown, after liberation enslaved people chose different 
naming strategies to mark the transformation from the oppressed to the liberated and 
empowered individual in order to claim in Collins’ words “the authority of her own 
experiences” (Collins 1998:229, cf. Benson 2006).
6.2.2.1 Name change as assignment for ownership
Name change can symbolize ownership of oppressed groups. The following example 
deals with the ownership of a group of people allowed only since 1958 to keep their own 
last names, initially in a hyphenated version, when changing their legal status: women-
identified people in Germany (cf. chapter 2.3.6). Although the change of legal status by 
marriage probably still applies mostly to heterosexual cis-women, it should be 
remembered that due to genderist and sexist discrimination in capitalist societies over 
the centuries, it is only since women-identified people’s empowerment that women-
identified people, including lesbians as well as trans and gender non-conform people, 
are no longer forced into marriage.
I will discuss the relevance of keeping one’s last name against the background of 
conventionalized family and kinship constructions that are consolidated by legislation. 
Traditionally, in Germany and Sweden surnames re_produce the idea of a name’s 
inheritability through kinship. Kinship interpellates a reprogenderist understanding of 
‘family’ as a biological concept, which is re_produced by the inheritance of not only 
materialistic goods and privilege but also by the last name, be it the same one or a 
patronymic. Thus, a last name contributes to the idea of ‘origin’ through ius sanguinis 
(cf. chapters 2.3.1 and 3.2.1).
This traditional hereditary naming practice might continue to be a German, norm-
conserving strategy, given the fact that ever since Swedish legislation was introduced, it  
224 Cf. title of Benson’s essay (Benson 2006).
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has implicitly disrupted the hereditary naming system by encouraging the changing of 
last names especially (cf. chapter 3.2.3.2.3). However, this does not mean that the 
conceptualization of ius sanguinis has become obsolete in Swedish society. Some of the 
newly created family names still interpellate references to previous family names or 
other family-related memories and traditions. For example, some newlywed couples 
combine their previous last names to create a new joint name. Carlén and Enarsson then 
becomes Carlenarsson; or they transfer a toponym, the name of a place that has 
symbolic meaning for the couple’s families, into an anthroponym.225 Thus, these family 
related names can also be regarded as a new form of hereditary naming practice which, 
however, is not prescribed by the state. It is chosen by the couples who continue to 
re_produce the conceptualization of marking heredity through naming.
In Germany, the ‘inheritance’ of a last name has traditionally been an andro- as well as 
heterogenderist concept because only the names of male-identified persons are 
hierarchically and unilaterally ‘transferred’: from fathers to daughters, from husbands to 
wives (cf. also the gendering of last names below). Of course, sons also receive their 
fathers’ names. However, unlike their women-identified siblings, they are considered as 
the legitimate heir who represents the family and therefore keeps the family name. 
Thus, it is assumed that the husband’s name symbolizes the heteronormative paradigm 
of the wife’s heterogenderist submission to her husband.
Consequently, the last name also constitutes a family’s existence and continuity. When 
there is no person to transfer the family’s genes, name and/or history to the next 
generation, a family is considered as extinct. For example, my father once told me that I  
was assigned the name ‘Evelyn’ because in this way the ‘y’ would be saved. He was afraid 
that once I married, I would lose the ‘y’ in my last name, ‘Hayn’. Based on my ascribed 
birth gender, he assumed that I would lead a heterosexual life (which so far I have 
actually done for the most part) and later agree to marry and to take on my presumed 
husband’s last name (which I have not). He also thought that I as a woman-identified, 
married person would no longer be in the position to represent the Hayn family. I still  
actually use both of my names and have no intention of changing that; not only because 
I intend to remain unmarried, but because I want to keep both y’s for the symmetry in 
225 Cf. Karlsson 2013 for both examples.
274
Naming Me, Naming You? Becoming a Person: the Personal, the Collective and Their Name(s)
the ending of both names and because I have gotten accustomed to my name. I am still 
content with it because my name is rather rare, which gives me the air and privilege 
(and vanity) of uniqueness (cf. chapter 6.1.4). However, the conceptualization of 
uniqueness needs to be examined, since with my name I am read as a non-migratized 
German woman-identified person – a position I share with several people in Germany 
which provides me with privilege and responsibility.
As illustrated and implied by the self-empowering name change of Sojourner Truth, the 
ownership concept together with oppression has also constituted naming practices in 
the context of slavery. However, unlike white womanisized persons, Black enslaved 
people’s history of kinship has been disrupted indelibly. Benson demonstrates the extent 
of violence against enslaved people that has been performed in enforced renaming 
practices. For example, enslaved people in British households were given “ordinary 
names, albeit often their diminutive form: Tom, Bess, or Jack: servant names” or
“named fancifully, often with names culled from classic antiquity: Scipio 
[Africanus] [sic!], Caesar, Nero or, most commonly, Pompey – the latter so popular 
that it became the generic name for a black servant in eighteenth-century England. 
[…] These were names to call as a joke, names whose grandiosity humiliated: 
Ignatius Sancho, Gustavus Vassa, Julius Soubise.” (Benson 2006:189)
In this way, these names did not only belittle the enslaved person’s position but also 
“indicated incomplete personhood” (Benson 2006:190) and interpellated “the 
performative iteration of [the] erasure [of the enslaved individual’s personal history, 
EH] in the ways in which slaves were addressed in the everyday contexts of their 
subjection” (Benson 2006:197). Thus, by violently disavowing their personal names, 
enslaved people were denied personhood in multiple ways: by the rupture of any 
connection to kinship and thus by the denial of personal history; by the violent 
assignment and tattooing of the ‘master’s’ name (Benson 2006:192), thus marking and 
interpellating ‘ownership’; and by the placement in a position of inferiority, which thus 
denied self-determination, personal rights as well as “autonomous selfhood and […] 
social capacity” (Benson 2006:181). Benson identifies the latter as Western 
conceptualizations linked to proper names (Benson 2006:181).
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6.2.2.2 Name change and emancipation from ownership and oppression
The use of pen names or pseudonyms by white woman-identified persons in the 19th 
century in Great Britain can be regarded as an example of white anti-genderist 
empowerment against white androgenderist naming practices. Woman-identified 
persons socialized and accustomed in a heteronormative way may have adopted and 
become familiar with the white oppressor’s sexist manners and language “for some 
illusion of protection” as Lorde has phrased it (Lorde 2007:114). The many cases where 
womanisized authors aimed at concealing their hegemonic genderization as ‘women’ 
serve as examples for a strategic adoption of the oppressor’s language. Some of the most 
commonly known women-identified writers are the Bell/Brontë siblings as well as 
George Eliot and George Sand who during the 19th century, were forced to conceal their 
ascribed genderization by using supposedly male pen names. In this way, they could 
increase their chances to be published. At the time, womanisized writers were barely 
given credit for their authorship, which is why they could not live from writing under 
their ‘original’ names (cf. Hacker 2007). The oppressors’ norms and manners could not 
be changed that easily, hence women-identified writers were forced to adopt them in an 
anti-sexist way. The use of pen names may also be negotiated as an empowering way for 
trans*people to change their names and initiate social birth (cf. chapter 6.1.1).
Elana Dykewomon undertook another empowering writer’s name change. In order to 
mark that she addressed lesbians, dykes or – as Dykewomon expressed it – womyn and 
dykewomyn only, she chose a last name that would make them a recognizable member 
of the lesbian community, Dykewomon (cf. Dykewomon 1991:158). ‘Woman’ was 
changed to ‘womon’ in order to reject any recognizable links to ‘man’ (Dykewomon 
1991:155–156). In this way, the name change was meant to symbolize community-
building among lesbians and dykes, thus providing space as well as encouragement for 
womyn and dykewomyn to identify needs and supportive opportunities for each other. 
Dykewomon also abandoned her patriarchal family’s name and simultaneously also her 
Jewish connection, which, as she later commented, she would not do again. Instead, she 
would “choose a name more easily identified as Jewish” (Dykewomon 1991:157). In this 
way, the name would address the community of Jewish womyn and dykewomyn in 
particular and in an empowering, intersecting way. In Germany, abandoning the family 
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name is also possible, according to German legislation (NamÄndG, Deutscher 
Bundestag 1/09/2009: articles 3, paragraph 1, NamÄndVwV, Bundesministerium des 
Inneren: section 28), if the name triggers trauma by interpellating family violence. 
However, a psychological opinion is mandatory which confirms that the person can no 
longer live with the name (Hayn 24/07/2012b).
An example for an anti-racist intervention in the hegemonic perception of names in 
Germany is the name change of May Ayim, who introduced her name as a pen name. 
When the book Farbe bekennen: Afro-deutsche Frauen auf den Spuren ihrer  
Geschichte (Oguntoye et al. 2006) was published, Ayim used her legalized surname, 
which is hegemonically perceived as ‘typically German’. However, her legalized first 
name was already replaced by a self-chosen one, May. In later publications as well as in 
later editions of Farbe bekennen, Ayim used her birth father’s name as last name 
(MacCarroll 2005). Afro-German poet Ika Hügel-Marshall also adopted her father’s 
name later in life (Hügel-Marshall 2001) to commemorate their family connection. By 
identifying themselves with their Black fathers’ ancestry via their last names, both Ayim 
and Hügel-Marshall wrote Afro-German history. To choose a new or – if known – old 
family name is a strategy of Black people in both Germany and Sweden to re_establish 
the connection to their African descent which was violently interrupted through 
colonialization and slavery (cf. chapter 6.2.3).
While writing about their struggles growing up and surviving as a Black German in the 
hegemonic white German society226, Ayim together with co-editor Katharina Oguntoye 
and all the other Afro-German authors of Farbe bekennen, Doris Reiprich, Erika 
Ngambi Ul Kuo, Helga Emde, Astrid Berger, Miriam Goldschmidt, Laura Baum, 
Eleonore Wiedenroth, Corinna N., Angelika Eisenbrandt, Julia Berger, Abena Adomako 
and Raja Lubinetzki, made the Afro-German identity that had been silenced in 
hegemonic discourse visible (Oguntoye et al. 2006).
The groundbreaking publication launched the founding of organizations representing 
Black people in Germany, most notably Initiative Schwarzer Deutscher (ISD) and Afro-
deutsche Frauen (ADEFRA). By naming the discriminatory conditions within 
226 Particularly in her poems e.g. afro-deutsch I, afro-deutsch II, blues in schwarz weiss, grenzenlos 
und unverschämt. Cf. Ayim 1996, Ayim 2002.
277
Naming Me, Naming You? Becoming a Person: the Personal, the Collective and Their Name(s)
hegemonic white German society and its structures in the book, as well as renaming a 
street after May Ayim in 2010, Ayim’s name today is regarded as a metaphor for the 
legacy of the Afro-German community and empowerment in Germany (cf. also Kelly 
2016; Kelly, Oguntoye 2015).
These anti-racist and anti-genderist examples demonstrate the symbolism of name 
change with regard to community-building. The social positioning is relevant for the 
recognition of community membership and empowerment. This is why name changes 
by privileged persons who adopt symbolic names of communities they are not members 
of are appropriation and deceit: Even by assuming to be an ally, actively appropriating a 
symbol of the community members’ anti-discriminatory struggle is an act of deception. 
Appropriation is not only a symbol of oppression but also a pretense to experience the 
same discriminatory struggles (which is impossible for privileged people).227
Alford (1988) provides another example which demonstrates the relevance and 
necessity of social positing. Searching for reasons why people change their names, 
Alford reports that it could “assist a person in shedding an old, unwanted identity” 
(Alford 1988:158). It is to be questioned why an ‘identity’ would be unwanted by a 
person, particularly with regard to the example. After having immigrated to the USA in 
the late 1800s and early 1900s, some Jews adopted so-called Anglicized names (Alford 
1988:158). This most probably did not happen – as Alford suggests – because Jews did 
not want a Jewish identity but because of anti-Semitic experience that is not only 
re_produced in Europe228. Here, I apply Dahl’s conceptualization of forced migration 
which Dahl introduced to reveal the de_mentioned history of Polish Jews forced to 
227 Cf. for example author Claus Heck, who hid his cis-male non-migratized privilege behind the name 
Aléa Torik, a name and an identity he invented in order to be able to write from the position of a  
womanisized migratized person (Heck, 22. Juli 2015 “Literatur 2.0: Was sind literarische Blogs“ 
http://www.aleatorik.eu/). A somewhat different case might be Ingrid Hella Irmelinde Kirsch who 
assumed ‘Sarah’ as her first name in the 1960’s post World War II Germany. This name was en-
forced upon Jewish woman-identified persons by Nazi German legislation (cf. below). With the ap-
propriation of ‘Sarah’, Kirsch denamed her white, non-Jewish privilege that was interpellated by 
her previous first names; however, the appropriation of a name that only a few years ago led to the  
extermination of Jews who were identified as such by the name can also be negotiated as a way to 
intervene in this anti-Semitic perception of the name ‘Sara(h)’ and to make presumably Jewish 
names intelligible as German.
228 Thanks to the initiators of the project ‘Who is missing and why’, I was made aware of the shift in 
perspective when talking about the reasons Jews were forced to flee Europe or “divested of her per-
mission to teach”: not because they were Jewish but because Europe was (and still is) anti-Semitic 
(cf. Projekt Who is missing? And why? 2012, in particular portait of Hedwig Hintze).
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immigrate to Sweden due to anti-Semitism in Poland (cf. Dahl 2013). In Alford’s 
example, one can also assume that Jews did not change their names because they did 
not like their ‘identity’ which was interpellated via their name but because the 
identification as Jewish by hegemonic discourse meant anti-Semitic discrimination. 
Although the decision to change a name was based on individual accounts, they cannot 
be detached from the power relations that influenced these decisions. The same applies 
to name changes where – as Alford mentions as a second reason – “name changes may 
express a person’s new sense of identity” (Alford 1988:158) in that he once more 
connects with religiously motivated reflections. It is again an individual’s decision to 
change their name due to religious conversion. However, whether the decision is forced 
upon someone or whether it expresses empowerment depends again on the individual’s 
social positioning. The cases of religiously motivated name change Alford mentions can 
be identified as empowerment. For Muhammed Ali it was an opportunity to get rid of 
his enforced slave name (Benson 2006:195) – a perception of Muhammed Ali’s name 
change that remained unmentioned by Alford. The same applies to Malcom X, who 
exchanged their previous last name that reminded of their family slave history for an X, 
which marks the space for the lost African last name of their ancestors (Benson 
2006:195, 199).
In her short story, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie illustrates how colonialist proselytization 
made Nigerians reject their Nigerian heritage. In order to attend school, children had to 
be baptized with an English Christian name and live a Christian life according to the 
“white men’s tradition” (Adichie 2008). However, Adichie’s protagonist rebels against 
the colonialist norms by keeping up their naming traditions and secretly using 
traditional first names for their children and grandchildren. The choice of these names 
also symbolizes the resistance against colonialist name erasure which, at the end of the 
story, is manifested by the granddaughter's change of name from their Christian name 
to the one their grandmother had given, Afamefu, meaning “my name will not be lost” 
(cf. Adichie 2008).
As far as religiously motivated name changes are concerned, the conversion of 
oppressed groups might also have been a forced one. As illustrated in chapter 3.2.2, 
Jews living in German speaking territories in the 18th and 19th centuries were forced to 
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adopt a German-sounding last name with the first edict issued in Austria in 1787. 
However, almost eighty years later, a new enforcement was institutionalized. In an 
article on the changing of names in the context of Vienna Jews ‘converting’ to 
Christianity, Anna Staudacher mentions that the conversion provided the opportunity to 
acquire civil rights until the year 1868 (cf. Staudacher 2009). Apparently, these rights 
had been denied to Jews, despite the ‘emancipation deal’ at the beginning of the 19th 
century. By investigating the accounts of a Vienna foundling hospital, Staudacher found 
out that the hospital’s Jewish children were forcefully christened until 1868. Until 1843, 
they were also assigned a new surname which, however, was not necessarily negotiated 
as distinctively ‘Christian’. Similar to the name changing practices of converts, some 
names were hegemonically negotiated as typically Jewish (cf. Staudacher 2009). 
Consequently, the enforced christening did not protect the children from anti-Semitism 
but needs to be understood as an expression of it.
6.2.2.3 Name change as tool for selection: marking the Other
As mentioned in chapter 3.2.2, the institutionalization of legislation on civil status and 
naming in Germany is an example of enforced name change. Jews living in German 
speaking territory were only assigned civil rights at the beginning of the 19th century. As 
a consequence, Jews were forced to take on a family name. Soon, the naming of Jews 
was regulated by the state, which aimed to maintain a clear distinction between Jews 
and gentiles through personal names and to limit and control ‘assimilation’ (cf. 
Mattlinger 1996:17–18, cf. chapter 3.2.2). Hence, Jews should be prevented from 
choosing Christian names. However, the definition of what was hegemonically 
recognized as a Christian name was ambiguous since, according to etymological 
research, names such as Maria and Joseph were of Hebrew origin instead of Germanic 
(cf. Bering 1992:153). In Germany in 1938, the legislation on civil status was changed in 
the latter respect. According to Erste Verordnung zum Personenstandsgesetz of May 
19th, it became obligatory to indicate “the former membership to the Jewish religious 
community” (Reichsministerium der Justiz 21/05/1938: article 12, paragraph 3). On 
July 4th 1939, the Nazi regime’s SS Reich Security Head Off ice , SS-
Reichssicherheitshauptamt, appropriated the umbrella organization of the Reich’s 
deputation of German Jews (Reichsvertretung der Deutschen Juden), the Reich’s 
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Association of the Jews in Germany (Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland), 
which was forced to operate under different names since the Nuremberg Laws had been 
passed in 1935. The Reichsvertretung der Deutschen Juden had been founded in 1933 to 
represent Jewish political and religious groups in Germany. It particularly focused on 
Jewish self-help activities during persecution under the Nazi regime and kept a register 
of its members. With its appropriation, the Jewish umbrella organization was turned 
into an organ of the Reich Security Main Office using the same name and retaining most 
of the staff. All persons who were racialized and defined as Jewish by the Nuremberg 
Laws were subject to compulsory membership. The work of Jewish staff members was 
controlled by the Gestapo (cf. Zentralrat der Juden n.d.), who therefore had access to 
the members’ register, and the staff was forced to ‘collaborate’ with the Reich Office for 
Hereditary Research (Reichsstelle für Sippenforschung) to evaluate Jewish registers on 
civil status. With the beginning of the deportations on October 18th 1941, the staff was 
forced to occasionally choose the persons who should be deported (cf. Maierhof 2009).  
Commenting on these anti-Semitic conditions, Klüger writes in her autobiography:
“And now, as my unconsolidated belief in Austria got wavered, I became Jewish in 
defense. Before I was seven, that is in the first months after the Anschluss, I 
abandoned my hitherto existing first name. Before Hitler [came to power, EH], 
everyone called me Susi; henceforward, I insisted on the other name, which I also 
had [...] I wanted a Jewish name, appropriate to the circumstances.”229
The juridically institutionalized racist anti-Semitic discrimination in the context of 
legislation on personal status in Nazi Germany continued with the introduction of 
compulsory names. With the Second Decree on the Execution of the Law regarding the 
Changing of Surnames and Forenames of August 17th, 1938, German Jews should 
become identifiable on the grounds of their names (Reichsministerium des Inneren, 
Reichsministerium der Justiz 18/08/1938). As previously mentioned (cf. chapter 
3.2.2.2.3), persons who were classified as Jewish according to the Nuremberg Laws were 
forced from the beginning of January 1939 to adopt the name Sara (for womanisized 
229 Original: “Und nun, als mein ungefestigter Glaube an Österreich ins Schwanken geriet, wurde ich 
jüdisch in Abwehr. Bevor ich sieben war, also schon in den ersten Monaten nach dem Anschluß, 
legte ich meinen bisherigen Rufnamen ab. Vor Hitler war ich für alle Welt die Susi, dann habe ich 
auf dem anderen Namen bestanden, den ich ja auch hatte […] Einen jüdischen Namen wollte ich,  
den Umständen angemessen.” (Klüger 2013:41, translated by EH).
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people) or Israel (for ‘males’) if their proper names did not follow the guidelines on the 
adoption of first names, Richtlinien über die Führung der Vornamen, of August 18th, 
1938 (Reichsministerium des Inneren 18/08/1938). The list consisted of pejorative 
names that had been chosen by Hitler and partly invented by NS authority (cf. below), 
most notably by Hans Globke. Globke’s employer, the Prussian Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, had already tasked him in November 1932 with drafting guidelines for the 
registry office which should prevent Jews from changing their name to one that was not 
identifiable as Jewish. A year later, under the NS regime, Globke was involved in 
introducing the law to prohibit misfeasance in marriage and in the adoption of a child, 
which enabled registrars to invalidate name changes conducted by Jews (cf. chapter 
3.2.2.2.3). Now, with the introduction of the Second Decree, Globke could forward his 
proposal to force Jews to bear specific first names that would ‘identify’ them as 
distinctively Jewish (cf. Maruhn 2002:153). Thus, the same person who should later 
have a successful career in post 1945 Germany (cf. below) continued to be responsible 
for anti-Semitic naming politics under the NS regime.
As a result, Jews were no longer allowed to change their family names when the old 
names were ‘identifiable’ as Jewish according to hegemonic perception. The 1938 list 
included, according to Antonia Kleikamp, first names that were considered seldom 
outside of Jewish communities, or they were invented for pejorative reasons (cf. below). 
Moreover, names such as Miriam, David, Michael or Matthias that traditionally had 
been negotiated as Jewish names were not included in the list because gentiles 
simultaneously used them (cf. Kleikamp 2013).
In its entry “Namensänderungsverordnung”, Wikipedia lists as sources some 
contemporary witnesses who were affected by the new legislation (cf. Wikipedia 2015). I 
researched them and present their full testimonies as follows. Jewish holocaust survivor 
and witness Victor Klemperer reports:
“Five minutes ago, I read the law on Jewish first names that was just published. It 
would make you laugh if you did not lose your mind [at the same time, EH]. The 
new names are mostly not taken from the Old Testament but are funny-sounding 
Yiddish or ghetto names – such as Franzos, Kompert. Accordingly, I have to inform 
the registry offices of Landsberg and Berlin as well as the community of Dölzschen 
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that my name is Victor-Israel; and I have to sign business letters in this way. 
Whether Eva has to consider Eva-Sara, I still have to find out.”230
According to racist Nazi ideology, Eva Klemperer, a Protestant white German, was 
considered ‘Aryan’. This is why Klemperer questions if the new legislation would also 
apply to his wife. In order to avoid forced naming, 76-year-old Jewish Hedwig Jastrow 
committed suicide on November 29th, 1938. In her suicide note she writes:
“If only one did not want to attempt resuscitation with someone who does not want 
to live! This is not an accident, nor has there been a fit of melancholia. Someone 
departs from life whose family has been in the possession of German civil letters for 
over 100 years, handed over with civic oath, always keeping that oath. For 43 years, 
I have been teaching and caring for German children against all troubles, and for 
an even longer period I have done charitable work on the German people in war 
and peace. I do not want to live without a fatherland, without a homeland, without  
a dwelling, without civic rights, ostracized and insulted. And I want to be buried 
with the name that my parents partly gave me and partly passed on to me […] on 
which there is no flaw. I do not want to wait until a stigma is attached to it. Every 
convict, every murderer keeps their name. It is a scandal!”231
People who were also recognized as ‘Aryans’ made a stand against the introduction of 
forced first names for Jews. Described as a Hitler admirer, Luise Solmitz, sister of 
230 Original: “Vor fünf Minuten habe ich das eben veröffentlichte Gesetz über die jüdischen Vornamen 
gelesen. Es wäre zum Lachen, wenn man nicht den Verstand darüber verlieren könnte. Die neuen 
Namen sind zum überwiegenden Teil nicht alttestamentarische, sondern komisch klingende jiddis-
che oder Ghettonamen – Richtung Franzos, Kompert. Ich selber habe also den Standesämtern 
Landsberg und Berlin sowie der Gemeinde Dölzschen zu melden, daß ich Victor-Israel heiße, und 
habe Geschäftsbriefe derart zu unterzeichnen. Ob für Eva Eva-Sara in Frage kommt, muß ich noch 
feststellen.” (Klemperer 1996:419, translated by EH).
231 Original: “Wenn man nur keine Wiederbelebungsversuche anstellen wollte bei einem, der nicht 
leben will! Es liegt auch kein Unfall vor und kein Schwermutsanfall. Es geht jemand aus dem 
Leben, dessen Familie seit über 100 Jahren deutsche Bürgerbriefe besitzt, mit Bürgereid 
übergeben, der Eid stets gehalten. 43 Jahre lang habe ich deutsche Kinder unterrichtet und in allen  
Nöten betreut und noch viel länger Wohlfahrtsarbeit am deutschen Volk getan in Krieg und 
Frieden. Ich will nicht leben ohne Vaterland, ohne Heimat, ohne Wohnung, ohne Bürgerrecht, 
geächtet und beschimpft. Und ich will begraben werden mit dem Namen, den meine Eltern mir 
teils gegeben und teils vererbt haben und auf dem kein Makel haftet. Ich will nicht warten, bis ihm 
ein Schandmal angehängt wird. Jeder Zuchthäusler, jeder Mörder behält seinen Namen. Es schreit  
zum Himmel!” (DOK. 181, Heim et al. 2009:512, translated by EH).
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NSDAP member and deputy press chief to the German Empire, Werner Stephan, was 
married to Friedrich Solmitz, a Jew. She writes in her diary on August 24th 1938:
“And in the evening, the next blow we were waiting for fell. Fr[iedrich] entirely pale 
and quiet; then he told me: German, only German first names, a few naturalized 
ones included; but Jews Jewish [names, EH]. – Just before, I had said: ‘Watch out, 
they will dictate them!’ And so, it happened. Not Jonas, Joshua, Benjamin, that 
could be endured, but the most terrible [ones, EH], barely known, partly insulting 
names; and what applies to Fr. – whoever has a different first name must add, as a 
man: Israel, as a woman: Sarah. One does not even know what to say. Every official  
signature must be made in such a way; [the names, EH] are listed in the telephone 
directory, in the address book, in the checking account. Fr. wrote immediately to 
Minister of the Interior Frick, asked him to spare him, gave his reasons. [But, EH] 
who knows if this is not considered a rebellion?”232
Protestant writer Jochen Klepper who was married to Johanna Stein, a Jew, noted on 
August 23rd 1938:
“As of January 1, all Jewish men, whether baptized or not, must use the name Israel 
as their middle name, and all Jewish women Sara as their second name. The list of 
first names that was stipulated for newborn Jewish children is eighty percent 
sadistic mockery. The biblical, famous names are banned for Jews.”233
232 Original: “Und abends fiel dann auch der neue Schlag, auf den wir warteten. Fr[iedrich] ganz blass 
und still, dann sagte er es mir. Deutsche, nur deutsche Vornamen, ein paar eingebürgerte 
eingeschlossen. Aber Juden jüdische. – Ich sagte vorher: ‘Pass auf, sie schreiben sie vor!’ Und so 
kam es auch. Nicht Jonas, Josua, Benjamin, die sich ertragen liessen, sondern furchtbarste, kaum 
gekannte, zum Teil beleidigende Namen, und was für Fr. in Betracht kommt, wer andere Vornamen 
hat, muss ihnen, als Mann: Israel, als Frau: Sarah hinzufügen. Man weiss gar nicht, was man sagen  
soll. Jede amtliche Unterschrift muss so geleistet werden; so steht’s im Fernsprechverzeichnis, im 
Adressbuch, im Girokonto. Fr. schrieb sogleich an den Minister des Inneren Frick, bat ihn, davon 
verschont zu bleiben, gab seine Gründe an. Wer weiss, ob das nicht noch als Auflehnung gilt?” 
(DOK. 86, Heim et al. 2009:272, translated by EH).
233 Original: “Ab 1.1. müssen alle Juden, ob getauft oder nicht, als zweiten Vornamen den Namen Is-
rael, alle Jüdinnen den zweiten Namen Sara führen. Die Liste der Vornamen, die für neugeborene 
Judenkinder festgesetzt ist, bedeutet zu achtzig Prozent eine sadistische Verhöhnung. Die biblis-
chen, berühmten Namen sind den Juden gesperrt.” (Klepper 1983:631, translated by EH).
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After denied permission to leave the German Empire, Jochen Klepper committed 
suicide together with his wife and daughter in December 1942, in order to escape 
deportation.
The Second Decree was abolished on September 20, 1945 by Law no. 1 of the Control  
Council which dealt with the abolition of Nazi law. On January 29, 1948, the Law 
regarding the Changing of Surnames and Forenames was extended by a Third Decree 
that initiated the erasure and change of Jewish forced names, which suspended the 
Second Decree (FamNamV BY, Bundesministerium der Justiz und für 
Verbraucherschutz). Although the Second Decree is not mentioned explicitly in current 
German legislation, it should be questioned why new legislation has not been written 
without any reference to the anti-Semitic establishment of the law on January 07, 1938. 
Here, this reference seems to imply that a possible Forth Decree might enable the 
Second Decree to come back into effect. Furthermore, why can one still find phrases 
such as “Deutsches Reich” (NamÄndG, Deutscher Bundestag 1/09/2009) and “Der 
Reichsminister des Inneren” (FamNamÄndGDV 1, Bundesministerium des Inneren 
15/08/2013)? Are these phrases meant to refer to the modern German state and to the 
current German Minister of the Interior?
The Law on the Changing of Surnames and Forenames and the Second Decree had been 
written by civil servant and lawyer Hans Globke, who later became director of West 
Germany’s Federal Chancellery from 1953-1963 and one of Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer’s closest advisors. Through Globke’s legislative activities between 1933 and 
1945, he was responsible for the juridical institutionalization of accustomed anti-
Semitism and the establishment of anti-Semitic legislation on personal status and 
naming, which through the explicit marking of Jews, facilitated the creation of 
deportation lists. Globke’s role in the planning of the Holocaust has been played down 
by himself and through the support of Adenauer. However, the effects of Globke’s 
actions cannot be minimized by the principle of unintentionality, which is a powerful 
presupposition of German (as well as Swedish234) hegemonic discourse and particularly 
jurisdiction which can limit legal culpability. Globke’s case is just one of many which 
234 Cf. Habel 2011:107: “[C]onceptions that racism is underpinned by intentions and acts of volition are 
very useful in the public arena [in Sweden] […]. If you don’t mean anything racist, you have not 
performed a racist act.“
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demonstrate the institutionalized continuities of National Socialism in Germany after 
1945.235
From my own family context, I am familiar with another continuity of anti-Semitic 
naming practices. I became accustomed to using the phrase ‘Sara’ as pejorization for 
girls – initially without conceptualizing it as a personal name in these contexts. It was 
only when my aunt and uncle decided that they wanted to assign a Hebrew name to my 
newborn cousin that other family members made it clear that Sarah was not an option 
because of the pejorative appellations. At this moment they explicitly re_produced the 
anti-Semitic use of the name that is discriminatory against Jews and not against the 
person whose name it initially is (cf. chapters 1.3.5 and 5.5).
6.2.2.4 Assimilation as enforced name change
As discussed in chapter 3.2.2.1, ‘Germanness’ was historically institutionalized as a 
white, non-migratized concept that is still negotiated as such today. Thus, when the first 
registration and naming laws were established in the German Empire, they were 
actually designed for white, non-migratized Germans. Afro-Germans were not 
conceptualized as intelligible (cf. El-Tayeb 2001; Oguntoye et al. 2006). El-Tayeb’s 
analysis of the racist context and exclusion of Afro-Germans in the German Empire 
shows that the enforced Germanification of their supposedly non-German names would 
not necessarily enable a Black person to naturalize as German. Rather, the 
Germanification of Afro-Germans’ names must be regarded as ignorance and the refusal 
by German authorities to learn and deal with names they were not accustomed to (El-
Tayeb 2001:114). Astrid Berger recalls that her father’s name was amended into not only 
a German but Christian name: from Kala King to Gottlieb Kala Kinger (cf. Berger 
2006:123). Apparently, both first and last names had to be changed, although the 
orthography suggests a phonetic pronunciation that would not have caused any 
problems for a white, non-migratized German registrar (cf. chapter 5.1). Assimilating 
235 On May 13, 1951, a law was established that regulated the legal relationships of people who fall un-
der article 131 of the German Constitution – in other words, former members of the NSdAP that 
were not classified as convicted war criminals. The legislation introduced one of the first quota sys-
tems which benefited these Nazis: It obliged the German public administration to reserve at least  
20% of the available positions for former NSdAP members (cf. Deutscher Bundestag 
13/05/1951:section II, articles 11–18), except for former employees of the Gestapo (cf. Deutscher 
Bundestag 13/05/1951:section I, article 3, paragraph 4).
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names in order to make them look ‘more German’ is a form of enforced name change.  
Asian-German Hanna Hoa Anh Mai also reports in her essay how her aunt ‘Susan’ was 
forcefully assigned her name:
“‘Your Aunt Susan’s name is not Susan. When she came to Canada with her 
grandparents, it was said in school: And your name is Susan; because they found 
her real name too difficult to pronounce.’ As a five-year-old, I thought that was 
terribly unfair. If someone just gave me another name, I’d think of a thousand ways 
to rebel.”236
The question of whether or not a person and their name has been recognized as 
hegemonically ‘intelligible’ and thus legalized in Germany, is linked to the legal status of 
the name bearer as a German citizen. As shown in chapter 3.2, since its  
institutionalization in Germany in 1913, citizenship has been negotiated as a legalized 
means for discrimination. People with names that did not comply with the hegemonic 
perception of German names were advised to assimilate their name with their 
naturalization as a German citizen. German Civil Code suggests that every person who
“acquired their name under an applicable foreign law and whose name will 
henceforth comply with German Law may […] take on a German version of their 
first or family name at the registration office; in case this version does not exist, 
another new first name can be taken instead.”237
As described in chapters 3.2.1 and 4.1, prior to 2000 only ius sanguinis ‘post-war 
repatriates’ were enabled to assume German citizenship. Consequently, it has only been 
possible since 2000 for anyone who wishes to naturalize as German to change their 
personal name through ‘Germanization’. This form of institutionally advised linguistic 
assimilation can, for example, be expressed by exchanging one’s original name with the 
236 Original: “‘Deine Tante Susan heißt eigentlich nicht Susan. Als sie mit deinen Großeltern nach 
Kanada kam, hieß es in der Schule: Und du heißt Susan, weil sie ihren richtigen Namen dort zu 
schwierig auszusprechen fanden.’ Als Fünfjährige fand ich das schrecklich ungerecht. Wenn mir 
einfach irgendjemand einen anderen Namen geben würde? Ich malte mir tausend Arten aus, wie 
dann rebellieren würde.” (Mai 2012:192, translated by EH).
237 Original: “Hat eine Person nach einem anwendbaren ausländischen Recht einen Namen erworben 
und richtet sich ihr Name fortan nach deutschem Recht, so kann sie durch Erklärung gegenüber 
dem Standesamt […] eine deutschsprachige Form ihres Vor- oder ihres Familiennamens an-
nehmen; gibt es eine solche Form des Vornamens nicht, so kann sie neue Vornamen annehmen“ 
(Deutscher Bundestag: article 47, paragraph 1, point 5, translated by EH).
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assumed German-sounding gendered equivalent (e.g. Katharina for Jekaterina; 
Mackensen 1978:272; 278–279 238) or finding a new name which appears to be gender-
distinct (cf. chapter 6.1.2). Although name assimilation is negotiated as an option in the 
legislation and is also recommended by the registrars (cf. Hayn 24/07/2012b; 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Standesbeamten n.d.), one can barely speak of an 
unrestricted choice. As migratist_genderist_racist perceptions of names affect  
discrimination in hegemonic German discourse, the choice is between facing migratist 
discrimination and passing as German, a risky and only potential privilege (cf. Hayn 
2015). When Eugen Litwinow moved to Germany in 1993, he was recognized as ‘post-
war repatriate’ according to the German Constitution article 116, a person entitled to 
German citizenship through ius sanguinis (cf. GG, Deutscher Bundestag 31/12/2014: 
article 116 paragraph 1). In the context of naturalization his name was assimilated, form 
Евгений to Eugen.239 In a documentary, Litwinow explains that changing his name did 
not happen voluntarily:
“20 years ago, still a child, I moved to Germany with my family. Shortly after our 
arrival I had to abandon the name Evgenij. It was said that this would make 
integration easier. And Eugen was the official German substitutional name.” 
(Litwinow 2013b:00:36-00:48)
Simultaneously, his middle name (the so-called father name) was eliminated according 
to the BGBEG’s claim that, “name parts that are not recognized by German law, can be 
238 In this book, the editor attempts to translate first ‘German’ names into their assumed ‘non-German’ 
variation and vice versa. As a side note, the editor of the book left out his own first name on the  
book cover.
239 For ‘post-war repatriates’, the following registration regulations of the Federal Refugee Act apply: 
“(1) Displaced persons and post-war expatriates […] that are recognized as ‘Germans’ according to 
Article 116,1 of the German Constitution may declare to the Federal Administration Office in charge 
of their redistribution procedure or to the registration office […] 1. to dismiss name parts that are  
not allowed by German Legislation, 2. to take on the original form of a name that was altered with  
regard to gender or family relations, 3. to take on a German version of their first or family name; in  
case this version does not exist, another new first name can be taken instead […] 5. to take on the  
family name in a German translation provided that the translation reveals a name that is accepted 
in the German speaking area.” (Deutscher Bundestag 25/11/2015: article 94, paragraph 1, translat-
ed by EH). There are special regulations for children: As soon as they turn five they must agree with 
the name change. At fourteen, they need to submit the declaration themselves. However, the extent 
can be questioned to which children are in the position and have the necessary life experience to 
understand the implications and consequences of a name change that is motivated by hegemonic 
assimiliation contraints.
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abandoned”240. After Litwinow learned from his father that his character had changed 
with the changing of his name, he started a book project which is based on the 
experiences of fellow Russian German youth who had moved from Russia to Germany. 
Their commonality is that they had been asked and/or forced to take on Eugen as their 
new name in Germany. However, they differ in their opinions and decisions when it 
comes to the identification with their name. With his project, Litwinow shows that the 
enforced name change did not necessarily ease a person’s life, despite its assimilation to 
hegemonic accustomed norms. Today, Eugen as well as other presumably ‘translated’ 
names such as Elsa for Jelisaweta (cf. Russian-online.net n.d.a) or Waldemar for 
Vladimir (cf. Russian-online.net n.d.b) are barely given to children as a first name. 
Litwinow even quotes a fellow migratized person who stresses that Eugen is an unusual  
name nowadays.
When Litwinow was asked his name and replied ‘Eugen’, he was identified as ‘Russian’, 
based on the experience that only naturalized ‘post-war repatriates’ have that name (cf. 
Litwinow 2013a:70). Hence, the name can be regarded as a marker for the biographical 
background of these people, as well as their social positioning in German society. 
Simultaneously, it proves that assimilation by changing a name did not have the 
‘integrating’ effects the registrars and legislation had thought they would. This form of 
enforced name change does not prevent migratist discrimination but instead divides the 
group of people discriminated against on the grounds of migratist perception, not only 
of their names but also of their use of language and place of birth and childhood. 
Russian Germans face migratist discrimination, although they are institutionally 
recognized and privileged as ‘ius sanguinis Germans’ by law.
However, legislative recognition provides an easier access to privilege, as a current 
example of name change and assimilation shows. In 2005, a family from Azerbaijan 
received asylum in Germany. After realizing discrimination on the grounds of 
migratist_racist name perception, they applied for a name change in order to increase 
their chances to find a job and to fully integrate into German society. Simultaneously, 
they also declared that they felt like an easy target for political persecution because their 
240 Original: “Bestandteile des Namens ablegen, die das deutsche Recht nicht vorsieht“ (Deutscher 
Bundestag: article 47, paragraph 1, point 3, translated by EH).
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family name was rare. However, the family’s right to change their name according to 
articles 1, 3 and 11 of Germany’s NamÄndG was denied (cf. Migazin - Migration in 
Germany Online 2012; Verwaltungsgericht Göttingen, Urteil of 25/04/2012).  
Discrimination on the grounds of a racist_migratist perception of their names was not 
recognized as a practice that excludes people from the labor market, nor was their fear 
of persecution regarded as a substantial risk in Germany. This trivializing perspective 
that regards Germany as safe ‘for all’ is only respecting a privileged position that never 
had to fear persecution or face structural discrimination. Also, to argue that name 
discrimination on the labor market cannot be a reason for a name change – although 
there might be evidence241 – mirrors the anti-Semitic decree introduced in 1894 that 
denied Jews their right to change their names, despite an awareness of the impact of  
anti-Semitism by those in charge (cf. Wagner-Kern 2002:96). In light of the historical 
presuppositions of NamÄndG, the following phrase by the administrative court 
Göttingen appears to be revisionist towards the law’s historical context: “It is not the 
role of the naming laws to counter-act societal aberration.”242 In this way, German 
legislation denames the fact that anti-Semitism constituted NamÄndG and that the law 
indeed contributes to societal aberration (cf. chapter 3.2.2). What is more, in the case of 
Litwinow, which addresses the forced Germanification of Russian-identified names 
during naturalization, German legislation claims that name assimilation would ease 
‘integration’. Thus, the perception of names as German or non-German has a powerful 
effect for the naturalizing person. However, the responsibility for any discriminatory 
consequences is assigned to the name bearer and not to the discriminatory norms that 
are re_produced in hegemonic discourse areas, such as legislation. Consequently, 
discrimination on the grounds of racist_migratist name perception is – despite 
empirical evidence (cf. Kaas, Manger 2010; Krause et al. 2012; Senatsverwaltung für 
Integration 2010) – neglected on a structural level and individualized on a personal 
level.
241 Original: “[...] aufgrund [eines] ausländischen Namens Diskriminierungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt 
ausgesetzt zu sein, ist zwar nicht ganz auszuschließen. Jedoch stellt diese keinen wichtigen Grund 
für eine Namensänderung dar“ (Verwaltungsgericht Göttingen, Urteil of 25/04/2012).
242 Original: “Es ist nicht Aufgabe des Namensrechts, einer gesellschaftlichen Fehlentwicklung entge-
genzusteuern“ (Verwaltungsgericht Göttingen, Urteil of 25/04/2012, translated by EH).
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For the German context, the enforced assimilation of names to an assumed German 
name grammar does not necessarily have inclusive effects for people who are considered 
non-German. Quite the contrary: Until 1990, naturalization and, thus the 
Germanization of names was more or less limited only to non-migratized Germans who 
were defined as such by ius sanguinis. Consequently, naming practices in Germany have 
resulted in what I would identify as a Germany-specific practice, the marking of ‘the 
Other’, the non-German (cf. 6.2.2.3). The invention of citizenship and nationality is the 
immediate prerequisite and institutionalized presupposition of Othering which is 
performed in German registration offices. In cases where persons with non-German 
citizenship come to register their children, the registrar applies the legislative rules of 
the respective state even though these persons may make Germany their permanent 
residence (Hayn 23/07/2012).
In comparison, the constraints that motivated the introduction of Sweden’s first law on 
names aimed at protecting existing ‘Swedish’ names and at promoting the creation of 
new names that hegemonically had been perceived as ‘Swedish’ on the grounds of their  
phonology and morphology. Thus, given the nationalist promotion of ‘Swedishness’ in 
the context of naming, and given the evidence of racist_migratist discrimination on the 
labor and housing markets, name changing in Sweden has also not necessarily been a 
free choice but rather a form of enforced assimilation.
6.2.2.5 Old name – new name – self-determined
What effect the changing of names can have for the individual person depends on the 
person’s social positioning and on the context of the naming act. In order to increase 
their chances on the job or housing markets, migratized people might experience the 
enforced need to change their migratized names in order to pass as ‘German’ or 
‘Swedish’ (cf. Verwaltungsgericht Göttingen, Urteil of 25/04/2012; Lerner 2011); 
statisized Germans or Swedes with a name that is hegemonically recognized as German 
or Swedish do not experience this form of exclusion. In comparison, to exchange the 
enforced gendered name with a gender-free and gender non-conform name is an act of 
empowerment, just as adding or exchanging names that remind of slavery and 
colonialization with names interpellating Afro-Germans’ African descent (cf. chapter 
6.2.2.1). Cis-people usually do not change their names because they identify with the 
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implied gender-distinctivity. As discussed before, in Germany they have the privilege of 
changing their name based on spelling difficulties (cf. chapter 6.1.1). In Sweden, name 
change appears to be more accepted, at least by legislation. The journal Språktidningen 
suggests that the changing of a person’s name might be motivated by a person’s wish to  
be unique, while ignoring the fact that deprivileged people might also have other 
reasons for name change, such as survival (cf. chapter 6.1.4). However, hegemonic 
discourse in Germany prevents the intelligibility of naming practices in which it is 
regarded as appropriate for a person to choose their own name. This concerns in 
particular the disruption of the enforced binary gender norm that forces trans and 
gender non-conform people to identify with their birth gender and with genderization in 
general. The following quotation reminds of the societal construction and distinction 
between biological and social birth (cf. chapter 6.1.1).
“There were nights that stretched past morning, but I knew if I could make it to 
sunrise, on the wall of the youth center would be hanging a white board that said:
Old name   New Name    Pronoun
Everyone knew to check it every day, because in our world, today’s new name could 
be tomorrow’s old news […] We were giving birth to our own lives, naming 
ourselves out of baby books or rebirthing ourselves with names that came to us, 
soaked and cold from a Portland rainstorm.” (Lowrey 2010:199–200)
This quotation is an empowering example for making social birth intelligible as a self-
chosen, self-determined act. Not only is self-naming negotiated as appropriate but also 
the possibility to actually change one’s name and pronoun every day. However, in 
German hegemonic discourse, both these empowering principles are denamed and 
de_conceptualized, as the following example demonstrates.
A friend243 I had not spoken to for a while called one day and we talked about what we 
had recently experienced in our lives. I was curious to learn how they were doing, since 
they had just changed their first name some weeks before. However, as sadly expected, 
my friend was confronted with not only supporting environments. When coming out as 
243 I am grateful to an anonymous friend that shared their knowledge about genderist name discrimi-
nation with me (Anonymous friend *** 2013).
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gender non-conform and sharing the good news of having finally found a fitting name, 
some people, in particular relatives, did not understand the relevance and impact of the 
name change for my friend. They started to question the reasons as well as the self-
empowerment, not realizing that this form of mistrust is discriminatory. In this way, the 
hegemonic norm was re_produced that restricts the opportunity to choose a first name 
to others, such as guardians or parents or – in the case of nicknaming – even to friends  
but not to oneself. Despite the wide-spread practice which negotiates names as one of 
the most personal and incarnating features about a person (cf. chapter 6.1) if a person 
chooses their own name, hegemonic discourse questions it and is even ignorant about 
the self-determined name change: “I might just not get used to it that quickly and might 
make ‘mistakes’ so that’s the reason why I am still using your old name” (a fictional but  
quite possible excuse, defense and denial). The accustoming of institutionalized hetero- 
as well as reprogendering practices becomes further evident against the background of 
ritualized practices, such as congratulating on the event of a newborn child or its 
baptism (representing personal first names as symbols for Christening, the becoming of 
a Christian) but not for name changes, which can have a similar social meaning in terms 
of social birth (cf. chapter 6.1.1).
Sharing their experiences with me, my friend bestowed upon me knowledge they gained 
through genderist discrimination, a knowledge – like all life stories of everyday 
discrimination that do not apply to me as a privileged person – I cannot experience in 
the same way. I speak from a position with a name that privileges me to experience full  
recognition as a citizen, thus recognition as non-migratized, white, cis-binary-
genderable. However, as this experience is so normalized for privileged people, they 
usually do not recognize that they are indeed privileged because they are simply not 
asked about how they got their names and why or where they came from.
As previously stated in chapter 4, the enforced gendering of names is implied in the 
principle of revealing the assigned birth gender through a conventionalized ‘gender-
distinct’ name (Geschlechtsoffenkundigkeit). This principle can be regarded not only as 
an institutionalized and structuralized discriminatory naming practice but also as an 
internalized as well as normalized accustomed ideology that remains unchallenged by 
hegemonic discourse. German Law on Civil Status forces newborn people to be classified 
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as either male or female (PStG, Deutscher Bundestag 1/01/2009: article 21, paragraph 
1). Since 2013, this does only apply to people who according to medical discourse are 
diagnosed with binary-gender fitting. People who are not recognized by medical 
discourse as genderable (thus denied normality), such as intergender and intersex 
people, are assigned without gender as ‘Other’, but not as a third category in addition to 
female and male. The legislation on personal status forces them to later decide between 
these two options, and does not provide a real choice for a self-identified life (cf. PStG, 
Deutscher Bundestag 1/01/2009: article 22, paragraph 3). In a press release, OII 
Germany (IVIM) states that “[t]his means that only with a present intersex diagnosis 
these options are accessible and that medicine would still act as gatekeeper for gender 
classification”244. Hence, they demand
“the elimination of official gender registration of newborns. As an alternative, the 
entry can remain open or be negotiated as a voluntary indication of one’s own 
choice. This option must be open to anyone – without the requirement of a medical 
diagnosis!”245
Thus, people who later will not be grouped within such cis-binary-gendered boundaries 
as trans and gender non-conform people will not be forcefully identified as cis-female or 
cis-male or gendered within a naturalized binary-gender at birth. In contrast, people 
who have never been discriminated by the binary-gender norm are not questioned in 
regard to their position or their conventionalized practice to ‘identify’ as female or male.
As already stated in cf. chapter 2.3.1, to forcefully gender a person is also explicitly 
linked to citizenship. Registration practices in Germany defer from those of other 
countries. For example, in the UK it is possible to name people gender unspecifically.246 
Until 2011 in Germany (cf. TSG, Deutscher Bundestag 23/07/2009: article 8, second 
footnote) and until 2013 in Sweden (Sveriges Riksdag 2013, cf. Liljenblad 2013) 
244 Original: “Das bedeutet, dass nur bei vorliegender Intersex-Diagnose diese Optionen offen stünden 
und weiterhin die Medizin als gatekeeper der Geschlechtsklassifikation fungieren würde” 
(IVIM/OII Deutschland 23.902.2012, translated by EH).
245 Original: “die Streichung der amtlichen Geschlechtsregistrierung von Neugeborenen. Alternativ: 
Eintragung offen lassen oder freiwillige Angabe mit einem Eintrag eigener Wahl. Diese Option 
muss allen Menschen offen stehen – ohne die Voraussetzung einer medizinischen Diagnose!” 
(IVIM/OII Deutschland 23.902.2012, translated by EH).
246 I am grateful to Natasha A. Kelly for this example (Kelly 2012b).
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trans*people were forced to be sterilized, which forced them to adapt to hegemonic 
gendered body norms in order to be registered under ‘the Other’ of only two gender 
options. In comparison to the silenced forms of denial of personhood that are at the core  
of my analysis, forced sterilization is an explicit indication for the depersonalization and 
denial of trans*_genderqueer people’s rights.
Based on the various ways to deal with fundamental genderism, one needs to question 
why the German registration process enforces and applies the principle of gender-
distinctivity (Geschlechtsoffenkundigkeit) for names, an activity that even from a 
hegemonic point of view lacks legal backing. Although the (separate) indication of 
gender is still negotiated as mandatory during registration, neither NamÄndG nor PStG 
demand a gender-distinct name. However, this also applied to the outdated 
administrative regulations (Dienstanweisung für die Standesbeamten und ihre 
Aufsichtsbehörden), which with their regulating character instructed registrars to 
enforce the gendering of names. Interviews I conducted with three registrars in 2012 
show that this regulative norm was still in effect (Hayn 23/07/2012; Hayn 
24/07/2012b; Hayn 24/07/2012a), despite the Federal Constitutional Court decision in 
2008 which declared the enforced gender-distinctivity of names to be without legal basis 
(cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss of 5/12/2008) and despite the fact that the DA 
regulations had been replaced by general administrative regulation to the Law on Civil  
Status (Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zum Personenstandsgesetz, PStGVwV) in 
2010 which no longer requires gender-distinctivity (cf. Bundesministerium des Inneren 
15/04/2010, cf. Justiz-und-Recht 2016, cf. chapter 4.4). Thus, the accustoming and 
cognitive internalization of hegemonic structuralist ways to gender people might serve 
as one possible explanation for the registrars’ continuing genderist practice. Those 
cognitive structuralizations shape and influence the individual’s perception of the social 
world and can be understood as a mutual process. People perceive and re_produce what 
they have become accustomed to. Given that registrars are accustomed to gender people 
and do not follow all juridical decisions that concern personal naming, they perceive and 
re_produce norms (cis-binary gendering) which are not challenged daily in hegemonic 
and media contexts but instead re_inforced. The ‘ability’ to gender a name is also linked 
to the names people are accustomed to gender. As shown in chapter 4, genderability is 
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usually implied in the statisizability of a name. In the German context, this means that 
every name that is statisizable is genderable. Thus, as long as privilege is not contested 
but silently maintained as the normative perspective of legislation, these discriminatory 
naming practices will not be eliminated. Or in Ahmed’s words: If your norm is already 
accomplished by general norm, you do not need to challenge the norm247.
The implicitness to conceptualize names as cis-binary-gendered, consisting of a first and 
second name as well as a denomination that one can always identify with, is 
re_produced in everyday practice: when ordering a library ID card, when applying for 
an e-mail address (although here it is possible and conventionalized to choose a self-
determined name, depending on provider), when addressing a letter or labeling a mail  
box. In Germany, people who cannot identify with their assigned birth name(s) are 
discriminated by a norm which prevents name change on the grounds of genderism by 
not asking a person at different states of their life to what extent they can still identify 
with their name. Until recently, the only legal way required either accepting the medical 
and juridical implications of the transgender law (Transsexuellengesetz, TSG), such as 
the requirement of ‘expert’ assessments as well as legal procedures (cf. TSG, Deutscher 
Bundestag 23/07/2009: article 1, paragraph 1, points 1 and 2; article 4, paragraph 3; cf. 
Bundesweiter Arbeitskreis TSG-Reform248), or choosing a pseudonym aka artist’s name 
(cf. PAuswG, Deutscher Bundestag 24/06/2009: article 9; BGB, Deutscher Bundestag 
31/05/2016: article 12). A creative intervention in the conceptualization that a personal 
name can represent one person only is the joint artist’s name Mwangi Hutter (formerly: 
Ingrid Mwangi Robert Hutter) that denominates two persons but only one artist 
(Mwangi Hutter n.d.). It remains to be seen what impact the newly accepted 
applications for name change (cf. chapter 3.1.1) will be allowed to have by those 
implementing the NamÄndG.
These accustomed forms of institutionalized naming also generate the assumption that 
people are willing to share the name they have been registered with, although this might 
247 Cf. Sara Ahmed’s ‘original’ words at thought as action conference in Bergen, August 16 th, 2012, 
were: “If your will is already accomplished by general will, you do not need to be self-willed” 
(Ahmed 2012).
248 Cf. postulation paper of Bundesweiter Arbeitskreis TSG-Reform of June 1st, 2012 for the reform of 
TSG, such as abolishing assessment as well as legal procedures: Bundesweiter Arbeitskreis TSG-Re-
form 2012.
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cause trauma (cf. chapter 6.2.1). Additionally, people who cannot identify or perceive 
themselves with their assigned initial name because of abjectification and accustomed 
unintelligibility are forced to name and explain their discrimination, as well as the desire 
to change their name in order to intervene in discriminatory naming practices. Since it 
is hegemonic as well as silenced naming norms which are fought against, structural 
discrimination is often individualized and made the ‘problem’ of those who experience 
discrimination (cf. Linton 2006; Corker). And yet it would be only respectful to ask 
people how they want to be addressed.
Transferring the observation of Critical Race theorists that structural discrimination and 
unequal treatment on the grounds of migratism, genderism and racism remain 
undisturbed by legislation (cf. chapter 3.2) to the present case, this means that neither 
NamÄndG nor any other law will fight discriminatory perceptions of names. Although 
there might be some opportunities to find self-determining ways of naming oneself 
within the law, they can simultaneously re_produce the discriminatory structural 
framework in which people are forced to respond to normative expectations on personal 
names. For example, name assimilation can lead to what Spade calls the “building and 
legitimizing systems of control” (Spade 2011:161). With regard to interventions in 
genderism, Spade reminds that counter-political activism which tries to compromise 
hegemonic gender norms is in danger to “leav[e] behind more vulnerable trans 
populations” (Spade 2011:161). Considering also migratist and racist name perceptions, 
enforced name assimilation in Germany re_produces the prototypical image of 
‘Germanness’ by making gender-free, gender non-conform and migration-free names 
unintelligible. However, as societal structures and norms are seldom quick to change, 
name assimilation can serve as a strategy of survival. Privileged people who do not 
experience discrimination based on their names might not even understand or will deny 
that the negotiation of names is not neutral. Hence, the hegemonic perception of names 
as German or Swedish, as gender-distinct or not, is critical to guarantee personal rights 
in German and Swedish society, including the right not be discriminated against.
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6.2.3 Hegemonic anonymization: silencing names, objectifying 
people, killing fellow humans
When looking at a random photograph in a journal, newspaper or charity poster that 
re_produces a scene of disaster, despair or poverty, People of Color as well as Black 
people are often presented in a token way that makes them represent the global South. 
In most cases they appear nameless, as if their individual life stories were not worth 
mentioning to contrast the colonialist charity concept. This is especially noticeable when 
the poster also shows photographs of white people representing the wealthy and 
pseudo-philanthropic global North.
As Carolin Philipp and Timo Kiesel state in their analysis of charity advertisement in 
Germany, there is an asymmetry when it comes to naming people on charity posters (cf.  
Philipp, Kiesel n.d.; Philipp 2006; Kiesel 2006; Kiesel, Philipp 2007; Kiesel, Bendix 
2009, Philipp 2012; Philipp, Kiesel 2011). Only white people on the posters are 
presented with their names and celebrities are often included in a pseudo-philanthropic 
manner that is accompanied by a message explaining why they support charity. Philipp, 
Daniel Kiesel and Bendix’s results display repetitive colonialist patterns depicted in 
charity posters which focus on the absence of People of Color and Black people’s names:
“No entire face, no portrait is shown; the pictures are neither described with names 
nor professions. They represent the many [anonymized; EH] people in the projects 
of ‘Brot für die Welt’. They are not described in a personalized, but in an 
impersonal way.”249
In comparison, white people are named, even those that are hegemonically unknown on 
a personal level but represent a certain stereotypical character in German hegemonic 
society (here: Granny Schmidt or Smith from next door):
“Every time when organizations choose white promotional ambassadors, they are 
usually well-known celebrities and occasionally ‘granny Smith from next door’ […]. 
In both cases, they are assigned individuality by a quotation, by certain attributes 
such as name, age, occupation. They are portrayed as subjects of their own doing 
249 Original: “Es wird kein ganzes Gesicht, kein Porträt gezeigt, die Bilder sind weder mit Namen, noch 
mit Professionen bezeichnet. Sie stehen stellvertretend für viele Menschen in den Projekten von 
Brot für die Welt. Sie werden nicht personalisiert beschrieben, sondern unpersönlich.” (Philipp 
2006:65, translated by EH).
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who are not defined solely by the circumstances they live in but by the way they 
take their lives into their own hands and shape them.”250
One campaign that was analyzed changed the way of presenting Black people and People 
of Color by naming them on a first name basis and thus providing a position for them to 
speak from. However, if again compared with the representation of white people, the 
whites are presented with their full name and profession, thus belittling and 
infantilizing Black people and People of Color’s professional achievements and 
knowledge in the context of ‘development’:
“In 2009, the Catholic relief organization Misereor developed a campaign format 
entitled “with anger and tenderness side by side with the poor“ [...] in which 
differently positioned people are portrayed. The big step forward is that Black 
people and People of Color are allowed to speak for themselves. Whilst white 
people are presented by their first and last name and their profession or activity, 
Misereor addresses Black people and People of Color – not consistently, but 
repeatedly – by their first name only. Furthermore, instead of also naming their 
profession, only the country of origin is referred to.251
The hegemonic colonialist_racist perception of Black people and People of Color as 
indigent, poor and dependent and the self-conception of white people as pseudo-
philanthropic and independent provide not only an explanation of the depicted 
hierarchy between ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘donors’ of charity but also re_produce a colonial 
scene. In this traumatic depiction, the role of the colonizer as the powerful one who 
controls, determines, objectifies, depersonalizes and silences the colonized, and the role 
250 Original: “Wenn die Organisationen weiße Werbebotschafter auswählen, sind dies meist bekannte 
Persönlichkeiten oder auch gelegentlich ‘Oma Schmidt von nebenan’ [...]. In beiden Fällen bekom-
men sie durch ein Zitat, durch bestimmte Attribute wie Name, Alter, Beruf eine Individualität zuge-
sprochen. Sie werden als Subjekte ihres Handels dargestellt, die nicht allein durch ihre Lebensum-
stände definiert werden, sondern ihr Leben aktiv in die Hand nehmen und formen können.” 
(Philipp 2012:23, translated by EH).
251 Original: “Das katholische Hilfswerk Misereor hat 2009 mit der Kampagne „mit Zorn und 
Zärtlichkeit an der Seite der Armen” [...] ein Format geschaffen, in dem Menschen unterschiedlich-
er Positionierung porträtiert werden. Der große Fortschritt besteht darin, dass hier Schwarze und 
People of Colour selbst sprechen dürfen. Während Weiße allerdings durch ihren Vor- und Nachna-
men sowie ihren Beruf oder ihre Tätigkeit vorgestellt werden, nennt Misereor Schwarze und People 
of Colour – zwar nicht durchgängig, jedoch wiederholt – nur beim Vornamen. Anstatt auch hier 
den Beruf zu nennen, wird lediglich auf das Herkunftsland verwiesen.” (Kiesel, Bendix 2009:492, 
translated by EH).
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of the colonized as the powerless ones who are controlled, objectified, depersonalized, 
made anonymous and silenced by the colonizer are re_produced. Those who are 
conceptualized as so-called ‘beneficiaries’ of the global North’s appropriated wealth and 
prosperity (that is grounded in the exploitation of the people in the global South) appear 
as nameless representatives of the many anonymous people who are conceptualized as 
one homogeneous group. The acceptance of the racist classification of the nameless 
person is presupposed to the white reading of the posters. It silences and 
de_intelligiblizes the perception of Black donors as well as counter-discourses of 
Afrocentric organizations, such as the African Union, that call on the global North for 
reparation payments instead of patriarchic ‘donation’ gestures (cf. Hayn 2010). Thus, 
the silencing of the Black person’s name also re_produces the colonialist scene that 
results in Othering and in devaluation and depersonalization. For this reason, it can be 
assumed that recognizing and respecting a person’s name and thus identifying them as a 
person (cf. chapter 6.1) promotes caring about them.
Kelly suggests decolonizing one’s own perception of colonialist images. A person looking 
at the colonialist photograph of an anonymous Black person has the power to question 
and change their accustomed cognitive colonialist gaze that is constituted by hegemonic 
linguistic as well as visual contexts and identify the Black person as an individual with a 
life story and professional background (cf. Kelly 2012a). In this way, the person in the 
photograph will be recognized as such and imagined as a person that indeed has a full 
name, which is silenced by hegemonic norms.
A similar form of name silencing can be observed when discriminated people are 
described and talked about on the grounds of their social positioning but not with their 
name and function in the given context. In chapter 2.3.4 I discussed a case that came to  
my attention on the website Leidmedien.de252. Daniel Themann, a 39-year-old person 
with trisomy 21, was nominated to Germany’s Federal Convention to elect the Federal 
President. Among others, the press office of the Protestant church in Germany reported 
on Themann’s nomination but instead of using the title to introduce him with his proper 
name and function (Daniel Themann, member of the Federal Convention) they chose to 
252 Revised version of the title of a report on the election of the German Federal President by an as-
signed member of the election committee, the Federal Convention: Nielsen 2012 and a screenshot 
of the original version: wheelmap.org 2012.
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call him by his disabilization. However, following some inventions (wheelmap.org 
2012), the discriminatory denomination was exchanged for his first name (only). I want 
to focus on two discriminatory practices that are discussed on Leidmedien.de (Maskos 
n.d.a): disability as a tool for sensationalism and for infantilization. First, the 
nomination is hegemonically negotiated as a practice to show respect towards an 
individual member’s engagement in society, as well as to bestow responsibility and 
certain privileges on the members. Thus, by silencing Themann’s name in the title, the 
church’s press office not only served mainstream sensationalism; they also denied 
Themann to be foremost recognized as a respectable citizen who was nominated by the 
federal state of Lower-Saxony to elect the president. Second, in hegemonic media 
discourse, it is an expression of politeness and respect to name a person either with their 
full name or – when abbreviated in the title – with the last name. In press titles, first 
names are usually only used for people who are commonly known on a first name basis 
(for example artists) or children. For politicians and representatives of state institutions 
such as Themann, however, naming the last name is the protocolic norm. By exchanging 
the discriminatory denomination with the first name, the evangelical press office 
infantilized Themann and did not recognize him as a fully respectable representative 
and member of the Federal Convention. Infantilization results in the representation of 
disableized persons as, according to Leidmedien.de, “passive and helpless [...], as 
‘problem children’ that need to be taken care of”253 as well as people that are spoken 
about but not with. In this way, their full names are silenced, which results in silencing 
their voices and expertise on their own experiences and life stories.
In contrast, naming practices go so far as to personalize all living creatures, as is  
demonstrated by the naming of pets. An example from a German TV show shows how a 
name metaphorically personalizes an animal in a way that makes it difficult to kill:
Criminal inspector (asking the owner of a rabbitry after learning the mate rabbit’s 
name): “What are the other [rabbits, EH] called?”
253 Original: “passiv und hilflos [...], als ‘Sorgenkinder’, um die man sich kümmern muss” (Maskos 
n.d.a, translated by EH).
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Owner of rabbitry: “They don’t have any names. They have a numbered ear. I could 
never slaughter an animal that has a name. Not me, that’s not possible.”254
Apparently, having named the mate rabbit prevents the owner from killing it, whereas a 
number makes it possible, thus intelligible, for him to kill the nameless rabbits. This 
correlation between name and life as well as number and death reminds of Nazi 
extermination practices, when a number tattooed on their arms replaced the prisoners’ 
names. It suggests that a number dehumanizes people and removes emotive attachment 
to a fellow human255, making the dehumanized more vulnerable to discrimination and 
finally to being killed. In his survival report, Schramm describes the correlation between 
being asked one’s name and feeling human (cf. Schramm 2011:95). Thus, a number does 
not have the same identity and personhood as a personal name, and even less so when 
the camp internees were never really interpellated by their enforced number (cf. Klüger 
2008) and the number interpellated its bearer’s arbitrariness and interchangeability (cf. 
Schramm 2011:88) instead.
Ilene Prusher, journalist at Haaretz, summarizes the relevance of a name, and in 
particular of a last name, for Jewish heritage as follows:
“[T]he horrors and miracles of the 20th century have left their mark on the state of 
Jewish family names. For some, the idea of a family name dying out sits on the 
collective memory of a whole people almost being wiped out. For others, the 
creation of a new name – often with a Hebrew element – is the ultimate statement 
of Jewish survival. It is no coincidence that Israel’s national holocaust memorial 
museum is called Yad Vashem, meaning “a place and a name,” a reference from the 
Book of Isaiah.” (Prusher 2014)
Against this background, the effect on people of being recognized by a number instead of 
by a name – as is the case in Sweden – should be examined. Since 1947, registration in 
Sweden includes the allocation of a personal identity number. Introduced shortly after 
254 Scene from episode “Sag nichts” of German TV series Tatort. Original: “Wie heißen denn die an-
dern [Hasen, EH]?“ – “Die haben keinen Namen. Die haben ‘ne Nummer im Ohr. Ich brächte es 
nicht übers Herz, ein Tier zu schlachten, das einen Namen hat. Nee, ich nicht.“ (Kraume 
2003:50:25–50:35) translated by EH.
255 Cf. for example the title of the chapter about Schramm’s survival in KZ Buchenwald: “Vom Men-
schen zur Nummer gemacht: Buchenwald” (Schramm 2011:77).
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World War II, the number is used in all official as well as everyday contexts. In this way,  
the personal identity number is negotiated as essential for daily life in Sweden. A person 
newly arrived in Sweden explains how the number has excluded her from numerous 
opportunities to participate in everyday life and summarizes: “Being any kind of human 
recognizable to Swedish bureaucracy? Nope” (Vashisht 2014). Given that it was 
introduced so shortly after World War II, the personal identity number has invoked 
trauma with Holocaust survivors living in Sweden (Dahl 2011).
The personal identity number also re_produces categorical information about a person 
in both its acquisition and compilation when issued by the Swedish Tax Agency. It is 
only since 2000 that it is assigned to everyone who is registered in Sweden. Hence, 
whether a person receives a personal identity number or not depends on whether they is 
identified as entitled for registration by law. Until 1990, the number consisted of 10 
digits, of which the seventh and eighth digit indicated place of birth (cf. Skatteverket 
2007; Statistiska centralbyrån 2007; Wikipedia 2016a). Thus, people who were born 
outside of Sweden were digitally marked as such by their personal identity number. In 
this way, the civic concept of ius soli is so interpellated that together with ius sanguinis, 
it constitutes the hegemonic conceptualization of Swedishness (cf. chapter 3.2.3.1). 
Hence, if someone’s place of birth is Sweden it is most likely that the digit interpellates 
the image of a white, ableized, non-migratized Swedish person on the grounds of 
accustomed default-setting (cf. chapter 2.3.4).
Additionally, hegemonic genderization according to the binary-gender system is also 
indicated in the personal identity number: “The three-digit birth number is [gender]-
specific. […] It is odd for men (e.g. 999) and even for women (998), i.e. the third digit is 
odd for men but never for women” (Ludvigsson et al. 2009:660).256
Thus, despite the fact that the personal identity number replaces and excels personal 
names in Swedish bureaucracy, the number can be regarded as having a similar function 
as a personal name: The indication of the date of one’s biological birth together with its 
enforced assignment of one of two genders and place of birth are indicators for the 
extent to which a person is perceived in a discriminatory way. Additionally, the process 
256 Cf. also Justitiedepartementet L6: article 18 and Skatteverket 2007.
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of applying for a personal identity number might thus need to be compared to the 
process of naturalization: Who is entitled to apply for a number? What difficulties do 
migratized and non-migratized, ableized and disableized, trans and gender non-conform 
people and cis-people encounter during the application process? And to what extent has 
bureaucracy in Sweden changed since the introduction of the personal identity number 
in terms of discrimination, specifically as it enables the objectification and alienation of 
people?
 
6.3 Summary
In this chapter, I discussed hegemonic Western expectations towards personal names 
which result in the recognition of people as legal persons with personal rights.  
Personhood is defined by hegemonic legal as well as medical discourse. Both discourses 
constitute a person’s existence as the result of a person’s biological and social birth. Both 
events are hegemonically negotiated as one-time events, thus making another or 
multiple social births of trans*_genderqueer people unintelligible.
However, as illustrated, people do not have the same access to personal rights, such as 
the right to choose a name that intervenes in the hegemonic perception of names as 
gendered and statisized. This can lead to the denial of personhood by hegemonic 
naming processes. The legally guaranteed right to a name therefore only applies to 
people who are privileged through naming practices. In Sweden, this right to a name 
includes the right to change the personal name without further medical pathologization 
and investigation. Since the right to change one’s name is negotiated as a statement that 
makes people’s names unique, this right is questioned: In comparison to migratized 
people who hope to increase their chances on the job and housing markets by changing 
their names, listing boredom of one’s name and the wish for uniqueness as reasons for  
name change needs to be regarded as a privileged person’s argumentation. This is valid 
despite the fact that even an assumed unique name interpellates group membership and 
thus personhood. In comparison to naming strategies which result in the denial of 
personhood, supposedly unique names make their bearers still intelligible in hegemonic 
discourse. Hegemonic silencing of traumatic names, the withdrawal of a person’s name 
and the enforced need to change one’s name in order to improve their chances in society 
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exclude people from the right to a name as well as from the right of non-discrimination 
that is caused by these naming practices.
Trauma is invoked by the ignorance of the historical impact and associations 
interpellated by names of, for example, colonial aggressors. The disconnection of a name 
from its historical and societal context allows white statisized people to de_perceive the 
continuities of historical crimes conducted by fellow white statisized people. In this way, 
hegemonic denial allows privileged people to play the ‘innocent’ – a strategy I contest in 
the final chapter by drafting recommendations for privileged people, such as me 
becoming actively involved with my own discriminatory perceptions of personal names.
With the institutionalization of naming practices, discrimination becomes particularly 
evident in name changing. Institutional regulations enforce people to take on names 
that interpellate conceptualizations of ownership, that mark people’s position as the 
oppressed and unwanted Other, and that re_produce hegemonic perceptions of names 
as statisized. Despite these hegemonic norms, empowering examples show how 
regulations can be used in order to emancipate from oppression and find a way for self-
determined identification.
Finally, the silencing of oppressed people’s names performs hegemonic anonymization 
of people. This results in the silencing of their voices, in their unintelligibility as 
members of society and thus as people to care about, and in the marking of their 
position as the underprivileged by fate (and not by power). Another effect of 
anonymization is the objectification of people by replacing their name with an entity,  
such as a number that does not interpellate those personhood-defining associations that 
a name does. This form of objectification can lead to dehumanization and to the killing 
of fellow humans.
In summary, name change can be motivated by very different circumstances. The 
following quotation by Klüger proves this. Under the National Socialist regime, Klüger 
and other Jews were forced to use a pseudonym to help them survive anti-Semitic 
persecution and murder. After World War II, they continued to live with their original 
names and forgot the enforced fake ones:
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“I also forgot our names. After the war had ended, I never thought about them. This 
is not repression, this is leaving behind. I know a Polish Jew […] who lived under a 
code name in Belgium during the Nazi period for four years. He cannot remember 
his fake name either although he use it for so long. […] The man has not repressed 
that he needed to change his name. But the name itself is like the telephone 
number of an appartment one does not live in any longer. One knows for sure that 
there was a telephone connection, but the order of numbers is irrelevant, thus 
blurred, erased. When you can finally have your real name back, why bringing the 
false identity back to mind?”257
Klüger did not see the need to memorize the enforced cover name. Retaining their own 
original name means empowerment – showing the connection to Jewish ancestry that 
was persecuted and murdered as the unwanted Other under National Socialism. It also 
symbolizes survival – the old name outlived the enforced temporary name that stands 
for anti-Semitic oppression.
257 Original: “Auch unsere Namen habe ich vergessen. Nach Kriegsende nie wieder daran gedacht. Das 
ist keine Verdrängung, das ist ein Hintersichlassen. Ich kenne einen polnischen Juden […], der als 
Kind in der Nazizeit in Belgien vier Jahre lang unter einem Decknamen lebte. Der weiß auch seinen  
falschen Namen nicht mehr, obwohl er ihn so lange benutzt hat. […] Der Mann hat ja nicht ver-
drängt, dass er sich umbenennen mußte. Doch der Name selbst ist wie die Telephonnummer einer  
Wohnung, die man nicht mehr bewohnt. Sicher weiß man, daß man dort Telephonanschluß hatte,  
aber die Reihenfolge der Zahlen ist unerheblich, daher verwischt, gelöscht. Wenn man endlich 
wieder so heißen kann, wie man wirklich heißt, warum sich die falsche Identität ins Gedächtnis 
zurückrufen?” (Klüger 2013:181, translated by EH).
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7. Summary: Deconstructivist Strategies to Negotiate Naming 
Processes: Interventions and Recommendations
 
“How should I live? Perhaps this is not even the question.
– How should I think?”258
 
7.1 What I Have Done: Returning to the Initial Questions
In this study, I investigated presuppositions, assumptions and perceptions that are 
hegemonically interpellated with personal names and that have been identified as 
structural discrimination that is performed and experienced every day. Personal names 
have been analyzed from a deconstructivist pragmatic perspective in their contextual 
usage in society and thus have been perceived as processual, naming activities to which 
meaning is ascribed. This approach allowed me to question what names are perceived 
and negotiated as gender-distinct, German or Swedish and to analyze and describe the 
consequences for people’s social perception in Germany and Sweden. By applying a 
feminist dispositive approach, I negotiated social reality as intrinsically constituted by 
intersecting power relations and _genderism_racism_migratism_ableism_classism_ 
which are enacted through hegemonic discourse. The model not only helped me to 
analyze how certain naming practices are discriminatory but also provided me with a 
framework to the question of why the identified power relations have been historically 
persistent in modern-day Sweden and Germany. To determine the conceptualization of 
hegemonic discourse in this study, I based my theoretical and methodological approach 
on feminist, postcolonial and postmigrant knowledge productions that deal with the 
discriminatory effects of hegemonic power relations. These knowledge productions 
allowed me to ask new questions on the powerful effects of a structuralist perception 
and classification of personal names. In this way, I aim to contribute to previous 
research on personal names with a new research perspective. By bringing those different 
theoretical and methodological approaches and their ‘materializations’ together and by 
applying a trans- and postdisciplinary approach that requires the researcher to critically 
258 Original: “Wie soll ich leben? Vielleicht ist das gar nicht die Frage. – Wie soll ich denken?” (Wen-
ders 1987:27:35–27:44 translated by EH).
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question their social positioning and privilege, I could identify diverse hegemonic 
strategies, presuppositions and assumptions that constitute, disseminate, sediment and 
normalize the discriminatory perceptions of personal names in both Swedish and 
German societies: accustoming of hegemonic naming practices, historical 
institutionalization of discriminatory naming practices, the ‘protection’ of the child’s 
well-being as a current institutionalized naming principle in Germany, the interpellation 
of a German and Swedish feel for names and, finally, the indispensable presupposition 
of personal names as a constitutive condition for the recognition of people’s personhood 
in Western societies. As a result, personal names position the person on a structural 
level, although they are hegemonically negotiated as denominating an individual person.
A name can then also be regarded as a marker for social categorization. The 
various everyday contexts in which names play a crucial role (e.g. at registration offices, 
labor market, housing market) show how these marking practices are constantly 
constituted and re_produced. In particular, those cases that aim at prohibiting 
interventions and prioritizing hegemonic names, such as in the context of name change, 
give evidence for the denial to deal with the effects of naming on a structural level.
I introduced accustoming by using an autobiographic life story of my role as the 
researcher of this study. Autobiographic reports may appear as a subjective narrative of 
an individual person who, in this case, explains how they perceived the personal name of 
a migratized sales person. Yet, as I illustrated, it is not. What a person knows about the 
social world and how a person is positioned within it is linked to the interaction with 
societal knowledge – knowledge productions that are shared, authorized, canonized and 
normalized on a broader societal, hegemonic level; knowledge productions a child 
quickly becomes accustomed to while growing up. Thus, I conceptualized accustoming 
as an approach to analyze how naming is institutionalized, what naming practices are 
normalized, why hegemonic naming practices remain discriminatory and how anti-
discriminatory interventions are de_mentioned or made unintelligible.
By linking the conceptualization of accustoming to findings of educational as well as 
cognitive pragmatic science, I aimed to illustrate that this process can be understood as 
a continuous process of human socialization. Commonly and hegemonically shared 
patterns to perceive, understand and explain the world are acquired, accommodated, 
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structuralized and sedimented cognitively by children. Through the categorizations’ 
constant silent confirmation as relevant linguistic activity, children internalize social 
differentiation rather quickly both as linguistic activity and cognitive knowledge 
production, which play a central role in society. Identity construction processes are 
conventionalized and normalized as existing structures and systems. Thus, with a 
quickly established system of perceiving people, hegemonic knowledge productions and 
personal names in a structuralist way, is convenient for children to get accustomed to. 
Children may even develop an emotional attachment to categorical identification and 
learn how to ‘feel’ female or male, German and Swedish, thus re_producing historical 
continuities of nationalist attachment that is constitutive for the conceptualization of 
German and Swedish citizenship.
As shown, hegemonic knowledge productions are grounded and develop in their societal 
and historical contexts. Using the example of the historical institutionalization of 
naming practices through legislation in Germany and Sweden, I illustrated how both 
societies are constituted by discriminatory regulations on citizenship and naming. With 
the institutionalization of citizenship and registration, not only has the nation state’s 
image been established in a way that is described by Claudia Brunner as a state’s self-
assurance (cf. Brunner 2011) that societal norms are ‘true’ and ‘relevant’; the genderist,  
racist, migratist as well as ableist perception of people as Germans and Swedes also 
affected the enacting of naming legislation. The legal definition of German and Swedish 
citizenship constitutes people’s expectations, perceptions and negotiations towards 
personal names and determine which names and citizens are intelligible within 
hegemonic discourse. For example, in this study it remained an open question to what 
extent people not considered part of the Christian and consequently statisized 
community were registered by the Church before the establishment of registry offices in 
Germany and before Sami and Roma (Swedish Roma, Finnish Roma, Travelers) were 
recognized as minorities in Sweden. Also, it is important to note that the conceptual 
exclusion of Jewish-, Polish- and Afro-Germans from the hegemonic conceptualization 
of Germanness and of Sami and Roma-Swedes from the hegemonic conceptualization of 
Swedishness are listed just as examples to show that both countries’ nationality 
conceptualizations are discriminatory. Another much broader study could focus on 
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further oppressed groups, for example disableized groups that have been denied 
citizens’ rights and thus personhood in both countries in a similar way (cf. Boréus 2005; 
Reichsministerium des Inneren, Reichsministerium der Justiz 25/07/1933).
By using both historical and recent legislative as well as literary and autobiographic 
examples on naming, I attempted to illustrate the impact previous exclusionary, 
oppressive legislation has had in German and Swedish hegemonic discourse with the 
effect that discrimination is still found in society despite, in the German case, the 
abolition of discriminatory regulations such as the anti-Semitic Second Decree on the 
Execution of the Law regarding the Changing of Surnames and Forenames. The 
historical process during which hegemonic knowledge productions on names have been 
re_produced, normalized and sedimented in the collective mind of a society is 
understood as a form of accustoming. Legislation on naturalization and citizenship, and 
influential publications such as the International Handbook on Forenames can therefore 
be considered as materializations of this process, which contribute to an understanding 
of names as nationalized, non-/migratized and gendered. In this way, categorical 
knowledge on names that has been passed on over time is hegemonically perceived and 
negotiated as given, finalized and completed, particularly in written and published form 
in Western societies, which has also been identified as a colonialist practice (Lee 2007; 
Hanson [2009]). Quotations from literary productions but also autobiographic life 
stories, media discourse, ad hoc interviews with registrars as well as court decisions 
were analyzed to emphasize that discriminatory name categorization is continuously 
adapted to current hegemonic social norms by being enforced, re_produced, negotiated, 
transformed, disseminated and affirmed in different ways, which are illustrated in the 
following chapter.
As shown by the examples of the normative principle of the child’s well-being and the 
German and Swedish feel for names as an argumentation strategy, the discriminatory 
effects of accustoming become especially evident when counter-activist anti-normative 
and anti-discriminatory naming practices confront the hegemonic order: They are 
perceived as a threat to the norm instead of providing an opportunity to learn about the 
one-sidedness and bias of historically accustomed knowledge.
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With the analysis of court decisions on names, I could demonstrate how the 
argumentation strategy of the child’s well-being contributes to individualized 
structural as well as institutional discrimination. Although the child’s well-being is 
negotiated against the background of the impact of societal norms in the court decisions, 
those norms are not problematized for their discriminatory effects on a structural level.  
Rather, the plaintiffs’ complaints are individualized and negotiated as single cases, 
which also complies with German jurisdiction. For example, in the context of the 
General Equal Treatment Act, people who experience racist discrimination need to 
prove it although their social positioning as e.g. Indianized German already is evidence 
for structural discrimination, but only from a feminist, postcolonial, postmigrant 
perspective. Additionally, German jurisdiction negotiates the discriminated position as 
just as powerful as the privileged position by stating that all people are ‘equal’ before the 
law and need to be treated equally, despite the fact that social positioning has an impact 
on the way people ‘succeed’ in society. How can a migratized person who is refused job 
interviews and who struggles to find housing and sign a rental contract prove that it is 
due to migratist name discrimination? By negotiating categories such as gender, 
migration, race and disability as given facts, legislation fails to focus on the 
discriminatory processes that ascribe people the idea of being female or male, Black, 
PoC or white, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu or Christian, disableized or ableized, precarious or 
elitist. Discrimination is not based on the grounds of a person’s name but on the 
grounds of how people perceive a personal name. Thus, the institutionalization of social 
categorization as a sedimented process of ascribing ‘identity’ to people prevents 
nondiscrimination. Since structural discrimination is not recognized by hegemonic 
discourse but denied, anti-discriminatory voices are either de_mentioned or 
appropriated, for example by implementing anti-discrimination legislation without 
deconstructing the hegemonic norm. The analysis of the Kiran court case confirms this 
strategy. First, Kiran’s parents were denied a German feel for language and, thus, the 
ability to choose a name that is ‘appropriate’ according to the hegemonic principle of  
Geschlechtsoffenkundigkeit. And second, the knowledge of the name’s conventionalized 
use in India was appropriated and adopted to hegemonic conditions in Germany: 
Although in India, Kiran is an acceptable name for people identified as female or male, 
the courts still aimed to neglect the name, insisting on gender-distinctivity. Germany’s 
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Federal Constitutional Court finally concluded the case by stating that the gender-
distinctivity of names is not required when registering a child under German law, but 
only due to a revised interpretation of the registration regulations. That is to say that the 
Constitutional Court did not question cis-binary-genderism or the German feel for 
language in general. By denaming that in hegemonic discourse only privileged are 
assigned the power of definition, oppressed people are deprived of their self-
determination and are subject to the oppressor’s will. Thus, anti-genderist_anti-
racist_anti-migratist activists need to find creative ways for empowerment in order to 
‘escape’259 the enforced cis-binary-gender-system as well as the statisizability of names 
(cf. forms of intervention below). Also, the right to a name is not equally accessible to 
everyone but constrained by institutionalized naming principles and their accustomed 
presuppositions. Furthermore, this decision proves that registrars are in the powerful 
position to decide whether or not they accept a personal name. Although the court 
decision was taken in 2008, the interviews with the registrars showed that the principle 
of gender-distinctivity is still applied in German registry offices without legal basis.
One of the court’s claims that a personal name needs to conform to the German feel for 
language led me to another presupposition that constitutes the discriminatory 
perception of personal names in Sweden and Germany. As with the analysis of the court 
decision, journal articles on language as well as an educational publication on German 
as a Second language suggest that the ‘feel for language’ is negotiated as language 
knowledge that is ‘possessed’ by people who have acquired German or Swedish as the 
first language. Thus, when language and names are connected with the concept of 
nationality and citizenship, this feel for language and names interpellates nationalist 
images of the self and ‘the Other’. As I could illustrate, in a text book for German as a  
Second Language, the feel for language was linked to personal names that are 
hegemonically negotiated as statisizable. Thus, migratized people with migratizable 
names are neglected the chance to identify with the protagonists who are assigned a feel 
for language. The assignment of names is based on the assumption that personal names 
either give or do not give clues about a person’s first language being German or Swedish. 
Despite the recognition that a feel for language can be acquired, and the actual 
259 If that is possible at all.
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possibility that German or Swedish might just well be their first language, the very feel is  
nevertheless initially denied to migratized persons with migratizable names, as the 
Kiran court case proves.
Consequently, implementing hegemonic norms which define who is entitled to a feel for 
the German language is not recognized and problematized in court rooms as 
discriminatory. Instead, the feel for language can become decisive for the intelligibility 
of names. Additionally, the normalization and internalization of the ‘feel for language’ 
conceptualization as a ‘true’ emotion ‘from within’ (cf. Wright 2004) makes it difficult to 
identify the hegemonic discourse as constitutive of this ‘feeling’.
The feel for language also serves as a silencing strategy to a migratist as well as genderist 
perception of names. In order to re_affirm and maintain the hegemonic order, both 
German and Swedish registry offices promote the statisizability of personal names and 
German authorities in particular the genderability of names. However, linguistic 
patterns that may or may not be identified as ‘grammatically German’, such as specific 
phonotactic rules and morphological structures, do not necessarily serve as indicators 
for the statization or migratization of names. Linguistic Othering is constituted by 
conventionalization: Despite the fact that the linguistic framework of both the German 
and Swedish language is flexible enough to incorporate previously ‘non-German’ or 
‘non-Swedish’ names, the names of migratized groups of people who have lived in the 
respective language communities for centuries are excluded from the ‘nationalization’ of 
names, despite their grammatical compliance. Thus, I suggest negotiating the feel for 
languages and names as an accustomed ‘emotion’ that is constituted by hegemonic 
perception of people as non-/migratized as well as by the nationalized 
‘grammaticalization’ of a language use and naming practices.
The final naming assumption that is hegemonically presupposed in hegemonic 
discourse is the indispensability of personal names for the recognition of 
personhood. That every person has a name is a crucial assumption in Western 
societies. It was taken as a starting point in the last chapter to discuss the relevance for a 
person to actually have a personal name that defines a person’s personhood. Using the 
example of biological and social birth, I illustrated situations where a name defines 
personhood and provides the person with access to societal privileges, such as 
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citizenship. Privilege such as access to citizenship gained through naming in the context 
of social birth, however, does not necessarily mean privilege only. Trans and gender 
non-conform people are simultaneously discriminated against and made unintelligible, 
since citizenship is only thinkable against the background of the binary-gender norm (cf. 
Fütty 2015). The last name has traditionally symbolized submission under a male-
dominated household for womanisized people who have been made unintelligible as 
inheritrix of a family (name). Furthermore, defaultism prioritizes names that are 
conventionalized as German and Swedish, thus interpellating the image of a default 
German and Swedish citizen. In this context, German and Swedish citizenship does not 
prevent racialized, migratized and disableized people from being discriminated against 
and negotiated as non-German and as a non-adult. Thus, different strategies of self-
empowerment might be employed in order to intervene in discriminatory naming 
practices, such as using a self- or community-chosen name openly or secretly. Here, the 
motivation for name change can serve as an indicator for the social position of the name 
changing person. People who change their names just to appear more unique might do 
so from a rather privileged position, whereas for deprivileged people, name change often 
symbolized survival and empowerment (cf. below). Thus, the changing of names 
appears to be a strategic political act with the potential for intervention and 
empowerment, depending on from which position and with what effects the change is 
performed.
In contrast, the hegemonic denial of personhood positions people as discriminated 
when the re_traumatization of historical symbolic names is silenced, when deprivileged 
people are forced to change their names for reasons of Othering, of assimilation and of  
indication of ownership, and when deprivileged people’s names are withdrawn in order 
to enable objectification and murder. Consequently, these hegemonic discriminatory 
practices provide a framework in which counter-activist inventions are made necessary 
for survival and empowerment and in which privileged people are required to question 
their accustomed ways to perceive and negotiate personal names and naming traditions 
(cf. below).
Comparing German and Swedish discourses showed the different motivations 
and attitudes towards discriminated minorities that constituted the historical context 
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when the first nation-wide laws on name change were introduced. In Germany, the 
NamÄndG has an anti-Semitic background since it was basically meant to prevent Jews 
from changing their names. The first Swedish name law, however, was intended to 
motivate people living in Sweden, and specifically minorities such as Sami, Finnish and 
Swedish Roma people with supposedly non-Swedish names and naming traditions, to 
assimilate to the grammatical Swedish naming norms in order to make everyone more 
equal. However, the conceptualization of equality in this context gives proof of a form of 
nationalist oppression that is implied in concepts such as ‘assimilation to’ and 
‘integration in’ a hegemonic norm which prevent plurality and diversity. These different 
historical contexts might also be reason why different strategies of dealing with counter-
activist interventions could be identified in both societies. German legislation and 
jurisdiction on personal names focus more on the conservation of well-established 
norms by taking ‘the public interest’ (read: hegemonic discourse) into account and 
making the changing of names an endeavor that exposes deprivileged people to more 
discrimination, whereas in Sweden, legislation and jurisdiction tend to include the 
perspective of minorities with regard to the changing of names. The German state 
authorities appear to adopt a more controlling role whereas, particularly since 2009, 
Swedish jurisdiction assigns more responsibility to its citizens. For example, a person 
who intends to change their name officially into a gender-contrarian name may do so; 
the same applies to parents who choose a gender-contrarian name for their newborn 
child. However, there are some tendencies that point to a more liberal interpretation of 
German naming legislation, which enables name change without pathologization (cf. 
Abad 2015).
7.2 Empowering Interventions in Discriminatory Naming  
Practices
The following name changing strategies can be empowering depending on the legal 
context and the social positioning of the person who changes their name. Empowerment 
is, according to Collins’ account (Collins 2000), a counter-activist intervention 
performed from a discriminated position. In this study, the following empowering 
strategies in the context of naming could be identified:
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7.2.1 Resignification of names
Following Hornscheidt (2008a), I transfer the conceptualization of strategic 
resignification to the context of naming. In their model of strategic resignification, 
Hornscheidt negotiates personal appellation (cf. chapter 1.1.2) as an activity that has the 
potential to change the context in which the activity is performed. Strategic  
resignifications are conducted from a counter-activist position and strategically 
interrupt conventionalized hegemonic naming practices by using them in a new 
empowering context with new connotations and meanings (cf. Hornscheidt 2008a:284–
285). Thus, in the context of naming, the resignification of personal names can be 
negotiated as the attempt to provide names that hegemonically symbolize privilege with 
a new, counter-activist interpellation that does not necessarily need to or is not 
supposed to be made known to hegemonic discourse. In comparison to the strategic 
resignification of pejorative collective interpellation forms which interpellate images of 
disableized people, Black people and trans*people in a discriminatory way, the 
resignification of personal names might appear less strategic because of a personal 
name’s function to signify one individual person only. However, since personal names 
are simultaneously perceived in categorical ways which assign people membership to 
certain groups, the resignification of names can, nevertheless, also be regarded as 
strategic for counter-activism.
Despite the hegemonic assimilation constraints, migratized and racialized people who 
adopt a statisizable name can be regarded as a form of strategic resignification. By 
assuming a name that is hegemonically perceived as Swedish, the fact that a person who 
is hegemonically negotiated as migratized_racialized bears a statisizable name can 
encourage to challenge hegemonic default perceptions of supposedly Swedish names. 
This could transform them into conceptualizations that migratizable people are, indeed, 
Swedish and grant them better chances on the labor market. For example, the Swedish 
newspaper Dagens Nyheter reports that soon after Manne Didehvar changed their first 
name, he was offered an attractive, well-paid position (Lerner 2011). Similarly, women-
identified writers had to take on a name that hegemonically was negotiated as ‘male’ in 
order to make a living in an otherwise male-identified profession.
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Another empowering example that resignifies the conventional perception of personal 
names as gendered according to the binary-gender norm is the negotiation of one’s 
personal name in a gender-free, gender-neutral way, e.g. by creating a new name (cf. 
examples in kollektief umkrempeln (hg.) 2016:59–61) and by resignifying so-called 
unisex as well as supposedly gender-distinct names (cf. Spoon, Coyote 2015:155) – 
although the latter might not work as a counter-activist strategy against the background 
of the impact of conventionalized and accustomed perceptions of names.
7.2.2 Reclaiming of names
Reclaiming is understood as a specific form of resignification that attempts to transform 
the discriminatory association of a denomination of a person with a group of people into 
a symbol for self-determination, empowerment and community building (cf. Butler 
1997; Hornscheidt, Nduka-Agwu 2010:40–42).
In the context of personal names, the reassumption of a disavowed and withdrawn 
family name that was taken away as a consequence of colonial racism can be negotiated 
as a form of reclaiming. One example is the adoption of the name of a family member in  
a self-empowering way in order to establish a visible connection to the Black family’s 
ancestry and to the Black community in general. Both Ayim (MacCarroll 2005) and 
Hügel-Marshall (Hügel-Marshall 2001) assumed their Black fathers’ last names in order 
to commemorate them. The assumption of the capital letter X by Malcom X as a last 
name also reclaims the space and presence of African names of Black people’s ancestors 
that are lost (Benson 2006). Exchanging the name by which they was generally called 
by, a name that has been typically interpellated as Jewish and that invoked the risk of 
exposing the name bearer to anti-Semitic discrimination, was a way for Klüger to cope 
with anti-Semitism in an empowering self-reclaiming way, and even more so in light of  
the anti-Semitic naming law that was introduced a few years after she had made the 
decision (Klüger 2013).
7.2.3 Re-naming & name change
The creation of a new name which signifies a new meaning is another way to counter-act 
discrimination. In this case, both the name and the association with the name are 
introduced as symbols demonstrating a self-chosen social birth. Both Sojourner Truth 
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(Collins 1998) and Muhammed Ali (Benson 2006:195) left their enforced slave names 
behind in order to initiate and introduce their post-slavery identities by ways of new 
religious names. Also, the protagonist in Robinet’s monologue play empowered himself 
from genderist discrimination by celebrating the day of his name change as his new 
birthday (Robinet 2015:88–90). Similarly, in a creative text by a trans*_genderqueer 
person, the birthday of the name symbolizes the day of death for the old initial name 
(AK ProNa 2015). Activist and author Dykewomon introduced her new last name to 
mark that her authorship addresses lesbians, womyn and dykewomyn (cf. Dykewomon 
1991) in order to encourage community-building among lesbians by providing space for 
the identification of specific needs and opportunities.
With the new name law in Sweden, all these forms of empowering name change should 
be legally accepted as long as the person is a Swedish citizen, a stateless person or 
recognized refugee living in Sweden. In Germany, however, name change is, as 
discussed in this study, nearly impossible. Nevertheless, there are some current and 
possible future ways that might enable people to change their names depending
• on the legal recognition of unequal access to gender-neutral names and of the 
need to adapt to current societal ‘change’ in terms of gender identification 
(NamÄndG, for a detailed description of the process cf. Abad 2015);
• on the legal recognition of a necessary proof that the use of the artist’s or religious 
name has already been conventionalized (cf. PauswG, Deutscher Bundestag 
24/06/2009: article 9);
• on people’s medical classification as transsexuals (TSG, Deutscher Bundestag 
23/07/2009: article 1, paragraph 1, points 1 and 2; article 4, paragraph 3);
• on people’s legal classification as ius sanguinis ‘post-war repatriates’ in the 
context of naturalization (BGBEG, Deutscher Bundestag: article 47; BGB, 
Deutscher Bundestag 31/05/2016: article 12).
318
Summary: Deconstructivist Strategies to Negotiate Naming Processes: Interventions and  
Recommendations
7.3 Recommendations for the Deconstruction of Accustomed  
Naming Practices
Through my study, I could identify different examples of structural discrimination in the 
context of naming. Changing historically accustomed, discriminatory structures is a 
necessary but plodding, if not utopian endeavor (cf. Sammla 2011). This is also due to 
the fact that hegemonic discourse is more persistent, in comparison to counter-activist 
discourse which relies on the resources of community members and their capacity to 
actively advocate counter-activism and empowerment, usually in addition to their daily 
occupations and obligations. Lorde demonstrates how ageism against older community 
members prohibits younger ones “to join hands and examine the living memories of the 
community” with repressive societies (Lorde 2007:117) and to persistently acquire and 
pass on counter-activist knowledge. Thus, how can counter-activist interventions be 
perpetuated and supported, also by privileged people who actually have the resources to 
be an active ally?
By building on a Four Pillars Model developed by the counter-activist Miami Workers 
Center, Spade regards it as indispensable for interventions to address the most 
vulnerable people in a society while focussing “on developing and mobilizing a base to 
create transformative change” (Spade 2011:184). This seems only possible when people 
actively and continuously understand and challenge the accustomed discriminatory 
ways of how both privileged and discriminated people are negotiated and perceived in 
hegemonic discourse (cf. Hayn 2015). As shown in this study, the accustomed 
discriminatory perception and negotiation of personal names is one central strategy that 
is decisive for people’s development options in a society.
Consequently, in order to become an accountable ally, I as a privileged person am 
required to contest my accustomed knowledge on names. Understanding accustoming 
as a sedimented process of hegemonic knowledge production that ‘makes’ individuals 
perceive and negotiate people in discriminatory ways, also unconsciously, might be a 
helpful way for privileged people to position themselves as privileged. In this way, they 
might recognize that they are in the powerful position to decide to which extent they 
want to deconstruct internalized gender expectations and images of ‘German-’ and 
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‘Swedishness’. Thus, I suggest the following, non-exhaustive self-critical strategies for 
the deconstruction of accustomed naming practices:
7.3.1 Recognizing differences, identifying and naming privilege
The circumstances and presuppositions of privilege and discrimination in the context of 
naming can only be understood and recognized when the historically grown 
differentiation of people who constitute naming laws is identified as an effect of 
structural power relations and when privileging naming practices are identified and 
named.
For example, as a cis-person, one can inquire about the circumstances that enable cis-
people to meet the hegemonic gender expectations that are interpellated by their names 
and which constitute the practice of gender-distinction in German registry offices. Why 
is it that only two genders are intelligible? Why do people need to be gendered at all?
Another case to be skeptical about is forbidden names: Why were such names as Judas 
forbidden and why are names that can cause trauma for structurally discriminated 
people allowed? In this context, privileged people need to be aware that just because 
they do not share the experience of retraumatization through symbolic names (which is 
a privilege) does not mean that retraumatization does not exist.
With regard to the restrictions applied to changing one’s name under German law, one 
can be skeptical about the few possible name changes that are intelligible by law, such as 
hetero- and reprogenderist name change in the context of marriage and the assimilation 
of names during naturalization: Who benefits from these opportunities? Who is enabled 
to change their name due to assimilation constraints and who is denied the same option 
in a contradictory way with regard to the hegemonic principle to ‘integrate’ migratized 
people into hegemonic society?
Another example that raises skepticism is when people who are actively involved in 
politics are addressed differently. What effect does it create when some people are 
addressed by their full name and others by their first name, professionalization or 
infantilization? The same applies to people who are depicted on charity posters. Who is 
portrayed with their personal name and who is not? What effects does this unequal 
presentation of people create? And how are these and all other examples related to 
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structural privilege? As a solution, one’s accustomed perception of anonymous 
victimized People of Color can be decolonized and exchanged by an image that 
conceptualizes them as people who have a full name and professional expertise.
7.3.2 Getting involved with historical continuities of structural 
discrimination in a society
A successful way to get white people involved in the critical reflection of white privilege 
as an effect of racism is, according to Habel, to illustrate how a society has been 
historically and currently participating in colonialism and the re_production of racist 
discourse (Habel 2011:117). A way to identify historical continuities of colonialist racism 
is to question the naming of streets after historical persons. Who is commemorated and 
honored with a street and for what reason)? Also, what name do I use when I talk about 
a historical person whose name was violently withdrawn, for example in the context of 
slavery? Do I use the initial or the self-chosen one or the one that person was violently  
enforced to bear (Benson 2006)?
Furthermore, when people change their names, the effects of this change need to be 
analyzed against the background of societal norms which had been institutionalized as 
valid at the time of the change. What can look like the re_production of hetero- and 
repronormative naming practices could also have been a way of survival for racialized 
people to pass as German or Swedish. What can look like abandoning a supposedly 
unwanted identity after having immigrated to the USA in the late 1800s and early 1900s 
can be a necessary survival strategy against anti-Semitic oppression. Someone who can 
look like a person with an unusual German name might have been ‘advised’ during 
naturalization to exchange their migratizable name for a supposedly German equivalent 
(e.g. Eugen, Waldemar and Elsa).
Contrary to hegemonic belief, legislation does not prevent discrimination but 
perpetuates it. Comparing the anti-Semitic historical context and motivation to 
introduce NamÄndG with current court argumentation strategies which claim that “it is 
not the role of the naming laws to counter-act societal aberration”260 begs the question of 
whether it was not the introduction of NamÄndG that was a societal aberration to begin 
260 Original: “Es ist nicht Aufgabe des Namensrechts, einer gesellschaftlichen Fehlentwicklung entge-
genzusteuern“ (Verwaltungsgericht Göttingen, Urteil of 25/04/2012, translated by EH).
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with. With regard to the changes in the Swedish naming law (and perhaps also in 
German naming jurisdiction), although counter-activist naming practices are recognized 
in the legislation, discrimination is still re_produced. For example, an ‘equalization’ of 
hegemonic and counter-activist naming practices does in fact prioritize hegemonic 
naming practices since they, as the accustomed norm, are not challenged and counter-
activist naming practices will still be negotiated as non-normative in hegemonic 
discourse that should accomplish with the hegemonic norm. Consequently, people who 
conduct other counter-activist naming practices which are not (yet) recognized in 
legislation will still face discrimination. This is also why, for example, Spade urges that 
interventions should address the most vulnerable people in a society (cf. above).
And finally, historical naming traditions in one’s own family should also be questioned. 
What traditions are re_produced and maintained? What names are chosen and what 
names are actively neglected, and why?
7.3.3 Learning from anti-discriminatory interventions and 
empowerment
Booklets like “Mein Name, mein Pronomen” specifically address privileged cis-people 
and invite them to make use of the knowledge that is generated from discriminatory 
experiences. By choosing name change as a central issue, the working group behind the 
project offers and shares information, creative texts and life stories on how to address 
trans*_genderqueer people in a nondiscriminatory way. For example, the booklet 
provides exercises on how to get accustomed to a friend’s new name and pronoun and 
makes suggestions on how to deal with cis-privileged insecurities, such as using the 
current name when talking about events that happened before a trans*_genderqueer 
person’s name change and asking whether it is ok to pass on the current name to other 
people in order to avoid unwanted outing (AK ProNa 2015:53; 56).
Also, by positioning themselves as privileged in the context of racism and ableism, the 
working group makes people aware that they “do speak as trans*persons but not for  
other trans*persons”261. Consequently, not all trans*people might agree with the 
suggestions in the booklet. Tudor also suggests using the prefix contra_ when fighting 
261 Original: “[…] sprechen als Trans*Personen, aber nicht für andere Trans*Personen” (AK ProNa 
2015:6 italics by ProNa, translated by EH).
322
Summary: Deconstructivist Strategies to Negotiate Naming Processes: Interventions and  
Recommendations
against discrimination from a privileged position, since people need to be aware that 
they might be against discrimination but not necessarily always act against 
discrimination (cf. Tudor 2014).
Another chance to learn from anti-discriminatory interventions and empowerment is 
reading and listening to people’s personal life stories. However, sharing personal 
experiences with discrimination is not an invitation to ask about people’s initial or 
community names.
7.3.4 Being accountable for one’s own decisions
Discriminatory naming practices consist of the denaming of hegemonic naming 
normalizations, such as the default perception of people with German-identified names 
a s white, statisized, ableized, cis-binary-genderable. A way of deconstructing this 
accustomed norm is to reflect on the powerful position of privileged people in terms of 
decision-making. For example, the fight against discrimination is more of an option 
than a form of survival for privileged people (cf. chapter 1.3.2). Thus, they cannot lose 
privilege when deciding whether or not they want to change the accustomed default 
perceptions of people and personal names in general by conceptualizing them as 
gender-free, and as names of disableized people and of migratizable names in particular 
by conceptualizing them as German and Swedish names. Consequently, an ally should 
try to be accountable for their decisions. This includes reflecting on questions that 
privileged people might not be required to deal with on the grounds of their 
accomplishment with the hegemonic norm. Why have I kept my initial name? Why do I 
want to give my newborn child a conventionally gender-distinct name? Why do I 
memorize some names more easily and how is this ‘ability’ constituted by accustomed 
discriminatory naming practices? What efforts do I make in memorizing names? Under 
Swedish law, what naming traditions do I follow when I exchange my name for one that 
has a symbolic meaning for my family? What effects do I, also unintentionally, create 
when I change my name because I am tired of my initial one and want to take on 
something unique?
Another way of acting in an accountable manner is to abandon naming practices which, 
for marketing reasons, appropriate a position that a privileged person cannot speak 
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from.262 In this context, it remains an open question whether privileged people’s 
appropriation of names which are symbolic for a minority community is discriminatory 
in general. For example, Sarah Kirsch is the pseudonym of a gentile author who changed 
her name after World War II into a name that was introduced by the National Socialist 
regime to mark and exterminate Jews. Can the name change motivated by showing 
solidarity with Jews be negotiated as a way to intervene in anti-Semitic naming practices 
and to make presumably Jewish names intelligible as German names? Does the same 
apply to privileged people’s assumption of first names which are negotiated as 
migratizable, such as Kiran and Ayşe? Are these naming practices appropriate ways to 
challenge hegemonic naming perceptions and to disrupt hegemonic default 
categorizations of people as statisized?
7.4 Questions for Further Research and Final Conclusion
In this study, I approached the initial research question of when, how and why everyday 
perceptions and negotiations of personal names are discriminatory from different 
angles. Looking back, I am very grateful to the many people who showed their interest in 
my research and who contributed to the differentiation of the research question, the 
implementation of my transdisciplinary approach, and the extension and rejection of 
boundaries that define primary and secondary literature, material, ‘academic’ and 
feminist, postcolonial and postmigrant knowledge productions.
However, as a consequence of this research, new question arose which, in the end, could 
only be touched upon briefly, partly due to my lack of knowledge and partly because 
they opened up a new field for investigation. As they may inspire further research, I list  
them here:
• The relevance of addressing people by their names has been discussed in chapter 
6. Conducting further interviews and employing the qualitative research method 
of focus group discussions with people who experience forced name change, 
name silencing and anonymization would have enriched my reflection on how 
people experience personhood by being addressed with or without a name, and 
262 Cf. case of Claus Heck described in footnote 227 in chapter 6.2.2.2.
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would have provided further examples that show where the deconstruction of 
privilege is necessary.
• In this study, I concentrated more on the relationship between naming and 
_racism_genderism_migratism_ than on the relationship between naming and 
ableism. For example, the impact of ableism on the conceptualization of a feel for 
language could have been discussed more. This is not because there is less 
available research but instead due to my limited knowledge of carrying out 
research in the field. Also, more research and knowledge productions could have 
been included that illustrate how Afro-Germans, Roma people and Sorbs as well 
as disableized people have been historically discriminated against by nationalized 
legislation and how they have been conceptualized in the context of German 
citizenship and nationality. In this way, the historical continuities of 
discrimination against people that have not been conceptualized as the default 
white, non-migratized, cis-binary-gendered, male, ableized German could have 
been sketched more comprehensively.
• The question of the relationship between a feel for language and the relevance of 
emotions in language use might lead to an interesting investigation of the impact 
the emotionalization of language use has on the authenticity, nativeness and 
natural authorization of the language users. However, it needs to be questioned to 
what extent a feel for language is actually comparable to, for example, Ahmed’s 
concept of a politics of emotions (Ahmed 2004a). Does a feel for language 
interpellate the same conceptualizations as emotions which are addressed by 
nationalist propaganda? To what extent and how are both conceptualizations 
comparable to each other?
On a methodological level, I also met my limits carrying out trans- and postdisciplinary 
research. I summarize some of them in the form of open questions which remain to be  
answered:
• How can knowledge on naming produced within the different research fields 
(disciplinary, inter-, trans- and postdisciplinary) be acknowledged in an 
accountable way? For example, concepts such as ‘equality’ that are broadly 
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negotiated in feminist, postcolonial, postmigrant and disability studies have only 
been touched upon in the context of naming but may require a broader 
discussion.
• Specifically with regard to developing a methodology to transgress disciplinary 
boundaries: How can one’s accustomed ways of perceiving and authorizing 
knowledge as academically ‘valid’ be constantly challenged in a productive way 
that encourages to question and challenge academically and educationally 
canonized knowledge productions? This also concerns the choices one makes as a 
researcher which are determined by accustomed research conventions, by 
hegemonic disciplinary conventions, and by coincidence, for example, when 
accidentally coming across a naming example in a novel. The latter might be 
questionable for conventionalized research norms that regard the traceability of 
the corpus’ composition as a necessary way to make the analysis repeatable for 
anyone, regardless of social and theoretical positioning.
• To what extent does trans- and postdisciplinary research meet hegemonic 
expectations of academic knowledge production that is defined by disciplines? I 
illustrate this question by help of an example. It is difficult to draw the traditional 
distinction between primary sources I used to conduct my research and the 
secondary sources I used to ground my theory, methodology and approach to 
research. They both support the conclusions of my analysis and contribute as 
material and corpus to the analysis of hegemonic discourses at the same time. 
For example, traditional linguistic research helped me to take into account the 
linguistic categories that are used in order to describe what a feel for language 
can entail. Research on traditional onomastics was crucial to identify the 
different areas in which naming decisions are made and on which grounds 
knowledge productions naming decisions are authorized. Simultaneously, I used 
these knowledge productions as examples for the historical continuity of 
accustomed knowledge traditions that presuppose the idea and the implicit 
necessity to classify languages and names as nationalized and cis-binary-
gendered. Thus, against what definition of academic discourse can trans- and 
postdisciplinary research still be considered academic, especially against the 
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background of methodological constraints by traditional academic research (cf. 
chapter 1.2).
• How can counter-activist interventions, experiences and life stories that do not 
follow conventionalized academic ways of producing knowledge be more 
acknowledged by hegemonic academic research, also on a methodological level? 
Or would this make them unrecognizable as counter-activist knowledge 
production?263
With regard to societal change, counter-activist interventions in conventionalized and 
accustomed naming practices have been met with confusion and rejection in German 
and Swedish registration offices and courts. In this study, these reactions are identified 
as accustomed default ways of categorizing people and as an acquired feel for language 
that is interpellated as soon as hegemonic grammatical structures are breached.
However, these counter-activist interventions and utopian ideas did, nevertheless, 
initiate societal change. Until recently, German administrative regulations and court 
decisions have stipulated that a name needs to binary-genderable. However, this 
historically conveyed norm is about to be changed, thanks to the interventions of two 
gender non-form people (Abad 2015). The successful counter-activist interventions in 
institutionalized naming practices in Sweden also have the potential to inspire societal 
change in Germany. In Sweden, individual persons have had the right to decide the 
extent to which the self-chosen name is appropriate in terms of genderization since 
2009. The same applies for parents and the name they assign to their child. Thus, a 
name that is hegemonically read as gender-contrarian to a person’s juridical gender is 
acceptable.
With regard to the possibilities for societal change, Ja’n Sammla identifies interventions 
as a fight against external powers and against oppression, whereas the sharing of 
Utopian ideas about a reality that does not yet exist and by definition might never exist, 
is a fight for empowerment within a community and for a non-oppressive society (cf. 
Sammla 2011). While conducting this study, I was encouraged to challenge my own 
accustomed ways of negotiating, perceiving and memorizing names in order to carry out 
263 Cf. Otoo in Kabisch 2014 for consequences of knowledge appropriation.
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research in an accountable way. Whether I have succeeded must be evaluated by others. 
However, these challenges have confirmed not only Layne’s initial quotation that 
naming is indeed a political act264 but has also made me aware that change is only 
possible when privileged people learn to recognize their privileges and continue working 
to change their ways of categorizing people in general and perceiving and negotiating 
personal names in particular, when approaching counter-activist utopian ideas. 
Consequently, I conclude this study with the following quotation from the film “Wings 
of Desire”:
“How should I live? Perhaps this is not even the question. – 
How should I think?”265
264 Choosing, giving, and using a name are political acts […].” (Layne 2006:32)
265 Original: “Wie soll ich leben? Vielleicht ist das gar nicht die Frage. – Wie soll ich denken?” (Wen-
ders 1987:27:35–27:44, translated by EH).
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Based on a social constructivist, pragmatic cognitive understanding of naming, the study investigates 
the discriminatory hegemonic presuppositions and perceptions that are interpellated with personal 
names in Germany and Sweden. The critical lens of Black Feminist, Postcolonial, Postmigrant, Critical 
Trans and Disability Studies is applied in order to deconstruct current and past hegemonic naming 
norms. By regarding the un/intelligibility of names as constituted by intersecting power relations, 
racism_genderism_ableism_migratism_classism, the dispositive model helps to identify what personal 
names and naming practices are made un/thinkable.
Accustoming is introduced as an analytic tool to understand how hegemonic knowledge on naming is 
acquired and internalized in a structuralist and essentializing way. The analysis of administrative and 
legislative discourses demonstrates how hegemonic naming norms have been historically and 
institutionally accustomed. That a personal name is not only determined by institutional but also by 
individual decision-making is illustrated on the example of the child’s well-being, a commonly used 
argument for name decisions at registry offices. The feel for language as another norm to justify name 
discrimination is analyzed against the background of how sprachgefühl as an emotive concept 
interpellates nationalist images of the self and the Other. The final chapter addresses the consequences 
of discriminatory naming practices: the definition and denial of personhood. The study concludes with a 
collection of empowering interventions in discriminatory naming practices and recommendations for a 
contra_discriminatory anti-structuralist perception of personal names.
By employing a transdisciplinary approach, the study illustrates how disciplinary boundaries are 
transgressed and how different discourse areas and material that traditionally are investigated in law, 
history, linguistics and literature is integrated in Gender Studies research.
